On rational forward-looking behavior in economic geography: An experimental analysis
Peer reviewed, Journal article
Published version
Permanent lenke
https://hdl.handle.net/11250/2760378Utgivelsesdato
2021-02-05Metadata
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Originalversjon
Regional Science and Urban Economics. 2021, 87, (1-15). https://doi.org/10.1016/j.regsciurbeco.2021.103654Sammendrag
This paper adapts the canonical New Economic Geography model for experimental testing of the model's behavioral assumptions by developing a finite-player, finite-horizon dynamic game of migration. Our analysis gives distinctive predictions when migration is consistent with myopic behavior (MB) and when it is consistent with sequentially rational or perfect forward-looking behavior (FB). These alternatives are tested in an economic laboratory experiment with increasing number of agents in different treatments. Results show that perfect FB loses ground against MB as the number of agents and periods increases, and this number may be surprisingly small.