Should Eudaimonia Structure Professional Virtue?

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This article develops a eudaimonistic account of professional virtue. Using the case of teaching, the article argues that professional virtue requires that role holders care about the ends of their work. Care is understood in terms of an investment of the self. Virtuous role holders are invested in their practice in a way that makes professional excellence part of their own good. Failure to care about the ends of professional practice reveals a lack of appreciation of the value of professional work. This 'investment view' is contrasted with the currently popular 'key goods view', which claims that professional virtues require a profession-specific teleological structure. Unlike ordinary virtues, which are governed by eudaimonia or human flourishing, professional virtues are allegedly derived from professional ends, like health or education. The article argues that this delivers an unconvincing criterion for determining the merits of character traits.

INTRODUCTION

It is widely agreed that character traits constitute a central aspect of the morality of professional roles. Compliance with duty does not exhaust the merit and meaning of moral actions in the professional sphere. Becoming a teacher or a physician does not mean taking on a role where formal standards and rules make traits like trustworthiness, creativity and patience superfluous. To the contrary, professionals appeal to such virtues to justify their stands in decisions and they are held accountable to the public by the same token. Requests are denied, policies opposed and battles fought in the name of virtues like integrity and loyalty. In addition to their justificatory function, the language of virtue provides the necessary categories for aspiration and evaluation, and helps us articulate the meaning of ideals and betrayals, triumphs and failures.

In order to appreciate the moral force of these various appeals to virtue, we need an understanding of what professional virtue is. In this article, I will present a eudaimonistic conception, where virtue involves being invested in the values of professional work. This is an application of an Aristotelian framework to the professional context. The main claim is that eudaimonia— the Greek word for flourishing or living well—has the same relation to virtue in the professional sphere as in ordinary moral life. In identifying virtue in professionals, we are not simply marking out the ability of role holders to skilfully bring about certain results. Professionals are entrusted with key social goods and part of being a virtuous professional is to be invested in this task. I develop the investment view as an interpretation of how the eudaimonistic dimension is partly constitutive of professional virtue.

This account is developed as a contrast to what I will call the key goods view. This is a currently popular non-eudaimonistic view of professional virtue that calls itself Aristotelian. The key goods view replaces eudaimonia with the profession-specific ends that are central to the various professions, like education for the teaching profession, and health for the medical profession. The article argues that there is no reason to accept this alteration to the original Aristotelian framework. The

supplanting of eudaimonia with key goods does not lead to a morally acceptable way of determining which character traits are virtues. A virtue ethics that lacks the eudaimonistic component fails to do justice to both the phenomenology of virtue and our evaluation of role holders.

RELATIVITY AND COMMITMENT

Teaching will be the main example to guide my development of the investment view. In this regard, the philosophy of education already contains some interesting discussions of *eudaimonia* and virtue. It is therefore worth noting how my view relates to some of the earlier contributions in this field. The idea that virtue is conceptually linked to the *eudaimonia* of the role holder has been met with both hesitance and wholehearted acceptance. Both of these responses are backed by considerations that deserve attention.

Although they hold Aristotelian eudaimonism to be the most plausible virtue theory, I place David Carr and Jan Steutel's (1999) introductory chapter on the virtue approach to moral education on the somewhat skeptical side. Their brief discussion of eudaimonism notes some fundamental challenges. Most importantly, they find this view of virtue problematic on the grounds that it leads to a morally troublesome 'relativisation' of virtue: 'To the extent that different cultural constituencies appear to embody different conceptions of the good life, it would appear that there may be rival and incompatible accounts of the virtues' (2006, p. 15). The worry is that tying virtue to *eudaimonia* robs us of the possibility of an objective grounding of virtue. The virtues appear to be culturally contingent if every initiation into virtue requires a substantive conception of the good life. This objection draws attention to the need to say more about what is meant by a conceptual connection between virtue and eudaimonia. The investment view developed here promises to steer us away from an untenable relativism.

Chris Higgins's *The Good Life of Teaching* (2010) stands out among accounts that unflinchingly embrace a eudaimonistic conception of professional ethics. His main focus is not the concept of virtue as such, but the book provides one of the most nuanced and wide-ranging accounts of teaching as a 'ground project' that gives meaning to the lives of role holders.[1] His overarching concern is to overcome the dichotomy between 'selfless saints and selfish scoundrels' (2010, p. 189). Higgins coins the term 'selffulness' (2010, p. 362) to describe an ideal that promotes self-realisation. This is presented as a contrast to the self-abnegation of the allegedly prevalent professional ideal of asceticism. Two considerations in particular are used to justify this theoretical shift towards the *eudaimonia* of the role holder: first, it fosters better moral education ('selfhood is contagious', 2010, p. 190). Second, the traditional ascetic ideal leads to burnout and poorer lives for role holders (eudaimonistic virtue theory is described as a move towards a 'sustainable ethic of teaching', 2010, p. 190).

Higgins develops his view through a close reading of Alasdair MacIntyre's (1984) theory of *practices* and *internal goods*. This analysis yields the suggestive claim that 'only those who have committed themselves to a practice over time are able to appreciate and articulate the goods of that practice' (Higgins, 2010, p. 253). Although it has an intuitive ring, the claim is likely to provoke exactly the kinds of accusations of relativization and insularisation that Carr and Steutel put forward. The idea of a special relationship between *commitment* and *appreciation* needs unpacking and defending in order to answer these accusations. What does the commitment in question entail? And what does it have to do with eudaimonia and virtue? While

Higgins has devoted much attention to how asceticism is destructive to healthy teacher ethics in general, more needs to be said on why the very concept of professional virtue involves a particular configuration of the will of the role holder. The investment view is an attempt to fill this gap with the help of the concept of care.

THE INVESTMENT VIEW

The primary aim of a philosophical theory of professional virtue is to explain why certain character traits are virtues. In this section, I will take a bottom up approach to professional virtue. That is, I want to start from reflection on a specific case and gradually move toward a more general statement about the role of *eudaimonia*. The film *Dangerous Minds* (1995) is a portrait of a high school teacher's experiences in a poor area school, based on teacher LouAnne Johnson's own account of entering the profession and dealing with at-risk teens in My Posse Don't Do Homework (1993). Of interest here is a scene where the teacher, LouAnne Johnson, tries to explain to her students that there are no victims in her classroom; they have all made a choice to go to school. Finding it hard to convince them, LouAnne appears filled with indignation. She accuses them of failing to understand the significance of the choice they make every day by getting on the bus. One student confronts LouAnne: 'Why do you care anyway? You just here for the money'. The student is apparently sceptical about the motivational weight of the internal goods of the teaching practice. LouAnne replies by vouching for her genuine devotion to their learning and denying that external goods can explain her actions: 'Because I make a choice to care. And honey, the money ain't that good'. Part of the lesson LouAnne wants to teach them is that of responsibility and owning one's actions. An equally important part is that of appreciating the value of the choice they have made. Their education matters to her and is something that should matter to them. Its value is capable of supporting the kind of forceful evaluative attitudes that LouAnne displays.

In this scene, the issue between LouAnne and the student concerns whether she cares about the education of her students. In vouching for her care, LouAnne is not only making a claim about what guides her behaviour, but also about *how* it guides. Caring about the education of students is not simply desiring or wanting them to do well. Nor can it be reduced to a belief in the importance of education. As Frankfurt (1988) writes, caring involves an 'investment' of the self: the person who cares '*identifies* himself with what he cares about in the sense that he makes himself vulnerable to losses and susceptible to benefits depending upon whether what he cares about is diminished or enhanced' (p. 83, italics original). The idea of the self as something invested resonates with ordinary ways of describing experiences. People often say that part of them died when they lost someone or something they cared about. They also speak of having been transformed by new objects of care, children being the paradigm example. In avowing her care, LouAnne is conveying the impact the value of education has on her: it would be a loss to her if the learning of her students were impaired.

Frankfurt's concept of care concerns the structure of the will, and I will argue that it is helpful in order to understand professional virtue. It is important to differentiate this account from the 'care ethics' tradition, where care is sometimes described as a master virtue in its own right.[2] For example, Michael Slote (2007) has developed an account where care is understood as empathic feelings of concern for the well-being of others. Drawing on this tradition, Tom Beauchamp and James Childress (2009, pp. 36–38) treat care as the fundamental virtue that gives direction to the other key virtues of medical practice. In this interpretation, care is an 'emotional

commitment to, and deep willingness to act on behalf of persons with whom one has a significant relationship' (2009, p. 36).

This is not the conception of care that Frankfurt is accounting for, and my argument does not concern its status as a professional virtue. Rather, the investment view is an attempt to describe how the concept of professional virtue involves care as an investment of the self or devotedness. Care is a way of relating to desires. It contrasts with simply feeling like doing something, like tapping a rhythm. It does not matter to us whether this desire persists or not; we are not committed to it. Frankfurt's point is that, in caring for something, we have made the desire part of our self-evaluation and we want to go on having the desire. It is therefore a 'lapse on our part if we neglect the desire' (Frankfurt, 2006, p. 19). The content of this desire is an entirely different matter. This concept of care is not in itself altruistic or grounded in empathic concern for others.

The point of highlighting the structural conception of care is to understand the connection between professional virtue and *eudaimonia*. However, this structural conception of care is insufficient on its own for understanding the importance of eudaimonia. It gives us the notion of being invested in something, but it does not yet explain why this investment should count as meritorious. We are not helped much further by Frankfurt, because he claims that the suitability of making one object rather than another important to oneself is a matter of whether it is '*possible* to care about the one and not the other' (1988, p. 94, italics original). His account of care reveals little interest in whether the objects of care are worth caring about. He does not deny that worth is relevant to care, but he rather avoids the subject (*cf.* Wolf, 2002). That is a problem for us, because care seems largely irrelevant to professional virtue if it is just a lucky coincidence when our objects of care have moral worth.

However, we cannot rectify this by simply stipulating that care should be directed at morally worthy ends. For one, it is not 'up to us' what we care about. LouAnne says she 'chooses to care', but she is probably not implying that what she cares about is under her direct voluntary control. The phenomenology of caring attests to how we find ourselves taking things to be important to us without having made a conscious decision to do so. We can also be unsuccessful in carrying out our intention to care about things we deem important. Perhaps LouAnne may want to care more about local politics; maybe she is not satisfied with her own lack of interest and unwillingness to participate. For years, she has been doing campaign work merely out of a sense of duty. It would not be an extraordinary psychological phenomenon if she—*to her own surprise*—finds herself wholeheartedly involved when a new political issue appears.

Nevertheless, the idea that we simply care about what it is possible for us to care about fails to make sense of the classroom confrontation between LouAnne and the student. The student questions whether LouAnne cares, and this comes off as an accusation that, if true, detracts from her meritas teacher. It is unclear how it could detract if care is unresponsive to judgements of worth. Why does her strong affirmation of the value of education make the question of care both appropriate and revealing of her virtuousness?

The solution is to interpret LouAnne's assertion of a 'choice to care' as accounting for something other than the genesis of her attitude to education. Rather, she is endorsing the complex volitional disposition that caring involves. That is, she takes the investment of herself into education to be good, regardless of how it came about. Furthermore, in asserting her devotion, she is not reporting on the structure of her will as something that luckily matches her cognitive judgements. Presumably, she

does not simply feel a strong pull toward education and then adds some intellectual sanction to this urge. In caring for the education of her students, she sees this end as worth promoting. This is the point where we need to expand on Frankfurt's concept: caring is not a pure motivational state detached from her intellectual faculty. Rather, it involves a way of understanding states of affairs, seeing some things as worthy and unworthy of pursuit. In other words, the investment of the self is not a motivational commitment to an independently cognised end, but a reconceptualisation of this same end.

CARING AND APPRECIATION

This expansion of the concept of care draws on John McDowell's (1998) interpretation of the process of gaining practical wisdom in the Aristotelian sense. He describes it as an 'initiation into a conceptual space, by way of being taught to admire and delight in actions in the right way' (1998, p. 39). The contrast between the noble and the base governs the conceptual space to which McDowell refers. The space is a shared sense of attraction to what is worthwhile and admirable, and a common sense of disgust at what is degrading and perverted. On this account, becoming virtuous is not learning how justice or temperance is *more* rewarding than a life of cruelty and uninhibited pursuit of pleasure. Rather, the immoral life is unmasked as wholly unrewarding and humiliating. The process of initiation leads toward a way of life in which immorality becomes alien to one's sense of what is worthwhile. As it happens, McDowell's account of the conceptual space that governs virtue is explicitly an interpretation of *eudaimonia*. Importantly, it is an account where virtue is not functionally derived from some independent conception of what makes life worth living. Rather, in learning to appreciate the noble, the agent is learning to live well. Virtuous agents choose actions because of their nobility, and this way of living in accordance with virtue is what *eudaimonia* consists of. As McDowell writes, 'the value of nobility will be what organizes one's conception of the eudaimonistic dimension of practical worthwhileness' (1998, p. 42).

With this sketch of the interconnections between the concepts in hand, we can reconstruct the process that leads to virtuous engagement with worth or the noble. Suppose LouAnne is initially quite indifferent to the education of her students. Nevertheless, she finds teaching pleasurable; sometimes it even engages her into a flow mode similar to what she experiences when playing basketball. She finds the work needed to control her disruptive class to be exciting. In this sense, the job is worthwhile when evaluated according to the practical dimension of enjoyment. The value of her teaching activity is on the same scale as playing sports and watching films. However, she gradually learns to appreciate more than just the fun of teaching. She starts to appreciate the inherent worth of the education of her students and the merit of her own actions. Her delight in work is no longer a function merely of her sense of her own mastery, but also an appreciation of how the virtues of patience and creativity in class enables her students to achieve something for themselves. This appreciation invites calls for her to devote herself to the value of teaching. It summons her to care about teaching, not just to prefer it to other desirable things.3 Teaching ceases to be just something she does; it becomes part of who she is.

Speaking of an investment of the self may echo exaggerated professional oaths, such as 'I solemnly pledge to consecrate my life to the service of humanity' (World Medical Association, Declaration of Geneva). However, we do not have to suppose that caring involves LouAnne's complete devotion to teaching. Presumably, her professional role is only one of several sources of meaning in her life. Caring

about the education of her students is compatible with giving higher priority to her family or some other ambition she has. Nevertheless, it is incompatible with rejecting her desire to promote education as part of her endorsed identity.

There is, of course, no mechanical procedure to determine the appropriate level of investment of the self. For those who evaluate role holders, the proper level will depend on their sense of the importance of the activity. Students convinced by LouAnne's speech about the worth of education and the merits of going to school would presumably see virtue as calling for a high level of investment. This is not a causal thesis about how worth produces a particular psychological attitude. Rather, it is a claim concerning appropriate regard. To the convinced students, education appears as deserving devotion. Role holders who fail to grasp this are not appreciating the key good of their practice. The mode of awareness in appreciation involves experiencing and feeling something as meritorious or worthy in a way that cannot be captured by belief or pure intellectual knowledge. It is not just a matter of endorsing a proposition or fact, but to have a quasi-perceptual state of connecting appropriately to what has worth (cf. Burnyeat, 1980, p. 78; Darwall, 2002, p. 90). On the other hand, students who do not appreciate the value of education will not be disappointed in the same way with teachers who are not invested in their role.

This account has the resources to answer the charge of relativization raised by Carr and Steutel (see above). The objection was that eudaimonistic accounts make virtue relative to culturally contingent conceptions of the good life. In this connection, I mentioned Higgins's claim that commitment is a precondition for appreciation of the goods of a practice. In developing the investment view, I have sought to bring out how Higgins's claim can be incorporated within a non-relativistic account of virtue. The students who meet uncaring teachers are not primarily disappointed in these teachers for their failure to fulfil themselves through their work. Rather, the source of disappointment is that these teachers fail to engage appropriately with the worth of education. The eudaimonistic component is an interpretation of what 'appropriate engagement' involves. The interpretation highlights that appreciative regard entails seeing education as something worth investing oneself in. That is, it is perceived as an end worth making part of one's own good. This eudaimonistic account of virtue does not make the value of character traits dependent on how they promote some particular conception of the good life. The status of character traits depends on how they respond to genuine worth. The virtuous person sees worthy ends as truly deserving care. The relativist worry disappears once it becomes clear that eudaimonist virtue theory is about investing oneself on the basis of real moral reasons.

I have argued that *eudaimonia* governs professional virtue in the same way as ordinary moral virtue. The next section presents a different view of professional virtue, where *eudaimonia* is dethroned in favour of key goods of professional practice. Do we have reason to accept this way of seeing professional virtue as governed by a distinct teleological structure?

THE KEY GOODS VIEW

A common view in professional virtue ethics theory is that the status of character traits depends on how they promote the 'internal' goods of the profession. MacIntyre's (1984) concept of practices forms the conceptual backdrop for this view on professional virtue. According toMacIntyre, practices are activities with standards of excellence derived from internal goods that partly constitutes the activity (p. 187). Virtue is excellence directed at the goods that are internal to the practice itself. For example, a sophisticated chess move is a good internal to the practice of chess; it

cannot be grasped independently of the standards of the practice. Playing only for fame or money is not virtuous, because these are 'external' goods. The structure of practices is meant to reveal the structure and point of virtues. They are teleological in the sense that we decide what a virtue is by reference to the good it promotes.

This framework for virtue has been subject to much discussion in the philosophy of education (e.g. the essays in Dunne and Hogan, 2003). MacIntyre's concept of practice has also been immensely influential in virtue theories for the medical professions, but with less critical discussion of the framework itself (e.g. Armstrong, 2006; Banks and Gallagher, 2009; Pellegrino and Thomasma, 1993; Radden and Sadler, 2009; Sellman, 2011). Overall, this rich literature has brought out many fruitful aspects of the connection between virtue and practice-internal goods.

However, MacIntyre's framework has been taken to support further assumptions about the nature of professional virtue. In particular, it has led to the idea that the ordinary structure for understanding virtue needs to be altered in the professional context. An influential idea is that professional virtue has its own teleological structure. Here is how Justin Oakley describes the approach he developed with Dean Cocking in *Virtue Ethics and Professional Roles* (2001):

> Because of its teleological structure, Aristotelian virtue ethics provides a natural basis for developing an ethical theory of professional roles. Which character traits count as virtues in everyday life is determined by their connections with *eudaimonia*, the overreaching goal of human life. Virtues in the context of professional roles can be derived through a similar teleological structure [. . .] For example, *health* is clearly central goal of medicine [. . .] which of a doctor's character trait count as virtues are those which help them serve the goal of patient health. (Oakley, 2013, p. 205, italics in original)

As this passage reveals, some self-styled Aristotelian accounts of professional virtue find it necessary to replace *eudaimonia* with key goods of professional practice.[4] The first thing to note about this claim is its radical nature, despite its purported Aristotelian origins. It concerns the fundamental structure that determines whether a trait is a virtue. As opposed to highlighting general moral reasons for holding certain traits to be particularly important, these accounts purport to provide a special grounding. It is not just a matter of emphasising a particular area of responsibility, but rather a model for understanding the distinct nature of professional virtue. Allegedly, this structure has parallels to the normative foundation of ordinary virtue, but it is not the same. The difference lies in what is the final end of virtuous action. The teleological structure is supposedly preserved by replacing *eudaimonia* with the key goods of professional practices. That is why I call this the key goods view.

To some extent, this approach seems to resonate with common sense. It is easy to agree that it is especially egregious for doctors to betray health or for teachers to impede education. The key ends view makes sense in light of our expectation that professionals should aim at education or health of others instead of their own flourishing. However, the investment view has already made it clear how a eudaimonistic conception can avoid positing personal flourishing as the intentional content of virtuous action. The virtuous teacher does not *aim* at flourishing, but cares about education in a way that makes this end part of her own good. Does the key goods view nevertheless capture something important about our moral evaluation of character traits?

To see the moral consequences of this alternative structure, let us consider

how it suggests we determine the status of truthfulness and trustworthiness. First, why should we consider truthfulness a medical virtue? One could argue that it is because patients have a right to know about their own conditions. This would ground the virtue in the concerns that are not peculiar to medical practice (e.g. respect for autonomy). This approach is contrary to the key goods view. The reason a doctor ought to tell the truth about the patient's condition is not that patients have a right to know (Oakley, 2013, p. 206). Rather, the status of traits like truthfulness, trustworthiness and beneficence is contingent on whether they have been shown to promote health. Traits are demoted to professional vices if they prove contrary to health. Furthermore, traits that are ordinarily considered vices may be professional virtues if they promote the key good of the practice (Oakley, 2013, p. 207).

Oakley and Cocking write that trustworthiness is a virtue because 'it helps patients feel comfortable about making full, frank, and timely disclosures of the sorts of intimate details that are necessary for effective diagnosis and treatment (2001, p. 93). Suppose we discover that diagnosis and treatment could be more effective by habituating deceit and untrustworthiness in role holders. Perhaps it is shown that diseases can be determined faster and more accurately by breaches of trust, such as performing tests that have not been consented to by the patient or investigating nondisclosed information about the patient's social background. According to the logic of the key goods view, such discoveries should cause us to rethink trustworthiness as a medical virtue. This character trait is apparently no longer a source of merit, because it does not promote the internal good of medicine. However, it is unclear how the good of health could gain the normative power to change basic norms of respect for persons. We need some way of separating virtuous character traits from monomaniacal fanaticism.

THE MORAL INTERPRETATION OF PROFESSIONAL ENDS

At this point, defenders of the key goods view would perhaps remind us of the side constraints on the promotion of key goods of practice. 'Broader social influences' and 'broad-based moral values' such as justice and patient autonomy constrain the legitimate pursuit of health (Oakley and Cocking, 2001, p. 90; Oakley, 2015). In other words, the idea of a practice-internal good is combined with the notion of constraint. This is a way to get the special teleological structure to produce right action. I will consider two ways to interpret this call for constraints on the pursuit of key professional goals. One is to read it as introducing constraints on the *pursuit* of ends—the public toleration reading. This reading is compatible with a call for a distinct teleological structure, but is not compatible with common understandings of virtuous agency. The other is to read it as introducing constraints on the *interpretation* of profession-specific ends—the constitutive reading. This is the most attractive reading, but it does not support an alternative teleological structure for professional virtue.

Let us begin with the public toleration reading, which concerns the justifiability of outcomes. This understands respect for 'broader social influences' to be a strategy that is necessary in order to be tolerated by the public. The basic idea is to take the goal of promoting health or education and add the constraints of justice and further general moral values. The public toleration reading provides us with the image of a doctor eager to promote the key good of her practice, but who manages to constrain herself to operate within the bounds of social expectations. This would fit an account of professional morality that sees role holders as 'granted freedom' by society to 'fanatically pursue their ideal' within certain ordinary moral bounds (Freedman,

1978, p. 14). This move does not lead to a unified account of virtuous agency. It resembles Aristotle's encratic or continent agent more than the virtuous (cf. Aristotle, 1999, VII, p. 9). That is, the good professional appears to be an agent who does the right thing overall, but who has motivational aims that conflict with the decision to do the right thing.

There is reason to believe that the public toleration reading is not the best interpretation of side constraints on profession-specific goods. For one, it conflicts with Oakley and Cocking's own account of virtuous agency, which precludes motivations that conflict with an appropriate conception of the ends of professional practice (2001, p. 28). If we proceed to the constitutive reading, we will find a more plausible conception of side constraints. This reading sees professional goals like health or education as having broad moral concerns as part of their meaning. That is, moral concepts are needed in order to understand the ends of professional practice, rather than to put external constraints on them. This provides a better match with the phenomenology of virtue, where ends are chosen for the sake of their worthiness.

Presumably, the value of education does not light up for LouAnne like a star in an evaluative void. Its status as a worthy practical end presupposes that it is interpreted in light of a more general evaluative schema. Part of what triggers her investment into the role is a recognition that her professional activity connects with further values like social justice, welfare and self-respect. That is, her appreciation of education is not sui generis; it is continuous with the wider moral space within which she orients herself. She does not weigh the goal of her practice against autonomy or justice. Education appears the proper goal of action only insofar as it is interpreted as worth promoting against the background of more general evaluations.

The same goes for other professional ends, like health. The sensible way to think of health, if posited as the goal of medicine, is to read it as shorthand that includes responsiveness to general moral concerns involved in medical issues. Therefore, broad-based moral considerations constrain the interpretation of what constitutes the goal of medicine, as opposed to constraining the pursuit of health.

The constitutive reading of moral constraints elucidates how the goals of professional practice call for an investment of the self. Integrating moral standards into the key ends of professional practice makes them appropriate objects of care. However, the constitutive reading conflicts with the basic procedure proposed by the key goods view. That is, the constitutive reading brings out how the idea of deriving virtues from a distinct goods-based teleological structure puts the cart before the horse. Take the example of education as the governing end of teaching. Suppose LouAnne fails to develop the virtue of patience. According to the key goods view, we determine whether LouAnne's lack of patience is a lack of professional virtue by asking how the trait in question fosters education. However, the constitutive reading indicates that we understand the key end of her profession by reflecting on what makes it a virtuous end—i.e. worth promoting for its own sake. Judging that LouAnne is not sufficiently tolerant of delay from her students implies making a judgement about what is important in her work. Her role is to promote student learning patiently, fairly and conscientiously.In this case, we are not deriving the relevant virtues from the key end of her profession. We are using an image of the virtuous professional to understand
the end itself.

This claim finds indirect support in a debate over whether teaching is a practice in MacIntyre's sense. In this debate, MacIntyre denies that teaching has its own goods, and claims that only specific subjects have goods

(MacIntyre and Dunne, 2002, p. 9). Mathematics teachers serve the good of mathematics, music teachers promote the good of music, and, allegedly, no common good exists to make teaching into a unified practice. By contrast, Dunne (2003) insists that there is an overarching goal that integrates the various fields of teaching, namely the good of helping others to share in the goods of the particular subjects (p. 369). Good teachers help others make the subjects their own. What is interesting about Dunne's account is how it gives hermeneutical priority to virtue. His argument does not present 'helping others to share in the goods of particular subjects' as a given end from which we can derive virtues. Rather, the end of teaching practice is argued for by reference to how we perceive the virtuous teacher. Dunne explains how a variety of qualities, ranging from impassioned enthusiasm to quiet empathy, give teaching a 'protean quality'. His rich description is explicitly used as an interpretive device for understanding the end of teaching. With reference to Aristotle's account of virtue, Dunne argues that 'one gets things right only against the background of countless ways of getting it wrong' (2003, p. 369).

The gist of this claim resonates with the investment view's emphasis on the mode of awareness involved in appreciative regard for something's worth. LouAnne's conception of teaching changed as she began to care about education and started to act on a direct appreciation of its worth. She went from delivering the curriculum to what she calls 'rejects from hell', to seeing her role as enabling underprivileged students to understand their own potential and to ignite some curiosity. What changed in the process of becoming a virtuous teacher was not simply her attitude toward some good, but also her understanding of what this good is.

CONCLUSION

The alternative teleological structure proposed by the key goods view implied that *eudaimonia* should not govern the professional virtues in the way it governs ordinary virtue. In developing the investment view, I have argued that disapproval of role holders who are 'just here for the money' is not properly understood if the dimension of eudaimonia is left out. Professional virtue requires a particular structure of the will (care), where the ends of professional practice matter to the role holder. The virtuous professional appreciates the worth of the key goods of her practice, and the promotion of these goods has become part of who she considers herself to be. Lack of patience or trustworthiness is not demeriting just because of the resulting inefficiency in promoting key goods. A lack of such virtues reveals inadequate appreciation of what these goods are in the first place.

However, the investment view is carried too far if taken to support a claim that there is nothing distinct about professional virtue. Professionals are entrusted with specific goods, and we evaluate them accordingly. Therefore, the problem with the key goods view is not that it highlights profession-specific goods. Its main defect is that it likens the role of these goods with the role of *eudaimonia*. The investment view shows how a eudaimonistic conception of virtuous agency involves a moral hermeneutic of professional ends. The importance of the ends can be accommodated within the traditional Aristotelian framework; there is no need to replace any structural features. When adequately interpreted, key goods like health and education can fill in the generic Aristotelian terms for intentional ends of virtuous action, like 'the noble' or 'the fine'. The resulting framework is more complex than the key goods view. It is not a neat and simple structure from which we can derive professional virtues. But the cost of this complexity is made up for in terms of plausibility and moral appeal.

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NOTES

1. David Carr was one of the targets of Higgins's earlier critique of the virtue tradition in educational philosophy (Higgins, 2003). Carr has responded by nuancing the picture (Carr, 2006).
2. That is, I do not share the impression that Frankfurt represents a 'de-gendered version of the feminist ethics of care' (Jouan, 2008, pp. 760–761). An early self-styled 'feminine approach' to care ethics is Noddings, 1984. This version of the ethics of care has been especially influential in the nursing profession (see Bishop and Scudder, 1991, 2001).
3. The distinction between caring and preferring is similar to Charles Taylor's, 1985, distinction between weak and strong evaluation.
4. It seems worth noting that similar claims have been defended without reference to MacIntyre's concept of practice, e.g. 'And so this Aristotelian account of professional virtue concludes that the virtuous professional life is the successful professional life, just as, for Aristotle, the virtuous life is the eudaimon or flourishing life' (Stovall, 2011, p. 128).

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