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Populist Political Right Opinions and Political Trust among Norwegian Youth

1. Introduction

On July 22, 2011, a car bomb exploded outside the central government offices in Oslo, killing eight people. Later that day, 69 people, mostly teenagers, were killed at the Labour Party's youth organisation's summer camp at Utøya. The 32-year-old perpetrator was a right-wing extremist. Even though large and extreme events do not necessarily require major causes, and the investigations of the terror attacks in Oslo and at Utøya confirmed that the killings were perpetrated by a "lone wolf" (Spaaij 2012; Gjørsv 2012; Borchgrevink 2012), the terror has led to a renewed interest in the political and ideological orientations of Norwegian youth, especially rightist political orientations linked to nationalist ideologies.

One of the reasons for this new interest is the Utøya tragedy, including the claim that some of the ideological positions associated with the perpetrator have wider followings than often assumed.¹ The most important reason, however, is a more significant long-term change in Western party politics: namely, the growth and institutionalisation of *new right* political parties combining liberal economical ideologies with conservative cultural orientations and scepticism towards immigration (Kitschelt 1995; Mudde 2007). Most of these rightist parties – including the Norwegian Progress Party – are clearly within the fold of conventional democratic politics. Nevertheless, several of these new parties do also express opinions indicating a certain resentment towards the conventional political system. Their most common

¹ The Norwegian researcher and specialist on totalitarian ideologies, Lars Gule, has studied radical right discussions on the Internet for several years and estimates that the perpetrator has 12,000 to 15,000 ideological followers.

and enduring critique of interest to this study concerns immigrant policies and/or as anti-elitism and populism (Mudde 2012).

An important insight from political science is that the legitimacy of societal and political institutions should not be presumed: Democracies' legitimacy depends on a continuous renewal of trust (Acemoglu and Robinson 2012; Fukuyama 2014). A timely question then becomes how these new ideological orientations might impact people's trust in social and political institutions.

Both the Utøya tragedy and more general political developments carry special importance for young people. First, the Utøya perpetrator was relatively young, and even though he was also—from all indications—an exceptional loner, the most insightful efforts to interpret the tragedy (Borchgrevink 2012; Seierstad 2013; Richards 2014) concern central aspects of mainstream youth culture. Second, young people tend to vote for radical right parties (Coffe and Voorpostel 2010), a tendency also confirmed in studies on Norwegian school elections (Ødegård et al. 2013). Third, even though their interest in politics increases as young people approach adulthood, studies on political socialisation indicate that political sympathies and attitudes established early in life tend to endure through to adult life (Jennings 2007; Jennings and van Deth 1990; Gross 2013).²

The purpose of this study is to bring these three issues – rightist political orientations, political trust, and youth studies – together to ask three questions: How might (a) new rightist politics orientations (b) affect the attitudes and actions toward societal and political institutions, understood and operationalized as trust, (c) for young people? Which rightist political orientations exist among Norwegian youth, and how widespread are these

² An argument in discussions concerning the lowering of the age for political voting is that 16-year olds are in the middle of a process of establishing political values and opinions; hence, giving them the right to vote would strengthen this process of political socialisation and have a longstanding effect on the habit of voting. See Ødegård (2011).

orientations? Do rightist political orientations carry any importance for young peoples' trust in societal and political institutions?

Answering these questions will contribute both to youth studies and political sociology. It will give a better understanding of the rightist political orientations found among young people, how young people's political orientations might differ from adults' political views, and how these new rightist political orientations matter, if at all, in the overall functioning of democratic political systems. For the field of political sociology, this research will contribute to a more complex understanding of populist right politics, and its content and functioning as part of larger political processes.

To answer these questions, a discussion of rightist politics and trust in a Norwegian context must be related to the situation of young people. To study the prevalence and possible effects of political orientations among Norwegian youth generally, a quantitative dataset presented in section three provides a foundation. The empirical analyses follow in two parts. First is an analysis of the question of the prevalence of rightist political views among Norwegian youth. Next, the research takes a closer look at how political trust might be influenced by such rightist orientations. The article ends with a summary and discussion of what contributes to rightist political orientations and how such orientations matter in trust of politically relevant institutions.

2. Rightist Politics, Trust and Young People

2.1 Extremism, Radicalism and Populism: Classification of Rightist Politics

In a seminal study, Lipset and Rokkan (1967) asserted that Norwegian politics was built on three cleavages: labour-capital, primary-secondary/tertiary industries, and urban-rural (centre-periphery) interests. Reflecting this model, post-war politics in Norway has been dominated by the social democratic Labour Party, centre parties and the Conservative Party in

various combinations. As in most Western nations, this political establishment has, for some decades, been challenged by “new politics” actors (Knutsen 1997; Hechter 2004; Jennings and van Deth 1990; Fuchs and Klingemann 1995; Aardal 2007, 2011), and the newcomer most responsible for making a difference in Norwegian party politics is the new right Progress Party which, in some elections, has emerged as the third largest party. The party shares several ideological characteristics with new right parties in other nations, but at the same time it appears more moderate and, at times, has felt the need to distance itself from some of these parties, most clearly the Swedish Democrats (Sverigedemokraterna). The Progress Party has been a government party since 2013.

The ideological field of the new right parties, and the more radical right ideologies occasionally associated with them, is complex and shifting. Even though the attempts to sum up the literature on modern rightist politics in international and Norwegian contexts comprise a large number of perspectives (Jupskås 2012; Mudde 2007; Rydgren 2007; Marsdal 2007; Hernes 2006; Bjørklund 2003, 2007; Hagtvet 2012; Sørensen 2012; Raknes 2012), there is also a relatively coherent set of themes running through these studies. To develop a useful theoretical framework from this multitude of approaches, Mudde's (2007) construction of rightist ideologies on a “ladder of conceptual abstraction” (in Figure 1) illustrates how different rightist political orientations vary from more conventional right politics to the extreme.

- Figure 1: Ideological ladder of abstraction -

Starting from the bottom left, the ideological ladder leads from “nationalism” towards the extreme right, adding key ideological features one by one. The first ideological position comprises *nationalism*. In most discussions, nationalism has both a political (civic) and a cultural (ethnic) side (Calhoun 1997; Smith 2009). As such, nationalism itself is a factor in

most nations' civic identities and is not necessarily controversial until the congruence of the political and the cultural is questioned. The question then becomes who actually belongs to a nation's polity, and a usual way to respond to this anxiety is to question immigrants' abilities and rights to participate in and benefit from this nation's polity. The result could then be some type of xenophobia, and nationalism combined with xenophobia results in what Mudde labels *nativism*. The following step is to combine nativism with populism and/or authoritarianism—a step that leads to the position mostly associated with *radical right* parties and groups. For many, the purview of the radical right appears to be scepticism towards, or mistrust in, established political elites, which, in turn, leads several of the radical right groups to question the factual openness and inclusiveness of political institutions. This questioning could also lead to less trust in social and political institutions. A closely related alternative is to opt for more authoritarian and traditional values, more religious (Christian) values, the strengthening of family values, more discipline in schools, and a stronger police power. At this stage – nationalism + xenophobia + authoritarianism –the (general) radical right position exists. The final step, adding anti-democratic attitudes and actions, leads to an *extreme right* position. In short, modern populist right politics comprises a spectre of parties and ideologies, from more innocent nationalism through nativism and radical rights to more extreme positions.

The conceptual ladder covers a political landscape whereby the ideology behind the Utøya tragedy is on, or even beyond, the top level, and conventional new right politics is on the bottom level. In the study of the prevalence of rightist attitudes, a decisive question is that of which classes of rightist orientations are expected in a survey of the general youth population. On the one hand, the ideology associated with the Progress Party, occasionally flirting with nationalist and xenophobic sentiments (nativism), would be expected to show up rather clearly. On the other hand, at present, there seem to be no large or visible right extremist groups in Norway (Fangen and Carlson 2013; Jupskås 2012). Accordingly,

extremism which rejects democratic values is probably too marginal to be detected in the general surveys applied in this study, particularly given that some rightist sympathisers are occasionally eager to communicate that they are strongly in favour of democracy, especially democracy implied in direct popular referendums (Raknes 2012).

Because of such complexities in rightist ideologies, this study utilizes two measurements for political rightism. First, following a more inductive assessment of the different types of rightist groups from the data, the result of this approach will be termed a *new right* political dimension. Second, based on the theoretical framework presented above, a constructed variable will, as much as the data allows, sort out the respondents with more radical values; from this approach comes an example of *nativism*.

For the second main area of inquiry – associations between political orientation and trust – it is assumed that young Norwegians tend to question existing institutions rather than denying them totally. Therefore, this study's focus is tendencies towards mistrust in the social institutions representing a liberal political system—a mistrust that is not equivalent to a denial of democratic values. To a certain extent, mistrust might even be considered a critical and healthy posture, but for some it could be a first indication of a process de-legitimising the political system, itself a significant step towards more extreme (i.e., non-democratic) attitudes and actions.

2.2 *Trust and Legitimacy*

Trust in democratic political institutions matters because the functioning of these institutions –making decisions on behalf of their citizens – depends on people's trust in them. Trust has been the focus of much research (Hardin 2006; Bagnasco 2001; Castiglione, Van Deth, and Wolleb 2008; Lin and Erickson 2008). In this study, the context is Norway, a country with comparatively high levels of trust in its political institutions (Gilley 2012;

Segaard and Wollebæk 2011).³ Accordingly, there should be few reasons to worry about the legitimacy of the democratic institutions in Norway. For young people, the picture appears more ambivalent. On the one hand, the claims have long been that young people today tend to shy away from party politics, are less concerned, interested, and involved, and are more apathetic and cynical than previous generations (Furlong and Cartmel 2007; Ødegård 2010). On the other hand, international empirical research on trust among young people seems to tell a similar story to that for the adult population: comparisons of political trust among youth from different nations show that Norwegian adolescents have a high level of “trust in government-related institutions” (Torney-Purta and Amadeo 2003; Schulz et al. 2010).

Why, then, should one be concerned about political trust in the Norwegian setting? A partial answer can be found in Delhey and Newton’s (2005) explanation of the high levels of trust in Nordic countries. The factors they emphasise as conducive to high levels of trust are “ethnic homogeneity, a protestant religious tradition, ‘good government,’ national wealth and income equality.”⁴ From this perspective, it seems that most factors at the time of the study – economics, politics, and religion – point towards continuously high levels of trust. This assumption is further supported by the fact that Norway, contrary to several other European countries, so far has avoided financial troubles, and its unemployment rates are low, including among young people (Hyggen, 2013). Finally, youth studies show that young people today are more law-abiding than previous generations and tend to conform to the present society’s values and expectations (Hegna, Ødegård, and Strandbu 2013). Nonetheless, an important factor with respect to the high level of trust is growing economic inequality. Coherent cultures and economic success also give rise to frustrated experiences of marginalisation and exclusion (Hegna, Ødegård, and Strandbu 2013). The main challenges for the development of trust,

³ A paradoxical situation is described in Borchgrevink (2012, 303) where the high level of trust was actually part of what made the Utøya tragedy possible. The perpetrator lured the young people out of hiding by assuming a police identity and saying that the police had arrived.

⁴ See also (Wilkinson and Pickett 2010).

therefore, concern shifts in ethnic and religious homogeneity, precisely the topics on which radical right parties tend to focus.⁵ How political actors and young people articulate and politicise these questions can influence institutional trust.

A further question is how the Utøya tragedy could eventually influence trust among young people. Research by Wollebæk et al. (2012) seems to indicate that the terror event reinforced interpersonal and institutional trust and civic values, especially in young people. The conclusion was that instead of having an “end-of-innocence effect,” the attacks resulted in a “remobilisation of trust.” The further question is whether this “remobilisation effect” was enduring nine months later when data was collected. For instance, a study on increased trust following the 9/11 terrorist attacks in New York showed that such an effect lasts about six months (Sander and Putnam 2010).

The background picture of our study is a society with a relatively high level of trust, also among young people, in the aftermath of the Utøya tragedy. Yet, at the same time as the general economic situation points towards a future of trust, some of the political developments highlighted in this article, especially political orientations relating to nationalism and immigration, could imply a potential development towards more distrust.

The article addresses the question of the prevalence of rightist political orientations and their influence on the level of political trust among Norwegian youth. Earlier in the paper, some factors of importance to this question appeared, the most important being how nationalism and attitudes concerning immigration might affect levels of trust. A further question is whether individual characteristics matter in political attitudes and trust. A review of previous research indicates that many of the same variables influence both political orientations and trust. Age does normally matter for political orientations and trust, but in this study, the differences in age were probably too small to make much difference. Nevertheless,

⁵ There is a huge body of literature on whether and how ethnic diversity fosters or harnesses trust. See for example (Uslaner 2012).

age has been included to ensure that even a small age effect is not overlooked. One important characteristic of rightist groups is their male dominance, both with respect to factual participation and the predominance of masculine values (Rydgren, 2007). In terms of trust, empirical studies do not seem to provide clear answers on the implications of age and gender (Newton and Zmerli, 2011). An explanatory factor often discussed in relation to radical right politics is the assumption that the working class tends to support new rightist parties to a greater extent than other groups (Rydgren 2007). A similar argument is found in relation to trust: the middle- and upper-classes' overrepresentation in most societal and political institutions could make the working class less trusting of these institutions.

3. Data and Methods

To draw a general picture of the right-wing political orientations among young people, this study included the data from the survey *Young in Oslo 2012*, in which the total population of students in the two final years of compulsory lower secondary school and in the first year of upper secondary school were invited to participate. In Norway, 98.5% of adolescents between 12 and 15 years of age attend lower secondary school. Upper secondary school is not compulsory, but about 97% of those leaving lower secondary school attend upper secondary school the following autumn. Five schools refused to participate due to lack of resources. A total of 9,734 respondents, 72% of the population of the participating schools, answered the questionnaire. The remaining 28% of the population either opted not to participate or had prolonged absences from school. The data collection was administered by the schools in cooperation with Norwegian Social Research (NOVA), and pupils completed the questionnaires online while in school. The strength of the data comes from the number of participants and the fact that the sample covers close to three cohorts of young people. Its weakness lies in the

restricted number of measurements of political attitudes. The survey, nevertheless, provides a rich source of data for answering the research questions.

To identify rightist political orientations, two methodological approaches were used in the study. The first approach was to use a comprehensive list of political statements and ask respondents about the importance they attached to each statement. Next, use of a factor analysis reduced the large number of political positions to a more restricted set of latent political ideologies, among which it was assumed there would be a prevalent rightist orientation—something similar to new right politics. For a more informed theoretical approach aiming at a somewhat more radical orientation (e.g., nativism), the study included an additive index (see section 4 for concrete specifications). For the second objective of the article – to ascertain the extent to which trust depended on rightist political orientations – multivariate regression analyses controlled for the effects of several variables. These regressions were set up as path analyses (Byrne 2010) to distinguish the effects of social background and ideological orientations on trust. Thus, path analyses helped reveal how the selection of control variables mattered both for rightist orientations and trust, and then, how rightist orientations, controlling for social background, affect levels of trust. Even though path analyses give an impression of causality in sequentially structuring relations between variables, the results do not necessarily imply causality.

4. Political Rightist Orientations: What Are They?

To investigate political right orientations, the survey started out with a question containing 21 propositions (see Table 1), and respondents were asked whether they considered these “very important,” “somewhat important,” or “not important.” The first explorative and inductive approach used a factor analysis to extract a set of latent dimensions from the many political opinions. For such analyses, an interesting question in itself was:

“Where will we end on Mudde's ladder, and how will the factors correspond to theoretical views of political right orientations? Which political ideological elements go into each of these factors?”

- Table 1: Factor Analyses of Political Orientations -

Table 1 shows that a first factor (E&W) involved a mixture of concerns about economic growth (“provide high economic growth,” “provide work,” “better personal economy”) and welfare (“safe and dignified old age,” “make sure no one is poor”) as well as a high score for “law and order” and “environmental protection.”⁶ The second factor (L&N) conjured economic liberalism with scepticism in relation to what should be seen as public responsibilities (“reduce public involvement in private life,” “reduce taxes,” “privatise schools”) and nativism (“success in sport,” “keep Norway free and independent,” “protect Norway against immigrant culture”). The third factor (ENV) addressed elements that were mainly concerned with environmental questions (“protect nature,” “sustainable population of carnivores”). The fourth dimension (SOL) was oriented towards solidarity and helping others (“admit more refugees,” “give aid to poorer nations”).

The most immediate interpretation of the first and weightiest factor is that it supports a hypothesis of hegemonic conformism among Norwegian youth: they do want both economic growth and protection of the environment. Moreover, the second factor indicates that the most widespread types of nationally oriented attitudes go together with pro-market views and corresponding levels of state scepticism. In short, it seems that a relatively strong ideological movement corresponds with the political orientations of the Progress Party: scepticism toward immigration policies, support for economic liberalism, and distrust in public solutions – by now a classic new right political position.

⁶ According to Inglehart (1990) “maintain order” taps into an authoritarian value set (materialists) whereas “environmentalism” is part of a post-material set of values.

A second approach, based on the theoretical framework outlined above, was inspired by the ideological ladder (see Figure 1), from which an index summing up information from several of the political opinions among the above questions was constructed. Looking to the ladder, attitudes move from nationalism to the first and most basic indication of a more radical right ideology – nativism – by including measures of nationalism paired with scepticism; next, attitudes move toward opposing immigration (xenophobia) and the belief that only a specific group of people (defined by culture, language and ideology) belongs to a state’s citizenry. In practical terms, this identifies a group responding positively to statements such as “Keep Norway free and independent of international influence,” “Protect Norwegian culture and language against Anglo-American influence,” and “Protect Norwegian culture against influence from immigrant culture.” In addition to nativist sympathies, the statement “maintain law and order,” added some authoritarian emphasis to nativism. Since this study’s measure of authoritarianism is interpreted as “weak,” it seemed inappropriate to label this group “radical right” as would fit into Mudde’s notions. Instead, the group ideology was termed “nativism.” Both measures of rightist political orientations are the at the lower levels of Mudde’s ideological ladder. Based on the theoretical considerations, this group of youth was expected to be less trusting of political institutions than other young people.

The factor analysis showed that the common political orientation described in elections studies and mostly linked to the Progress Party is also found among young people. A somewhat more rightist but still rather moderate political orientation, nativism, was supported by 13% of Norwegian youth.

- Table 2: Descriptive Statistics

5. Political Rightist Orientations and Trust

The study contained a set of nine questions about degree of trust in various institutions. The question of rightist political orientations had an influence on trust in these institutions, particularly in five - the police, judiciary, parliament, government, and the media – which were then included in the study. Control variables, were gender and the students' grade levels. Parents' educational levels (whether none, one, or both parents had attended higher education) and whether or not the parents were born in Norway were used as background variables (see Table 2).

To get a full picture of the results, findings from ten different models appear in Figure 2. Each figure (model) contains three sets of variables. First, there are (to the right in the figures) five dependent variables representing trust in five different institutions. Second, there are (in the middle of the figures) two versions of the independent variable of most interest to our study: political right attitudes. The first version (left column of figures) results from the factor analyses – new right positions - and the second (right column of figures) from the more theoretically-based index: nativism. Five dependent variables and two versions of the central independent variable give rise to ten models. Third, a set of control variables were included: age, gender, immigrant status, and parents' education. Researchers expected the social background variables to influence both political attitudes and trust, and the assumption was further that some of the effects of the social background variables would be mediated by political attitudes. Accordingly, path models were applied to capture and visualize this complexity.

- Figure 2: Path Analyses -

Looking into the question of the extent to which rightist political attitudes influenced trust, we see that the first way to measure political attitudes (new right politics, factor: L&N) for three of the five trust types – judiciary, parliament and government – have a small negative effect. For “police,” the effect is not significant, and for “media,” the effect is positive. For the other measures of political rightist orientations, “nativism,” the effects are significantly positive for all trust types, but vary from low influence on trust in Parliament to the higher in trust in media.

Interestingly and somewhat surprisingly, this result indicates first that there is a difference between the manner in which the two measures of political right orientations affect trust. Looking in greater detail into how the various dimensions comprising the L&N factor (“new right”) work, the “economic liberalism” dimensions produced negative effects, not the questions addressing nationalism.⁷ In sum, the overall findings indicate that right political opinions, as measured in this paper, go together with high trust in central political institutions and turn negative only when economic liberal orientations are included in the measure (as in the factor analysis). Accordingly, the low level of trust that comes with the new right position is probably more a result of a classic left/right cleavage – positive views on market solutions and sceptical views on state involvement – than something relating to the political right orientations studied in this article. Rightist political orientations on low levels in Mudde’s hierarchy are not in themselves conducive to mistrust in political institutions among young people.

In terms of social background, age had no significant effects in six of the ten models, and had only small effects where significant. This should come as no surprise, given the small age variance in the sample. Females are altogether more trusting than males, and males tend

⁷ This comes to the fore when investigating correlations between all the indicators going into the factor analysis and the trust variables. Except for trust in the media, the correlations between the economic liberal dimensions and the trust variables are negative, and for all types of trust, the correlations with nationalist stances are positive.

to find political populist right attitudes more attractive than females. Immigrant status, to various extents, goes together with low trust in institutions and support for populist right positions. Finally, when respondents' parents had higher levels of education, the result was high institutional trust and less politically right attitudes.

What is interesting to note, however, is that the path analyses clearly indicated that the effects of social background on trust mediated through political right opinions are rather multifaceted, and that interpretations of young people's political orientations should take contextual factors into consideration. The effect of age (because it only includes three levels) is marginal and immigrant background matters in more or less the same way regardless of type of rightist political attitudes. For gender, however, the picture is a bit more intricate. Women are, in general, negative towards rightist political orientations, but much more so for the new right than for the nativist view. As for parents' educational levels, there is a negative effect for new right orientations, but no effect for nativism. Similarly, immigrant status is positively linked to new right orientations, but without effect for nativism. Taken together, this indicates that the nativism view is less embedded in social background than the new right political orientation, which is also reflected in the low R-square values for nativist orientations. In terms of the quality of the models, the overall impression is that the independent variables explained a rather modest part of the variance in the dependent variables of interest, although considerably more for the "new right" position than for the nativist view.

6. Discussion and conclusion

The background of this article was specific to the dramatic events in Oslo and at Utøya in 2011, and the more general development of new right populist political orientations. The point was not to link the tragedy with the more general political trend but to highlight the

existence of two strands of rightist political orientations: nationalist extremism and conventional new right politics. From this, the questions were (a) what type of political right orientations are found among Norwegian youth, and (b) how do various strands of political right ideologies among young people influence their trust in social and political institutions.

The first question was partly explorative: what kind of political right orientations will we find among Norwegian 14- to 17-year olds, and how prevalent are they? A factor analysis identified a general new right political orientation – second in importance only to the factor “Economy & Welfare” – consisting mainly of one set of economic liberal orientations and one set of nationalist orientations. This orientation seems to represent a general new right populist orientation, in many ways reminiscent of the ideology of the Norwegian new right party, the Progress Party. Since young people’s political opinions often reflect those of their parents (Jennings 2007), it is interesting but not surprising to find that a specific Norwegian variant of new right populism also shows up in a survey of young people. Extreme rightist orientations were not expected, so the researchers instead chose to construct a theoretically informed index which identified a political orientation containing nationalism with an imprint of scepticism towards immigration and support for authoritarian values: nativism. Thirteen percent of our respondents fell into this category.

Part of the background picture is that Norway is a high trust society, but at the same time, there is a worry that radical rightist political orientations might weaken the trust that Norwegian youth have had in political institutions, or that the radical rightist political orientations are the result of less trust in political institutions. The analyses give a somewhat ambivalent answer to this question. On the one hand, the *nativist* orientation seems to go together with a higher-than-average trust in political institutions. On the other hand, the more general *new right* orientation appears to weaken the trust in these institutions. When the new

right orientation is split into two dimensions, the economic liberal dimension, and not the nationalist dimension, resulted in lower trust in political institutions.

Three findings stand out. First, the explorative factor analysis revealed political dimensions resembling the general political scene in Norway. This shows that young people in their mid-teens group themselves along political dimensions that are familiar to the Norwegian political landscape, and that these political orientations are rather conventional. Of special interest is the fact that the right political orientations showing up in the factor analyses, in most respects, resemble the new right political profile of the Progress Party, which comprises both nationalism and economic liberalism. The second finding is that the various components of the new right political orientation give slightly different results regarding their importance for trust in public institutions. The economic liberal elements are the dimensions correlated with lower trust in public institutions, not the nationalist ones. This suggests that it may be useful to distinguish more clearly between the different components of right-wing political orientations in future studies. The third main finding is that nationalism and/or nativism among adolescents is not associated with lower trust in social institutions.

Given discussions on the legitimacy of the politics of modern democracies and the idea that a threat to these institutions might emanate from the radical populist political right, these findings present a message worthy of consideration. Even if the mainstream youth scored higher on trust than those adhering to rightist opinions, the most important result from this study is that young people with nationalist and nativist sympathies do trust public and political institutions. This finding questions the idea of a direct link between new right, nativism, and populist right orientations and more extreme right-wing orientations, and there is, accordingly, no agreement in the literature when it comes to this question. One argument is that the populist new right paves the way for extremism by making direct or more implicit racist and xenophobic arguments a legitimate part of the public political debate. The opposite

argument sees the new right parties as arenas that capture frustration among certain groups of people – often those with direct involvement with immigrants as neighbours or competing with them in the labour market. The argument goes further that the populist new right parties operate as a buffer against extremism by serving as a channel for the more legitimate frustrations, especially of the working class population. These important questions were beyond the remit of this paper, but they should be a topic for future studies in the field.

Regarding further research in this area, there is a need for data that is more directly aimed at understanding political attitudes among adolescents as well as data that makes it possible to distinguish more clearly between some of the central attitudes of various right political groups. Secondly, it would also be helpful to examine qualitative data, in addition to the type of quantitative data used in this study, to provide a better understanding of the central positions and contexts described. Given the marginal position of the more extreme political attitudes, there will also be a need for studies that are aimed more directly at adherents to these communities.

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Table 1. Factor Analyses of Political Orientations (“goals for the nation”). Factor Loadings.

| | Economy & Welfare (E &W) | <i>New Right</i> Liberalism & Nationalism (L&N) | Environment (ENV) | Solidarity (SOL) |
|---|---|---|--------------------------|-------------------------|
| Give people more influence in important political decisions | ,601 | ,113 | ,245 | ,105 |
| <i>Provide high economic growth</i> | ,661 | ,378 | ,020 | -,103 |
| Protect the environment against pollution | ,558 | -,040 | ,571 | ,193 |
| <i>Provide people with a safe and dignified old age, even if young people have to pay for it.</i> | ,512 | ,211 | ,374 | ,211 |
| Maintain law and order | ,697 | ,069 | ,381 | ,037 |
| <i>Provides work for everyone who wants to work</i> | ,736 | ,027 | ,275 | ,195 |
| Make sure everyone gets a better personal economy | ,709 | ,297 | ,006 | ,257 |
| <i>Make sure no one is poor in Norway</i> | ,588 | ,119 | ,107 | ,436 |
| Reduce public involvement in private life | ,371 | ,485 | ,255 | ,011 |
| <i>Promote Norwegian success in international sports</i> | ,255 | ,582 | ,189 | -,013 |
| Keep Norway free and independent of international influence | ,386 | ,406 | ,378 | -,026 |
| <i>Protect Norwegian culture and language against Anglo-American influence</i> | -,002 | ,521 | ,512 | ,186 |
| Reduce taxes on gasoline and diesel | ,377 | ,657 | -,190 | ,089 |
| <i>Leave more of the care for elders to children and other relatives</i> | ,155 | ,628 | ,024 | ,434 |
| Reduce prevalence of divorces | ,154 | ,559 | ,130 | ,363 |
| <i>Privatize all public schools</i> | -,110 | ,714 | ,101 | ,288 |
| Protect Norwegian culture against influence from immigrant culture | ,090 | ,602 | ,376 | -,328 |
| <i>Protect what is left of pristine Norwegian nature against all type of destruction (f ex roads and forestry)</i> | ,419 | ,076 | ,672 | ,094 |
| Make sure we have sustainable populations of the large carnivores | ,240 | ,232 | ,657 | ,182 |
| <i>Make Norway admit more refugees and asylum seekers</i> | ,260 | ,033 | ,136 | ,783 |
| Give more of incomes from the oil production to poor nations rather than save them for ourselves | ,097 | ,262 | ,162 | ,763 |
| <i>Percent explained variacne</i> | 19.6 | 16.5 | 11.4 | 10.4 |
| | | | | |

Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis. Rotation Method: Varimax with Kaiser Normalization.

Table 2. Descriptive statistics, independent variables, frequencies percents.

| | <i>Frequencies %</i> | | |
|---------------------|---|--------------|----------------------------|
| Gender (female) | Male: 49.6 Female: 50.4 | | |
| Grade (age) | 9 th grade, primary school: 33.1 10 th grade, primary school: 33.9 1 st grade, high school: 33.1 | | |
| Parent's education | No parents with higher education : 20.3 One of parents with higher education: 26.5 Both parents with higher education: 53.2 | | |
| Immigrant status | Both or one parent Norwegian born: 67.8 Both parents foreign born: 32.2 | | |
| Nativism | Yes: 12.6 No: 77.4 | | |
| | <i>Range</i> | <i>Means</i> | <i>Standard deviations</i> |
| Trust in judiciary | 1:4 | 2.61 | 1.03 |
| Trust in police | 1:4 | 2.85 | 1.03 |
| Trust in Parliament | 1:4 | 2.65 | 1.01 |
| Trust in government | 1:4 | 2.61 | 1.02 |
| Trust in media | 1:4 | 2.31 | 0.93 |

Figure 1: Ideological ladder of abstraction, inspired by Mudde (2007)





Figure 2. Path Analysis. The effect of right political orientations on trust. Regression coefficients for significant ($p < 0.05$) variables.

New Rightist Orientations



Nativist Orientations

