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# War in Ukraine: A Sociological Study

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Abstract: A survey of 3,007 respondents in Ukraine conducted in March 2022 during the first month of the Russian invasion shows the effects of the war on Ukrainians. It demonstrates the hardships Ukrainian people are undergoing, but also the high level of mobilisation, the will to help each other, and optimism as regards the outcome of the war.

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# PREFACE

This report has been written by Oleksandra Deineko, Associate Professor at the School of Sociology V.N. Karazin Kharkiv National University, Ukraine; since March 2022, a guest researcher at the Norwegian Institute for Urban and Regional Research, It is based on a telephone survey of 3,007 Ukrainian respondents in the period 13 to 23 March 2022.

Senior researcher Aadne Aasland at NIBR has been project leader, and NIBR researchers Marthe Handå Myhre and Anne B. Staver have contributed in designing the questionnaire.

We would like to thank the research company “Operativna Sociologiya” for conducting the telephone survey under extreme conditions of war.

Oslo, April 2022

Kristian Tronstad  
Research Director

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# Introduction

On February 24, 2022, the Russian military invasion of Ukraine started, and is still ongoing as of this writing. Under such conditions, all spheres of everyday life become reoriented toward meeting survival needs. What dramatic changes did Ukrainian society undergo during the first month of war? How may the international community help Ukraine most effectively? The search for answers to these questions has prompted the Norwegian Institute for Urban and Regional Research (NIBR) at Oslo Metropolitan University to support a sociological survey, initiated by Ukrainian sociologists from Dnipro.

At the request of NIBR, the Dnipro-based Ukrainian company “Operatyvna Sociologiya” conducted a nationwide survey “War in Ukraine: a sociological survey” among the general population, to identify the urgent problems that have arisen due to the Moscow-instigated war. Between March 13 and 23, a total of 3007 adult respondents were interviewed by phone. The questionnaire covered issues of relocation and damages, current humanitarian needs, the psychological and emotional state of the populace, and other challenges faced by Ukrainians.

The study was conducted by telephone interview method (CATI - Computer Assisted Telephone Interviews). This method allows a representative survey to be conducted also during conditions of ongoing warfare, as well as relocation within Ukraine and abroad. A database of mobile numbers was generated, where each number is a random set of digits and indices of mobile operators (considering the total share of operators that provide mobile services on Ukrainian market).

This approach satisfies the requirements of representativeness and inclusion, regardless of the respondents’ physical location.

Conducting a survey under conditions of war obviously entails considerable challenges. However, response rates were similar to those obtained during more normal conditions. As telephone lines in Ukraine have generally remained intact, it was possible to reach Ukrainians even during times of high mobility and warfare. In fact, the poll-takers report receiving more positive feedback than usual, as many respondents appreciated the opportunity to talk about their situation. As mentioned, 3007 respondents took part in the survey. Representativeness error, with a confidence level of 95%, does not exceed  $\pm 1.79\%$ .

# 1 Relocation and damages

## 1.1 Relocation and plans to return

Russian President Putin's Blitzkrieg plans have met with unexpectedly strong resistance. This war, conducted in the very heart of Europe, has resulted in a terrible humanitarian and social catastrophe for Ukraine. As of April 9, 2022, the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) verified a total of 1,793 civilian deaths,<sup>1</sup> and over 2,400 injured: and these are only the official data as of early April. Thousands of people are still under blockades on Russian-occupied territories. The extent of the true humanitarian catastrophe is hard to imagine. Active warfare, intensive weapon attacks, massive infrastructural damage, and the brutal crimes committed by Russian troops have forced millions of Ukrainians to leave their homes.

However, our research has shown that, as of March 13 to 23, 78% of Ukrainians had not changed their location since the beginning of war. Almost 12% have moved to another region within Ukraine, 5% to another settlement within the same district (region). Almost 2% of Ukrainians have stayed at the same locality but moved to another apartment, and a further 2% have fled abroad.

**Figure 1: Changes of location since the beginning of war (in %, n=3007)**



As Figure 1 shows, the majority of Ukrainians have not changed their location. Among the internally displaced, people have generally moved to another region within Ukraine—primarily to the western and central parts, which are considered safer than the north, east and south of the country. Fewer have moved to another settlement within the same region (primarily from urban areas to rural ones, deemed safer).

Several tendencies could be noted as to the correlation between the indicators of relocation and gender, age and place of living. Firstly, women have changed their location more often than men, especially as to the decision to leave Ukraine (3% rate for women and 0.6% rate for men). This

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
<sup>1</sup> Number of civilian casualties in Ukraine during Russia's invasion verified by OHCHR as of April 9, 2022. URL: <https://www.statista.com/statistics/1293492/ukraine-war-casualties/>

finding is expected, not least as all males between the ages of 18 and 60 are now under mobilization and are not allowed to leave Ukraine. Secondly, we find that fewer elderly people leave their homes than do other age groups: 89% of respondents in the age group 60+ and 85% among those aged 50–59 have not changed their location since the beginning of war (the corresponding rates among those aged 18–24 and 25–34 are 71% and 70%). A strong desire among the oldest age groups to stay at home may be explained by problems with health conditions, and their wish to stay where they were born. Thirdly, the majority of displaced persons are from the east (Kharkiv, Luhansk, Donetsk regions) and north (Kyiv, Chernihiv, Sumy regions). That persons with high incomes are over-represented among the displaced may be explained by their financial possibility to move relying on own savings. Further, urban residents (cities, towns) have more often decided to change their location since the beginning of war, as compared with those living in rural areas. Our data also highlight the forced character of migration under conditions of war. A full 82% of those interviewed said they did not plan to change their location in the next four weeks: people tend to remain in their homes, leaving only when forced, in order to save their lives.

The internal displacement of Ukrainians has been more prevalent than external displacement. Some parts of Ukraine are considered as being ‘safe’; and that attracts people from the East, South and North to move there (primarily to the West and Central parts of the country). On the other hand, people believe in the strength of the Ukrainian army and its capacity to defend them. Convinced of a speedy victory, many people do not want to leave that native land.

Figure 2 shows Ukrainians’ plans for future staying abroad. Among those who at the time of the survey were planning to leave Ukraine, 60% said they planned to return home as soon as possible.

**Figure 2: Plans for future staying abroad (% of those planning to go abroad, n=59)**



Our data show that emigration is not connected with the desire to get a better life, but as forced and involuntary process. This is reflected in extremely low rate of those planning to apply for citizenship – less than 2% of Ukrainians who planned to go abroad have chosen this intention. Survey respondents who plan to go abroad demonstrate a high level of social agency. They rely primarily on themselves, not on the host states. This is indicated by a low rate of those applying for refugee status (3.5 %) and the strong desire to work: 36%. Here it should be borne in mind that those planning to flee the country are more often women, especially women with children. We cannot say how realistic these plans are (especially taking into account language barriers and need for childcare), but we note the potential of Ukrainian refugees’ social agency.



Correlation analysis has shown some specificities of those planning to return as soon as possible. From the data, we may conclude that the older the respondent is, the more likely is he or she to plan to return. Thus, among respondents aged 18 to 24, 36% plan to return, as contrasted with 60% among those aged 50 to 59, and 100% among those over 60 years old. The younger generations, growing up in an independent Ukraine, have been influenced by globalization tendencies and an open border policy. Many of them have travelled abroad, and know foreign languages, with greater opportunities for self-realization outside Ukraine, and are thus more inclined to think of creating a new home abroad.

Those who plan to return are often middle-income women from western regions of Ukraine living in urban areas. The western part of Ukraine has suffered relatively less damage, so “returnees” know they have a place to come back to, unlike people from the heavily damaged eastern, central and southern regions.

Unexpectedly, our survey shows no correlation between plans to return, and respondents’ language use. We had expected Ukrainians who have Ukrainian language as their mother tongue to be more interested and active in plans to return, as one’s mother tongue is considered a core indicator of patriotism. But this hypothesis was not confirmed. That shows the new areas of Ukrainian identity have developed during the war.


## 1.2 Location: safety and harm

A separate set of questions in our survey concerned damages caused by the war. The first question concerned types of military actions occurring in different regions of Ukraine (see Figure 3).

The high rates of various military actions found (each action more than 10% rate) testify to the active phase of the war in Ukraine. Most widespread are air-strike alerts, due to enemy attempts to enter Ukrainian airspace. Less intensive across all regions but still common are actual air strikes and shelling—32% and 25% respectively. One in four respondents mentioned fighting on the outskirts of their settlements. The presence of military actions varies, with the highest rates in the East, North and South, and the lowest in West and Central of Ukraine.

Our research confirms that greatest danger is attached to being in major cities (regional centers—oblast centers, see Figure 4). The smaller the type of settlement, the less dangerous it is. The enemy has focused on trying to capture metropolitan areas and big cities like Kharkiv, Dnipro, and Sumy, as they are administrative centers with power concentration on the all-region level. Capturing Sumy city, for instance, would mean gaining control over all of Sumy region. Moreover, attacks on regional centers have deep symbolic meaning, important for creating pro-Russian sentiments. Thus, these areas have been the most dangerous and most severely damaged. Especially afflicted are regions in the North, South and East of Ukraine because of the territorial border with Russia and the high possibility of constant attacks.

**Figure 3: Types of military actions under the war (in %, n=3007)**




**Figure 4: Types of military actions in terms of type of settlement (in %, n=3007)**

IN TERMS OF THE TYPE OF SETTLEMENT OF THE RESPONDENT	IN GENERAL	City-center of oblast	Another city	Urban-type settlement / village / small settlement
Air strike alert sounded	63,3%	75,5%	63,4%	49,2%
Air strike	32,1%	49,9%	26,3%	14,4%
Shelling	25,1%	37,9%	23,1%	11,9%
Fighting on the outskirts of the settlement	24,0%	31,1%	24,1%	16,0%
Enemy sabotage and reconnaissance groups worked in our settlement	14,3%	22,0%	12,7%	6,5%
Fighting in the village	13,9%	20,7%	13,4%	6,3%
The village has enemy vehicles or the military	11,9%	14,3%	13,0%	9,0%
None of the above	14,5%	6,4%	10,8%	27,9%
Difficult to answer	2,7%	2,5%	2,8%	2,4%
I do not want to answer	3,2%	1,5%	2,5%	2,6%

The most frequent types of damage reported concern the homes of relatives and friends (13%) and harm to one's own home—4%. Moreover, 3% of our respondents report having friends who have been wounded; and 3% have relatives who have been killed. The proportion between home damages and the number of injured or killed shows that many have used shelters or moved to

other, safer, places in hopes of staying alive and well. However, with the still-ongoing military attacks, these data are constantly changing

**Figure 5: Types of personal damages and settlement harm (in %, n=3007)**




In the East of Ukraine (Kharkiv, Donetsk and Luhansk regions) almost one in every six respondents mentions damage to own home (15) and one in four, damages to the homes of friends or relatives. In the second place is the North and in the third place are places in the South. That confirms the West and Central parts as the (relatively) safest in Ukraine at present. Often mentioned are ruined urban areas —16% of respondents from regional centers and 15% from other urban areas report that the homes of their relatives or friends have been destroyed or damaged, in contrast to 8% in rural areas. That the highest numbers of personal home damages, injured and killed friends or relatives are reported from city areas not regional centers could be explained by the greater number of cities occupied by enemy troops.

In fact, respondents whose houses have been destroyed or damaged are often Russian-speaking Ukrainians—proof of the absurdity of Putin’s propaganda about "defending" Russian-speaking Ukrainians since 2014. The most common decision for those who lost their own homes has been to move to another region within Ukraine or to remain in the same settlement, but in different housing (less often: to leave Ukraine or to move to a rural area).

Another aspect of personal harm Ukrainians have faced during the war is being unable to continue previous work activity (see Figure 6). Almost 40% of the respondents in this study were not working on the date of survey because their work has been suspended due to the war. Thus, families all over Ukraine have experienced the economic impacts of the Russian military invasion. Only one in every three Ukrainians has been able to continue working at the same place—testimony to the dramatic changes in the sphere of the national economy and the labor market.

The financial possibilities of Ukrainians are quite limited today: 70% of our respondents report having savings for the next two to three months at the most. More specifically, 19% do not have savings at all, 30% have enough savings at least for one month, 20% for two to three months). There is a great need for international humanitarian support.. Not less valuable will be international cooperation to assist Ukrainians remaining in the country to cover their basic needs.

**Figure 6: Changes of employment during the war (in %, n=3007)**



## 2 Urgent humanitarian needs

One set of questions in our survey was dedicated to identifying Ukrainians' current urgent humanitarian needs during the war. As seen in Figure 7, there is a great need for medicines (12% in general for Ukraine), fresh food (8%), and food for longer-term storage (8%). Clothing is also needed, but this is less urgently, probably because the majority of Ukrainians have remained at home and generally have clothing and materials. Current data are extremely important for international actors (NGOs, foreign national authorities, other foreign donators) to correct and adapt their capacities to the urgent needs of the Ukrainian population, medicines in particular.

Humanitarian needs have a regional aspect. Figure 7 shows those regions in greatest need of humanitarian aid. These regions have come under heavy attack, and portions of some territories—Luhansk, Kherson, Chernihiv, Donetsk, Sumy, Kharkiv and Mykolayiv regions (East, North and South parts of Ukraine) are under enemy occupation. Since the survey date, Russian troops have left Chernihiv, Sumy and Kyiv regions; the most severe humanitarian crises are in Donetsk (Mariupol is located there), Luhansk, Kharkiv, Kherson and Mykolayiv regions. Respondents' estimates of the intensity of humanitarian need coincide with the areas most heavily damaged, or occupied by enemy troops. Moreover, Russian forces have repeatedly blocked humanitarian convoys<sup>2</sup> moving to occupied territories.


**Figure 7: Urgent humanitarian needs in different regions of Ukraine (in %, n=3007)**

IN TERMS OF THE RESPONDENT'S AREA OF RESIDENCE	Medicine	Lack of fresh food	Lack of food for long-term storage	Lack of hygiene products	Clothes for adults	Clothes for children	Drinking water	No power supply	No heating	Others	There are no problems
IN GENERAL	12,2%	7,5%	7,5%	2,5%	2,5%	2,4%	1,5%	1,1%	1,1%	1,6%	74,9%
Luhansk region	32,2%	20,3%	22,0%	6,8%	5,1%	3,4%	11,9%	10,2%	6,8%	3,4%	45,8%
Kherson region	35,8%	23,3%	21,7%	3,3%	1,7%	5,0%	0,8%	0,8%	0,8%	2,5%	49,2%
Chernihiv region	28,3%	18,3%	13,3%	5,0%	8,3%	8,3%	3,3%	6,7%	1,7%	5,0%	55,0%
Donetsk region	20,3%	13,7%	16,2%	5,1%	2,5%	3,6%	9,1%	1,5%	3,6%	4,1%	57,4%
Sumy region	25,0%	12,0%	9,3%	1,9%	3,7%	3,7%	0,0%	0,0%	0,0%	0,9%	62,0%
Kharkiv region	18,7%	11,7%	11,7%	4,0%	5,4%	3,3%	2,7%	0,7%	2,0%	2,0%	63,2%
Mykolayiv region	16,7%	6,0%	4,8%	3,6%	1,2%	1,2%	0,0%	2,4%	0,0%	0,0%	70,2%
Zaporizhya region	16,0%	10,4%	11,2%	4,8%	0,8%	0,0%	0,8%	2,4%	5,6%	1,6%	70,4%
Kyiv region	10,1%	7,0%	6,3%	3,5%	6,3%	4,2%	1,0%	1,7%	0,0%	1,4%	76,2%
Kyiv	12,0%	6,0%	4,3%	2,7%	3,3%	2,7%	0,0%	0,5%	0,0%	0,5%	79,3%

<sup>2</sup> The occupiers robbed a humanitarian convoy followed to Mariupol. URL: <https://glavcom.ua/country/incidents/okupanti-rozikrali-gumanitarniy-konvoy-shcho-sliduvav-do-mariupolya-829209.html>

Ukrainians have deeply appreciated the international support that has been provided (see Illustration 8). The unprecedented help and support to the Ukrainian army, the state and the citizenry provided by international community has already played a significant role in resisting the Russian military invasion. This study shows Ukrainians recognize and appreciate the adequacy of all kinds of international support, in particular, the humanitarian and financial aid provided by international actors. However, they are less satisfied as regards international military assistance—56% of respondents do not consider it sufficient. This position could be explained by the lack of a NATO decision to close the skies over Ukraine, the most expected and desirable decision for Ukraine today. However, after the survey was conducted, several foreign governments have intensified their activity in weapons support to the Ukrainian army. In particular, Ukrainians participating in territorial defense and army demonstrate high rates of satisfaction with all types of international assistance. This could be explained by their higher level of awareness and their direct involvement in these matters.

**Figure 8: Ukrainians’ assessment of international support (in %, n=3007)**



### 3 Practices of resistance

The war has stimulated volunteering among the populace. From the qualitative angle, activities usually conducted during leisure time have now replaced their professional practices. Many Ukrainian business, professional, cultural, sports, and civil society groups have reoriented their activities to civilian and army needs. Well-known Ukrainian sportspersons, singers, businesspeople, and ordinary citizens have been donating to the Ukrainian army and organizing humanitarian aid for vulnerable groups. For others, volunteering has become a means of healing war trauma.<sup>3</sup> Volunteering has assumed a central position in the processes of nation-building and unity in Ukrainian society, as confirmed by quantitative data from the study (see Table 1).

Indeed, only 16% of Ukrainians are not engaged in different types of volunteering. That the elderly people (60+ age category) mentioned this position more often could be primarily explained by health issues. However, we should also note the story of Mykola Shevchuk from Bukovina—an 83-year-old Ukrainian pensioner who donated all his life savings to support the Ukrainian army.<sup>4</sup> In fact, every third Ukrainian has made monetary donations since the beginning of the war.

Ukrainians aim to help not only their friends and relatives (38%), but also other people in need (34%). Non-formal volunteering is particularly widespread (19%), which shows that during the war people have become socially closer to one another. War actions occurring throughout the country have made Ukrainians more horizontally bonded, enhancing horizontal social capital.

Women are more active than men in helping others and making monetary donations. Men are more involved in volunteering in centers, conducting cyberattacks and participating in territorial defense. Young Ukrainians often engage in monetary donations, cyberattacks and volunteering in centers; the oldest show their care by helping others (non-formal volunteering). Basically, people try to be effective in the areas where they are good. This shows the strong force of bottom-up initiatives and the powerful potential of Ukrainian resistance.

**Table 1: Types of volunteering during the war (in %, n=3007)**

I help relatives / friends / acquaintances	38,1%
I help other people in need	33,5%
I make monetary donations	29,3%
I'm a volunteer (work in volunteer centers and providing financial assistance with things, food)	18,7%
Joined a cyberattack, cyber defense, or online resistance	8,1%
I'm a member of the Territorial Defense or a volunteer battalion	(no data for security goals)
I'm a Military	(no data for security goals)
Other	1,8%
None of the above	15,9%
Difficult to answer	2,3%
I do not want to answer	1,7%

<sup>3</sup> Ukrainian Society Under Conditions of War: A Strong Force of Social Cohesion. URL : <https://ukrainian-studies.ca/2022/04/02/ukrainian-society-under-conditions-of-war-a-strong-force-of-social-cohesion%ef%bf%bc/>

<sup>4</sup> 83-year-old pensioner from Bukovina transferred 100,000 hryvnias and 10,000 dollars to support the Armed Forces. URL : <https://suspilne.media/212995-na-bukovini-83-ricnij-pensioner-pererahuvav-na-pidtrimku-zsu-100-tisac-griven-ta-10-tisac-dolariv/>.

The war has smoothed out many divisions and established the foundation for new unity among the populace of Ukraine. People have donated their cars for military purposes and opened their houses and apartments for those in need. Most active in volunteering are middle-income Ukrainians. Initially, we had two assumptions: One, the wealthiest Ukrainians would acknowledge their social responsibility, and would to help Ukraine the most actively. Secondly, volunteering practices should be widespread among the poorest Ukrainians, who have less capacity for monetary donations. In fact, neither assumption has been confirmed. The picture that emerges is more complex and less linear. Among the most “passive” Ukrainians (those who do not participate in volunteering) more often are respondents from the poorest group, whereas the lowest share of “passive” respondents is among the group with middle-high income levels. This shows the huge potential of social agency demonstrated by the Ukrainian middle class, and how important is its contribution to furthering Ukrainian victory.



## 4 Ukrainians' Psychological and Emotional State Under the War

Interpreting sociological data is always difficult task. Chronological or spatial comparison is often used to make the results more profound and reliable. But with wars, comparison is problematic: each war is unique in its deeper nature, specificities, and phases, to mention only few aspects. That is why traditional approaches under war circumstances demonstrate their weaknesses as regards sociological interpretation.

Migration studies often measure people's psychological and emotional states in connection with military acts.<sup>5</sup> These data indirectly demonstrate the potential for resistance practices among civilians, because emotions and feelings always influence one's thoughts, decisions and actions. Importantly, they are useful in helping national authorities and international actors to provide appropriate measures for psychological assistance projects and programs.

**Table 2: Ukrainians' psychological and emotional state under the war (in %, n=3007)**

IN TERMS OF GENDER OF THE RESPONDENT	IN GENERAL	WOMEN'S	MEN'S	DIVERSE
Sense of sadness	22,9%	29,8%	15,8%	28,6%
Nervousness and inner trembling	20,8%	27,6%	13,5%	28,6%
Fear and panic attacks	19,8%	32,2%	6,7%	28,6%
Feeling of tension and anxiety	16,3%	19,9%	12,4%	28,6%
Feeling sad when something reminds of stressful events	14,9%	19,7%	9,9%	0,0%
Loss of interest in daily activities and tasks	14,3%	18,8%	9,6%	14,3%
Fatigue, lack of energy, stagnation	12,7%	18,5%	6,5%	14,3%
Repetitive or disturbing memories, thoughts or images of past events	12,5%	15,7%	9,2%	0,0%
I cry easily	10,1%	18,0%	1,8%	0,0%
Feelings of hopelessness and being trapped	8,6%	12,2%	4,9%	0,0%
Trembling	8,1%	13,0%	3,0%	28,6%
Feelings of loneliness and isolation	6,5%	9,0%	3,9%	0,0%
Avoid memories related to past stressful events	5,4%	7,0%	3,6%	0,0%
Avoid activities or situations that remind past stressful events	4,4%	6,6%	2,2%	0,0%
The feeling that no one understands me	3,9%	5,1%	2,8%	0,0%
Loss of self-esteem	3,4%	4,6%	2,1%	0,0%
Feelings of worthlessness	3,4%	4,4%	2,3%	0,0%
A strong need or urge to drink alcohol	3,3%	2,3%	4,2%	0,0%
Slow or fast speech or movement, much noticeable to others	2,9%	4,3%	1,4%	0,0%

<sup>5</sup> Green B.L., Friedman M.J., et al. Trauma interventions in war and peace: prevention, practice and policy. New York: Kluwer/Plenum; 2003.

Difficult to answer	33,4%	20,5%	47,0%	28,6%
I do not want to answer	0,2%	0,1%	0,2%	0,0%

Research conducted in Afghanistan in 2004 found symptoms of depression in 68% of respondents, symptoms of anxiety in 72%, and post-traumatic stress disorder in 42%.<sup>6</sup> Comparison of these rates shows that Ukrainians demonstrate quite stable and balanced psychological and emotional states under wartime conditions (see Table 2). The most widespread disturbing feelings among those surveyed are sense of sadness (23%), nervousness and trembling (21%), and fear and panic attacks (20%). The rather low rates (in the 20s) of these indicators indicate that difficult psychological and emotional conditions are not common among Ukrainians (they do not characterize the mental state of majority)—and that gives grounds for optimistic prognoses as to the force of Ukrainian resistance.

Gender specificities in respondents' answers show that women suffer disturbing feelings and emotions almost twice as often as men. Here the war may be viewed as a space of masculinity that makes gender roles (fight, defense, support) and statuses (men as warriors, women as responsible for children) more tangible. Research data highlight how Ukrainian males do not cry but remain stable and balanced under military attacks. Importantly, rates of fatigue, lack of energy and stagnation are not high in respondents' answers—only 13% in general. This forms a precondition for perspectives as to Ukrainians' active resistance practices.

Correlation analysis of mental state with location in Ukraine since the beginning of war has shown unexpected tendency: the farther from home the respondent is, the worse psychological and emotional state he (she) has. Simply being in a safe place does not necessarily lead to mental state normalization: quite the contrary, the feeling of "home" becomes lost, and liminality appears. This is particularly noticeable in the responses of Ukrainians abroad. Those who left Ukraine feel the greatest stress: the further from home—the worse the psychological and emotional state is. The survey showed that every second Ukrainian staying abroad reports feelings of sadness, fear and panic attacks; one in three cries easily, suffers trembling and feeling of loneliness and isolation. In part, this can be explained by gender specificities of those who have fled—primarily women, and women with children. Moreover, these people have left their homes but have not created new ones abroad, finding themselves stuck in liminality and limbo. Thirdly, they primarily left "hot" zones (with active military action), so they may face posttraumatic stress disorder. And lastly, they find themselves in new cultural and language surroundings, which may entail various problems and difficulties. This group in particular needs psychological support and social care in their new host communities. Indeed, 20% of those who fled abroad mention feelings of worthlessness: this we view as an indicator of feeling guilt (guilt for being alive, guilt for going abroad). Volunteering and participation in various integrating events, and active support to Ukraine from abroad could help these refugees to overcome such feelings and orient their life energy into a constructive stream.

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
<sup>6</sup> Cardozo BL, Bilukha OO, Gotway Crawford CA, et al. Mental health, social functioning, and disability in postwar Afghanistan. *JAMA*. 2004; 292:575–584.

# 5 Expectations about the end of war

How people think determines their behavior. That is why it is so important to analyze Ukrainians' expectations as to the end of the war: they influence resistance activities and can speed up victory for Ukraine. As shown in Figure 9, the majority of respondents believe in military victory for Ukraine (72%). Such uplifting social moods and expectations are "in the air" in Ukrainian society, enhanced by the media and public actors, inspiring the Ukrainian army to withstand enemy pressure. They also encourage the forces of civil resistance—mass volunteering, donating and support.

Indeed, almost no one believes in a military victory for Russia (less than 0.5% of the respondents). Nor are negotiations and compromise deemed realistic—only 12% of respondents chose this alternative as to how the war would end. Ukrainians strongly distrust the idea of negotiations because of deeply rooted perceptions of Russia as an untrustworthy opponent that will betray. This perceptual model was created and maintained by Russia's non-compliance with the Minsk agreements on Donbas since 2014. Here we should note President Zelensky's idea about a national referendum to agree on the agenda for possible negotiations. The genocide of Ukrainians in Butcha, Borodianka, Irpin, Mariupol, Izum and elsewhere shows that Ukraine has already paid a high price and will not accept "peace at any cost." Some 66% of the respondents say they would be ready to support a peace agreement between Russia and Ukraine only under conditions of the full return to Ukraine all its territories, including currently occupied Donbas and the Crimea, and reparations paid. Ukrainian society today is united in the strong belief in Ukrainian victory, with proper punishment meted out to the enemy.

Figure 9: Ukrainian expectations about the end of war (in %, n=3007)



## 6 Research findings


This study has shown that the war has dramatically changed Ukrainian society on all levels of society—institutional, community, and individual. The war has forced internal and external migration, with more than 20% of the population leaving their home-places. It has inflicted vast infrastructural damage and economic difficulties on every Ukrainian family. The Russian military invasion has taken the lives of thousands of civilians—indeed, the genocide of the Ukrainian nation. The highest instances of humanitarian problems are found in the regions experiencing active military actions or occupied by the enemy—Luhansk, Donetsk, Kherson, Chernigiv, Kharkiv and Sumy. Medicines and food are desperately needed.

The “face” of Ukrainian external migration is primarily female five times more women than men have fled abroad. The majority of those who had plans to move abroad now plan to come back as soon as possible. Our data show that migration is not connected with the desire for a better life, but as a forced and involuntary process. This is evident in the extremely low rate of those planning to apply for citizenship abroad. Moreover, the Ukrainians who go abroad demonstrate a high level of social agency: they rely primarily on themselves, not on the host states; and they plan to work while abroad. Indeed, this potential of the social agency of Ukrainian refugees may be viewed as an indirect indicator of their desire to support and donate to Ukraine.


Ukrainians experience disturbing feelings like a sense of sadness, nervousness and trembling, fear and panic attacks. But the relatively low rate (20%) of these indicators also indicates that the above-mentioned psychological and emotional problems are not characteristic of the mental state of the majority—and that should give grounds for optimism as to the force of Ukrainian resistance. Our research has shown that being in a safe place abroad does not necessarily lead to more “normal” mental states. On the contrary, Ukrainians who fled emerge as the most deeply stressed: the further from home, the worse their psychological and emotional state is. This may be explained by gender specificities of those who fled, their being stuck in liminality, with post-traumatic stress disorder and trying to find their way in a new cultural and language surrounding. This group in particular needs psychological support and social care in host communities.

In conclusion, we note how, under conditions of brutal invasion and warfare, the Ukrainian people have demonstrated the strength of military and civic resistance, mass-volunteering, mutual support and high trust. All these components are elements of enhanced social cohesion in Ukrainian society and indicators of nation-building unity. The war has brought a new common goal that has consolidated the entire nation: the deeply felt belief in victory for Ukraine. As this study has shown, Ukrainians have come to realize that each individual has a responsibility for bringing this victory closer. Indeed, this indicates a shift in identity configurations: being a Ukrainian now entails contributing to victory—individually and collectively.


## 7 Appendix: Socio-demographic characteristics



## Marital status of the respondent



## Residential area of residence of the respondent



# Respondent's ethnicity

