dc.contributor.author | Kundu, Tapas | |
dc.contributor.author | Nilssen, Tore | |
dc.date.accessioned | 2020-11-18T14:08:56Z | |
dc.date.accessioned | 2021-02-15T10:45:56Z | |
dc.date.available | 2020-11-18T14:08:56Z | |
dc.date.available | 2021-02-15T10:45:56Z | |
dc.date.issued | 2020-11-12 | |
dc.identifier.citation | Kundu T, Nilssen T. Delegation of Regulation. The Journal of Industrial Economics. 2020;68(3):445-482 | en |
dc.identifier.issn | 0022-1821 | |
dc.identifier.issn | 1467-6451 | |
dc.identifier.uri | https://hdl.handle.net/10642/9554 | |
dc.description.abstract | We discuss a government’s incentives to delegate regulation to
bureaucrats. The government faces a trade-off in its delegation
decision: bureaucrats have knowledge of the firms in the industry that
the government does not have, but at the same time, they have other
preferences than the government. The preference bias and the private
information interact to affect the incentives to delegate regulation.
Allowing for constrained delegation, we introduce the concepts of weak
and strict delegation. We find that bureaucratic discretion reduces with
bureaucratic drift, while the effect of increased uncertainty about the
firm’s technology depends on how that uncertainty changes. | en |
dc.description.sponsorship | This research has received funding from the ESOP Centre at the University of Oslo, with which both authors are associated. ESOP has received support from the Research Council of Norway through its Centres of Excellence funding scheme, project number 179552. | en |
dc.language.iso | en | en |
dc.publisher | Wiley | en |
dc.relation.ispartofseries | The Journal of Industrial Economics;Volume 68, Issue 3, September 2020 | |
dc.rights | Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International (CC BY 4.0) License | en |
dc.rights.uri | https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/ | |
dc.subject | Regulations | en |
dc.subject | Bureaucracy | en |
dc.subject | Delegation | en |
dc.title | Delegation of Regulation | en |
dc.type | Journal article | en |
dc.type | Peer reviewed | en |
dc.date.updated | 2020-11-18T14:08:56Z | |
dc.description.version | publishedVersion | en |
dc.identifier.cristin | 1849349 | |
dc.source.journal | The Journal of Industrial Economics | |