Determinants of executive incentive pay in Europe
Journal article, Peer reviewed
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Date
2013Metadata
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Original version
Døving, E. & Nordhaug, O. (2013). Determinants of executive incentive pay in Europe. Beta : tidsskrift for bedriftsøkonomi, 27(1), 22-35Abstract
In this paper we study possible determinants of the use of incentive pay for managers in European companies. Data
from 5,000 firms in 15 countries are used to analyze the degree to which incentive pay is associated with national
embeddedness, local labour market institutions, ownership, and internationalization of markets. We find that companies
in countries with high scores on power distance and individualism tend to use incentive schemes for managers more
frequently than companies with lower scores on these cultural dimensions. Centralized wage bargaining and unionization
at the firm level tend to reduce the prevalence of such schemes. Incentive pay is less common in state-owned companies
than in privately owned firms. The findings also reveal that the more global the market in which a firm operates, the
greater the probability that it will implement incentive pay elements for its managers. Our results suggest that unions,
national labour market institutions and social and cultural norms serve as buffers against the introduction of US-style
compensation systems