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Can a better informed listener be easier to persuade?

dc.contributor.authorBizzotto, Jacopo
dc.contributor.authorVigier, Adrien
dc.date.accessioned2021-02-01T11:59:22Z
dc.date.accessioned2021-03-09T17:16:21Z
dc.date.available2021-02-01T11:59:22Z
dc.date.available2021-03-09T17:16:21Z
dc.date.issued2020-10-22
dc.identifier.citationBizzotto, Vigier. Can a better informed listener be easier to persuade?. Economic Theory. 2020en
dc.identifier.issn0938-2259
dc.identifier.issn1432-0479
dc.identifier.urihttps://hdl.handle.net/10642/9954
dc.description.abstractWe study the impact of exogenous news on the classic Bayesian persuasion problem. The sender supplies information over multiple periods, but is unable to commit at the onset to the information that she will supply in periods ahead. A tension then emerges between the sender and her future self. We show that by resolving this tension, more informative news can make the sender better off.en
dc.description.sponsorshipOpen access funding provided by OsloMet - Oslo Metropolitan University.en
dc.language.isoenen
dc.publisherSpringeren
dc.relation.ispartofseriesEconomic Theory;
dc.rightsCreative Commons Attribution 4.0 International (CC BY 4.0) Licenseen
dc.rights.urihttps://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/
dc.subjectBayesian persuasionen
dc.subjectDynamic gamesen
dc.subjectInformation provisionen
dc.titleCan a better informed listener be easier to persuade?en
dc.typeJournal articleen
dc.typePeer revieweden
dc.date.updated2021-02-01T11:59:22Z
dc.description.versionpublishedVersionen
dc.identifier.doihttps://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-020-01321-w
dc.identifier.cristin1845582
dc.source.journalEconomic Theory


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