New Public Management and the Police Profession at Play

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This article explores the ways in which competing institutional logics influence the knowledge base of the police, ideas about good police practice and organizational identities. A tension between the humanistic professional police logic and the instrumental New Public Management (NPM) logic is discussed in the context of policing. While the humanistic professional police logic gradually emerged in the 1960s and 70s, over the past twenty years the police force has been reformed in line with the NPM logic. Through qualitative interviews and a quantitative study of the police force, the article investigates the ways in which the ideas of what constitutes a normative good practice are shaped in relation to these two, opposing, logics. A central finding is that despite many years of NPM as the dominant steering logic, a humanistic professional logic persists. However, the shift towards the NPM logic transforms the knowledge base in a more evidence-oriented direction and affects the ideas of normative good practice, especially among police management.

Keywords: New public management, police management, knowledge, social identity, institutional logic

Introduction

I propose to show in this article how a shift towards the New Public Management (NPM) logic in government changes the knowledge base in the police and affects the ideas of normative good practice, especially among police management. The article explores how goal management contributes to change in the knowledge base, and why police managers are mostly affected.

Many serving professions of the welfare state, such as doctors, nurses, social workers, teachers and police officers, perform their roles in the context of tension between help and control. The characteristic professional gaze sustained by organizational identity influences how help and control in the
meeting with users/clients/patients/the public are balanced. The professional gaze captures central aspects of the work and is shaped by standards and norms about what constitutes good work. Organizational identity and the professional gaze build upon an informal and a formal knowledge base and are shaped through education and work practices influenced by institutional logics. By institutional logics we mean: “the socially constructed, historical patterns of cultural symbols and material practices, including assumptions, values, and beliefs, by which individuals and organizations provide meaning to their daily activity, organize time and reproduce their lives and experiences.”

In other words, the professional gaze reflects the institutional logics that constitute the profession and organizational identities, as well as which aspects of work create meaning and provide direction. Organizations can have multiple organizational identities that have different and even conflicting views on the organization’s central mission.

Just as institutional logics shape both collective and individual organizational identities, changes in identities can have transformative effects on the logics.

Even though organizations in modern societies tend to be characterized by one dominant logic, in practice they are influenced by many. Studies have shown that these logics may clash, exist side by side in competing dynamics, or interact in a collaboration based on territorial division. Even if the influence of the logics on the organization can change over time, studies show that the influence of one institutional logic does not necessarily fully replace a different logic. In line with this finding, the police force has historically been the carrier of several logics that have made themselves dominant at different points in time. The two institutional logics found within policing that I will discuss here can roughly be divided both along historical and ideological lines: a tradition of restraint and a militaristic tradition. The tradition of restraint, as its name suggests, is characterized by the view that the police shall be restrained in their use of force, remain focused on regulation by law and aim to avoid shooting, unnecessarily harming, or killing people. Within this tradition, to which the Norwegian policing belongs, political, professional, and practical discretion in the everyday police work are fundamental. Community policing is a central part of this tradition. By contrast, the militaristic tradition is characterized by secrecy, hierarchic lines of command, risk management and military solutions that involve weapons and uncompromising tactics. The goal is to eliminate threats, and there is little emphasis on practical discretion in the day-to-day work. This tradition has its roots in the continental parts of Europe and other parts of the world. Both the restrictive tradition and the militaristic tradition claim to have a professional approach, but the content differs. While both refer to the idea of policing as being knowledge-based rather than intuitive, the restrictive tradition is to a greater degree oriented towards professional discretion than the militaristic tradition.

In England in the late 1950s, police forces were regarded as the embodiment of impersonal, rule-bound authority, enforcing democratically-enacted legislation on behalf of the broad mass of society rather than any partisan interest, and constrained by tight legal requirements of due
In line with the continental development, the professional humanistic logic with humans and their values at the center emerged as hegemonic in Norway and the Scandinavian countries in the 1970s. The police should no longer be a special symbol of social power, but rather an organization integrated into society.

The humanistic logic assumes that the performance of police tasks also requires professional discretion and contextual judgements. In the 1990s, the humanistic institutional logic was challenged through New Public Management-inspired reforms in Norway. The main purpose of the NPM reforms was to increase cost effectiveness, whereas other aspects of management were given less priority. Centralization, specialization, goal management, and stronger focus on the core mission have been central aspects of reform-work within the Norwegian police force, both in Police Reform 2000 and in the on-going police reform.

The NPM-inspired reforms coincided with a global shift in the understanding of the crime picture, where organized crime and terror groups have come to be perceived as some of the greatest threats to security and social order. In line with this view, the role of the police transformed and become primarily defined by fighting crime at the expense of the role as crime preventer. Through these reforms, NPM has challenged the traditional practice and the dominant profession-based logic in the police force, and tensions have emerged between the two logics. Given that on the one hand police management today still assert that the ten basic principles of the professional humanistic logic apply, while emphasizing on the other hand measurable knowledge as a way forward, we can expect changes in police organizational identities.

Assuming that practice is a tangible focus for change in institutional logics, and that changes of practice often go hand in hand with changes in organizational identity, I show in this article how we can trace the seeds of change in the organizational identity and professional gaze of police management. Given the fact that professional practice is anchored in different knowledge bases, I show how the understanding of what constitutes valid platforms for action in the police has changed over the past twenty years. I argue that these changes are related to a shift in the hegemonic institutional logic of police organizations. While earlier the knowledge base was anchored in experience-based, professional judgment, today the knowledge base relies on measurable factors and a specific notion of evidence.

The current insistence on evidence within management is linked to the fact that the evidence-oriented understanding of knowledge reigns supreme in contemporary knowledge hierarchy. In other words, today’s hegemonic knowledge base is at the same time more scientific and measurable as it becomes increasingly less contextual. Within the context of hyper-focus on evidence, and on what appears as “hard data,” it becomes easy to forget that the data that shape the evidence are not necessarily as neutral and objective as the rhetoric suggests; here one risks losing sight of how the data is actually obtained, registered, and understood, and of the fact that even empirical bases must be assessed with contextual and critical insight.

The article is structured as follows: In line with the understanding that...
different logics only have effect and become tangible in specific settings through practice and identity.\textsuperscript{21} I will show how we can trace a shift towards the NPM logic through a historical overview of the institutional logics of the police. In order to show the more general significance of this shift, I will present earlier research on the effects of the NPM reforms on management and leadership. Using quantitative and qualitative data from the police, I will then explore how ideas of normative good practice are related to the knowledge base police employees make use of and to where they are situated within the organization.\textsuperscript{22} At the end, I summarize the findings.

The Core Tasks of the Police in a Historical Perspective

Historically speaking, the core tasks of the police are situated within the tension between control tasks and help/preventive tasks. The definition of core tasks is related to the institutional logics that have characterized the social mandate of the police at any given time. Following World War II, police tasks in Norway were about control and fighting crime. Both at the police academy of the day and in professional practice there was more emphasis on control than on assistance and help to the public. Using physical force to solve tasks was regarded as a more expedient tool than communication. The focus on law and order problems and crime reduction from the 1950s up until the 1970s leads us to describe the organization of the police in this period as “the force and control model.”\textsuperscript{23}

Later on, the work methods of the police were characterized to a greater extent by communication, and the agency moved towards a “community policing model.” The community policing model was introduced in Norway in 1978–79 and entailed decentralization of police work where the police increasingly emphasized prevention and greater public safety.\textsuperscript{24} The model reached its zenith in the 1980s, when police professionalism translated into a more self-regulated police that was less affected by bureaucratic management structures.\textsuperscript{25} But because the police are the state’s monopoly of physical force, the profession also has to be politically controlled, and their use of power must be grounded in democratic principles from which their legitimacy springs.\textsuperscript{26} However, Helene Gundhus argues that this autonomy depends on a range of structures and frameworks that facilitate trust in practical administration, control, and the idea that professional judgement can be justified. In this way structures, frameworks, norms, and values together shape the professional judgement of the police in relation to help and control.

In the 1990s, Liv Finstad conducted a study of the Norwegian police in which she developed the concept of the “police gaze,” arguing that the unique police gaze can be regarded as an analytical tool for both control and assistance practices. The concept describes how law and order service acts within a logic that primarily sees single acts and single individuals.\textsuperscript{27} In other words, this police gaze was event-driven in the sense of being guided by different events and needs that occurred among the public. The police gaze is grounded in certain logics. At the time when Finstad conducted her study, the dominant logic was the
humanistic police logic of the community-policing model, which was based on the ten basic principles of the Norwegian police from 1981.

The ten basic principles are an important result of the work of The Police Role Committee in Norway, that was given a mandate to consider the role of the police in the community. The committee analysed society’s need for police services, and, based on this analysis, proposed ten basic principles for Norwegian police. These principles can be seen as an expression of the basic values that the police must safeguard.28

Among other things, the principles command that police should be generalists with a civilian character, be integrated in the local community and act in cooperation with the public.29 In this way, the “police gaze” in the 1990s involved to a lesser extent elements from more incompatible logics. However, also during the 1990s, this humanistic logic was challenged by the tougher tone of justice policy, stronger orientation toward the situation of victims, and less toward the marginalized groups on the street.30

Even though Finstad developed the concept of the police gaze on the basis of practical operational police work, this gaze can be characterized as a hegemonic gaze because it was in line with official police documents about how the police should work. In other words, the operational professional gaze fit hand in glove with the police management’s professional gaze. Since findings from organizational studies tend to be valid at one time and not at others,31 I will show in the following how the operative professional gaze and the police management’s professional gaze today can be seen to be anchored in different institutional logics and knowledge bases.

A Split in the Police Gaze

Since the millennium, we find in society at large clear signs of a pendulum movement away from decentralized management toward centralized management with an emphasis on goal management.32 Since it is difficult to document the effects of broad, preventive police work, the idea that humanistic good intentions were sufficient to guide police resources was — within the logic of efficiency, evidence, and measurement — inevitably headed for a fall.33 The traditional broad prevention methods lost their legitimacy and came to be increasingly replaced by more targeted and measurable approaches. These changes must be seen in relation to the introduction of goal and result management as an organizing principle of public sector governance. The focus on reporting goal achievements implied that the concept of “responsibility” changed meaning from being about controlling the power of the police over citizens and protecting their legal rights, to being accountable for how the police spend their resources.34

Kjell Arne Røvik claims that the general system “organization” consists of business, administration, and association that exists in practice through private companies, the public sector and NGOs. From the late 1970s, business ideas have been advancing and we are approaching the logic of business over management and association.

Røvik calls this trend the new “radical economism,” which refers to the idea that all types of organizations
should be shaped in the image of a business and act like businesses.35

The official statements about the purpose of the police have undergone a substantial shift towards measurable crime-fighting tasks, clearly shaped by NPM reforms that have made the police answerable to accountancy rather than the public as such. Audits have replaced the traditional understanding of accountability in the police,36 with strategies, business plans, and budgets taking center stage and becoming key tools for generating this new form of accountability.

NPM reforms have a clear ideological-political dimension where the logic of economism and its concepts and approaches dominate.37 Traces of how NPM trickled into the police can be found in the rhetoric of police management. Where the police in the 1990s discovered crimes and solved them, today the police “produce” cases. Language distinctly reinforces institutional logics that rub off on cultural values and the way employees think.38 The concepts of the NPM reforms, together with the emphasis on resource use and goal achievement, can be seen to contribute towards changing management roles in the direction of business managers, in line with new ideals of how organizations should be put together.39

When the police move from the community-policing model to the specialist model changes in logic can affect not only employees’ self-image but also contribute to their understanding of how they should ideally act.40 In other words, institutional logics structure the world and provide conditions for the construction of meaning and experience of identity,41 while shaping behaviors and individual decision-making processes. Whereas the professional police logic emerged as society in general became more humanistic and was gradually framed by the community-policing model, the new logic entered with NPM reforms, goal management, and the increased valorization of knowledge-based police work.42 Based on earlier research, the following section shows how goal management led to new work practices and new criteria for a good piece of work.

The Impact of NPM Reforms on Management and Leadership

The first police studies that looked at the effects of NPM reforms showed that police management developed a more administrative focus and became more distant from the employees.43 Even though research has shown that police culture and police practice are the primary factors that influence the work of employees in a particular way,44 police leaders, too, have a key culture-building role in the way they handle steering, leadership and norm formation.45 In this context, Elisabeth Reuss-Ianni’s theory about “street cop culture” and “management cop culture” is central.46 “Street cop culture” is characterized by ideas about “the good old days” when management was a part of the police family and the police were treated as professionals who knew their work and had a large degree of trust. In contrast, at the moment when police leaders became increasingly management oriented and concerned with measurable productivity, the unified police culture was weakened and a division created between management and the rank and file: “What was once a family is now a factory.”47 The new “management cop culture” was
positively oriented towards scientifically-founded management and leadership in the public sector and must be seen in relation to police reforms in the US from the 1950s to the 1970s. In practice, these reforms emphasized technology, objectivity, and expertise at the expense of trust, legitimacy, justice etc. Despite the fact that the challenges in the US were not primarily police corruption and the like, but rather related to the lack of open and constructive interaction with the public, the reforms that marched under that banner in midcentury America tended to share three central features: (1) that they focused law enforcement agencies on crime suppression, pushing to the side other traditional functions of the police, (2) that they sought to create police departments that operated objectively and scientifically, free from political influence, (3) that they worked to centralize, and bureaucratize lines of authority within law enforcement agencies.

Reuss-Ianni’s studies can be seen in the context of “street-level bureaucrats” who work directly with the public and seek to perform their tasks in line with their own preferences. In contrast, management is more concerned with performance and emphasizes that which can be subjected to investigations or critical scrutiny. This is in line with the findings of Norway’s Auditor General from 2010, where twenty-one out of twenty-five police districts lacked incentives to cooperate across district boundaries in investigations that crossed district lines. The reason was that cooperation was not financially rewarded or did not appear in goal and reporting systems in the management dialogue. In other words, it seems that management’s work identity and professional gaze follow the formal role displacement of the NPM reforms towards that of a business manager who is mainly concerned with financial results and “production.” This is a paradox in light of a study that shows that police employees’ work motivation is in line with “public service motivation” (PSM), where individuals are motivated by tasks in the public sector because they have internalized values that have been traditionally embodied in and associated with the organizations they work for.

The current split in police culture must be seen in the light of the fact that employees can use the frames of reference and rationality of a specific institutional logic in a given situation and thus activate a specific social identity at a given time. Social identity as analytical concept enables us to understand reproduction and changes in institutions because it highlights how the actor’s perceptions and actions spring from this membership in a social group. Social context contributes to shaping social identities, individual preferences, and frames of reference, which in practice translates into the parallel co-existence of competing and even conflicting institutional logics: frontline police officers and police management can develop different professional gazes.

Methodology

This article is based on a quantitative survey conducted in 2013, as well as interviews. The main purpose of the survey was to examine how police
employees experienced goal and result management in the organization. The survey, built with the online survey tool QuestBack, opened for four weeks in October 2013. The questionnaire was distributed through Politiets Fellesforbund’s email lists. The survey was sent to all members of Politiets Fellesforbund, meaning that 8,341 police-educated individuals were asked to participate, making the sample almost identical to the population. I received 2,248 answers from the 8,341 individuals who received the questionnaires, a response rate of 27%. This means that while I received a lot of answers, the response rate was low. There is greater risk of sampling errors in small samples, and a high response rate is therefore preferable, since it leads to more data and statistical power, as well as lower margins of error. The response rate is just one of several indicators of the quality of surveys; it is more important to examine whether the respondents are representative of the researched population. The key point is to control for possible systematic biases in the selection and to check if some groups are systematically under- or overrepresented. Since I have information about the way the population is distributed along a number of key variables, such as job title, gender, geography, age, function, etc., I have tried to reduce uncertainty connected with missing responses by comparing the population and the sample, i.e. to conduct a non-response analysis. This analysis shows no systematic bias. Of the 2,248 respondents, 22% are women and 78% are men. The share of management in the sample is 39% in total, 19.2% are personnel managers and 19.5% are not. This means that 61% are non-management.

Personnel managers in the police have overall responsibility for employees in their unit, section, or police office, both professionally and administratively (e.g. hiring, leave, firing etc.), which corresponds to middle management on the administrative level. Their responsibility for goal- and result-management follows mainly from the Financial Instructions, from management-salary contracts with police chiefs and from job-vacancy announcements. With regard to Reuss-Ianni’s theory about “management cop culture,” it is primarily personnel managers who fall into this category. Managers without personnel responsibilities only have professional responsibilities, and can for instance be on-scene commanders with operative and professional responsibility for services, project managers, or experts in specialized agencies, etc. The most common job title for non-management is police officer (82.6%), of whom 25.7% have more than twenty years of experience, 26.5% have between ten and twenty years, 35.8% between two and ten years and 12.1% have less than two years of experience in the police.

In order to elaborate on the way management and steering processes in the police are intended to function and function in practice, I have conducted six semi-structured interviews with managers and other employees who can be regarded as key informants. Employers and employees were recruited with “the snowball method,” in which participants with relevant insights further referred to other relevant participants. These are informants with special knowledge about, or experience with, the issues explored. The interviews lasted approximately 1.5 h and led to
Findings and Discussion

The Development of a More Goal-oriented Police Gaze

Based on her police study in the 1990s, Finstad thought that goal-oriented management could lead to a police force that is more concerned with big, measurable efficiency goals than small, qualitative and less visible goals. Around twenty years later it may seem that Finstad had seen the beginnings of a change in the legitimate knowledge base of the police. While the small, qualitative and less visible goals that Finstad discusses are related to police work based on experience and professional judgement, the big and measurable efficiency goals are related to goal-oriented management in the police. To find out how police employees assess these goals, I presented the claim that the goal- and result-oriented system focuses on the most important aspects of one’s work. The table below shows that personnel managers agree the most with this claim (Figure 1).

This finding corresponds to the fact that 42% of personnel managers in the police agree that the task-prioritization in the police is correct and that the organization is on the right track. The corresponding number for non-managers is 24%. This indicates that the operative police in part see management control as stressful, which is in line with a range of studies that have shown that work-related stress in the police primarily is a result of management and organization, and to a lesser degree a consequence of specific police tasks.

The Bifocal Professional Gaze

The experience in the police of not being able to offer assistance and services to the public to the extent they desire, can be seen in relation to the interest of the street-level bureaucrats in conducting their work in line with their own preferences. The street-level bureaucrats are oriented towards developing their own practices in relation to their face-to-face communication with the public, clients, customers, etc.

However, even if specific groups of employees can be associated with a specific institutional logic, one cannot assume that all members of the group will always relate to the same logic: “They may be influenced by the nature of the issues at hand – how they characterize it, or how important they think it is.” This means that even if these logics may have contributed to developing different ideas of what constitutes good practices among managers and non-managers, it is not necessarily the case that managers and frontline officers have two distinctly separate professional gazes. When police employees relate to competing institutional logics, the professional gaze can become bifocal in the sense that the individual employee focuses on individuals and individual events as well as on goal-management systems more or less simultaneously.
This can be illustrated in the following quote from one interview with a police chief:

*I have a deep-rooted police professionalism where I want to be as useful as possible to society. What is a little sad is that I have changed. I am very concerned about having a good score on the measurement parameters, and more so than having good results. A simple warning may be all it takes to prevent something, but the most important thing is to register a case so that it can be counted. It is not certain that charging a 16-year-old with a crime is the best, but the demand to produce cases is there. I used to be more concerned with finding good solutions for the future and considered what would be right from my professional perspective, but now I am more concerned with generating good measurement results. I think that might be a negative consequence of the measurement hysteria we see to some degree. I have to move between my police professionalism and the measurement criteria. Sometimes I choose the ideological police professionalism, and at other times I have to be cynical and do what contributes as much as possible to goal attainment. I will have to live with that.*

Here the police chief reflects on the change he has gone through from having a social identity with a heavy emphasis on the professional aspects of work, to a social identity with a strong focus on producing cases. This is in line with how goal orientation can teach employees to think in a different way and change cultural norms and values. The quote illustrates how employees can construct new and hybrid identities that draw on several types of logic by mixing new orientations with old ideas. The police chief’s reflections can be seen as an example of how employees at a given time can activate one social identity with its associated frames of reference and rationality from a specific institutional logic, while other social organizational identities are recognized simultaneously. The police chief says that he moves between his police professionalism, which can be understood as representing the humanistically-oriented police logic, and the measurement criteria, which can be seen to represent the NPM logic. He activates the value logic and the professional social identity when he says that he has a deep-rooted police professionalism. When he is a little sad
because he has changed, he recognizes the value of the social identity from which he is moving away. He says that the change (in the professional gaze) is a negative consequence of the measurement hysteria (goal management). It is reasonable to assume that the moment when he took on a management role and became responsible for the quantitative goals is a central demarcation line for the change in his professional gaze. The policeman’s statement that he sometimes chooses ideological police professionalism and at other times he is cynical (or instrumental?) and does what contributes to the greatest possible goal attainment, illustrates how employees who have hybrid identities can juggle different types of action logic.

Changes in the Knowledge Base as a Catalyst for the Development of New Police Gazes

The institutional logics for action are connected through different knowledge bases or ideas of how the world functions and makes sense. In the police, “knowledge-based police work” is promoted as the legitimate base in central police documents and in the discourse on the development of the police. Knowledge-based police work is a common category for new models for goal-oriented and problem-based police work and crime investigation, and it contrasts with more random and individual experience-based police work. In light of the fact that NPM-inspired reforms emphasize efficient and measurable police work where effects can be traced through statistics, the NPM logic goes hand in hand with goal-oriented police work. Emphasis on efficiency in the task of solving crimes disregards the fact that the role of the police can also entail a broad public contact as a value in itself, in line with the ten basic principles.

In the following, we shall look more closely at how police employees think that police practice should be conducted with regard to assistance and minor crimes as opposed to more measurable and serious crime. I will look for patterns that point towards different professional identities related to the community-policing model and the expert model respectively.

Police managers as well as other employees agreed to a large extent (93%) with the statement that “the core tasks” of the police are to help and assist the public when they need it. Furthermore, 84% of the respondents said that they agreed that the police should do more general preventive work in the local community to create trust and safety. Even if non-managers agree more (86%) compared to specialized managers (84%) and personnel managers (81%), the respondents were generally of one mind in this respect. The uniformed police agreed the most with this statement, but the differences are minimal, even if they are statistically significant.

In order to study the prevalence of the desire in the police to have time and resources to handle requests from the public for assistance with minor problems and minor crimes (which points towards the community policing model), I presented a statement that addressed this question. It turned out that 89% of the respondents think that the police should have time and resources for such tasks, and managers and non-managers alike are in relative agreement on this issue, too. Nor do I find any major differences in opinion on
this statement based on the type of police work people do.

I presented the statement that police to a larger extent should reject requests from the public for help and assistance in connection with minor problems and minor crimes. Relatively few (11%) agreed with this statement, whereas the great majority disagreed somewhat (25%) or completely (51%). Non-managers (78%) disagreed most strongly that the police should reject requests from the public compared to managers (75%) (significant at the .01 level). In the following statement we went even further in the reasoning that minor crime should be sacrificed to the benefit of the fight against more serious crime.

A little over half the sample disagreed that investigating minor crimes such as shoplifting, bike thefts, etc. should give way to investigating more serious crime, while 36% agreed. Personnel managers were most likely to agree that less serious crime must be sacrificed in order to battle more serious crimes (44%), while specialized managers and non-managers disagreed (35 and 34% agreed, respectively). The numbers indicate that personnel managers agree more with this police strategy than other employees. This may be an example of how organizational identities can be seen as latent and manifest in the sense that the identity that manifests itself at a given time is context dependent.77

We followed up on desires and realities in the next statement, which concerned whether the police should use its limited resources on exposed risk groups rather than on more general preventive work, for instance in schools. In the table below, we see that personnel managers agreed the most with the statement (70%), followed by specialized managers, where 65% agreed, and finally non-managers, where 62% agreed that the police should use its limited resources on exposed risk groups (Figure 2).

![Figure 2. Resource priorities. (**Significant at the .01 level).](image-url)
There were only minor non-significant differences in opinion on this statement between types of services. I then presented a claim that the task prioritisation in the police is correct, and the organisation is on the right track. In the table below, we see that the sample is rather divided on this statement, where 42% of personnel managers agreed, 29% of specialized managers agreed, while the corresponding number for non-managers is 24% (Figure 3).

Even if the community-policing logic and the NMP logic can be seen to be active simultaneously, like transparent cellophane layers on the employees’ actions, they create different pressures on the employees depending on where in the organization they are. The differences between how personnel managers, specialized managers, and non-managers see more targeted and measurable police work can be regarded as an image of closeness or remoteness to the goal-measurement system and to the general public respectively. Specialized managers may be seen as having a foot in both camps. In this way, the logic behind a specific self-image influences decisions, and the activated motivation factors constitute the organizational identities that define how you should act.78

The Outline of Two Professional Gazes

The data indicate that managers in the police adopt to a larger extent elements of the management logic compared to non-managers. NPM reforms can thus function as an identity project where new professional roles and social identities emerge: people are transformed from servants of the state, its interests and its people, to managers of organizations and scarce resources.79 It is reasonable to assume that the new professional gaze did not emerge as a clear transition from one gaze to another, but as the development of a prism of parallel sets of structuring logics. In keeping with how motivation is affected by individual, social, as well as organizational conditions,80 and with the fact that different forms of goal management can displace internal motivation,81 a Norwegian police study has shown that personnel managers are more motivated by goal management than
non-managers, which can partly be explained by the fact that personnel managers to a larger extent think that the goal-management system captures the most important aspects of police work compared to the frontline.82

The manager’s preferences can be interpreted in light of the fact that NPM reforms can contribute to moving the manager’s role in the direction of a business manager.83 The fact that police managers are recruited from the ranks of ordinary policemen, and that well over 90% of all police employees are motivated by a desire to make a difference for others, strengthen the hypothesis that the managers’ hierarchical position pushes the motivation towards external incentives, rather than the assumption that externally-motivated managers seek or are recruited to management positions.84 When managers are measured by results in the goal-management system, and to a lesser degree provide services directly to the public, the instrumental logic that governs the management system gets stronger motivational force, and the police manager’s motivation shifts outwards. In this way the erroneous assumption from the field of economics that man is an economic actor can become self-fulfilling,85 moving organizations to fit the image of a business.86 When the image of the organization is business, the social action tends to be more goal-rational than value-rational.87

Measures that aim to increase internal competition and reward employees who act in accordance with set goals can over time lead to an organization that consists of employees who pursue their own interests rather than the best interests of the organization.88 In other words, the professional gaze changes when the logic of management influences the cultural values and the thinking of employees.

However, this does not mean that police employees who follow the NPM logic necessarily are more concerned with their own careers than with the organization’s interests. It may be a question of loyalty based on the belief that a police employee, as part of the state’s political power, must conform loyally to the demands that management puts on them. Based on the theory on this subject matter, earlier research, and analysis of the presented data, I can in simplified and ideal terms sketch the two following professional gazes in the police:

1. The goal-oriented professional gaze characterized by an instrumental and evidence-based approach to the management of organizations and police work, with a particular focus on measurable tasks

2. The traditional humanistic police gaze characterized by professional judgement and a contextual approach to police work

In line with these two professional gazes, Gundhus found that the absence of measurement indicators for preventive police work created tension between a service-driven police style and a police system driven by measurement indicators from law enforcement and rise and fall in crime statistics. Gundhus uses the terms standardization and “experience-based professionalism” to elucidate the different knowledge systems in today’s police work.89
These knowledge systems can be seen in relation to the different professional gazes that spring from the NPM logic compared to the traditional humanistic police logic. See the table below for a juxtaposition that builds on earlier studies and my own data (Table 1).

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<tr>
<th>Hegemonic period</th>
<th>Welfare and democracy logic</th>
<th>NPM logic</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Central values</td>
<td>From the 1970s to the 1990s</td>
<td>From the 1990s</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Equal treatment, dialogue, rule of law</td>
<td>Efficiency, productivity, measurability</td>
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<td>Knowledge base</td>
<td>Experience-based professionalism (Gundhus, 2006)</td>
<td>Analysis, measurement indicators and standardization (Gundhus, 2006)</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Emphasis on reflection on data</td>
<td>Emphasis on evidence in a strict sense</td>
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<td>Central police role</td>
<td>Generalist</td>
<td>Specialist</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Professional gaze</td>
<td>Community policing gaze with focus on the needs of the public, crime detection and solving cases</td>
<td>Measurement orientation with focus on producing cases and measuring effects</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indicators for well-executed work</td>
<td>Feedback from the public and the feeling that work reflects professional standards</td>
<td>Measurement results</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The different professional gazes are models that must not be seen as necessarily mutually exclusive. As mentioned, the professional gazes are sustained by new hybrid identities that draw on several logics by combining new orientations with traditional assumptions.90

Conclusion

This article contributes to the literature about the way the institutional logic of organizations change over time and to the literature on the way institutional logics relate to intra-organizational dynamics of practices and identities.91 Furthermore, it helps to close the gap in police research regarding how perceptions of valid knowledge in police work change over time,92 and to explain the somewhat diverging interpretations of the NPM logic among frontline employees and management.

Over the past couple of years, a number of NPM-inspired reforms in Europe have caused a movement away from the traditional Weberian bureaucratic model in the public sector as well.93 This shift leads to changes in the institutional logics of public agencies and create new power and knowledge positions that represent a first step towards a new social construction of reality,94 which can also involve new professional gazes.

Although not all police employees are equally favorable to goal management, the emphasis in goal management logic on efficiency and measurable police work shifts the professional logic and hegemonic professional gaze of the police in a more evidence-oriented direction. Primary
observable and measurable effects are seen as a valid knowledge base for steering, management, and resource use. Just as a strict evidence-based approach sits at the top of society’s knowledge hierarchy, evidence-oriented knowledge work has attained a hegemonic position in the police. When effects that can be measured directly constitute the dominant knowledge base, in accordance with what is captured in the goal measurement system, a demarcation line is created against more discretionary professional police work that loses its legitimacy. The emergence of such a demarcation line must be seen in light of the fact that a characteristic of institutional logics is that they involve certain “laws” within a closed system, which means that they cannot easily be joined together, but rather tend to clash, or play out side-by-side in either a competing dynamic, or in cooperation based on territorial division.

Since there is a fundamental and principal discrepancy between the humanistic professional police logic and the NPM logic, the two logics cannot synthesize new “laws” and merge into a new closed system. The origin of the discrepancy is that the professional police logic assumes that the performance of police tasks requires professional discretion and contextual judgements that go beyond evidence in the strict sense. Hence, there is a reason to think that the NPM logic cannot be fully integrated into the professional police logic. In light of Finstad’s claim that the locally-embedded and discretionary police gaze is a barometer of the degree of civilization and democracy, inasmuch as the police are the stewards of socially authorized coercive power, this raises the question of whether an evidence-oriented goal management logic leads to a less democratic police.

In keeping with an institutional-logic-perspective, this article explores how police employees and the police organization are influenced by and modify elements of different institutional logics, which in turn influence values. Whereas Meyer and Hammerschmid find that managers only show small signs that the management logic has gained a foothold, I find significant differences between managers and non-managers in this area. It appears that the closeness to the goal-measurement system that personnel managers have, gives them a more measurable and evidence-based view on what knowledge-based and good police work is. At this organizational level, knowledge-based policing in practice replaces insight/discretion with standardization and measuring. In this way the accountability of the police moves in the direction of accountability and audits. My findings indicate that personnel managers change their values in the direction of this kind of management thinking. Nevertheless, my findings are so modest that they give reason to conclude in line with Meyer and Hammerschmid: “If new public management is mainly an «identity project», at least so far it has not been successful in superceding the «old» administrative orientation.”

Despite many years with NPM as the dominant management logic, a humanistic professional logic is maintained both by managers and other employees.
New Public Management and the Police Profession at Play

Notes

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1 See Friedland and Alford, “Bringing Society Back In.”


3 See Pratt and Foreman, “Classifying Managerial Reponses.”

4 See Thornton et al., The Institutional Logics Perspective, 130.


7 See Wathne, “Kvinners plass i politiet.”

8 See Justis- og beredskapsdepartementet, Politi og bevepning, 28.

9 See ibid., 28.

10 See Reiner, Politics of the Police, 59.

11 See Westerberg, “Politiet som Reformrende Organisasjon,” 80.


13 See Christensen, Forvaltning og politikk.

14 The goal of both Police Reform 2000 and the ongoing police reform is to create a police force that more effectively prevents and fights crime, and is more service-oriented and public-friendly, while also being more cost-effective. This means that we find the classic NPM rhetoric with emphasis on efficiency, service delivery, audience orientation, and cost effectiveness, in both reform efforts.

15 See Reiner, Politics of the Police, 199.

16 See Justis- og politidepartementet, Politiets rolle i samfunnet, 6; Politidirektoratet, Høringsuttalelse; Justis- og beredskapsdepartementet. Ett politi.

17 See Reuss-Ianni, Two Cultures of Policing.

18 The concept of “practice” here is used to refer to established shapes or constellations of socially meaningful activities that can be related to cultural beliefs. See Thornton et al., The Institutional Logics Perspective, 128, 130.


21 See Thornton et al., The Institutional Logics Perspective, 132.


23 See Wathne, “Kvinners plass i politiet”; Reiner, Politics of the Police.

24 See Balvig and Holmberg, Politi & Tryghed, 11.

25 See Sklansky, “Promise and the Perils.”

26 See Gundhus, “Å målstrye skjønnsutøvelse.”

27 See Finstad, Politiblikket, 332.

28 See Justis- og politidepartementet, Politiets rolle og oppgaver.

29 See Justis- og politidepartementet, Politiets rolle i samfunnet, 35.

30 See Justis- og politidepartementet, Gode krefter, kriminalitetsforebyggende handlingsplan, 249.

31 See Friedland and Alford, “Bringing Society Back In,” here in; Thornton et al., The Institutional Logics Perspective.

32 See Røvik, Trender og translasjoner.

33 See Larsson, Unpublished Manuscript.

34 At the end of the 1980s the concept of the “audit” became increasingly common, and more and more entities were required to provide detailed accounts of their activities. See Power, The Audit Society; see Reiner, “Who Governs?”


37 See Røvik, *Trender og translasjoner*, 34.


39 See Røvik, *Trender og translasjoner*, 34.


41 See Wathne, *Kvinners plass i politiet*.


45 See Reuss-Ianni, *Two Cultures of Policing*.

46 See Reuss-Ianni, *Two Cultures of Policing*.

47 See ibid., 4.

48 See Sklansky, “Promise and the Perils.”

49 See ibid., 348.

50 See Lipsky, *Street-level Bureaucracy*.

51 See ibid., 19.


53 See Wathne, *Som å bli fremmed*.


56 Social identity as an analytical tool is almost analogous with organisational identity, which is also context-dependent, and where e.g. demands from the institutional environment or special internal conditions shape the organisational identities that manifest at a given time. See Pratt and Foreman, “Classifying Managerial Reponses”; Meyer et al., “Of Bureaucrats.”


58 PF is the biggest union in the Norwegian police force with approximately 11,750 members, organises all categories of police employees.

59 See Johannessen et al. *Introduksjon til samfunnsvitenskapelig metode*, 246.

60 See Baruch and Holtom, “Survey Response Rate Levels,” 1140.

61 See ibid., 1153.


63 See Johannessen et al., *Introduksjon til samfunnsvitenskapelig metode*, 246.

64 See Jacobsen and Thorsvik. *Hvordan organisasjoner fungerer*, 348.

65 See Reuss-Ianni, *Two Cultures of Policing*.


68 See Wathne, *Som å bli fremmed*.

69 See Lipsky, *Street-level Bureaucracy*.


74 See Gundhus, *For sikkerhets skyld*, 12.

75 See Lumsden and Goode, “Policing Research.”

76 See Justis- og politidepartementet, *Poltiets rolle i samfunnet; Justis- og beredskapsdepartementet, Ett politi*. 

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77 See Pratt and Foreman, “Classifying Managerial Responses.”
78 See Alvesson, “Hvordan motivere individer,” 35.
80 See Kjeldsen and Jacobsen, “Public Service Motivation,” 102; Vandenabeele, “Who Wants to Deliver.”
82 See Wathne, Som å bli fremmed.
83 See Røvik, Trender og translasjoner, 161.
85 See Røvik, Trender og translasjoner.
86 See Weber. Ekonomi och samhälle.
87 See Røvik, Trender og translasjoner.
89 See Gundhus, For sikkerhets skyld, 454.
91 See Thornton et al., The Institutional Logics Perspective, 133.
92 See Gundhus, “Experience or Knowledge?” 180.
93 See Meyer et al., “Of Bureaucrats.”
95 See Lumsden and Goode, “Policing Research.”
96 See Finstad, Politiblikket, 332.
97 See Thornton et al., The Institutional Logics Perspective; Thornton and Ocasio, “Institutional Logics.”
98 See Skafinesmo, “Evidensbasering: Den nye eminensen.”
100 See Meyer and Hammerschmid, “Changing Institutional Logics,” 1013.

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