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dc.contributor.authorClark, Derek John
dc.contributor.authorKundu, Tapas
dc.date.accessioned2021-06-21T12:32:32Z
dc.date.available2021-06-21T12:32:32Z
dc.date.created2021-03-02T15:06:41Z
dc.date.issued2021-02-14
dc.identifier.citationJournal of Economic Behavior and Organization. 2021, 184, (178-198).en_US
dc.identifier.issn0167-2681
dc.identifier.urihttps://hdl.handle.net/11250/2760436
dc.description.abstractWe study a design problem for an effort-maximizing principal in a two-player contest with two dimensions of asymmetry. Players have different skill levels and an information gap exists, as only one player knows the skill difference. The principal has two policy instru- ments to redress the lack of competitive balance due to asymmetry; she can commit to an information-disclosing mechanism, and she can discriminate one of the players by biasing his effort. We characterize the optimal level of discrimination to maximize aggregate effort, showing how this inextricably determines the choice of information disclosure. Applica- tions are found in newcomer-incumbent situations in an internal labor market, sales-force management, and research contests.en_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisherElseveiren_US
dc.relation.ispartofseriesJournal of Economic Behavior and Organization;volume 184
dc.relation.urihttps://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S016726812100055X?via%3Dihub
dc.rightsNavngivelse 4.0 Internasjonal*
dc.rights.urihttp://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/deed.no*
dc.subjectAsymmetric contesten_US
dc.subjectInformation designsen_US
dc.subjectDiscriminationsen_US
dc.titleCompetitive balance: Information disclosure and discrimination in an asymmetric contesten_US
dc.typePeer revieweden_US
dc.typeJournal articleen_US
dc.description.versionpublishedVersionen_US
dc.rights.holder© 2021 The Author(s).en_US
cristin.ispublishedtrue
cristin.fulltextoriginal
cristin.qualitycode2
dc.identifier.doihttps://doi.org/10.1016/j.jebo.2021.01.034
dc.identifier.cristin1894944
dc.source.journalJournal of Economic Behavior and Organizationen_US
dc.source.volume184en_US
dc.source.pagenumber178-198en_US


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Navngivelse 4.0 Internasjonal
Except where otherwise noted, this item's license is described as Navngivelse 4.0 Internasjonal