dc.contributor.author | Bizzotto, Jacopo | |
dc.contributor.author | Vigier, Adrien Henri | |
dc.contributor.author | Rudiger, Jesper | |
dc.date.accessioned | 2020-06-17T12:43:54Z | |
dc.date.accessioned | 2020-07-02T11:05:48Z | |
dc.date.available | 2020-06-17T12:43:54Z | |
dc.date.available | 2020-07-02T11:05:48Z | |
dc.date.issued | 2020-02-06 | |
dc.identifier.citation | Bizzotto J, Vigier AH, Rudiger J. Testing, Disclosure and Approval. Journal of Economic Theory. 2020 | en |
dc.identifier.issn | 0022-0531 | |
dc.identifier.issn | 0022-0531 | |
dc.identifier.issn | 1095-7235 | |
dc.identifier.uri | https://hdl.handle.net/10642/8748 | |
dc.description.abstract | Certifiers often base their decisions on a mixture of information, some of which is
voluntarily disclosed by applicants, and some of which they acquire by way of tests or
otherwise. We study the interplay between the information acquisition of certifiers and
the information disclosure of applicants. We show that the inability of a certifier to
commit to the amount of information to be acquired can result in a reduction of information
disclosed. Among other consequences, given the choice between two information
acquisition technologies, the certifier may prefer to commit to the inferior technology, in
the sense of being either more expensive or less accurate. | en |
dc.language.iso | en | en |
dc.publisher | Elsevier | en |
dc.relation.ispartofseries | Journal of Economic Theory;Volume 187, May 2020 | |
dc.rights | © 2020. This manuscript version is made available under the CC-BY-NC-ND 4.0 license http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ | en |
dc.rights.uri | https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ | |
dc.subject | Information acquisitions | en |
dc.subject | Testing | en |
dc.subject | Disclosures | en |
dc.subject | Certifications | en |
dc.title | Testing, Disclosure and Approval | en |
dc.type | Journal article | en |
dc.type | Peer reviewed | en |
dc.date.updated | 2020-06-17T12:43:54Z | |
dc.description.version | acceptedVersion | en |
dc.identifier.doi | https://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2020.105002 | |
dc.identifier.cristin | 1815988 | |
dc.source.journal | Journal of Economic Theory | |