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dc.contributor.authorFjesme, Sturla
dc.date.accessioned2020-05-05T08:51:30Z
dc.date.accessioned2020-05-07T11:42:59Z
dc.date.available2020-05-05T08:51:30Z
dc.date.available2020-05-07T11:42:59Z
dc.date.issued2018-10-30
dc.identifier.citationFjesme S. Laddering IPO Shares . European Journal of Finance. 2018:1-15en
dc.identifier.issn1351-847X
dc.identifier.issn1351-847X
dc.identifier.issn1466-4364
dc.identifier.urihttps://hdl.handle.net/10642/8524
dc.description.sponsorshipRegulators, investors, and the financial media argue that underwriters tie Initial Public Offering (IPO) allocations to investor post-listing purchases in the issuer shares. Using unique data from the Oslo Stock Exchange (OSE) I investigate if these tie-in agreements are driven by price stabilization (reducing price falls below the offer price) or laddering (inflating prices above the offer price). I find that both stabilizing and laddering investors are rewarded with increased allocations for their service. However, only laddering investors increase allocations in very oversubscribed future issues. Secondary investors also lose from falling returns following laddering. I conclude that underwriters use both price stabilization and laddering across different IPOs. However, the rewards for cooperating investors and the economic consequences for secondary investors are much greater following laddering.en
dc.language.isoenen
dc.publisherTaylor & Francisen
dc.relation.ispartofseriesEuropean Journal of Finance;Volume 25, 2019 - Issue 8
dc.rightsThis is an Accepted Manuscript of an article published by Taylor & Francis in European Journal of Finance on 30/10/2018, available online: https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/1351847X.2018.1541327en
dc.subjectInitial public offering allocationsen
dc.subjectLadderingen
dc.subjectTie-in agreementsen
dc.subjectRent seekingen
dc.subjectEquity offeringsen
dc.titleLaddering IPO Sharesen
dc.typeJournal articleen
dc.typePeer revieweden
dc.date.updated2020-05-05T08:51:30Z
dc.description.versionacceptedVersionen
dc.identifier.doihttps://dx.doi.org/10.1080/1351847X.2018.1541327
dc.identifier.cristin1631928
dc.source.journalEuropean Journal of Finance


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