• Competitive balance: Information disclosure and discrimination in an asymmetric contest 

      Clark, Derek John; Kundu, Tapas (Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization;volume 184, Peer reviewed; Journal article, 2021-02-14)
      We study a design problem for an effort-maximizing principal in a two-player contest with two dimensions of asymmetry. Players have different skill levels and an information gap exists, as only one player knows the skill ...
    • Delegating Pollution Permits 

      Kundu, Tapas; Nilssen, Tore (The Scandinavian Journal of Economics;Volume 124, Issue 2, Peer reviewed; Journal article, 2021-12-02)
      We discuss the decision to delegate the regulation of pollution through sales of permits to a biased expert in a situation where the polluting firm has private information about its technology. We consider, in particular, ...
    • Delegation of Regulation 

      Nilssen, Tore; Kundu, Tapas (Working Paper;, Working paper, 2017)
    • Delegation of Regulation 

      Kundu, Tapas; Nilssen, Tore (The Journal of Industrial Economics;Volume 68, Issue 3, September 2020, Journal article; Peer reviewed, 2020-11-12)
      We discuss a government’s incentives to delegate regulation to bureaucrats. The government faces a trade-off in its delegation decision: bureaucrats have knowledge of the firms in the industry that the government does ...
    • Integration and Competition for Innovations in Science-Based Industries 

      Kundu, Tapas; Moon, Seongwuk (Working Paper;6/2017, Working paper, 2017)
    • On rational forward-looking behavior in economic geography: An experimental analysis 

      Barreda-Tarrazona, Iván; Kundu, Tapas; Østbye, Stein (Regional Science and Urban Economics;volume 87, Peer reviewed; Journal article, 2021-02-05)
      This paper adapts the canonical New Economic Geography model for experimental testing of the model's behavioral assumptions by developing a finite-player, finite-horizon dynamic game of migration. Our analysis gives ...
    • Partial information disclosure in a contest 

      Clark, Derek John; Kundu, Tapas (Economics Letters;Volume 204, July 2021, 109915, Peer reviewed; Journal article, 2021-05-18)
      Zhang and Zhou (2016) use the concept of Bayesian persuasion due to Kamenica and Gentzkow (2011) to analyze information disclosure in a contest with one-sided asymmetric information. They show that an effort-maximizing ...