Vis enkel innførsel

dc.contributor.authorHolst, Cathrine
dc.contributor.authorMolander, Anders
dc.date.accessioned2017-06-12T08:43:37Z
dc.date.accessioned2017-06-13T11:12:01Z
dc.date.available2017-06-12T08:43:37Z
dc.date.available2017-06-13T11:12:01Z
dc.date.issued2017
dc.identifier.citationHolst, C. & Molander, A. (2017). Public deliberation and the fact of expertise: making experts accountable. Social Epistemology, 1-16. doi:10.1080/02691728.2017.1317865language
dc.identifier.issn0269-1728
dc.identifier.issn1464-5297
dc.identifier.urihttps://hdl.handle.net/10642/5016
dc.description.abstractThis paper discusses the conditions for legitimate expert arrangements within a democratic order and from a deliberative systems approach. It is argued that standard objections against the political role of experts are flawed or ill-conceived. The problem that confronts us instead is primarily one of truth-sensitive institutional design: Which mechanisms can contribute to ensuring that experts are really experts and that they use their competencies in the right way? The paper outlines a set of such mechanisms. However, the challenge exceeds that of producing epistemically optimal expert deliberations because a deliberative political system must also fulfil the ethical and democratic requirements of respect and inclusion. Yet, epistemic concerns justify expertise arrangements in the first place, and measures taken to make the use of expertise compatible with these requirements have to balance the potential rewards from expertise against potential deliberative costs. In the final part of the paper, the regulatory framework of a best practice expert advice system is tentatively analysed to illustrate the applicability and critical potential of our approach.language
dc.description.abstractThis paper discusses the conditions for legitimate expert arrangements within a democratic order and from a deliberative systems approach. It is argued that standard objections against the political role of experts are flawed or ill-conceived. The problem that confronts us instead is primarily one of truth-sensitive institutional design: Which mechanisms can contribute to ensuring that experts are really experts and that they use their competencies in the right way? The paper outlines a set of such mechanisms. However, the challenge exceeds that of producing epistemically optimal expert deliberations because a deliberative political system must also fulfil the ethical and democratic requirements of respect and inclusion. Yet, epistemic concerns justify expertise arrangements in the first place, and measures taken to make the use of expertise compatible with these requirements have to balance the potential rewards from expertise against potential deliberative costs. In the final part of the paper, the regulatory framework of a best practice expert advice system is tentatively analysed to illustrate the applicability and critical potential of our approach.language
dc.language.isoenlanguage
dc.publisherTaylor & Francislanguage
dc.relation.ispartofseriesSocial Epistemology;
dc.rightsThis is an Accepted Manuscript of an article published by Taylor & Francis in Social Epistemology, available online: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/02691728.2017.1317865language
dc.subjectExpertiselanguage
dc.subjectSciencelanguage
dc.subjectDemocracylanguage
dc.subjectAccountabilitylanguage
dc.subjectDeliberationlanguage
dc.titlePublic deliberation and the fact of expertise: making experts accountablelanguage
dc.typeJournal articlelanguage
dc.typePeer reviewedlanguage
dc.date.updated2017-06-12T08:43:37Z
dc.description.versionacceptedVersionlanguage
dc.identifier.doihttp://doi.org/10.1080/02691728.2017.1317865
dc.identifier.cristin1360435
dc.relation.projectIDNorges forskningsråd: 217924


Tilhørende fil(er)

Thumbnail

Denne innførselen finnes i følgende samling(er)

Vis enkel innførsel