Say-on-pay, kompensasjonspraksis og daglig leders lønn: En studie av aksjonærenes uttalerett og daglig leders lønn

Abstract

We examine the relationship between SOP, pay-practice and CEO-compensation. There is an ongoing debate of whether executives receive excessive compensation, and we therefore find it particularly relevant to study the interaction between these three factors. By surveying board members and CEOs of Norwegian ASA we examine attitudes towards SOP legislation, elements of CEO pay-package, and risk. In addition, we compare female board members with men in their attitudes towards performance-related pay. We find major differences in attitudes regarding the SOP legislation´s impact on CEO-compensation. These findings indicate that SOP is an effective control mechanism for some firms, but not so for others. Further, we find that risk-tolerance is positively related to favouring performance-related pay. CEOs in our sample are also mainly characterized as relatively risk-tolerant. By this result we provide evidence to a scarcely researched topic. Finally, our results indicate that men and women have different preferences regarding CEO paystructure, as women in this sample tend to favour performance-related pay more than their male colleagues.