dc.contributor.author | Bizzotto, Jacopo | |
dc.contributor.author | Vigier, Adrien Henri | |
dc.date.accessioned | 2020-06-18T07:27:30Z | |
dc.date.accessioned | 2021-01-14T11:08:35Z | |
dc.date.available | 2020-06-18T07:27:30Z | |
dc.date.available | 2021-01-14T11:08:35Z | |
dc.date.issued | 2021 | |
dc.identifier.citation | Bizzotto J, Vigier AH. Fees, Reputation and Information Production in the Credit Rating Industry. American Economic Journal: Microeconomics. 2020 | en |
dc.identifier.issn | 1945-7669 | |
dc.identifier.issn | 1945-7685 | |
dc.identifier.uri | https://hdl.handle.net/10642/9310 | |
dc.description.abstract | We compare a credit rating agency’s incentives to acquire costly information when it is
only paid for giving favorable ratings to the corresponding incentives when the agency is
paid upfront, i.e. irrespective of the ratings assigned. We show that, in the presence of
moral hazard, contingent fees provide stronger dynamic incentives to acquire information
than upfront fees and may induce higher social welfare. When the fee structure is chosen
by the agency, contingent fees arise as an equilibrium outcome, in line with the way the
market for credit rating actually works. | en |
dc.language.iso | en | en |
dc.publisher | American Economic Association | en |
dc.relation.ispartofseries | American Economic Journal: Microeconomics; | |
dc.relation.uri | https://www.aeaweb.org/articles?id=10.1257/mic.20180170 | |
dc.rights | Den aksepterte, fagfellevurderte postprint-versjonen av artikkelen er tillatt å arkivere i institusjonelle arkiv. | en |
dc.subject | Credit rating agencies | en |
dc.subject | Information acquisition | en |
dc.subject | Reputations | en |
dc.title | Fees, Reputation and Information Production in the Credit Rating Industry | en |
dc.type | Journal article | en |
dc.type | Peer reviewed | en |
dc.date.updated | 2020-06-18T07:27:30Z | |
dc.description.version | acceptedVersion | en |
dc.identifier.cristin | 1816062 | |
dc.source.journal | American Economic Journal: Microeconomics | |