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dc.contributor.authorHaugen, Kjetil K.
dc.contributor.authorSandnes, Frode Eika
dc.date.accessioned2016-10-19T06:46:00Z
dc.date.accessioned2017-03-30T13:47:14Z
dc.date.available2016-10-19T06:46:00Z
dc.date.available2017-03-30T13:47:14Z
dc.date.issued2016-07-15
dc.identifier.citationScientometrics 2016, 109(2):1299-1306language
dc.identifier.issn0138-9130
dc.identifier.urihttps://hdl.handle.net/10642/4610
dc.description.abstractThe new Norwegian system for calculation of publication credits is examined. The new system was launched due to criticism for penalizing collaborative research. It turns out that adverse incentive problems emerge as a result of this system change. We show by a simple case, that institutions will benefit (credit-wise) by adding more authors to a scientific publication. Even worse, the beneficial effect increases the more authors the paper has initially. Alternative cases indicate even stronger incentives for co-author maximization.language
dc.language.isoenlanguage
dc.publisherSpringerlanguage
dc.rightsThe final publication is available at Springer via http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11192-016-2075-2language
dc.subjectResearchlanguage
dc.subjectReward systemlanguage
dc.subjectAdverse incentive effectslanguage
dc.subjectNorwaylanguage
dc.titleThe new Norwegian incentive system for publication: from bad to worselanguage
dc.typePeer reviewedlanguage
dc.typeJournal article
dc.date.updated2016-10-19T06:46:00Z
dc.description.versionacceptedVersionlanguage
dc.identifier.doihttp://doi.org/10.1007/s11192-016-2075-2
dc.identifier.cristin1368453


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