

Дополнительные дискуссионные материалы

Additional materials for discussion

R. W. Vaagan

Oslo and Akershus University College of Applied Sciences, Norway

CRISIS COMMUNICATION AS A PEDAGOGICAL METHOD IN MEDIA & COMMUNICATION STUDIES AND IN JOURNALISM STUDIES IN NORWAY

ABSTRACT

Crisis communication has been a regular topic in Media & Communication Studies and in Journalism Studies in Norway for many years. This article outlines experiences at Oslo and Akershus University College of Applied Sciences (HiOA) with taking part in two large-scale anti-terror exercises in 2006 and 2012 in and around the Norwegian capital Oslo. The main organizers were The Norwegian Directorate for Civil Protection and Emergency Planning and The Norwegian Police Directorate. Students from The Department of Journalism and Media Studies at HiOA staffed online (intranet) newspapers to simulate “media pressure” on 40–50 key institutions with a total of 4,000–5,000 staff from all management levels right up to the Prime Minister’s office. The analysis and findings confirm that from the vantage point of a tertiary education institution, the benefits of taking

part by far outweighed some drawbacks. Specifically, the exercises a) gave students first-hand experience in crisis communication and crisis management; b) have improved conceptually and take into account relevant crisis communication theory; c) reflect that Norway still has to come to terms with the tragic events of 22 July 2011 when 77 Norwegians were murdered by a Norwegian terrorist; d) suggest that many of the 40–50 organizations singled out to be trained in the exercises are still inadequately prepared for terror strikes.

Keywords: extended classroom, internships, anti-terror exercises, crisis communication

EDUCATOR-EMPLOYER COOPERATION

In Norway, tertiary educational institutions interact with the labour market and potential employers in a variety of ways. By law, the governing boards of all tertiary education facilities have external representatives from the public and private sectors who are supposed to represent the interests of the tax payers. Furthermore, evaluation and accreditation procedures take account of the needs of society and the job market, in addition to factors such as student grades, study programmes, student opinion, scientific publishing, staff and curricula development, level of internationalization and scholarly ranking etc. In Norway these factors are important for all tertiary education institutions, which are all governed by one single law for universities and university colleges (NOKUT 2013). While all teaching is supposed to be research-based, irrespective of institutional status, universities tend to prioritize research more than teaching. Conversely, university colleges of applied science are more preoccupied with teaching than research, especially teaching that involves networking and interaction with public institutions and private sector enterprises. Three examples of such networking stressed in this article are a) joint projects, b) inviting practitioners to meet and lecture students and c) securing internships for students in the public and private sectors. As this article seeks to demonstrate, this type of educator-employer cooperation or what we could call “the extended classroom”, is instrumental in providing students with real-life experience and job opportunities, and it also benefits employers.

Oslo and Akershus University College of Applied Sciences (HiOA) is Norway's largest state university college. With 17,000 students and 2,500 academic and non-academic staff, it is organized in 4 faculties and two specialist centres, offering a variety of 56 BA, 35 MA and 6 PhD programmes. Close links with the labour market and a broad spectrum of professions characterize HiOA, where internships are seen as the interface between education and professional life. This strategy will continue when HiOA in 2015 applies for full university status (HiOA 2013).

The Department of Journalism and Media Studies offers BA programmes in Journalism, Photo journalism and Media and communication studies plus an MA programme in Journalism. The two undergraduate programmes in Journalism and Photo journalism can be traced back to the 1950s and 1980s, respectively. Each year 70 journalism students and 12 photo journalism students are accepted. Internships have always been regarded as vital and are compulsory in both programmes. Journalism students spend 10 weeks (15 ECTS) in the last part of their 3rd semester as interns, whereas photo journalism students devote their entire 5th semester (14 weeks or 30 ECTS) to internships in Norwegian newspapers and media houses. A tariff agreement between The Norwegian Journalist Association and The Federation of Media Enterprises / Confederation of Norwegian Enterprises, guarantees that student interns get 40% of the starting salary of new journalists / photo journalists.

Media and communication studies, which are the focus of this article since it is the main responsibility of the author, handle internships somewhat differently. The first batch of students from the undergraduate programme in Media and communication studies received their diplomas in 2007. During their 3-year programme, students have an option to spend 11 weeks as interns in a variety of public institutions or private enterprises. 2 weeks are part of their 5th semester and a 15 ECTS optional course, while 9 weeks take place in their final 6th semester as a 15 ECTS optional course, totalling 30 ECTS over two semesters. Over the last 7 years approximately 150 internship agreements with institutional or corporate partners have been made, including The Police Directorate and The Directorate

for Civil Protection and Emergency Planning. These are informal agreements and the students are in most cases not paid. They are also encouraged to seek out an internship that interests them and matches their qualifications. In student evaluations, the internships, albeit optional, are seen as the most important part of the entire undergraduate programme. This is the interface between education and professional life; internships give students an invaluable opportunity to get first-hand experience, contacts and relevant media productions for their student portfolios which can lead to later employment. Host institutions are also overwhelmingly positive. From the host institutions' point of view, the practical drawbacks of allocating people and resources to mentoring a student are more than offset by the new ideas, impulses and updated knowledge that young student interns often bring in with them.

This is especially the case when it comes to social media where young students as a rule are very skilled. Although unemployment figures in Norway for several years have been among the lowest in Europe, job announcements can attract hundreds of applicants. To the employer, the cost of job announcements, shortlisting and interviewing can be considerable, as compared with recruitment through internships. In the labour market, legislation designed to protect the rights of job seekers (The Discrimination Act, 2006) and employees (The Working Environment Act, 1977) mean that internships can be a more efficient and informal way of vetting candidates for later employment, and at the same time adding to the employer's earned reputation, branding and CSR.

ANTI-TERROR EXERCISES

Norwegian authorities, normally the police, regularly organize anti-terror exercises in different parts of the country to improve the capacity of key institutions and staff to handle terror situations. In order to not confuse or frighten the public, such exercises with their simulated events are often staged in remote locations, and are always announced to the public well in advance. These exercises get some coverage in local print and broadcast media, but an effort is made to

draw a clear distinction line between exercise and reality. Participants in exercises who are visible to the public e.g. all wear distinctive yellow vests marked “Exercise”. Integral to such exercises are “media games”, where online (intranet) newspapers are set up by the police and staffed with students from Journalism studies and/or Media and communication studies from different educational institutions.

These subjects are taught at several of Norway’s seven universities and 26 university colleges around the country. These online exercise newspapers are supposed to simulate real-life press coverage and exert “media pressure” on participants. The two exercises described in this article which took place in 2006 and 2012, were exceptional since they were located in and around the capital Oslo and were large-scale. A total of 260 students and 10 teachers from The Department of Journalism and Media Studies at Oslo and Akershus University College of Applied Sciences were involved.

A key issue for the second exercise in 2012 was the expected impact of the national tragedy of 22 July 2011, when a Norwegian terrorist had killed 77 people in Oslo city centre and on the island of Utøya just outside Oslo.

EXERCISE OSLO, 17–18 OCTOBER 2006

As I have explained in more detail elsewhere (Vaagan 2008), “Exercise Oslo 2006” was the largest civilian-led crisis exercise ever in Norway. The scale of the exercise was influenced by the terrorist bombings in Madrid in March 2004 and in London in July 2005. In addition, the tsunami in the Indian Ocean in December 2004 when 84 Norwegian tourists in Thailand died, also played in. Exercise Oslo was staged in Oslo and involved 50 key organizations and 4,000 participants, from operative personnel to strategic decision-makers at ministry level. The exercise took place over a 30-hour period 17–18 October 2006, and was organized by The Directorate for Civil Protection and Emergency Planning on the instructions of The Ministry of Justice and the Police. The main objective was to prepare Norwegian society to handle terrorist strikes. A small part of the exercise involved a “media game”: An online (intranet) newspaper *Oslo News* was set

up by The Police Directorate, and staffed by voluntary participants, both professional journalists from the Norwegian State Broadcasting Corporation (NRK), and students and teachers in both Media and communication studies and Journalism studies from what was then Oslo University College. In August 2011, Oslo University College merged with Akershus University College to become the present Oslo and Akershus University College of Applied Sciences.

The news room was located at The Police University College. A total of 108 articles on many aspects of the exercise, written mostly by students and all by-lined, were published. The terror scenario envisaged a fictional Islamist group controlled from an imaginary country Tagistan striking against civilian infrastructure targets in Norway, echoing the attacks in Madrid and London 2004-2005. The fictional bombs were set off as a reaction to Norwegian involvement in oil and gas exploration in Tagistan.

Other members of the exercise included The Norwegian Police Directorate, the Directorate for Health and Social Affairs, the City of Oslo, and the County Governor of Oslo and Akershus as well as many sub-units especially in health and transport. Interestingly, the Norwegian armed forces were not involved. In Norway, there is a constitutional ban on using armed forces against the civilian population and there has therefore historically been a certain distance and lack of cooperation between the police and armed forces. The police is extremely reluctant to ask for assistance from the armed forces in the event of emergencies or crises. This became evident during the tragic events of 22 July 2011 described later. An inter-ministerial crisis group also took part, reporting to the Prime Minister's Office. In addition, the British, Danish, Finnish, Icelandic and Pakistani embassies in Oslo also participated, reflecting the increasingly heterogeneous demography of Oslo. Basic information about the exercise for the public was also made available in English, Somali, Urdu and Arabic.

From Oslo University College, 120 first-, second- and third-year students in Media and communication studies as well as 70 first-year students in Journalism studies plus 9 teachers from both fields volunteered to staff and help run the newspaper. Also, four visiting students in Media and information management from Hogeschool

van Amsterdam joined in as part of the international group handling relations with embassies and the foreign press.

Students and teachers worked in shifts of 8 hours. Some students worked one shift while most teachers had two shifts. Meals were served in the refectory. At any given time there were 4 teachers and about 40 students available. About 40 of the first-year journalism students kept up “media pressure” on key stakeholders by telephone. The news desk was headed by a managing editor, alternately from The Norwegian State Broadcasting Corporation and Oslo University College. The news desk was staffed mainly by students from Journalism studies and some students in Media and communication studies, plus supervisors from the police. Most of the Media and communication students acted as field reporters, visiting the sites of the bombings, hospitals, key infrastructure points and attending press conferences. They had their own cameras and were given a limited number of mobile phones by The Police Directorate. They wrote their stories at a variety of locations. The author worked as group leader and as managing editor on one shift. Most of the 108 articles that were published were in Norwegian and only 10% had photos. Many of the articles were short news items of 50–100 words or less. Some by-lines had one author, others two, while some were anonymous press releases. In several cases, police officers in the newsroom sanctioned or vetoed article content, so there was little editorial freedom.



Figure 1. Photo of bombed-out bus
(Courtesy of The Directorate for Civil Protection and Emergency Planning)

Well in advance of the exercise, Oslo University College cautioned the organizers against using religious or ethnic stereotypes in preparing threat scenarios. At the time, minorities constituted 9% of the Norwegian population, and 25% in the capital. As one of the largest tertiary educational institutions in the capital, we had (and have) a significant proportion of minority students. The organizers to some extent complied with our wish. Although the background scenario of the police was restrained and without direct reference to Islam or Muslims, it nonetheless did suggest risk and threat perceptions based on a stereotype of the Muslim terrorist in conflict with the secular, affluent West. This stereotype was muted in *Oslo News* but clearly present in text and footage provided by the organizers and more surprisingly by The Norwegian State Broadcasting Corporation.

All participating students and staff were given a questionnaire by DSB to fill in, and the responses formed part of a 47-page evaluation. Overall, the exercise was described as very useful, including some shortcomings in information sharing among key institutions. The report was primarily concerned with cooperation among the major participants, but failed to mention the participation of 200 students and teachers from Oslo University College. I therefore later sent DSB a draft version of an article (Vaagan 2008) which summarized the viewpoints of our institution, based on informal discussions with teachers and students. DSB had no comments to the draft article. Our viewpoints were as follows:

- It was a very useful experience in crisis communication for students and staff.
- There was a good co-operative spirit and good relations esp. with The Directorate for Civil Protection and Emergency Planning and key police personnel.
- All students and staff appreciated the diploma they received from The Directorate for Civil Protection and Emergency Planning.
- The 120 first-, second- and third-year students in Media and communication studies benefited from acting as journalists (and four as desk editors). These are tasks they normally do not do.
- The 70 first-year students in Journalism studies benefited less, since they to some extent already knew the job and judged acting

as journalists less interesting. They were e.g. not encouraged to use independent sources, as they are trained to do, but had to limit themselves to predefined sources. There were limitations on uploading photos and *Oslo News* had no possibilities to receive MMS photos.

- The 9 teachers working as either group leaders or editors thought the exercise provided valuable training for the students, and also an interesting experience as far as their own roles were concerned.

- The 9 teachers also believed editorial work and running the newspaper in some cases were hampered by non-professionals from the police, by limitations on editorial independence and journalistic freedom.

- Most of the 9 teachers believed that in the event of a participating in a new future exercise, more effort must be given to involve the media, press and public.

One factor which only became apparent later, was that one of the Norwegian students in Media and communication studies who had taken part in the exercise, Eira Kamvåg, was recruited by DSB. She moved to the city of Tønsberg approximately 100 kilometres south of Oslo where DSB has its headquarters and she continued working with DSB for several years.

EXERCISE BULL, 30 OCTOBER – 1 NOVEMBER 2012

Exercise Bull was supposed to have taken place in late 2011 in Oslo, and was the first exercise in the capital since Exercise Oslo six years earlier. Once again Oslo and Akershus University College of Applied Sciences was among the participants. But the tragic events of 22 July 2011 when 77 people were murdered in and around Oslo by the terrorist Anders Behring Breivik forced the police to postpone the exercise. When it finally did take place in late 2012, there were several similarities but also noticeable changes compared with Exercise Oslo six years earlier. Since 2007 when the first batch of Media and communication students graduated, both The Police Directorate and The Directorate for Civil Protection and Emergency Planning had joined the internship programme of Media and communication studies. Several of our students had done internships with these

organizations. We have therefore come to know each other quite well and a longstanding educator-employer relationship has developed which all sides are content with. Also, as part of the preparatory lecturing and preparation, students received a copy of the Police Directorate's handbook on crisis communication (Politiet 2010).



Figure 2. Police special forces storming airplane with suspected hijackers (Courtesy of The Police Directorate)

Although not taking part in this exercise, The Directorate for Civil Protection and Emergency Planning in 2012 gave its regular spring lecture on crisis communication to the students and demonstrated the organization's new crisis website kriseinfo.no set up in January 2012. Also missing this time was The Norwegian State Broadcasting Corporation, which nonetheless of course did report about the exercise, although it was not involved as it had been in 2006. But many of the other key organizations were the same.

This was not a civilian-led exercise. The Police Directorate and not The Directorate for Civil Protection and Emergency Planning, was now in charge and the Norwegian military were actively involved. This was a major difference from 2006. The overall purpose, however, was very similar: to train around 40 key institutions and 5,000 staff from all management levels right up to the Prime Minister's Office, at

the national and regional level in Oslo and Akershus to handle terror situations, including Oslo Airport Gardermoen and adjacent local authorities in Romerike. The media game participants included Oslo and Akershus University College of Applied Sciences but also to some extent students in Journalism from Volda University College and pupils from Breivika secondary school in Tromsø. They also provided “media pressure” by telephone and, in the case of Volda University College, by supplying the news desk with articles for publishing.

As in 2006, the threat scenario was prepared by The Police Security Service, and kept secret from most participants until shortly before the exercise started. It then became clear that a fictional terrorist organization Democratic Sealand located somewhere in the Middle East had threatened NATO member countries involved in Afghanistan and Libya with reprisal attacks. As in 2006, but less pronounced, Islam and Muslim terrorists were again the stereotyped perpetrators.

This time the police stressed that the exercise was to be the “sharpest” ever, including two simulated plane hijackings at Oslo Airport Gardermoen. The Police Directorate had also improved its intranet newspaper so that videos and photos now could easily be uploaded and integrated in cross-media content. All material was this time in Norwegian only. With regard to student participation, our Department of Journalism and Media Studies had decided that for practical reasons only 2nd and 3rd year students – 70 in all - in Media and communication studies would be involved, along with 2 teachers. In addition, one teacher from Journalism studies took part on an observer basis. The students included a visiting Russian journalism student from the MGIMO University in Moscow attending a Media and communication course who role-played as a RIA Novosti foreign correspondent. The present author was the main organizer from our institution’s side. The news desk was set up in a computer room at Oslo and Akershus University College of Applied Sciences, not at The Police University College as in 2006. Also, this time there were no police officers in the newsroom or working on the news desk. This was a major change and assured that this time there would be full editorial freedom.

The exercise started around 09:00 on 30 October and ended at midnight 1 November. We worked in 5-hour shifts, both in the newsroom staffed by 3rd year students (about 20), and the 50 field reporters which were 2nd year students. The students working in the newsroom elected their desk leader, and the field reporters chose their own shift leaders. All students had been equipped with smartphones by the Police Directorate, a clear improvement on Exercise Oslo six years earlier. Meals were paid for by the Police Directorate and delivered by outside suppliers.

A total of 144 news items were published, of which approximately 30% had either photos, videos or links to videos on YouTube or Vimeo. The desk set up several g-mail accounts for incoming traffic from field reporters and others. In addition, the Police Directorate provided a series of news releases, photos, videos and tips. All phone calls and e-mails with sources and contact persons had to be preceded by the warning “Exercise” in order to avoid possible misunderstandings. All field reporters wore yellow vests marked “Exercise” for easy identification.



Figure 3. Students working in newsroom during Exercise Bull. Desk leader Henrikke Vågen (left) and shift leader Janni Frederiksen Kalafatis (right) (Photo: R.Vaagan)

All news items were by-lined and copies could be taken by students for their own portfolios. These are potentially useful for subsequent job applications and interviews. Below is an example of the type of article that was published.

Hijacking averted.

30.10.12,
18:32 hrs

Drama as police special forces storm passenger airliner

By Anne-Margrethe Malkenes Mathiesen, Deniz Feta and Linn-Mari Kolstad Velo

Drama

Passenger Bernt Kibsgård witnessed dramatic scenes as police special forces stormed the airliner he was in with 90 passengers.

— Our departure was delayed several times before armed police special forces suddenly stormed the plane. I didn't see anything suspicious before the police entered. I had fallen asleep when burst into the cabin shouting. In an attempt to document events, Kibsgård reached for his mobile phone, which alarmed the police. He was detained, searched and interrogated. — As we were being evacuated from the plane, one passenger tripped and cut his arm on a seat. He was later assisted by paramedics.

— Do you know why the police stormed the plane?

— No, but I saw that several other passengers in addition to myself were detained. I was searched several times by the police which made me feel targeted, but they were only doing their job.

Ordered to leave plane

— There were 10–12 armed policemen in combat suits who stormed the plane and ordered the passengers to fold their hands above their heads, lean forward and look down, recounts Alice Marie Johansen, who was also onboard the plane. She saw that persons behaving suspiciously, e.g. by reaching for items in their pockets, were detained and interrogated.

Robert Vaagan was among the passengers and confirms the statements of Johansen.

— We were ordered off the plane and not allowed to take any luggage with us. Later we had to give personal details and we were searched. Finally we were taken to buses, explains Vaagan.

Taken to reception centre

After more than an hour waiting in busses, the 90 passengers were taken to a reception centre in the military part of Oslo Airport

Gardermoen, while security staff searched the plane for suspicious objects.
— We were well received by staff at the reception centre, according to Robert Vaagan

Figure 4. News item published by students in Exercise Bull intranet newspaper

It should be added here that several students in Media and communication studies over the last years who have been involved in either planning or implementing Exercise Bull, have had internships at The Police Directorate. As part of these internships, some have also been allowed to complete BA dissertations on assigned topics in crisis communication and crisis management (Bredesen 2013). Similarly, although this is not in focus in this article, several students not directly involved in this type of exercise have also had internships with and been employed by the Norwegian armed forces. These students have also completed BA dissertations in crisis communication and crisis management (Hage 2011, Selvig 2011).

At Oslo Airport Gardermoen, field reporters had free access to WiFi and there was also a press centre. There were restrictions on photography at the airport, but military photographers provided a photo bank. Along with two 3rd year student volunteers, the author was among the 90 passengers on a plane at Oslo Airport Gardermoen which the police stormed in order to prevent a suspected hijacking (figure 2).

As in 2006, a questionnaire was distributed by the organizer (The Police Directorate) to all participants, including students and teachers, as part of an evaluation conducted by The Norwegian Police University College. In their 180-page detailed report, which is structured in a 3-phase planning, implementation and evaluation part, the focus (as in 2006) is on cooperation between the key institutional participants and their information and communication flows. It must be remembered that insufficient cooperation between the police and the military during the

22 July 2011 tragedy was a major criticism of several evaluations and reports, as we shall see shortly.

Participants from the security services and military needed to withhold classified information that was not included in the report. As in 2006, neither the media game, nor Oslo and Akershus University College of Applied Sciences nor any other educational participants are mentioned, although The Police Directorate expressed verbal satisfaction regarding the contribution by students and staff in Media and communication studies. Despite fewer student participants than in 2006, more news items were published and “media pressure” had been kept up. The main conclusion in the evaluation report was that although the exercise generated invaluable experience and training opportunities for most participants, there were shortcomings in the preparations of many participants. These had not prepared appropriate criteria to measure their performances during the exercise (The Norwegian Police University College 2013). Overall, since this exercise was conceptualized as the “sharpest” ever and the first after the tragedy of 22 July 2011, the results were disappointing to the organizers.

IMPACT OF 22 JULY 2011 TRAGEDY

The preparations and documentation were, as expected, strongly influenced by the tragic events of 22 July 2011 and the ensuing public debate over how this tragedy could happen (Stormark 2011, Brurås 2012, Lippestad 2013). The main facts are well-known and need not be repeated in detail. On 2 July 2011 the terrorist Anders Behring Breivik detonated a 900 kilogram fertilizer bomb planted in a van which he, due to lax security, was able to park outside the main building of the Norwegian government and Prime Minister’s Office in the centre of Oslo. Disguised as a policeman, the terrorist walked away from the parked van and the explosion that killed 8 random pedestrians. He then drove off in an escape car to the summer holiday camp of the Labour Party youth movement at the idyllic Utøya island in lake Tyrifjorden about 1 hour’s drive

to the west of Oslo. There he shot and killed another 69 people, mostly youngsters, before police special forces arrested him. In his 1500-page manifesto which he posted on the Internet and sent to around 1,000 recipients just before starting on his killing spree, he accused the ruling red-green coalition government, and in particular the Labour Party, of ruining Norway by allowing Muslim immigration.

The trial which started in April 2012, lasted 10 weeks and proved to be the most mediated trial in Norwegian history. 170 media companies and newspapers from all over the world were represented at the opening of the trial. The trial proved to be a breakthrough for live-feed TV provided by leading Norwegian newspapers. Attempting to use the trial as a platform to spread his extreme political and Islamophobic views, Behring Breivik was found to be sane after lengthy psychiatric evaluations, and sentenced to 21 years' of preventive detention (with the possibility of extension).

Immediately after 22 July 2012, the Norwegian Prime Minister Jens Stoltenberg and his government got massive public support for their handling of the crisis. The rose is a symbol of the Labour Party in Norway and thousands turned out for peaceful and dignified "rose marches" in support of the victims, their families and the government. The Prime Minister and his government underlined that Norway was an open society and had never wanted massive security measures that probably could have stopped the terrorist. Prime Minister Stoltenberg and several of his ministers attended the funerals of the victims, including the several Muslim victims.

Yet as evaluations started to appear on how such a tragic event could take place, the government came under increasing criticism for lack of preparedness and public security.

A series of reports and evaluations regarding public security leading up to the tragedy were completed in 2011-2012 by Parliament, several ministries, The Directorate of Health, The Directorate of Civil Protection and Emergency Planning, The Directorate for Emergency Communication, The Joint Rescue Coordination Centres, The National Security Authority, The Police Security Service and the police. In November 2011, The Minister of

Justice left office and the Ministry was renamed Ministry of Police and Public Security. Several top officials in the police also departed quietly. Many of the evaluations and reports revealed system failure in the gathering, processing and sharing of information, in communication and media management. The same conclusions were drawn in a White Paper to parliament in June 2012 by the Ministry of Justice and Public Security on safety measures in society (*St.melding 29 (2011–2012) Samfunnssikkerhet*). In August 2012, a comprehensive and independent report on 22 July 2011, which had been commissioned by the Prime Minister's Office in August 2011, was presented to the Prime Minister. It offered no less than 31 specific recommendations of which at least 16 involved how to secure better information and communication procedures. Its main message was that:

- The bomb attack on the Government HQ in Oslo city centre 22 July 2011 could have been stopped if security measures previously decided on had been efficiently implemented.

- The ability of the authorities to protect people at Utøya island failed. A more prompt police response had been possible. The perpetrator could have been stopped earlier on the 22 July.

- More security and preparedness measures to stop new attacks and reduce damage should have been implemented.

- Medical and salvage operations in the acute phase handled the wounded and next-of-kin satisfactorily.

- Government communication to the public was good. The ministries were able to continue their work despite damages.

- With better work methodology and a broader focus, the Norwegian Police Security Service could have detected the perpetrator before 22 July. The committee could, however, not conclude that The Police Security Service could and should have prevented the attacks (*NOU 2012:14 Rapport fra 22.juli kommisjonen*).

The report was discussed in parliament in the autumn of 2012 in a public hearing of top politicians and civil servants. On 20 March 2013, the government's answer was presented to Parliament as a White Paper on preparedness against terror (*St. melding 21 (2012–2013) Terrorberedskap*).



Figure 5. A selection of reports and evaluations following the 22 July 2011 tragedy

In May 2013, the government also presented a toughening of anti-terrorism legislation, designed to allow prosecution of “solo” terrorists like Anders Behring Breivik. In June 2013, a complete reorganization of the Norwegian police was proposed (NOU 2013:9 *Politianalysen*).

Taken together, the learning outcomes for students and teachers from taking part in these two national anti-terror exercises in 2006 and 2012 have been considerable (Vaagan 2012). The exercises have proven to be “extended classrooms”. The students have gained first-hand experience with crisis communication and been involved in important exercises. One student was later employed by The Directorate for Civil Protection and Emergency Planning, several got internships and wrote BA dissertations on assigned topics in crisis communication and crisis management with The Police Directorate. The 22 July 2011 tragedy, which was the most mediated event ever in Norway, has left a deep imprint on all Norwegians, and by taking part in Exercise Bull students and staff have been sensitized to issues of public security and civic engagement.

The students have also received diplomas that can be useful later in their careers. From a pedagogical point of view, the exercises have been successful and provided students and teachers with invaluable real-life role-play. In contrast with 2006, the newsroom and news desk experienced editorial freedom and more articles were published with a smaller number of students taking part. The

police have expressed satisfaction with the published articles and the “media pressure” which the students were assigned to deliver. The few problems that were felt had more to do with coordinating with other educational institutions who believed their material was not being prioritized.

On a more critical note, it needs to be said that it is surprising that the threat scenario prepared by The Police Security Service had not changed significantly in 2012, so shortly after the 22 July 2011 tragedy. Their main focus remains on Muslim terrorists, not on Norwegian right-wing solo extremists like Anders Behring Breivik.

In a wider sense, the reports and evaluations following 22 July 2011 document that organizational learning from previous crises remains limited. Despite crisis exercises, it is difficult for key organizations to perform optimally and coordinated during crisis situations. The Government’s response to the 22 July has been to acknowledge serious system shortcomings and propose amendments. The government has acknowledged ultimate responsibility for some of the shortcomings uncovered during its 8-year rule 2005–2013, and many key people from the police left office. But the government also distributed much of the blame to the police authorities and top-level bureaucracy, while protecting the political leaders. In particular, the next-of-kin of the 77 people who were killed voiced frustration that no top politician was made responsible and had to leave office. Popular demands that the Prime Minister must “accept responsibility” and resign were answered rhetorically by the Prime Minister that he “took responsibility” - by remaining in office! Far from all Norwegians were content with this state of affairs and the issue was obviously going to play a role in the parliamentary elections in September 2013. The Labour Party coalition government lost the election resoundingly and a new Conservative coalition government took office. However, former Prime Minister Jens Stoltenberg may have emerged relatively unscathed from the 22 July 2011 tragedy: In March 2014 it became known that he was to become the new Secretary General of NATO from October 2014.

CRISIS COMMUNICATION THEORY AND PRACTICE

Ullmer, Sellnow and Seeger (2011) argue that a wide variety of disciplines (psychology, sociology, political science, communication, business, mathematics and physics) are engaged in research on crises. Much of the literature derives from research on private business enterprises and has been adapted to public sector institutions (Coombs 2007, Ullmer Sellnow and Seeger 2011, Fearn-Banks 2011, Johansen and Frandsen 2007). Some of the literature links with a vast corpus of research on organizational communication (Lewis 2011, Miller 2011, Fincham and Rhodes 2005, Hatch and Cunliffe 2006, Starbuck 2003).

The contributions from the communication discipline over the last two decades can be divided into four broad categories: a) corporate apoloia, b) image repair theory, c) situational crisis communication and d) organizational renewal.

Table 1

Theories of crisis communication
(Ullmer, Sellnow and Seeger 2011, p.16)

Theories of crisis communication	
Theory	Characteristics
Corporate apoloia	Emphasizes managing the threat created by a persuasive attack against an organization Focuses on apology for wrongdoing Features communication strategies for the apology
Image repair theory	Emphasizes repairing the threat to the image of the accused Focuses on accounting for organizational actions that caused the crisis Features communication strategies for managing the account

<p>Situational crisis communication theory</p>	<p>Emphasizes lowering crisis attributions of responsibility for the crisis</p> <p>Focuses on determining communication based upon the type of crisis and the organization's reputational assets</p> <p>Features flow-chart decision-making process for using crisis response strategies to influence stakeholder perceptions or attributions of responsibility</p>
<p>Organizational renewal theory</p>	<p>Emphasizes opportunities to learn and grow from the crisis</p> <p>Focuses on creating opportunities inherent to crisis events</p> <p>Features broad leadership and organizational communication guidelines, emphasizing strong positive values, an optimistic forward-looking perspective, and learning to overcome the crisis</p>

I have elsewhere argued that Exercise Oslo 2006 was based on an analytical paradigm often used in Sweden by the National Board of Psychological Defence (Nordlund 2000, Vaagan 2008). The model involved a simple triangular communication model where three main stakeholders each occupy a corner: a sender (e.g. the government), a distributor (primarily the press, radio and TV) and a receiver (the public). Democratic systems like the Nordic countries depend on the level, quality and balance of mediated, communicated mutual trust, confidence and credibility in this equilateral triangle, both in peacetime and especially during crises and disasters. Yet in terms of communication theory (see e.g. Cappelen 2012, Curran 2010, Heier and Kjølborg 2013, Fearn-Banks 2011, Johansen and Frandsen 2007, McQuail 2010, Nohrstedt 2011, Street 2011) the triangle used by Sweden's National Board of Psychological Defence fails to reflect the composite nature of all three corners. It also says little about symmetric and dialogic communication, assuming e.g. that the government is the only sender during a crisis. This is often not the case. Today, social media used by eyewitnesses are often the first to alert the public of a crisis, as we saw during the Boston marathon bombing in April 2013.

The triangle came under a cloud during the tsunami crisis in Asia in December 2004, when many Swedish and Norwegian tourists died. The Swedish and Norwegian governments were subsequently blamed for defective crisis communication and management.

Exercise Bull in 2012, by contrast, seems to have relied more on Coombs' comprehensive 3-phase model with separate phases for planning, implementation and evaluation (Coombs 2007). As such, this model has elements of image repair theory, situational crisis communication theory and organizational renewal theory in table 1. That this model was used is suggested not only in the evaluation report made by The Norwegian Police University College, which explicitly uses this 3-phase structure. The 3-phase model is also present in The Police Directorate's handbook in crisis communication (Politiet 2010), and can therefore be considered as official police strategy for crisis management and communication. More research is needed to clarify why this development has taken place. In 2006, the exercise was led and designed by The Directorate for Civil Protection and Emergency Planning and there were some noticeable problems in the cooperation with the police, as specified in the 47-page evaluation report. In 2012, the exercise was led by the police, which, as we have seen, came under serious criticism over its handling of the 22 July 2011 tragedy. This may well have influenced the design of the exercise, which was the "sharpest" until then. It was also clear that the exercise was to be evaluated by an academic institution - The Norwegian Police University College, which later published a detailed 180-page report. This may explain the switch from the reductionist triangle model to a more academic and sophisticated model in the shape of Coombs 3-phase model.

CONCLUSION

Exercise Oslo in 2006 and Exercise Bull in 2012 were both important anti-terror exercises involving 40–50 key public institutions and between 4,000-5,000 staff from all management levels, including the Prime Minister's Office. Oslo and Akershus University College of Applied Sciences took part in both exercises in a minor role with

students and staff primarily from Media and communication studies, but also from Journalism studies. 260 students and 10 teachers participated. Fixed employment and student internships with The Norwegian Directorate for Civil Protection and Emergency Planning and The Norwegian Police Directorate followed in the wake of Exercise Oslo in 2006. In addition, regular lectures in crisis communication by practitioners from both institutions were integrated into the undergraduate programme in Media and communication studies. This confirms the “extended classroom” philosophy and successful educator-employer cooperation between The Department of Journalism and Media Studies at Oslo and Akershus University College of Applied Sciences, The Norwegian Directorate for Civil Protection and Emergency Planning and The Norwegian Police Directorate. The learning outcomes for students and staff have overall been valuable in both exercises. First-hand experience from highly prioritized anti-terror exercises, diplomas and by-lined articles and several BA dissertations on crisis communication and management are useful additions to student CVs and portfolios.

The planning, implementation and evaluation of Exercise Bull in 2012 (the “sharpest” exercise ever) was significantly affected by the national tragedy of 22 July 2011 when 77 people were killed by a Norwegian terrorist. Nonetheless, the threat scenario by The Police Security Service did not change between the two exercises, and remains fixed on Muslim terrorists, not on right-wing “solo” terrorists.

Regarding crisis communication theory, there has been progress from the reductionist triangle model employed in Exercise Oslo in 2006 by The Directorate for Civil Protection and Emergency Planning, to the more academic and sophisticated Coombsian 3-phase model used in Exercise Bull 2012 by The Police Directorate.

The highly critical evaluation by The Norwegian Police University College of Exercise Bull in 2012 strongly indicates that simulated exercise events are not taken seriously enough by key participants, and that shortcomings persist in information gathering and processing as well as in terms of communication and coordination among key participants.

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И. Н. Блохин

С.-Петербургский гос. университет

МЕДИАКОМПЕТЕНТНОСТЬ ЛИЧНОСТИ: СТРУКТУРА И ФУНКЦИИ

Медиакомпетентность как целевая функция образования представляет собой сложный комплекс знаний, умений и навыков, конкретный перечень которых зависит как от уровня образования (от начального до послевузовского), так и от его предметной специфики. В качестве педагогической задачи медиакомпетентность включена в комплекс медиаобразования, которое, в широком значении, понимается как подготовка человека к жизни и деятельности в современных информационных условиях (постоянное увеличение объема информации и интенсивности ее воздействия, необходимость использования информационных технологий и т. д.). В узком смысле медиаобразование трактуется как подготовка специалиста для работы в медиасфере (по созданию текстов, регулированию коммуникаций, медиакритике и анализу массовых коммуникаций и др.).

При анализе структуры медиакомпетентности предлагается использовать два подхода: анализ взаимодействия личности с медиасферой и ролевой анализ медиаповедения. Взаимодействие личности с медиасферой основано на процессах внешнего и внутреннего регулирования этих отношений. Внешнее регулирование лежит в основе выделения группы *нормативных*