

A Values Base for the Norwegian Kindergarten – Common Ground across Cultural Affiliations?

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Abstract

One of the major challenges facing modern-day secular states is the issue of social integration. The issue discussed in this article is how it is possible to arrive at unifying values in a multicultural society that is characterised by secularisation and disintegration of the Christian hegemony of former times on the one hand and by the emergence of cultural and religious diversity on the other. The analysis is centred around Norwegian Kindergarten, which represent a key institution for communicating values and morals in contemporary Norwegian society. The objects clause states that the kindergarten is based on the fundamental values of Christian and humanistic heritage and traditions, combined with values that are expressed in different religions and philosophies and that are also clearly expressed in the Declaration of Human Rights. I argue that the objects clause can be understood as a form of “common ground strategy”. This can be seen as a possible unifying values base and a key strategy for future social integration, across cultural affiliations.

Keywords

Kindergarten – Multicultural Society – Objects Clause - Secularism – Secularization – Charles Taylor

INTRODUCTION: THE NORWEGIAN CASE

One of the greatest challenges facing modern-day secular states is how to integrate the seemingly increasing cultural diversity within society at large. In the space of a few decades, Norway, like most other Western countries, has become a multicultural society in which different cultures have to some extent either been interwoven with each other or live alongside each other. However, all societies are dependent on striking a balance between freedom and institutional control, in which case there will be a need to come up with integrating institutions that can promote integration through moral training in its broadest sense. In Norwegian society the intention is that kindergartens should play a key role in this training. The focus of this article is the Norwegian model, more specifically how the kindergartens' values base can be understood as a contribution towards integration in contemporary Norwegian society. The issue discussed is how it is possible to arrive at unifying values in a multicultural society that is characterised by secularisation and disintegration of the Christian hegemony of former times on the one hand and by the emergence of cultural and religious diversity on the other. This has to do with significant social changes, and the trend has accelerated in the post-war period. In this respect, many European countries have many features in common; support for churches and organised religion has weakened considerably during this period, at the same time as religious faith has become a more private and more individualised affair. This is also the case in Norway, even though the Norwegian state church system was not officially abolished until the summer of 2011. In practice, the Norwegian state has been secular for a long time, like other countries with which it is natural to compare, such as Sweden, the Netherlands and the UK (cf. section 2 of the Constitution of the Kingdom of Norway; Schmidt 2010; Trägårdh 1997). Although it is unlikely that the Norwegian model, with its relatively strong state control, would have universal application, it could serve as an interesting case for further discussion on the role of the modern state in social integration.

THE NORWEGIAN KINDERGARTEN AS AN INSTITUTION OF INTEGRATION

In Norway it is established by law that a place in a kindergarten must be provided to all children who turn the age of one by no later than the end of August in the year in

which a place is applied for. The right to a place in kindergarten was introduced by the government on 1 January 2009 (Act no. 64 of 17 June 2005 relating to Kindertartens, section 12a). The state sponsoring of both public and private kindertartens is quite unique for Norway. Both gets almost full state funding except a relatively small maximum price parents pay for each child per month. At the end of 2011, nearly 90 per cent of all children aged 1-5 years attended kindertarten, which is therefore a very important institution for integration and moral education in today's multicultural Norway, even though the percentage of children with an immigrant background attending kindertarten is significantly lower.¹ The need for social integration can hardly be said to be less than before. The kindertarten is a place where children with different religious, cultural and social backgrounds meet in order to be, among other things, culturally influenced and equipped for participating in cultural and civic life, including getting state sponsored moral education. And Norway certainly benefits from being a rich country which makes such sponsoring possible.

Norwegian public institutions have traditionally been rooted in Christian values, but this has proved increasingly problematic in recent years, in line with the fact that a steadily declining proportion of the population has clear Christian affiliations (cf. Botvar and Schmidt (eds.) 2010). Norway's Constitution is based on parliamentarianism, which gives the Norwegian Parliament (Storting) authority over the executive branch (the ministerial Government). The parliament provides amends and repeals the statutes by which society is ruled. The Constitution states that the legislative power is exercised through the Storting. In practice, however, the Storting delegates much of its power to the Government and government administration.

In August 2010 a new objects clause for state kindertartens in Norway was introduced, 18 months after an almost identical clause was introduced for the schools. Approximately half of the kindertartens are state-owned and therefore obligated to comply with a common objects clause that is passed by the Norwegian parliament, whereas the private kindertartens are given the right to deviate from some of its provisions. The main reason for changing the provisions in the objects clause was the trend towards a more secularised, yet at the same time culturally diverse, society (cf.

NOU 2007:6; Proposition to the Odelsting no. 47 (2007-2008)ⁱⁱ; Recommendation to the Odelsting no. 18 (2008-2009)).

The wording of the objects clause was approved already in December 2008 but did not come into force before the autumn of 2010 because the consequential amendments were not clarified before June of that year. These consequential amendments were incorporated into the regulations for the Kindergarten Act (Framework Plan) and, put briefly, state that private kindergartens may still choose not to comply with the paragraph referring to Christian and humanist heritage and traditions in the new objects clause. At the same time, it was emphasized that owners of private kindergartens and kindergartens owned or run by Church of Norway congregations could also continue to stipulate special provisions regarding philosophical purpose as a supplement to the current objects clause.ⁱⁱⁱ According to legislation, and in line with the UN's Universal Declaration of Human Rights of 1948 to which Norway has pledged itself, it is the parents/guardians that have the main responsibility for upbringing, not the kindergarten. This is stipulated in the following sections of the Declaration: Article 16: "The family is the natural and fundamental group unit of society and is entitled to protection by society and the State." and Article 26: "Parents have a prior right to choose the kind of education that shall be given to their children." The private kindergartens' freedom to choose an alternative objects clause to that which applies for state kindergartens has empowered parents to choose kindergartens with alternative religious or philosophical values that are more in keeping with the education and values they want for their children. This was also specified in a legislative Bill concerning the Act relating to Amendments to the Kindergarten Act (On the Purpose of the Kindergarten), which reads as follows:

"Norway is bound by several international agreements (conventions) on human rights. Particularly relevant to the objects clauses are the provisions in these conventions regarding the specific content of education, the right of the child to participation, non-discrimination, the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion, and respect for the rights of parents to ensure that education and teaching comply with their own religious or philosophical convictions." (Proposition to the Odelsting no. 47 (2007-2008)).

This was incorporated into the new objects clause in connection with the amendments that were made in the summer of 2010 to the regulations for the kindergarten.

Essentially, there is broad political consensus in Norway that the right of the parent must be protected, even if there is disagreement over where the opportunity to operate private kindergartens under an alternative objects clause stands in relation to this. Furthermore, the parental mandate implies that the parents' upbringing of their children, which will be influenced by various cultural factors including religious and philosophical affiliations and related understandings of reality, views of humanity, and values, should be supported in the kindergarten regardless of the background of the child. This was also explicitly expressed in the Framework Plan, with the following specification: “Cultural diversity must be reflected in the kindergarten.” (Framework Plan 2006:7). In this article, however, it is not the kindergartens' continued right to stipulate parts of their own values base that is the main focus of attention, even if this does provide significant and necessary background information for being able to understand the new objects clause. The focus of this article is on the different ways in which the new objects clause contained in the first paragraph of section 1 can be interpreted, with a view to offering a justified interpretation of its wording. The Christian values contained in the previous objects clause, as expressed in the wording “The kindergarten should help give children an upbringing in accordance with basic Christian values,” has now been replaced by the following, more detailed, wording:

“The Kindergarten shall be based on fundamental values in the Christian and humanist heritage and traditions, such as respect for human dignity and nature, intellectual freedom, charity, forgiveness, equality and solidarity, values which are also expressed in different religions and philosophies and which are rooted in human rights.” (Decision in the Odelsting no. 43 (2008-2009); cf. Recommendation to the Odelsting no. 18 (2008-2009) and Proposition to the Odelsting no. 47 (2007-2008)).

Nonetheless, there is a connection between parental rights and interpretation of the objects clause in that the kindergarten may not adopt a objects clause that does not protect the rights of the parents to determine the content of their child's upbringing. Along with other countries, Norway has pledged to uphold human rights as they are

defined in international conventions, and these have been incorporated into Norwegian legislation (cf. Constitution of the Kingdom of Norway, article 110c). On the basis of a prior understanding that the Canadian philosopher Charles Taylor's thinking may have something to contribute towards an understanding of the objects clause for Norwegian kindergartens, I have formulated the following questions, which will be elucidated in this paper: Has the new objects clause meant that the kindergarten has acquired a secular values base? If so, what type of secularism could this be?

SECULARISATION AT DIFFERENT LEVELS

“Belief in God is no longer axiomatic. There are alternatives. And this will also likely mean that at least in certain milieux, it may be hard to sustain one's faith. There will be people who feel bound to give it up, even though they mourn its loss. This has been a recognizable experience in our societies, at least since the mid-nineteenth century.” Taylor writes this in his broadly conceived historical presentation in *A Secular Age* from 2007 (Taylor 2007: 3). This quotation can be linked to two concepts which together express key features of the developments which Norwegian society, like many other Western countries, has undergone during the post-war period.

Firstly, the quotation can be linked to the concept of secularisation, a social process whereby religion and religious institutions gradually lose their dominant role in society when it comes to expressing collective beliefs in the broadest sense of the word, defining values, and contributing towards forming the identity of the individual. Taylor links his understanding of secularisation to the classical expression of a secularisation thesis such as that found in Peter Berger's book *The Sacred Canopy*, which was first published in 1967 (Berger 1990). This secularisation thesis deals with, among other things, a marginalisation of the influence of religion on public institutions in society, which no longer seek religious legitimacy, at the same time as religion is being relegated from the public to the private sphere. Secondly, secularisation has also occurred at the individual level in that religious understandings of reality now have less significance for a growing number of people. Taylor distinguishes between three forms of secularity resulting from the secularisation described by Berger and religious sociologists. The classical

secularisation thesis has since been considerably toned down, not least by Berger himself (cf. Berger 1999). This mostly applies to secularisation at the individual level. With regard to the issue of secularisation at the level of public institutions, this is still maintained to a large extent in today's research into the sociology of religion.^{iv} Taylor's term for secularisation at society level in *A Secular Age* is *Secularity 1*, while secularisation at individual level is referred to as *Secularity 2* (Taylor 2007:2-20). Thus far Taylor's thinking adds nothing new, a fact of which he is of course aware. What is new, as we will soon see, is the category he calls *Secularity 3*.

CULTURAL PLURALISATION AND *SECULARITY 3*

The quotation by Taylor cited above can also be linked to another cultural analytical concept, namely cultural pluralisation. Parallel with the secularisation of key public institutions, Norwegian society has in recent decades transformed from a relatively culturally homogeneous society into a multicultural society in which different cultures partly co-exist and partly are interwoven. This is particularly reflected in the fact that Norway today has a significant proportion of people with backgrounds from non-Western countries, particularly in the largest cities. In Oslo, for example, approximately every fourth inhabitant has an immigrant background. As per 1 January 2009, Norway's immigrant population accounted for 11 per cent of the total population, or just over 500,000 people, with backgrounds from more than 200 different countries. By immigration population here is meant individuals with two foreign-born parents. Approximately two thirds of these have backgrounds from non-Western countries, of which approximately half came to Norway as refugees. By comparison, in 1950 only 1.4 per cent of the population was born abroad (<http://www.ssb.no/innvandring/>).

According to Taylor, it would be difficult in today's society not to realise that there are alternatives to one's own religious and philosophical conceptions. This applies just as much to fundamental existential questions as to questions of how we justify our choice of values. Our realisation that others think differently to us, also when it comes to fundamental existential questions and questions to do with values, will lead many of us to question our own way of thinking or perhaps make us open and inquisitive about how others view their lives. Viewed in this light, this has to do with radical changes in our empirical universe from the 1500s up to the present day (cf. Taylor

2007:11; Repstad 2008:322). It is this observation which Taylor associates with the concept of *Secularity 3*, and this concept can therefore be said to point to an interesting connection between cultural pluralisation and secularisation.

The title of the book *A Secular Age* can also be directly tied in with the concept of *Secularity 3*, since the awareness that it is fully possible to subscribe to alternative religious and philosophical conceptions is precisely what Taylor has in mind when he says that those of us living in modern Western society are living in a secular age.^v This also brings us to an essential point in this part of Taylor's philosophy: according to him, this awareness of the existence of alternatives to our world view unites us across religious and philosophical affiliations and represents a form of shared experience to which it is possible to subscribe in the search for a common, socially integrated, cultural framework. Or put more simply: an awareness of diversity suggests the necessity to also have something in common.

TAYLOR'S TYPOLOGY OF SECULARISM

We have already touched on Taylor's concepts of three different forms of secularity that represent a kind of temporary standstill in the secularisation process undergone by the West. It may seem a little confusing, but Taylor has also used the concept of secularism in connection with related topics in other accounts (Taylor 1999; Taylor 2009). The concept of secularisation is not easy to grasp. It is often used polemically, as something one is either for or against, and there is no agreement in scholarly accounts as to how the concept should be understood (cf. Bangstad 2008). A more popularised way of putting it is that the concept of secularism can be said to refer to a normative line of thought or ideology. We could perhaps say that secularisation is a position where a normative viewpoint of the abovementioned secularisation is adopted and offers a positive judgement of it. Based on this understanding of the concept, a secularist would be a person who welcomes secularisation. Such a sketchy definition of the concept brings us closer to an understanding of the concept of secularism that can also be found in everyday speech.

Taylor undertakes a more precise definition of his account of the concept when he presents a typology of secularism in his article entitled "Modes of Secularism" from

1999. Here Taylor draws a distinction between two main types of strategy on which to base the concept of secularism. He calls the first of these strategies the *common ground strategy*. This is a strategy that emphasizes peaceful coexistence and political order. Today this can be linked to natural law and to a political doctrine that emphasizes human rights or constitutional rights (Taylor 1999:33). The idea is that these rights could make it possible to agree on normative values in a multicultural society, across religious or philosophical affiliations. Moreover, this could be achieved without this affiliation being regarded as irrelevant for public life and politics and without one particular religion or philosophical tradition becoming dominant. Such a *soft* secularism supports state neutrality with respect to different religions and their practitioners, with an appropriate divide between state and religion/Church.

Taylor calls the other strategy the *independent political ethic strategy* (Taylor 1999:33). This strategy requires the state to distance itself from all forms of religion and to refrain from giving religious expressions any form of official status. Such secularism could be criticised for representing a world view which in itself is based on a secular, tentatively empirically-based understanding of reality, or an anti-religious ideology, depending on what kind of vocabulary is associated with it when criticism is raised. It would be possible to show a connection between the strategies for establishing the concept of secularism in such a way that those who can be described as philosophical secularists would most probably also want secularism understood as a political doctrine to have an impact on all of society's public institutions. This could lead to the risk of secularism becoming the dominant philosophical tradition at the expense of others. On the other hand, it would be possible to claim that secularism as a political doctrine could be expedient, without any philosophical or ideological consequences being drawn.

To contextualize Taylor's typology further, it could be linked to the discussion in meta-ethics whether moral facts are given, and if it's possible to have knowledge of such facts or not. Simply said, on the one hand we have the cognitivists who argue that such moral facts exist and could be acknowledged, and on the other hand the non-cognitivists who deny this. The non-cognitivists claim that morality is not objective

and does not have a foothold in any kind of independent reality (cf. Marturano 2005). Taylor's common ground strategy could be linked to a form of culturalist moral realism, as Arto Laitinen pointed out with reference to earlier works of Taylor (Laitinen 2002. Cf. Taylor 1985, Taylor 1989). It could be argued that expressions of values grounded in different cultures can be situated without leading to relativism. This could certainly be of interest in the discussion of common values in a multicultural society, while trying to find a way of peaceful co-existence across cultural and religious affiliations. Taylor's position is a form of value based moral realism concerning the ontology of values on phenomenological grounds. A detailed discussion of this topic is outside the scope of this essay since the focus here is on Taylor's typology of secularism as an analytical framework.

In any case, taking Taylor as our basis, we have outlined a two-pronged typology of secularism with two ideal types that help us in our understanding of what secularism is, even though he does not use the terms "soft" and "hard". There is also a need for caution here. We have now looked at Taylor's three types of secularity that are linked to three different aspects of the result of the change process which secularisation represents. The concept of secularism is normatively charged, but Taylor's typology of secularism also has a descriptive, analytical aim, since he uses these to give a better understanding of what secularism entails rather than take a standpoint on the types of secularism per se.

NEW OBJECTS CLAUSE – BREAK OR CONTINUITY?

If we return to the kindergarten, it becomes apparent that by referring to Taylor's three types of secularity we can understand the objects clause as an attempt to respond to the results of secularisation in all shapes and forms. As already mentioned, the significance of Christianity in Norwegian society has diminished, regardless of how it is measured, and, parallel with this secularisation, Norway has become a multicultural society. The introduction of a new objects clause for the kindergarten can be understood on the background of this social trend, as it would have been difficult and perhaps undesirable to maintain a objects clause rooted in Christian values in a society characterised by secularism and multiculturalism. With reference to Taylor's

three types of secularity, the amendment to the objects clause can be interpreted as an expression of secularisation at the level of public institutions (Secularity 1), while parental rights and human rights place clear constraints on any desire that the kindergarten should contribute to secularisation at individual level (Secularity 2). On the contrary; parental rights lean towards respect for religious and philosophical diversity, where the objects clause can be interpreted as an expression of an awareness of this diversity (Secularity 3).

It will of course be the case that the wording of the objects clause can be read in different ways. First of all, it can be read as a list of values that are rooted in equally ranked religious and philosophical traditions (including human rights), as Helje Kringlebotn Sødal has postulated (Sødal 2009:19). Based on this interpretation, in practice this would mean that the values that should apply in the kindergarten would be the values that are common to those religious and philosophical traditions, like a kind of values-based lowest common multiple. As it is extremely difficult to arrive at such a lowest common multiple on the basis of the different religions and philosophical traditions, it would be obvious to understand human rights as an expression of this lowest common multiple, something which in practice may lead to these being understood as elevated above the other religious and philosophical traditions. Or put more simply: the new objects clause will in practice be understood to the effect that the kindergarten should be based on the values that are common to the abovementioned religious and philosophical traditions as long as these comply with human rights. Such an emphasis on common values across cultural, religious and philosophical convictions, combined with an emphasis on human rights as an expression of general values, clearly point in the direction of Taylor's first type of secularism, common ground secularism, or what I have referred to as soft secularism. Correspondingly, if understood in this way, the objects clause could contribute to protecting the religious and philosophical diversity which Taylor ties in with the concept of *Secularity 3*. In this way parental rights could also be respected.

Alternatively, the wording of the objects clause could be interpreted in such a way that emphasis is placed on positioning the wording “fundamental values in the Christian and humanist heritage and traditions” at the beginning of the clause. This can be interpreted to mean that the traditions that are mentioned first are considered to

be more important than the traditions that are referred to as “different religions and philosophies” and human rights. A key premise for such an understanding is also given in and through the wording of the previous objects clause, and on the basis of an assumption that there was perhaps a lack of political will to introduce radical changes. Such an understanding therefore means that continuity in relation to the previous objects clause for the kindergarten is emphasized, and that the order of the elements in the new version of the clause is considered to be more significant than their content, perhaps at the expense of grammatical constraints. It seems therefore clear that if we take such an understanding of the objects clause in the Kindergartens Act as our basis, we are far removed from both of Taylor's types of secularism. It is more a case of rhetorical concealment whereby some words have been replaced but otherwise everything is as it was. Such a reading implies an assertion that the objects clause does not take into account any of Taylor's categories of secularity, something which would also imply that parental rights are set aside.

In my opinion it is Sødal's reading that is most relevant. The reason that can be given for this is that the first part of the sentence is to be understood as a preliminary affirmation of what type of religious and philosophical traditions the kindergarten should be based on: “The Kindergarten shall be based on fundamental values in the Christian and humanist heritage and traditions,”. Then comes the phrase “such as”, which signals that it has to do with a list of specifics of what the initial wording entails, after a comma: “respect for human dignity and nature, on intellectual freedom, charity, forgiveness, equality and solidarity”. Following this list of what kinds of values are associated with the Christian and humanist traditions comes a more precise definition, after a new comma: “values that are also expressed in different religions and beliefs and are rooted in human rights.” Here it is specified that the values mentioned in the first sentence are also expressed in “different” religions and philosophies, in addition to human rights. The listed values are not regarded as exclusively linked to the Christian and humanistic traditions, just as the objects clause does not favour exclusively Christian and humanistic values at the expense of the traditions that are referred to in the vaguely formulated “different religions and philosophies”.

A PLATFORM OF COMMON VALUES?

The new objects clause will hardly lead to a revolution in the kindergarten's promotion of values. Nor was the previous Christian objects clause one that attempted to preach Christianity. Guidelines were set to interpret the link to Christianity in the previous objects clause as an introduction to Christian values, with the justification that this had traditionally been a cultural and therefore values-based framework to which the majority of the Norwegian population could subscribe. In other words, it should align with the prevailing interpretation of the previous objects clause for the kindergarten, where the wording "The kindergarten shall help provide children with an upbringing that is in accordance with fundamental Christian values" should, in accordance with the guidelines in the framework plan valid at the time when the objects clause was adopted, be interpreted in line with the following definition in the Framework Plan:

"The Kindergarten Act prescribes that upbringing in the kindergarten must be in accordance with fundamental Christian values. This means that the kindergarten must base its activities on the ethical values that are rooted in Christianity and that are assumed to be widely supported by the inhabitants of Norway." (Framework Plan 2006:9).

Naturally, the reference to Christian and humanistic traditions in the new objects clause signals a certain degree of continuity between the two versions of the objects clauses, but in my opinion, and in support of Sødal, it is difficult to deny that the amendment effectively represents a break in the sense that it formalises a values base other than the exclusively Christian. There is therefore no getting away from the fact that a secularist mentality has gained more ground in the kindergarten through the adoption of the new objects clause, even if this comes about in a rather undramatic way. A form of soft secularism could then become a unifying values base for the kindergarten of the future, regardless of cultural affiliation. The other category of secularism, referred to here as hard secularism, would be unacceptable from the perspectives of the Convention on the Rights of the Child and human rights, since such secularism would be more intolerant of other religious and philosophical traditions than would one specific secular philosophical tradition. Or to put it another way: the kindergarten's new secularist values base can be seen to allow for the

promotion of both secular and religious values in the kindergarten of the future. In this connection, the kindergarten could perhaps prove to be an integrating institution in the best sense of the term.

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NOTES

ⁱ At the end of 2011, nearly 90 per cent of all children aged 1-5 years attended kindergarten. Since 2009, the proportion of children aged 3-5 years has been almost unchanged and was 96.5 per cent in 2011. Similarly, the proportion of children aged 1-2 years increased by 2.3 percentage points and was 79.5 per cent at the end of 2011. For children aged 1-5, 89.7 per cent attended kindergartens. This was an increase of 1.2 percentage points from 2010. At the end of 2011, 30 500 children from linguistic and cultural minorities attended kindergarten. A total of 57.3 per cent of children aged 0-5 with an immigrant background attended kindergarten. (http://www.ssb.no/barnehager_en/).

ⁱⁱ The Odelsting is a historical term for one of the two chambers in the Norwegian Parliament (the other was called the Lagting). A proposition to the Odelsting was a legislative Bill sent by the Government to the Odelsting for consideration. The system of two chambers was abolished as of 1 October 2009. Propositions to the Odelsting have now been replaced by Propositions to the Storting (the Norwegian Parliament) (http://www.stortinget.no/Global/pdf/Hovedbrosjyre%20div%20spraak/2009_eng_web.pdf).

ⁱⁱⁱ Cf. the decision regarding amendments to the Kindergarten Act, section 1a: Special purpose: “The new section 1a shall read as follows: Owners of private kindergartens are at liberty to decide that the values referred to in section 1 of the Act shall not be based on the Christian or humanist heritage and traditions. In their statutes, private kindergartens and kindergartens owned or run by congregations within the Church of Norway may stipulate special provisions in their statutes regarding religious or philosophical purpose. [http://www.stortinget.no/no/Saker-og-publikasjoner/Vedtak/Beslutninger/Lovvedtak/2009-2010/vedtak-200910-059/#a1\(18.10.2010\)](http://www.stortinget.no/no/Saker-og-publikasjoner/Vedtak/Beslutninger/Lovvedtak/2009-2010/vedtak-200910-059/#a1(18.10.2010)). A summary of Norwegian research on kindergartens is given in Alvestad et al. (2009). Relevant research in connection with the objects clause for the kindergarten can be found in Lindboe (2007), Østrem (2008), and Sødal (2009). The most important study on the promotion of values and the place of religion in the kindergarten is still the teacher of religious education Sturla Sagberg's doctoral dissertation *Autentisitet og undring [Authenticity and Wonder]* from 2001 (Sagberg (2001)).

^{iv} The processes of secularisation are complex and there are varieties from between countries based on differences in cultural and social contexts (cf. Berger, P. et al. (2008) and Berger (ed.)(1999)).

^v The connection to Taylor's theory of secularisation is made on the basis that Taylor has stood as a central secularisation theorist in the West in recent decades and has published a number of publications in this field. There are of course alternatives to Taylor, such as the theories developed by Habermas and Asad, the latter of whom criticised Taylor for being overly Western-oriented in his understanding of the concept of secularisation (cf. Bangstad 2009:51-96).