• Can a better informed listener be easier to persuade? 

      Bizzotto, Jacopo; Vigier, Adrien (Economic Theory;, Journal article; Peer reviewed, 2020-10-22)
      We study the impact of exogenous news on the classic Bayesian persuasion problem. The sender supplies information over multiple periods, but is unable to commit at the onset to the information that she will supply in periods ...
    • The certifier for the long run 

      Bizzotto, Jacopo; Harstad, Bård (Peer reviewed; Journal article, 2023)
      We build a workhorse model to study the optimal and the equilibrium certifier from a long-run perspective. Firms enter the market, and invest in their capacity to provide qual- ity, before the certification threshold is ...
    • Electoral competition with strategic disclosure 

      Bizzotto, Jacopo; Solow, Benjamin (Games;Volume 10, Issue 3, Journal article; Peer reviewed, 2019-06-28)
      Recent developments in information and communication technologies allow candidates for office to engage in sophisticated messaging strategies to influence voter choice. We consider how access to different technologies influence ...
    • Fees, Reputation and Information Production in the Credit Rating Industry 

      Bizzotto, Jacopo; Vigier, Adrien Henri (American Economic Journal: Microeconomics;, Journal article; Peer reviewed, 2021)
      We compare a credit rating agency’s incentives to acquire costly information when it is only paid for giving favorable ratings to the corresponding incentives when the agency is paid upfront, i.e. irrespective of the ...
    • Testing, Disclosure and Approval 

      Bizzotto, Jacopo; Vigier, Adrien Henri; Rudiger, Jesper (Journal of Economic Theory;Volume 187, May 2020, Journal article; Peer reviewed, 2020-02-06)
      Certifiers often base their decisions on a mixture of information, some of which is voluntarily disclosed by applicants, and some of which they acquire by way of tests or otherwise. We study the interplay between the ...