NIBR

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PLUS – PARTICIPATION, LEADERSHIP AND URBAN SUSTAINABILITY

Country report Norway

Abstract:	This is the report of Norwegian case studies of the PLUS ("Participation, Leadership and Urban Sustainability") project funded by the European Commission under the 5th Frame-work Programme on Research and Development. The same format has been adopted in all nine country reports of this international project, and the research has responded to a common set of concepts and ideas about leadership and communities. The PLUS project examines how leadership and community involvement can combine to lead to better policies for cities.

Preface

In the period 2002 - 2004, NIBR and the cities of Bergen and Oslo participated in the project "Participation, leadership and urban sustainability" – PLUS. Funded by the City of Tomorrow and Cultural Heritage key action 4 within the Framework 5 Research Programme of the European Community, the project proposal was initiated by members of the European Consortium for Urban Research (EURA), in which NIBR is among the founding members. Nine academic partners and eighteen city partners were involved in PLUS, in addition to the international organisations Eurocities and Quartiers en Crise. The Cities Research Centre of the University of the West of England, Bristol, coordinated the project.

Research activities in PLUS have been meticulously co-ordinated across countries, in order to facilitate comparative analysis. Following this, the Norwegian case studies are to be seen as inputs to the cross-national comparative analysis, and not as stand-alone outputs. This publication is not the final report of an assessment of the four policy initiatives studied in Norway, and they should not be regarded as such.

The Norwegian PLUS team has been co-ordinated by Jan Erling Klausen, succeeding Jon Naustdalslid who headed NIBRs efforts in the quite extensive development phase of the project proposal. Other members of NIBRs PLUS team have been Gro Sandkjær Hanssen and Signy Irene Vabo, who are co-writers of this working paper with Klausen. Co-ordinators in Bergen and Oslo have been City Secretary Roar Kristiansen and Assistant Director General Helene Solbakken. NIBR would like to thank Kristiansen and Solbakken sincerely for their valuable contributions to PLUS. Our gratitude is also extended to the numerous individuals who have contributed to PLUS in terms of submitting forms, being interviewed or providing relevant documents.

The main comparative findings in PLUS will be published in two books. The first book is about to be published by Routledge, and the title is *Urban Governance and Democracy* (Michael Haus, Hubert Heinelt, Murray Stewart, eds., 2004). Draft title of the second book is

Leadership and Participation: Searching for sustainability in European cities. Editors are Panagiotis Getimis, Hubert Heinelt and David Sweeting, and expected publication is late 2005. For the present, the PLUS website is http://www.plus-eura.org/. Documents pertaining to PLUS may be downloaded, including the various national reports.

PLUS has had a focus on two policy fields which are crucial to the quality of life in towns and cities: economic competitiveness and social inclusion. The research project is founded on the assumption that the achievement of effective urban governance and thus of sustainable policies is strongly dependent on the complementarity of urban leadership and community involvement. This complementarity is dependent on the institutional settings and contexts of local governments and the result of the initiative and action of local actors. Following this, the Norwegian case studies presented in this volume emphasize strongly the exertion of urban leadership and manifestations of community involvement.

Oslo, 25 august 2004

Hilde Lorentzen

Research Director

Table of Contents

Tables

Summary

Gro Sandkjær Hansen, Jan Erling Klausen and Signy Irene Vabo
PLUS – Participation, leadership and urban sustainability
Working Paper 2004:108

This is the national report for the Norwegian case studies in the project PLUS – Participation, Leadership and Urban Sustainability. The PLUS project, funded by the European Commission, examines how leadership and community involvement can combine to lead to better policies for cities. The cross-national project has involved research in 18 cities from 9 countries. In each city, there have been two case studies of policy areas relevant to all cities - social inclusion and economic competitiveness.

The quality of life in the towns and cities of Europe depends to a considerable extent on the quality of urban governance. Policy makers at all levels of government recognise that enhancing the quality of human life requires a more sustainable approach to urban development. For example, the European Commission published a Framework for Action in 1998 titled: *Sustainable Urban Development in the European Union*. This indicates that the economic, social and environmental challenges facing European urban areas are intertwined and that effective approaches to meeting these challenges require improvements in governance and local citizen empowerment. The PLUS project aims to promote effective urban governance by identifying approaches to city leadership and community involvement which work well. Strong leadership and effective public involvement are complementary and both need to be developed if the quality of urban living in Europe is to be enhanced.

The objective of PLUS is to accumulate and disseminate practical knowledge about the complementarity of political leadership and citizen involvement in cities which are active in promoting sustainable development. By researching alternative approaches to urban leadership and community involvement in local decision-making in

nine countries the project seeks to identify aspects of good practice, and disseminate the research findings to cities, national governments, and the EU.

The two Norwegian cities are Bergen and Oslo. This is a brief outline of the four policy initiatives studied in Norway for PLUS:

The Programme for Regional Development for the City of Oslo and the County of Akershus is a joint effort by the Municipality of Oslo, the County of Akershus, and different governmental institutions. The main objective of the programme is to stimulate regional development by promotion of entrepreneurship, innovation, building of new competence and international promotion of the area. The Confederation of Norwegian Business and Industry employers' organization (NHO) and the Norwegian Confederation of Trade Unions (LO) are represented in the working group of the programme, along with governmental representatives. The participants of the working group cooperate comprehensively with a broad range of actors in the private sector. In addition to being active partners in implementation, these external actors also provide considerable financial contributions to the projects carried out within the programme– and are responsible for a major part of the total funding of the programme.

The *Oslo Regeneration Programme for the Inner City Districts* is a ten year programme for urban development and improvement of living conditions in three of the east-central districts of Oslo. The programme was formally initiated by the Norwegian Parliament, and was a joint effort between the National Government and the City of Oslo, with an annual budget of €12,2 million for the 10-year period 1997-2006. The programme represents an attempt to actively strengthen the scope, broadness and quality of social services in the three Urban Districts, and thus achieve an improvement of the living conditions for the inhabitants. A wide variety of governmental organisations from various levels and sectors of public administration co-operate in the programme, in addition to some actors from the private sector. A large number of projects have been implemented.

The city of Bergen in 2000 initiated a process to develop a *Strategic Plan for Culture*. A broad range of actors from the cultural sector and the private business sector were invited to contribute to the development process of the strategic plan by attending working groups. The groups dealt with various aspects of the cultural sector, including such subjects as the conditions for children, urban development, theatre, dance and music, new technology, museums

and cultural institutions, city festivals, and interaction between culture and business. The deliberations in the working groups provided input for the city department for culture as it drafted a proposal for strategic plan. The proposal was passed by vote in the City Council in December 2002, and is currently in the early stages of implementation.

In the mid 1990s a growing awareness of problematic living conditions, environmental issues, unemployment, and poor public health in the former working class area of Løvstakken led to the initiation of *The Program of Development for the area of Løvstakken*. The Districtof Årstad has been in charge of the program. The programme has involved local community actors on a broad scale. The programme has focused on improvement of the physical environment and public housing, better conditions for upbringing the children in the area, improvement in services for foreign language speaking parents and single parents, measures towards refugees, immigrants and integration, services for long-term welfare recipients and for substance and alcohol abusers.

The case studies have been carried out using a methodological framework common to all the 36 policy initiatives included in PLUS. Furthermore, an elaborate common conceptual framework has provided the basis for the theoretical analysis.

Sammendrag

Gro Sandkjær Hansen, Jan Erling Klausen og Signy Irene Vabo
PLUS - Lederskap. deltagelse og bærekraftig byutvikling
Case-rapport Norge
NIBR-notat 2004:108

Dette er den nasjonale rapporten for de Norske case-studiene i prosjektet PLUS – Participation, Leadership and Urban Sustainability. PLUS prosjektet er finansiert av den Europeiske kommisjonen. Det undersøker hvordan samspillet mellom lederskap og deltagelse kan føre til bedre bypolitikk. Prosjektet har omfattet 18 byer i ni land. I hver by har det blitt gjennomført to case-studier av politiske initiativer innenfor to områder som er relevante for alle byer – økonomisk utvikling og forbedring av levekår.

Livskvaliteten i Europeiske byer er i betydelig grad avhengig av at byene har en god politisk og administrativ styring. Det erkjennes av politikere på alle styringsnivåer at en forbedring av livskvaliteten blant innbyggere i byer er avhengig av en mer bærekraftig tilnærming til byutvikling. For eksempel publiserte den Europeiske kommisjonen en handlingsplan i 1998 med tittelen "Bærekraftig utvikling i den Europeiske Union".[1] Dette indikerer at de økonomiske, sosiale og miljømessige utfordringene som europeiske byer står overfor er sammenvevde, og at effektive tilnærminger for å møte disse utfordringene er avhengige av så vel forbedringer av styringen av byene som av økt folkelig deltagelse og medvirkning. PLUS har som formål å fremme effektiv styring av byer ved å identifisere velfungerende tilnærminger til styring og medvirkning. Sterkt lederskap og effektiv medvirkning er gjensidig utfyllende, og er begge nødvendige hvis livskvaliteten i europeiske byer skal forbedres.

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[1] Publikasjonens originale tittel er "Sustainable developement in the European Union".

Målet med PLUS er å samle og videreformidle praktisk kunnskaper om gjensidigheten mellom politisk ledelse og folkelig medvirkning, i byer som er aktive når det gjelder å fremme en bærekraftig byutvikling. Ved å utforske alternative tilnærminger til lederskap og medvirkning i lokale beslutningsprosesser i ni land, skal prosjektet identifisere aspekter som representerer beste praksis i så måte. Disse funnene skal videreformidles til byer, nasjonale myndigheter og til EU.

De to norske byene som har deltatt i PLUS er Bergen og Oslo. De fire politiske initiativene som er studert er de følgende:

"Regionalt utviklingsprogram for Oslo og Akershus" (RUP) er et samarbeid som skal fremme næringsutvikling i regionen. Programmet har et budsjett på ca. 10 mill. NOK i året. Det er etablert på oppfordring fra statlige myndigheter, som ut over på 1990-tallet presiserte denne typen partnerskap som arbeidsformen i fylkeskommunenes nærings- og sysselsettingspolitikk. Det første handlingsprogrammet ble utviklet for 2001. Det revideres årlig, og vedtas da i de utøvende organ i Oslo og Akershus; henholdsvis byrådet og fylkesutvalget. I tillegg bevilger de overordnede og folkevalgte organene (bystyret og fylkestinget) de to (fylkes)kommunenes årlige andel av handlingsprogrammets budsjett. Det er iverksatt et knippe av tiltak, men omfanget er – spesielt sett i forhold til det policyfeltet en her arbeider innenfor – meget begrenset.

"Handlingsprogrammet Oslo indre øst" er en tiårig satsing (1997–2006) for levekårsforbedring og byutvikling i tre østlige sentrumsbydeler. På begynnelsen av 1990-tallet ble det konstatert at opphopningen av levekårsproblemer i dette området var for omfattende til at Oslo kommune kunne løse dem alene. I samarbeid med staten, ved Kommunal- og regionaldepartementet, har kommunen så langt investert 700 mill. NOK (100 mill. NOK hvert år) for å få til et levekårsløft i de tre bydelene. Satsingen impliserer et bredt samarbeid på tvers av sektorer og forvaltningsnivåer, i og med at både staten, ulike etater i kommunen, bydelene og – i meget begrenset grad – aktører i nærmiljøet er involvert. Det er gjennomført et stort antall tiltak, spesielt knyttet til barn og unges oppvekstvilkår i bydelene.

Bergen bystyre vedtok i 2002 kulturstrategien *"Kulturbyen Bergen 2003–2013"*, hvor en av hovedtankene var å se "kultur som næring". Ett av målene for strategien var at den skulle fungere som en brobygger mellom kultursektoren og næringslivet. Forskningsinstitusjoner ble trukket med i startfasen, og det ble gjennomført casestudier og brukerundersøkelser for å kartlegge

kulturlivets økonomiske ringvirkninger for byen. Deretter etablerte administrasjonen ni bredt sammensatte arbeidsgrupper; med representanter fra privat næringsliv, kunst-, kultur- og utdanningsinstitusjoner, organisasjoner, kunstnere, festivaler, arrangører og filmmiljøet. Også andre kommunale etater og forvaltningsnivåer, inklusive bydelene, fylkeskommunen, samt Statens nærings- og distriktsutviklingsfond (SND) var representert i gruppene. Til sammen var opp mot 80 aktører involvert. Gruppenes innspill ble bearbeidet av kulturavdelingen i Bergen kommune, og lagt fram som forslag til vedtak i bystyret. Strategien er nå i begynnelsen av iverksettingsfasen.

"Strategisk områdeplan for Løvstakksiden" omhandler levekårstiltak i et utsatt byområde i Bergen. Utgangspunktet for arbeidet var at bydelen på slutten av 1990-tallet sto overfor omfattende levekårsproblemer knyttet blant annet til arbeidsledighet, rusmisbruk, dårlig bygningsstandard og opphoping av sosialklienter i bydelens mange kommunale boliger. Bydelen satte i gang planprosessen, hvor aktører fra nærmiljøet ble trukket inn. Arbeidet har også involvert samarbeid mellom offentlige instanser fra ulike forvaltningsnivåer og sektorer. Planen og de tiltakene som er iverksatt i kjølvannet av den er dermed resultat av et lite formalisert nettverk av private og offentlige aktører. Offentlige myndigheter har spilt en sentral rolle som organisator, og bydelen er den mest sentrale aktøren i nettverkssamarbeidet. Selve planvedtaket ble fattet i bydelsstyret – byens politisk oppnevnte organ i bydelen. Utformingen av planen skjedde i en meget åpen, og utpreget inkluderende og horisontal prosess i bydelen. *Alle* organiserte aktører i nærmiljøet ble identifisert og invitert til å komme med konkrete innspill til planen. Alt i alt var 23 organisasjoner invitert, alt fra menighetene i området til idrettslag og borettslag.

Det understrekes at denne rapporten er det norske bidraget til PLUS, og først og fremst er utarbeidet for å inngå i den sammenlignende analysen. Et felles konseptuelt rammeverk har dannet grunnlaget for de teoretiske analysene. Dermed skal ikke denne rapporten betraktes som frittstående evalueringer av disse fire politiske initiativene.

1   Introduction

This is the national report for the Norwegian case studies in the project PLUS – Participation, Leadership and Urban Sustainability. The PLUS project, funded by the European Commission, examines how leadership and community involvement can combine to lead to better policies for cities. The cross-national project has involved research in 18 cities from 9 countries. In each city, there have been two case studies of policy areas relevant to all cities - social inclusion and economic competitiveness. The two Norwegian cities are Bergen and Oslo. In Bergen, the economic competitiveness case is the "Strategic Plan for Culture" which is an attempt to enhance economic competitiveness by means of co-ordinating activities in the cultural sector. The social inclusion case is the development and subsequent implementation of a plan for the regeneration of the challenged area of Løvstakken. In Oslo, the competitiveness case study is the "Regional Development Plan", which is an initiative made jointly by the city of Oslo and the neighbouring county of Akershus. The inclusion case in Oslo is a 10-year "Action Programme for Inner City Districts" which is co-funded by the city and national government.

The Norwegian case studies have been implemented by researchers from the Norwegian Institute for Urban and Regional Research, in close co-operation with representatives of the PLUS city partners Bergen and Oslo. Bergen and Oslo have been co-operative and helpful partners and we are most grateful for the input we have got from the communities, officers and elected leaders. The four policy initiatives presented in this paper offers insight into how these cities have used innovative approaches to manage emerging challenges and opportunities. We hope that we have recorded their attempts to manage change in a constructive and positive way.

Research design and data

The analysis in this National report is based on the analytical
framework used in the PLUS-project. The data consists predominantly
of structured interviews with a broad range of actors. The interviews
are presented in Table 1.1 below.

Table 1.1   *Interviews*

		Bergen		Oslo	
		Social inclusion	*Economic competitiveness*	*Social inclusion*	*Economic competitiveness*
Political leaders	*Municipality*	1	1	2	2
	Districts	1		4	
Administrators and other actors	*External participants*	3	5	1	2
	Districts, municipality or state	7	8	12	6
Total	(Total 55)	12	14	19	10

In addition to the interviews, studies of relevant documents have also
been conducted. Furthermore, a questionnaire used in all PLUS case
studies has been sent to a broad panel in each city. The respondents in
the panel were asked general questions on political culture and
institutional performance in their city. The respondents in the panel
were not selected after the standard criteria to get a representative
selection of the population. Rather, the panel was selected following a
set of criteria based on the idea that the panel were to mirror the broad
range of organisations and institutions in the two cities. The panel
included both interviewed stakeholders and respondents selected on
the above mentioned criteria. Of the 168 in the panel 92 respondents
answered the questionnaire, yielding a response rate of 55 percent.
Although the response rate is relatively low, we believe that it is
nevertheless possible to point at some tendencies regarding political
culture in the two cities based on this material.

2   National context

Constitutional position of local government

The counties and municipalities are not mentioned in the Norwegian constitution of 1814. Their powers, functions and boundaries are determined by parliament, and formally speaking, they could be dissolved by parliament at any time. Norwegian municipalities were originally incorporated as public bodies by legislation in 1837. Until 1976, the political responsibility for determining the functions and finances of the counties resided with the municipalities. Following a reform in 1976, however, the counties' status is similar to that of the municipalities.

As of today, Norwegian local government consists of 434 municipalities and 19 counties including the capital of Oslo. Norway is a unitary state.

The function of the county governor is primarily one of supervision of local government, on behalf of central government. Some of the cabinet ministries have regional offices. Some of these, in turn, are departments in the offices of the county governor. These governors, 18 in all, are appointed by the cabinet.

The structure of local government

In Norway, local government is two tier with functions split between municipal and county government. The only exception from this rule is Oslo. The capital is a county as well as a municipality. The municipalities are not subordinate to the counties. The counties do not exert direct authority over the municipalities, although they do perform certain functions as regards regional co-ordination, most notably within the field of spatial planning.

Several municipalities, including Oslo and Bergen, have instigated a system of sublocal councils, covering smaller areas within the municipal boundaries. In most cases, these councils perform purely advisory functions, and deal mostly with local amenities. In a few of

the largest cities, however, these councils are politically responsible for a wide range of services, most notably in the fields of health services, care functions, social welfare, kindergartens and primary schools. In Bergen, for example, the sub-municipal councils account for as much as 70% of net municipal expenditures.

The size of the municipalities varies extremely, ranging from 224 to 517 401 inhabitants. 56% of the municipalities have less than 5000 inhabitants.[2] Currently, a consultation process is underway involving all municipalities in the debate on structural reform. Parliament has however decided that no municipalities are to be merged except by their own free will, and so far only a few municipalities have decided to merge.

Local government powers and functions

Municipalities and counties are required through legislation to provide a number of specific services. The bulk of local government activities are mandatory. Also, a voluminous body of state-imposed regulations provide quite specific prescriptions on the planning, organising and execution of these services. If allowed by the economic situation local government can, however, also initiate tasks on their own accord. The relationship between national government and local and regional authorities may most accurately be described as integrated, in the sense that state government has adopted a highly active role in relation to local and regional authorities.

Local government is responsible for a wide range of functions. Principal services provided by the municipalities include kindergartens, primary schools, care for the elderly and the disabled (including nursing homes and home-help services), primary health care, public housing, child care services and social welfare services including economic support, local roads and parks, and technical services. The counties are responsible for the high school system (ages 16 to 18), regional roads and public transportation. They are also responsible for regional development.

The municipalities have been given the primary responsibility for spatial planning. The councils are by law obliged to decide upon a municipal master plan, including a map showing various zoning regulations. The plan is legally binding. It is possible, however, to make exemptions from the plan and grant dispensations. The counties are supposed to co-ordinate spatial planning within their territories. All planning decisions made in the municipalities are forwarded to the

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[2] These are figures from 1.1.2003

counties and to the county governor's office for scrutiny. The counties and the county governor are empowered to block local planning decisions until an agreement is reached.

Several municipalities and counties are involved in locally initiated co-operative schemes. In many cases, neighbouring local governments establish joint corporations (allowed by special legislation) to perform various functions, such as waste disposal, public transportation, water supply and regional development.

Norwegian municipalities and counties are required to set up supervisory bodies known as control committees. Persons serving on these committees are elected by local and county councils. The control committees perform functions of supervision and surveillance through performance auditing (i.e., evaluation of resource use and results achieved). The control committee system, in function since 1993, has invigorated traditional monitoring functions such as financial auditing and supervision of compliance with rules and regulations. The control committees and the auditing bodies have had less success in transferring resources from financial auditing to performance auditing.

Local government finance

About 15,1% of Norwegian GNP is administered by local government, compared to 9,4% of GNP administered by central government.[3] About 93 of total local government expenditure is current expenditure, the remainder is capital expenditure. All in all, 537 000 people are employed by local and regional authorities, as compared to about 150 000 people employed by central government. As a consequence, local government employs about a quarter of the entire Norwegian work force.

Local government activities are financed primarily by taxation (43% of gross income) and by grants from central government (39%). Various fees account for 14% and other sources of revenue 4%. Borrowing is allowed, and borrowing may finance capital expenditure and current spending alike. As of today Norwegian local government has accumulated a total net debt of NOK 27 000 million (about £ 2 000 million), roughly equivalent to 15% of total annual expenditures. This is currently an issue of some concern.

The local government tax is levied on personal income. Parliament decides the maximum percentage of taxation annually. Currently, local government tax equals 17% of annual income (10,8% to the

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[3] All figures in this section: 2002

municipalities, 6,2% to the counties). As of today, all municipalities charge the maximum amount. In addition, municipalities may choose to charge a tax on real estate, according to a system of property value. This form of taxation is politically controversial, and many municipalities have chosen to abstain from this source of income. All in all, local governments are only to a very limited extent able to affect their own income.

As a general rule, grants from central government are block grants. Local and regional authorities themselves decide how to allocate their budgets. As for the relationship with the national government, its involvement in local affairs has consistently increased throughout the 1990s. An increasing amount of national grants are earmarked for particular purposes, thus limiting the discretionary powers of local governments. This means that the funds are to be allocated to certain specific purposes, and the implication is that the discretionary powers of the local and regional authorities are limited. The amount of earmarked grants has steadily increased during the nineties. As of today, an estimated 43,5% of state grants are earmarked. Also, the volume of mandatory services and the various regulations on these services further delimit local government's powers of discretion.

Several large-scale national policy initiatives related to local government services have been introduced, more often than not involving detailed prescriptions of measures to be implemented locally.

Because Norway is not a member of the European Union, the relationship between Oslo and Bergen and the various branches of the EU probably differ substantially from that of all the other cities in the PLUS project, except the cities in New Zealand. This must be taken into account, not least by WP 3 (framework for analysis).

Local politics

Elections for the 434 municipal councils and the 18 county councils are carried out simultaneously every four years. Proportional elections are held in multicandidate constituencies.

A comparatively large number of parties are represented in local government. This reflects the situation in national politics in Norway, which may be described as highly fragmented. In the municipal elections in 1999, Norway's largest party – Labour – received no more than 28,6% of the votes. As many as six parties received more than 5% of the votes each. County elections had a similar outcome. The

national parties controlled more than 95% of the votes. The rest of the votes were cast for local lists and local parties.

Some parties hold a much stronger position in local politics than in national politics. One party, the Center (formerly the Agrarian Party) has the mayor in 102 local governments, even though it has no more than 11 representatives in Parliament (2002).

Decision making in local government

The local government act allocates all political powers delegated to local government to the councils. The councils may however decide to delegate powers to subordinate political bodies or, subject to restrictions, to the administration.

According to the Local Government Act local governments may choose between two models of political organisation in Norway, the traditional model and the parliamentary model. Oslo was the first local government to implement a parliamentary system in 1986, Bergen followed suit in 2000.

The traditional aldermen-model is based on the principle of proportional representation in all committees, according to the composition of the council. In this model, the councils are required to establish a preparatory and executive committee with a composition roughly equal to that of the council. Apart from this, councils are allowed to organise their committee structure according to their own wishes, and they may also allocate political offices any way they please. As a consequence, in some municipalities the majority holds all posts of chairman and wise chairman of the committees.

In a parliamentary system, the council is still the highest political authority. The council elects a city government, in the same fashion as the cabinet in national politics. The city government may consist of one or several parties, and it must resign if there is a majority vote of no confidence in the council. The government members are responsible for implementing decisions made in the council, and they have executive authority over their own parts of the administration. The responsibility of supervising the production of services and the administration of the various agencies and enterprises within their respective sectors resides with the city departments of the city government.

All councils, regardless of model of governance, are required to elect a mayor. The mayor leads the meetings in the council. The functions of the mayor vary. In a parliamentary system, the mayor is less powerful because much power resides with the leader of the city government.

The standard set-up for local government organisation in Norway is a structure with standing sector boards. In this structure, boards for each of the main service branches of the local authorities assume preparatory functions for political issues within their sphere of competence. Also, the council may delegate certain specific decision-making powers to these committees, and they may initiate issues to be raised in the council. In an alternative structure, the "preparatory committee structure", there is no delegation of authority.

Local governments increasingly replace standing sector board structures with preparatory committee structures, although the former is still dominant. Also, there is a tendency towards increased use of functional organisation, in which the committee structure is designed in accordance with various types of administrative processes (service, development, administration).

All meetings in elected political bodies are by law open to the public. All documents pertaining to public issues are available to the public, if no legally allowed exceptions have been made.

All "traditional" local governments are required to hire a chief administrative officer (in a parliamentary system, the city government hold this position collectively). The CAO is responsible for the administration in its entirety, but has no executive power (in opposition to the city government in the parliamentary system). All communication between the political and the administrative levels of a municipality or a county is to pass through the CAO.

In principle, issues should not reach the political level before the CAO deems that the administrative preparatory procedure is concluded. The CAO is not a political appointee, and is not replaced as a consequence of elections. He is responsible for implementing decisions made in the council, and he is allowed and required to submit issues to the council. In particular, he is required to submit a proposal for annual budget. In doing so, he needs to consult closely with the council members and the party factions. The CAO is not eligible for any political office.

Local elections and representation

All in all, there are 13 616 politicians in local government in Norway (2002). About one third are women. The distribution is as follows:

Table 2.1   *Membership in local and regional councils (2002)*

Council	N members	Share female (%)
Municipal	12663	32,7
County	953	41,2
Total	13616	33,3

According to the Local Government Act, municipal and county councils may themselves decide the number of council members. The Act does however require a specified minimum number of members relative to the size of the population. For instance, councils in municipalities with less than 5 000 inhabitants must have at least 11 members. In cities larger than 100 000, the number must be at least 43. Similar requirements for county councils are 19 members for counties with less than 150 000 people, or 43 members in counties larger than 300 000 people. For medium range localities, other figures apply.

Average voter turnout in local elections has been steadily decreasing since the early eighties. In the last election in 2003, the lowest turnout for municipal elections was 45,1%, an all-time low. Average turnout the same year was 58,8%.

Citizen participation

There is a widespread concern regarding what is perceived as a declining trend in popular participation and involvement in local politics.

A number of measures has been tried out as remedies to this trend. In 1999, 68,9% of all municipalities reports to have staged public meetings concurrent with the development of the municipal plan.[4] 41,2% have staged public meetings for other purposes. 25,7% have established local councils for children and youth. 11,7% have established neighbourhood councils with advisory functions. Other measures include popular elections for mayor or DistrictCouncil.

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[4] All figures are cited from the national database on local government organisation. This database is maintained by NIBR on commission by the Ministry of Local Government.

Economic competitiveness

In 2003, the Norwegian gross domestic product was approx. 189 billion euro. The five largest contributors to this product were crude petroleum and natural gas extraction (17,4%), provision of government services (16,4%), maufacturing (9%), business service provision (9%) and wholesale and retail trade (8,4%). The largest contributors within the manufacturing industries included food products and beverages, basic metals, chemicals and chemical products, oil platforms and modules, electrical and optical equipment, machinery and equipment.

All in all, the Norwegian economy is dominated by the manufacturing of raw materials and intermediate goods. On the global consumer markets, only a small number of Norwegian brand products are widely available. In the Norwegian policy debate on economic competitiveness and development, there is a pronounced concern about the scarcity of knowledge-based, technology intensive enterprises, not least in the global markets for consumer products. Even though these markets in later years have proven highly volatile, it is a common conception that the Norwegian economy should gradually be made less dependent on the production of raw materials, and more heavily oriented towards the knowledge based industries. A common slogan is that Norway should move away from the petroleum society towards the knowledge society. A number of measures in Norwegian policies on economic competitiveness, on the national as well as the regional and local levels, are aimed towards this end. In this sense, economic competitiveness is more about restructuring than increased output.

The context of Norwegian policies on economic competitiveness is fundamentally paradoxical. On the one hand, numerous studies have shown that the innovation rate in Norwegian business is very low, scarce resources are allocated to research and development, the economic potentials in research and development are under-utilised, and there is a dependency on the production of raw materials and intermediate goods often seen as unfitting for an advanced society with a very high level of education and extensive use of modern technology. On the other hand, economic output is very high. Among the OECD countries, only USA, Japan and Luxembourg and have higher GDP per capita. Unemployment rates are very low, personal income is very high and increasing. It is hardly surprising that policies to increase economic competitiveness under these circumstances often seem to lack momentum.

Norway is very sparsely populated. Compared to many other countries, a relatively high share of the population live in rural areas. A stated political goal, shared by shifting government coalitions, has been to support this decentralised pattern of habitation. As a consequence, the economic competitiveness and general vitality of rural areas, towns and villages has been a prominent concern in several different policy areas. Infrastructure investments, subsidies to agriculture, fisheries, forest works and so forth have been justified not least with reference to the desire to support the decentralised pattern of habitation. All in all, policy measures to promote rural areas, the *Distriktspolitikk,* have by far exceeded any other kind of policies geared towards economic competitiveness, in terms of resources as well as general attention.

The Norwegian Industrial and Regional Development Fund (SND) have played an important part in national policies for economic competitiveness. Recently incorporated in the new state owned company Innovation Norway, SND have provided funding and general support for the establishment of new businesses. Some of SND's funds have only been available to enterprises in certain geographical areas designated for this kind of support. In this way, SND has been a policy tool for the *Distriktspolitikk*. Other funds are specially designated to business establishment in high-tech industries.

3   City case studies

3.1   Oslo

3.1.1   City context

Economic and social profile

Oslo is the capital city of Norway. With a total population of 517 401[5] it is by far the biggest city in the country, holding as many as 11,4% of all Norwegian citizens. Greater Oslo holds approx. 775 000 people.

Oslo is located by the Oslo fjord, in the south-eastern part of the country. It is surrounded by forest lands in the west, north and east, and the fjord in the south. The geographical size of the city is 454,0 km^2, so the population density is 1 120 people pr. km^2.

The local economy is dominated by public services, business and trade. In 1999, 35% of all jobs in Oslo were in service provision (public and private), 24,3% in finance and corporate service provision, 19,3% in retail, hotels and restaurants. Industry, oil and mining accounted for as little as 7%. As capital city, Oslo is home to the bulk of national government offices, including the ministries and a high number of state agencies.

Major projects in Oslo in recent years include the new national hospital and the new Oslo Airport Gardermoen. The site of the old airport, *Fornebu*, is set up to be converted into an area for housing and business – most prominently, emerging high-tech companies. Currently, plans are being made for a large-scale development project in *Bjørvika*, in the eastern part of the city centre, by the fjord. A new opera house is being built, and a new freeway below sea level is on

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[5] 1.1.2003. Source: Statistics Norway

the planning stage, in order to accommodate a whole new area of housing and businesses.

The population of Oslo has doubled since 1900. Except for a period of decline through the early 1980s, the annual growth rate has been about 0,5 – 1 %. In the period 1992 – 1998 annual growth rate was at 1 – 1,3 %. In later years however, population growth has stagnated. From 2000 to 2001 the total number of inhabitants increased by no more than 0,2 %.

Housing prices have increased rapidly through the 1990s, from about NOK 6 000 (€750) pr. m2 in 1993 to NOK 17 209 (€2 151) pr. m2 in 2001.[6] This may partially account for the stagnating population trend. However, it must also be taken into account that the number of newly built dwellings is very low. In the period 1990 – 2000, the number of completed (new) dwellings were at about 1 000 – 1 500 annually, as compared to a total number of 244 434 dwellings in 1990. In other words, the growth in number of dwellings has been at about 0,5%, significantly less than the population growth. The sharp increase in housing prices surely is related to this discrepancy. A major political issue in Oslo is if, and how, the city should go about the task of increasing the growth rate of buildings, as well as providing reasonably priced housing.

As of 1.1.2001, unemployment in Oslo was 2,6%, as compared to 3,0% for the country as a whole. These figures have been dropping sharply through the 1990s, after the historical 6,1% unemployment in Oslo in 1992. In 1999, gross personal income pro capita (over the age of 17) in Oslo was NOK 266 708 (€33 339).

In all, about 7 % of the population of Oslo is in need of social assistance. The child welfare services look after 2,6% of all children under 18 years of age. About 14 % of the population of Oslo have origins from countries outside Europe and north America, as compared to approximately 4 % in the country as a whole. 33% of all inhabitants 16 years or older have higher education (21,5% in the country). Mortality is 21 pr. 1 000 inhabitants 60 – 74 years of age.

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[6] Real prices, not corrected for inflation. Dwellings belonging to OBOS (The Cooperative Housing Corporation of Oslo). Source: Statistical yearbook for Oslo, 2001.

Government and governance

A. The municipal authority

The city of Oslo is a municipal government which also is delegated the tasks and powers normally delegated to the counties. This means that the city of Oslo have powers over a wider range of functions than any other local government in Norway. Services provided by the city of Oslo includes education (all schools below university and college level), kindergartens, care for the elderly (institutionalized care and open care), primary health services, social services, public transportation and public roads, parks and green spaces, spatial planning, culture, churches and sports, public housing, environment and technical services (waste disposal, sewerage, water and so forth).

National government recently assumed ownership of all public hospitals, releasing the counties (including Oslo) of this responsibility. Because of this, gross running expenditures for the city of Oslo decreased by more than 21% from 2001 to 2002. The city's annual budget for 2002 is NOK 20 522 million (€2 565 million) in gross running expenditures, and NOK 5 469 million (€684 million) in capital expenditures. Running expenditures are financed primarily by taxation (62%), fees and other own sources of income (26,5%) and grants from national government (10%).

As for the expenditures, about 39% of gross running expenditures is delegated to the urban districts, who take on responsibility for a wide range of primary welfare services (including care for the elderly, primary health care, social services, care for the disabled, kindergartens, youth measures, see section 4 below). Culture and education consumes about 25%, environment and transportation about 10%.

The city of Oslo employs a total of 43 220 persons, more than 8% of the total population.[7] 23 220 of these employees work in the urban districts, 12 891 in culture and education (mostly teachers).

B. Political management system

In Norway, elections for local governments (municipal and county councils) are carried out every four years. The City Parliament of Oslo is a municipal council, and was last elected in 2003. In 1995, 1999 and in 2003, trial elections were held for district councils in four of the urban districts.

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[7] September 2003. The figure includes part-time and short-term labor. A total of 33 882 man-years are carried out.

The City Parliament is the highest political authority in Oslo. It consists of 59 members, and is chaired by the mayor, who is elected by the council. In the current election period, the parties have the following numbers of councilors:

Table 3.1   *Composition of Oslo's City Council, 2003 - 2007*

Party	*Seats in City Council*
Høyre (Conservatives)	15
Arbeiderpartiet (Labor)	15
Sosialistisk venstreparti (Socialist left)	12
Fremskrittspartiet (Progressive party)	9
Venstre (Liberal party)	3
Kristelig folkeparti (Christian democrats)	2
Rød valgallianse (Red Electoral Alliance)	2

The City Parliament is divided into five standing committees: Health and Social Welfare, Education and Cultural Affairs, Urban Development, Transportation and Environmental Affairs, and The Standing Committee on Finance. Each member of the City Parliament is a member of one of these committees. The committees are responsible for preparing propositions and reports to the City Parliament.

The City Parliament elects the City Government, which currently has 7 members called commissioners. One does not need to be a member of the City Parliament to become a commissioner. The commissioners have a function similar to that of government ministers in the national parliamentary system, and the Chief Commissioner is the "Prime Minister" of Oslo. The City Government runs the city administration, makes propositions to the City Parliament and is responsible for carrying out decisions made by the City Parliament. The City Government also has the authority to make its own decisions on various issues.

Every Commissioner is the political leader of a department, which is comparable to a government ministry. As of 2003, the department structure is as follows: The Chief Commissioner's Department, Department of Finance and Development, Department of Urban

Development, Department of Children and Education, Department of Welfare and Social Services, Department of Environment and Traffic, Department of Business and Culture.

The current Chief Commissioner is Mr. Erling Lae of the Conservative Party. He has been in office since November 2000.

In July 1988 the City of Oslo was divided into 25 districts. The districts as such had already existed since 1973, but in 1988 the number of districts was reduced and they were given more responsibility. Following a reform in 2004, the number of Districts has been reduced to 15. Each district is governed by a district council with 15 members. The district councils are appointed by the City Parliament and reflect its political composition. Since 1995 however, voters could cast their ballots directly for their district politicians in four of the districts.

Each district has its own district administration that prepares the business of the district council and implements the decisions taken there. The main task of the districts is to administer and operate social and health services, such as care for the elderly, day care facilities, youth clubs, mental health care facilities and health centers. The districts are also responsible for services for the mentally disabled, treatment and care for alcoholics and drug addicts, and integrating refugees and immigrants into the community.

The PLUS case studies were carried out prior to the UDC reform in 2004. References will therefore be made to the system as it existed prior to this reform (25 urban districts).

C. Governance

Oslo is surrounded geographically by the county of *Akershus,* which has a total population of 471 988, about the same size as Oslo. There are 22 municipalities in Akershus. The counties of *Buskerud, Vestfold* and *Østfold* are also located by the Oslo fjord, and their borders are less than 50 km. from Oslo. These three counties have a total population of 704 895, in 54 municipalities. In other words, about 1,7 of Norway's 4,5 million inhabitants live in Oslo and the surrounding area.

In the Norwegian system of local government, the counties and municipalities are supervised primarily by the regional offices of national government. There is one office of the County Governor in every county, except for Oslo and Akershus where there is a joint County Governor. The Governor is appointed by, and acts on behalf

of the national government. The various branches of this office scrutinize decisions made by local governments, not least pertaining to spatial planning and economic management. The County Governor is empowered to block local decisions and demand to enter into negotiations about these decisions. If an agreement is not reached, issues may be forwarded to the national level.

The county governor is the recipient of several kinds of complaints pertaining to local government decisions. This function is mandated in several laws that regulate local government activities, for instance the law on spatial planing. Furthermore, the office of the County Governor co-ordinates national policy measures within its geographical sphere of jurisdiction.

The counties also have some (relatively minor) coordinating and supervisory powers over the municipalities. Because there is no "county of Oslo" (Oslo is a municipality with functions normally delegated to the counties), this is not of relevance in the present context. In the near future, however, decisions will be made that may alter the division of functions between the County Governor and the County Government, thus affecting Oslo.

Oslo is a member of the Eastern Norway County Network, which deals with international and regional cooperation. The City also closely cooperates with the National Association of Local and Regional Authorities on international issues. The City of Oslo is member of several international organisations in a broad range of fields. Among them we find Eurocities, Major cities of Europe, IT Users Group, Assembly of European Regions, European Cities Against Drugs, ICLEI, IULA, IFHP and others.

The relationship between Oslo and national government can at times appear somewhat strained. Political figures in Oslo frequently voice complaints about what they perceive as neglect on behalf of national government towards Oslo's problems and concerns. The argument is often being made that Oslo is not compensated for its particular big city problems, related for instance to the integration of immigrants, the care for substance abusers, traffic congestion and particular environmental problems. Furthermore, Norway has never implemented the principle of "one person, one vote" in parliamentary elections. Some rural counties have a much higher rate of representatives pro capita than other counties. For instance, one vote in the county of *Finnmark* roughly equals two votes in *Akershus*. As a consequence, the interests of the periphery are often perceived as

being higher on the agenda of national parliament than those of Oslo, frequently causing resentment in the capital.

D. Public participation and community involvement

In 2003, turnout for local government elections in Oslo (City Parliament) was 61,8%, slightly higher than the average turnout in all municipalities in the country (58,8%) and somewhat lower than the 63,7% in 1999. Turnout in elections in Oslo has decreased quite dramatically in later years. In 1987 74,3% voted, in 1991 71,3%, in 1995 70,0 %. This reflects the sharp decrease in turnout nationally in the same period, from 69,4% to 60,4% in municipal elections and 66,2% to 56,8% in county elections.

As previously mentioned, in all three local elections since 1995, elections were held for the district councils in four of the Districts in Oslo. The most prominent justification for carrying out these trial elections has been to enhance public political participation, and to give people a greater sense of being able to affect local political decisions. Rather disappointingly, turnout for these elections has been low. Even though the elections for District Councils were held concurrently with the elections for City Parliament, turnout were significantly lower in the district elections. In 1995, turnout for district council elections were on average 58,0% in the four districts, dropping to 52,2% in 1999. In 2003 the lowest turnout was 44,9%, in one of the inner city districts.

The system of decentralized government, the Urban Districts, is a central item in Oslo's strategy for enhancing public participation and community involvement. The districts are designed as local political arenas, closer to the individual citizens than that of the city as a whole. The general idea is that these arenas should be inviting in terms of political participation, because of the close ties between the neighborhoods and the districts, and because the districts are responsible for a great deal of services consumed by individuals (including for instance care-services and kindergartens).

In practice, these ambitions have only to some extent been satisfied. Relatively few people participate in district politics. Nevertheless, the system includes a substantial number of politicians in the district councils. Members of the City Parliament often point out that district politicians have much closer relations with the citizens than they themselves do. Also, local groups and individuals to a substantial degree relate to the district councils, and bring their issues before the council.

E. Urban Leadership

The City Government has a very prominent and highly visible role in the system of governance in Oslo. The City Government as a whole, and its individual commissioners, are expected to develop specific policies in response to emerging problems and needs. Its members – the commissioners – are held publicly accountable for the state of affairs within their individual spheres of responsibility. The City Government system was introduced not least with an emphasis on the need for accountability. In cases when specific policies come to be regarded as failures, or whenever specific problems arise in a service, the news media quickly turn to the relevant commissioner. Because the City Government has a specific political profile, hitherto either left-wing or right-wing, the system of governance is supposed to highlight ideological differences. This can reasonably be interpreted as a democratic gain: The contents of political decisions, and the responsibility for the outcomes of these decisions, can more easily be linked to specific political parties. For the voters, the advantage of this is that the choice of political alternatives becomes much more clear-cut. Also, if a voter is dissatisfied, he can vote to replace the City Government. In this way, the parliamentary system is quite different from the traditional system of governance in Norwegian municipalities. In many local governments political cleavages appear blurred, and accountability is held to be low, because decisions are made by alternating coalitions in the municipal council.

One other important aspect of the parliamentary system, again quite different from other Norwegian local governments, is that the political commissioners are the top leaders of the various sectors of the municipal administration. This system serves to strengthen the political control over the specific branches of municipal administration, and highlights the political aspects of executive management. In many Norwegian municipalities, the top leader (CAO) of the municipal administration is perceived as very powerful figures, often to the extent that political leadership is severely impaired. Thus, the introduction of political appointees as chief executive officers can be regarded as a counter-move to the omnipotence of civil servants in the municipal administration.

As for the City Parliament and the mayor, these have not been relegated to the valley of shadows even though there is a strong focus on the City Government and the individual commissioners. This is not least the case because minority City Governments have become the rule, not the exception. Minority Government certainly gives more leeway for political processes in the Parliament.

The mayor is highly visible as the leader of the City Parliament, and does no doubt wield political power in performing his function as the head of the largest party coalition. All the same, his most prominent functions are to officially represent the city of Oslo. Even when the mayor and the Chief Commissioner represents the same party, the Chief Commissioner has the leading role in initiating as well as accounting for political decisions and their implementation.

F. Policies on social inclusion and economic competitiveness

In Oslo, the Districts play a key part in the development and implementation of the city's policies of social inclusion. All the Districts have one or more offices for the social services. These offices provide advise and assistance for people who are affected by welfare problems. They can advise clients about their social rights, and make them aware of the relevant services provided by various public agencies. They also have their own measures to alleviate problems, including economic assistance. The Districts also supply child and family care services. These measures targets children, youth and families facing complex difficulties.

The Districts provide services for clients affected by alcohol or substance abuse. Institutions for these clients are under the supervision of an agency run by the City Government. The responsibility for refugees and immigrants is also partially decentralized to the urban districts. The districts are responsible for providing public housing, as well as implementing various measures to facilitate integration into Norwegian society. An agency run by the City Government provides support for the Districts in this respect. The agency also allocates grants to projects that aim to enhance integration. Community involvement is obtained not least through interaction with the immigrant's organizations.

Services for the mentally and physically impaired are provided by the urban districts. These services include housing, transportation, technical utilities, home care services and activation measures.

As for economic competitiveness; this policy area would probably not strike an outside observer as the main political concern in Oslo. As previously noted, unemployment rates are very low in Oslo. Also, average personal income pro capita is higher than in most Norwegian municipalities. Oslo's status as national capital and center of the country's largest economic region has proven to attract activities to a point where worries about environmental degradation, sky-rocketing housing prices and general congestion often seems to outweigh worries about economic competitiveness.

Even so, the city of Oslo is actively pursuing policy aims pertaining to economic competitiveness, not least in terms of the knowledge-based industries. In the current municipal master plan (drawn up in 2000), it is noted that space-consuming and often polluting industries currently tend to move out of the city to less expensive locations. At the same time, the city is increasingly home to companies that require less space, but on the other hand are more highly dependent on close proximity to customers and specialized expertise. Supporting these tendencies, Oslo aims to become a center for knowledge and expertise.

According to the city government, one major impediment for the achievement of this aim is the small size and relative anonymity of Oslo. Not least compared to the larger and more dynamic economic regions surrounding Stockholm and Copenhagen, Oslo's international reputation as an attractive location for business is rather poor. To address this problem, the city has recently initiated a three-year project to promote Oslo as an attractive business location. The aims of the project are to improve international knowledge about Oslo as an attractive business location, to attract competence-based international corporations and to support local businesses in international ventures and on international markets.

This project is a part of the "Regional development program for Oslo and Akershus", which is an ongoing co-operative venture between Oslo and its neighboring county and the PLUS economic competitiveness case in Oslo. In addition to international promotion of the Oslo region, the program has a focus on providing guidance and support to newly established enterprises, facilitate new establishments and improve the recruitment of youth into certain careers, including science and technology.

Because Oslo and neighboring Akershus county are parts of the same economic region, much of Oslo's activities relating to economic competitiveness takes place on the regional level. Oslo and Akershus have set up a joint business development council for the two counties. This council serves as a board for a company called Oslo Teknopol, which is owned by the two counties. The main purpose for Oslo Teknopol is to promote knowledge-based innovation and business establishment in the region.

The city's Department of Business Development and Urban Planning Policies are primarily responsible for policy measures relating to economic competitiveness, most notably the Section for Business Development. Subordinate to the Department, the city also has an

agency for Business Development Service, running a service office for business enterprises. This office is set up to provide guidance and information to business, in order to facilitate the establishment and continuing operation of enterprises in Oslo.

Political culture

The political culture in Oslo is characterised by a moderate to low level of trust. (See Appendix 1 for the formulations of the questions quoted in this section.) The average trust score in our total panel in Oslo is 2.5 on a scale from 1 to 5. Scores for collaboration between the city and citizens are slightly lower than the middle value. This is also the case concerning collaboration between the city and business. This score indicates that collaboration is on a medium level – not very small, but neither very extensive.

Panel results regarding expectations on political leaders show that citizens expect a majoritarian leadership style. Given the choice between a preference for majority decisions and consensus seeking, the mean score is closest to the former. Even so, the panel members to a moderate extent expect leaders to build local networks with business and NGOs, not just to concentrate on their formal roles. The Oslo panel as a whole is undecided (medium average value) on whether they expect political leaders to take the interests of the entire city into account, or just the interests of the party or the electoral groups that they happen to represent.

On the question of whether they expect citizens and business to seek consensus or to go for majority decisions in political issues, the average score for the Oslo panel is slightly closer to consensus than to majority. The panel is however undecided as for whether citizens and business should take the interests of the entire city into account, or just their own interests.

3.1.2   Case 1: Economic competitiveness

Description of the initiative

The Programme for Regional Development for the City of Oslo and the County of Akershus is a joint effort by the Municipality of Oslo, the County of Akershus, and different governmental institutions. The main objective of the programme is to stimulate regional development. In spite of the quite ambitious objective of the programme, the general objective has been boiled down to a narrow range of specific objectives: To promote entrepreneurship, innovation, building of new competence and international promotion of the area.

The Programme for Regional Development is an example of multi-level governance, in which three different levels of authority; the state, the County and the Municipality are involved in the process of formulating an annual programme, as well as in financing and implementing the projects that are included. The Ministry of Local Government and Regional Development has since 1997/8 strongly recommended all Counties to develop Programmes of Regional Development, thus giving strong signals as to which institutions are to be included. The co-operation between Akershus and Oslo was formally initiated by the elected bodies; the County Council in 1998 and the City Council in 1999, respectively.

A working group is responsible for managing the programme. In this group, substantial and allocative decisions are made jointly. As mentioned above, the Ministry has given strong signals regarding what institutions to include in such co-operative schemes. In accordance with these signals, the programme mainly consists of cooperation between institutions. The working group includes representatives from the Oslo City administration, Akershus County administration, Oslo Technopole (an inter-county corporation), Norwegian Industrial and Regional Development Fund (SND), The County Governor, The Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry, and Aetat (the Norwegian Employment Service). In addition to the institutions recommended by the Ministry, the regional offices of the main organisation of employees, Confederation of Norwegian Business and Industry employers' organization (NHO) and the Norwegian Confederation of Trade Unions (LO) are represented. The total budget of the program was about €1,6 million (13 million NOK) in 2003, and the 13 projects included in the program are mostly small-scale projects.

As regards the implementation of the projects, the participants of the working group cooperate comprehensively with a broad range of actors in the private sector, like business associations, the Research Council of Norway and research and educational institutions in the region. In addition to being active in implementing the projects, these external actors also provide considerable financial contributions to the projects – and are responsible for a major part of the total funding of the programme.

Institutional analysis

In the programme several arenas can be identified. Corresponding to the analytical framework used in the PLUS-project, four arenas and

their rules can be identified in this case. In each of these arenas many actors are involved.

Table 3.2   *The Programme for Regional Development for the City of Oslo and the County of Akershus: Operational arenas*

Phase	Arena	Content	Actors involved
Policy development	Development	Organizing the Programme for Regional Development for the City of Oslo and the County of Akershus (1998 – 2001)	- Oslo City administration - Akershus County administration
	Elaboration	The annual process in the working group of concretizing the content, developing the proposal to the programme.	- Oslo city administration - Akershus County administration - Norwegian Industrial and Regional Development Fund (SND) - The Norwegian Confederation of Trade Unions (LO) - Confederation of Norwegian Business and Industry employers' organization (NHO) - County Governor, Department of farming and forestry - Aetat (public employment office) - Oslo Technopol (a inter-county corporation)
Policy decision	Annual decisions	The annual budgetary process in the Oslo City Council, Akershus County Council and the annual decision about the program in the Oslo City Government and in the Akershus County Executive Board (2001 – 2003)	- City Council in Oslo - City Government in Oslo - Akershus County Council - Akershus County Executive Board
Policy implementation	Implementation	Implementation of the Programme (2001 – 2003)	- Oslo city administration - Akershus County administration - Norwegian Industrial and Regional Development Fund (SND) - The Norwegian Confederation of Trade Unions (LO) - Confederation of Norwegian Business and Industry employers' organization (NHO) - County Governor (department of farming and forestry) - Aetat (National Employment Service) - Oslo Teknopol - private actors (business partners)

1. Development arena

The scope rule on this arena of policy development was to prepare and organize the actual cooperation between the Municipality of Oslo and the County of Akershus, and to develop a proposal for a joint programme for regional development (following the clear signals from the Ministry as to how these programmes were to be designed). The *positions rules* were to a certain degree formal. The responsibility of organizing the programme rested with the Oslo City administration and the administration of the County of Akershus. Key positions were held by Morten Bildeng (Section for Business), in the Oslo City Administration and Øystein Lunde, in the administration of the County of Akershus (Department of Regional Development), leading the development-process. Regarding *boundary rules*, these rules are defined by employment and positions in the city department. The *authority rules* were formal as well, as the administrative staffs are to prepare proposals for political decisions. Still, in the process of developing and formulating the proposals the administrative staff had to take into account signals from their political leaders, although they also had the right to address and to advise their political leaders, based on their own expertise and knowledge. Nevertheless, according to formal *aggregation rules*, the political leadership in the City Government had the last word in preparing and presenting the proposals for the City Council. In the county of Akershus, the administration presents the proposal to the County Council. As for *information rules,* the members of staff may exchange information freely.

Pay-off rules in this arena were formal, in terms of the salaries of the members of the City and County administration. These pay-offs were not in any sense related directly to the policy initiative.

2. Elaboration arena

The scope rule on the elaboration arena was to develop and formulate a proposal, in order to concretize the content and to make a proposal concerning how to distribute the available funds. The proposal was to be politically decided upon in the Oslo City Government and in the County Executive Board of Akershus County Council. *The position rules* were partially formal and explicit, following the signals from the Ministry of Local Government and Regional Development, stated in several white papers.[8] The ministry defined representatives from Oslo

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[8] This is referred to in a letter from the Ministry to all the Counties dated 26.01.2000, and in Report to the Storting no. 34 (2000 - 2001).

city administration, Akershus County administration, Norwegian Industrial and Regional Development Fund (SND), the County Governor, farming and forestry and Aetat (the Norwegian Employment service) to be represented in a working group. In addition to these actors suggested by the Ministry, informal position rules allowed the inclusion of representatives assumed to be relevant for the initiative; from Oslo Technopol (a inter-county corporation), and from the main organisations of employers and employees in the private sector: The Confederation of Norwegian Business and Industry employers' organization (NHO) and the Norwegian Confederation of Trade Unions (LO). As for *boundary rules*, these were formal and explicit, defined by employment and positions in the different institutions and organisations. When it comes *to authority rules* on this arena these are quite explicit, but to a lesser degree formal. All the participants in the working group had the authority to approve the profile of the programme, as well as the projects to be included. However, the authorizations of the institutions and organisations varied. The actors possessing the authorization to contribute with funding as well as projects were the Oslo City administration and the administration of the County of Akershus, SND, the County Governor and NHO. Oslo Technopol and Aetat were only authorized to contribute with projects. LO first and foremost had the authorization to contribute with projects, and not funding. Still, they contributed with a very small and almost symbolic amount. Each of the project proposals had to involve comprehensive cooperation with external actors; like business associations, the Research Council of Norway and research - and educational institutions, on both co-funding and joint implementation of the projects.

In the working group, an explicit though informal *aggregation rule* states that all decisions are made by consensus. There are nevertheless other informal rules that most of the participants are aware of. One is that the participants have unequal weight in the negotiations, in proportion to the amount of financial support and competence they contribute with. According to some of the participants, the representatives from Oslo City Administration and the administration of the County of Akershus have the last word in formulating the final proposal – both by virtue of their large financial contributions and because of their important position as secretariat. A formal rule is that the projects chosen to be included in the programme are to be relevant for both the City of Oslo and the County of Akershus. The

representative from the County Governor is the one with the least influence in the working group, according to almost all the participants, including himself. The representative has until now got few, if any, of his projects included in the programme. The explanation is probably to be found in the fact that these projects have been farming projects, which haven't fulfilled the criteria of being relevant for both Oslo and Akershus. Regarding *information rules,* the meetings of the working group are closed meetings. Although the minutes from the meetings are for internal use, it is possible for the public to get access to them. Still, they are not considered to be public information.

Pay-off rules in this arena were formal, in terms of the salaries of the participants from their employers (the City and County administration, organisations and governmental institutions). These pay-offs were not in any sense related directly to the policy initiative. In addition to this, there is certain pay- offs for the institutions and organisations involved in the working group, getting co-funding for their projects.

3. Annual decision arena

In the decision arena, institutional rules largely follow the requirements of the parliamentary system of governance. The *scope rules* for this arena of policy decisions are explicit and formal; to grant annual funding and make the final decision about the content of the program. There exist strict formal *position rules* defining the elected political bodies (The City Council of Oslo and the Akershus County Council) and the executive bodies (the City Government in Oslo and the Akershus County Executive Board) as the arenas for formal decision- making.

Boundary rules are strictly formal and explicit. The members of the City Council and County Council are elected in the municipal and regional elections every forth year. The executive bodies (City Government and County are elected (or appointed) by their councils, respectively.

The *authority rules* gave the elected bodies authority to grant annual funding for the programme in the budgetary process. The elected bodies have delegated the authority to take decisions about the content of the programme to their executive bodies. The *aggregation rules* are formal as well, defining all members of the City Council of Oslo and the Akershus County Council as having equal weight in the decision-making. Also the *information rule* is formal: In accordance with the Transparency Act, debates and decisions are made available to the public.

Pay-off rules in this arena are strictly formal, in terms of the salaries of the politicians working full-time, and the regular fee for the other politicians.

4. Implementation arena

The *scope rule* on the arena of implementation is to carry out the projects according to the goals stated in the accepted proposal. Formal *position rules* and *boundary rules* define all the participants in the working group to be responsible for implementing their project proposals. Nevertheless, they do not implement the projects entirely by themselves. Each of the projects includes comprehensive cooperation with external actors, both regarding co-financing and implementation. The external actors are business associations, the Research Council of Norway and research- and educational institutions. When it comes to *information rules,* these are relatively explicit. A contract must be signed for each project, and there are strict formal rules for annual reports and accounts approved by an accountant. In addition to this, the participants in the working group inform each other about the status for the projects.

Actual behaviour of actors

A. Original actor strategies

The political leadership in this initiative resides with the City Commissioner for Urban Development (Ann Kathrine Tornaas) and the County Mayor in Akershus (Ragnar Kristoffersen). In the parliamentary model (in Oslo), much power resides with the head of the City Government, and the model promotes strong and visible political leadership. However, the political leadership has been largely absent from the initiative. This might be explained by the fact that economic competitiveness has not priority on the political agenda, neither in Oslo nor in Akershus. The City Commissioner for Urban Development in Oslo nevertheless had her clear opinion about her objectives in the initiative. She put emphasis on objectives pertaining to the general improvement of business and commercial development; however she especially stressed the importance of the connection between the business sector and the research sector, in addition to enhancing entrepreneurship.

As for to the objectives of the different groups of actors, the representatives from governmental institutions and organisations emphasized the enhancement of innovation, regional development and evolution of networks. Among the key actors are the representatives from the Akershus County Administration and the Oslo City

Administration, having the formal positions as the secretariat of the working group.

The representatives from the main (non-governmental) organisations of employers and employees put emphasis on much of the same. They considered the enhancement of innovation and the development of networks, but they also stressed increased cooperation between schools and the business sector, in addition to the protection of employment.

The goals of the actor groups appear to have been largely similar. The different strategies the different groups of actors pursued is reported in table 3.3 below.

Table 3.3   *Strategies for governmental actors*

As a governmental representative I should…	Mean value*
…operate on the basis of a clear vision of the organisation about the future of the city (1), vs. … operate on the basis of a vision about the future of the city that has been developed in consultations with the local community (7)	5,8
…concentrate on the implementation of local policies with our own organisational resources, vs. …spend the time in going out to mobilise community support and local resources to implement local policies.	4,1
…not compromise in heeding the will of the majority of the local politicians, vs. ….strive for broad-based consensus even at the expense of decisive action.	3,7
…act as a representative of my department, vs. …represent the city as a whole.	1,6
…actively engage in and stimulate local partnerships and networks, vs. …concentrate on my role as the representative of city government.	2,3

* Score is on a scale of 1-7, 1 equals agree with first alternative, 7 equals agree with last alternative. N=<6,7> (representatives of governmental organisations).

The representatives from governmental organisations tend to say they should develop their vision in consultations with the local community - their visions thereby being rooted in the local community, not in their organisation. There are however a few ambiguities. On the

question of whether they see their role as a representative of the whole city, or of a specific branch of the city's administration, it is possible to observe a contradictory tendency. The representatives tend to see themselves as a representative from their own department.

When it comes to network orientation, they are on the average leaning towards a networking strategy, in terms of the engagement in network in general, but also regarding whether local policies should be implemented by support of local resources or not.

To what degree do governmental actors accept a responsibility to ensure norms like transparency, accountability and participation? Their view on this question is presented in table 3.4 below.

Table 3.4   *Modus operandi for governmental organisations*

As a governmental organisation we should…	Mean value*
…take care that local decision-making is transparent.	4,2
…take care that those responsible for decisions can be held to account.	3,8
…make sure that the local community can have a direct say over major local policies.	4,0

* Score is on a scale of 1-5, 1 equals "not important at all", 5 equals "highly important". N=6 (representatives of governmental organisations).

On the average, the governmental representatives emphasize their responsibility of ensuring all these norms relatively strongly.

Summing up, the strategy of the staff seems to be leaning towards networking, traces of ambiguity notwithstanding. Their vision is to a large extent rooted in the local community, even if they tend to look at themselves more like representatives of the specific branch of the city's administration than for the city as a whole. As for transparency, accountability and participation, they emphasize their responsibility to ensure that these norms take effect in local decision making.

What have been the main strategies for the representatives from the non-governmental organisations (NGOs) in this initiative? Their view upon this is presented in table 3.5 below.

Table 3.5   *Strategies for non-governmental organisations*

	Mean value*
As a representative of my organisation, I should… …not mess with politics (1), vs. …participate actively in the process of setting the local political agenda and the making of important local decisions (7).	6,5
Once major policy decisions have been made my organisation should… …restrict itself to respect the decisions and abide by the local statutes, vs. …actively engage in joint efforts with the municipality to make local policies a success.	4,3
As a representative of my organisation I should… …concentrate on establishing a winning majority for my views, vs. …strive for broad-based consensus even at the expense of decisive action.	3,0
As a representative of my organisation I should… …only pursue my organisation's interest, vs. …take the interest of the city as a whole into account.	3,3

* Score is on a scale of 1-7, 1 equals agree with first alternative, 7 equals agree with last alternative. N=<3,4> (representatives of non-governmental organisations).

On average, the representatives from the two organisations representing employees and employers strongly emphasize the importance of being involved in all the phases of local policy decision making. However, the representatives are of the opinion that they should concentrate on pursuing the interests of their own organisations, as well as concentrating on establishing a majority for their views.

What about these representatives attitude towards the role of non-governmental organisations? These views are presented in table 3.6.

Table 3.6   *Modus operandi for non-governmental organisations*

My (non-governmental) organisation should…	Mean value*
…contribute to the solving of local problems by using its own resources.	3,3
…inform itself of local decisions and hold those responsible accountable.	3,0
…participate actively in local decision-making.	4,0

* Score is on a scale of 1-5, 1 equals "not important at all", 5 equals "highly important". N=<3,4> (representatives of non-governmental organisations).

On average, these respondents are of the opinion that non-governmental organisations should participate actively in local decision-making. As for their responsibility of contributing to the solving of local problems, results are less clear-cut. The respondents do however tend to acknowledge this responsibility to a certain extent.

B. Patterns of interaction

In the questionnaire all the participants were asked to voice their opinion about the strategies of different groups of actors in the programme. The question was what groups were regarded as being the most consensus orientated.

Table 3.7   *Majoritarian versus consensual strategies among different participants*

Did various actors… …heed the will of the majority without compromise (1), or …strive for broad-based consensus (7)?	Mean value*
Political leaders	3,2
Local government representatives	3,4
Citizens	3,0
Business	3,6
Local NGO's	2,5

* Score is on a scale of 1-5, 1 equals "heed the will of the majority", 5 equals agree with "strive for broad-based consensus". N=<1,7> (all respondents).

The groups that to the largest extent are assumed to strive for a broad-based consensus are business actors and local administrators. NGOs are the groups of actors that least of all are assumed to strive for consensus. How engaged in pursuing their own interests are the actors assumed to be?

Table 3.8   *Interests pursued by various actors*

Did various actors… …pursue their own interest (5), or …take the interest of the city as a whole into account (1)?	Mean value*
Political leaders	2,4
Local government representatives	2,2
Citizens	-
Business	4,3
Local NGO's	4,0

* Score is on a scale of 1-5, 1 equals "the interest of the city as a whole", 5 equals "pursue their own interest". N=<3,6> (all respondents).

The participants tend to regard the actors localised in civil society as pursuing their own interests to a higher degree than do the politicians and representatives from the local government.

How was the pattern of interaction among the participants? The participants of the working group were asked to what degree the other actors had influences their own decisions.

Table 3.9   *Patterns of influence*

To what extent have the participants named below influenced your own decisions?	Mean value*
Members of the city parliament, Oslo	1,9
Members of the city government, Oslo	2,3
Members of the County Council in Akershus	2,5
Staff, Section for Business, Oslo	4,1
Staff, Department for Regional Development, Akershus	4,1
National Fund for Business- and Regional Development (SND)	3,9
National Employment Agency (Aetat)	2,5
NHO (Confederation of Norwegian Business and Industry employers' organization)	3,1
LO (The Norwegian Confederation of Trade Unions)	2,5
Oslo Technopol (a municipal company)	3,6
The County Governor, the Department of farming and forestry	2,1

* Score is on a scale of 1-5, 1 equals "not at all", 5 equals "To a great extent".
N=<7,8> (all respondents).

When interpreting these results, it is important to have in mind that the first three groups of actors represent the formal decision arenas, while all the other groups are represented in the working group (both related to the development phase and the implementation phase). Beginning with the working group, the participants that to the largest extent have influenced other actors' decisions are the two representatives from the administrative staff of the City of Oslo and the County of Akershus. This corresponds to our impression from the interviews, that these participants both have formal (due to the position as the secretariat) and actual key roles in the working group. Oslo Technopol and SND are also regarded as having influenced the decisions of the other actors, while it seems like the County Governor, Aetat and LO are the actors having the least influence on the others.

As can be seen the participants are least influenced by members of the formal decision-making arena. This result strengthens the impression that the politicians and the political leaders occupy a rather distanced position in this network. This might be partly explained by the fact

that the work to be carried out is delegated to the administrative staff, and partly by the politicians' general lack of interest in this field reported in the interviews.

The politicians do not really seem to have been influencing the participants, but how do the participants consider the *actual behaviour* of the political leaders and the local administrators in the programme?

Table 3.10   *Behaviour of local leaders and local administrators (I)*

How can the behaviour of local leaders and local administrators best be described?	Political leaders (mean values*)	Local government representatives (mean values*)
Did they operate on the basis of… …a clear personal vision about the future of the city (1), or …a vision about the future of the city that had been developed in consultations with the local community (5)?	2,2	3,0
Did they… …concentrate on their roles as the leader of city government/representatives of the city administration, or …engage actively in local partnerships and networks?	2,9	4,0
Did they… …manage the implementation of local policies by the local administrative apparatus, or …mobilise community support and local resources to implement local policies?	2,8	3,8

* Score is on a scale of 1-5, 1 equals "to a very small extent", 5 equals "To a great extent" for the second alternative. N=<6,8> (all respondents).

The results in this table are quite interesting. The visions of the political leaders are only to a minor degree seen as rooted in the local community, especially as compared with those of the local administration. Also, the local government representatives are assumed to be far more network-oriented than the politicians, both when it comes to the engagement in networks in general, and more specifically related to the implementation of local politics. This points to the general impression in this initiative: The politicians are not seen as the driving force. Rather, their role appears to be marked by distance.

What about the ensuring of norms as transparency, accountability, participation? How do the involved actors consider the contribution of political leaders and local administrators when it comes to these norms?

Table 3.11   *Behaviour of local leaders and local administrators (II)*

How can the behaviour of local leaders and local administrators best be described?	Political leaders (mean values*)	Local government representatives (mean values*)
Did they make sure that the local community could have a direct say over major local policies?	1,8	2,4
Did they ensure transparency?	2,8	3,3
Did they make sure that those responsible for decisions can be held to account?	3,4	3,7
Did they take care that local problems were being solved?	3,8	3,9

* Score is on a scale of 1-5, 1 equals "to a very small extent", 5 equals "To a great extent". N=<5,8> (all respondents).

The main tendency repeats itself here: The local government representatives are assumed to have ensured these norms to a larger extent than the political leaders. However, when it comes to the contribution to solving the problem, the scores are approximately equal between the two groups. Another interesting observation is that neither the politicians, nor the local administrators are seen as having ensured that the local community have a direct say over major local policies. Both of the scores on this question are below middle value. This corresponds to the main impression that this initiative is not a broad-based initiative where the representatives from the local community is involved, but a network between governmental institutions (both on state level and on city level) and corporate organisations.

Another question related to transparency is to what degree the inhabitants stayed informed. What are the impressions of the involved actors on this issue? This is presented in table 3.12 below.

Table 3.12 *Information of citizens*

	Mean values*
Did citizens stay informed?	1,8

* Score is on a scale of 1-5, 1 equals "to a very small extent", 5 equals "To a great extent". N=5 (all respondents).

According to the actors involved in the programme, citizens have to a very limited extent stayed informed. What about the behaviour of the citizens and other actors in the private sector in the contexts of this initiative?

Table 3.13 *Behaviour of citizens, business and NGO representatives*

How did citizens, business and NGO representatives behave in the context of this initiative?	Citizens	Business	NGOs
Did these groups… …stick to their narrow roles as citizens, business representatives or representatives of NGOs (1), or …participate actively in the process of setting the local political agenda and the making of important local decisions (5)?	1,3	3,9	2,3
Did these groups… …stick to their own roles[+], or …actively engage in joint efforts with the municipality to make this policy a success?	1,1	3,1	2,1

* Score is on a scale of 1-5, 1 equals "to a very small extent", 5 equals "To a great extent" for the second alternative. N=<7,8> (all respondents). +: For citizens, *electing leaders and holding them electoral accountable*; for business, *making profits*.

The main tendency observed in this table is that the citizens have been totally absent. This corresponds to the general impression of the initiative, as a network between governmental institutions and corporate organisations – not actors representing the inhabitants. One of the participants explained this as follows:

Our budget is too tight. The politicians have not given us the economical margin to carry out processes of broad participation.

Business actors are considered to be the group of actors having participated most actively both in setting the political agenda, in the decision making, and in the implementation phase ("to make this policy a success"). As to NGOs they are not assumed to have been particular actively involved in the process.

C. Actor influence

Which of the actors are assumed to be the most influential on the outcome of the initiative? How are the participants assessing the influence of other actors?

Table 3.14 *Influence of various actor groups*

To what extent have the participants named below influenced the outcome of this initiative?	Mean value*
Members of the city parliament, Oslo	2,4
Members of the city government, Oslo	3,3
Members of the County Council in Akershus	3,0
Staff, Section for Business, Oslo	4,6
Staff, Department for Regional Development, Akershus	4,6
National Fund for Business- and Regional Development (SND)	3,8
National Employment Agency (Aetat)	2,4
NHO (Confederation of Norwegian Business and Industry employers' organization)	3,6
LO (The Norwegian Confederation of Trade Unions)	2,9
Oslo Technopol (a municipal company)	4,0
The County Governor, the Department of farming and forestry	2,5

* Score is 1-5, 5 equals highest. N=<7,8> (all respondents).

The participants in the working group tend to credit the two representatives from the administration staff of Oslo and Akershus with the most influence on the outcome. This corresponds to results earlier in this report, stating the significant role of these actors. The

representative from Oslo Technopol is attributed with a certain degree of influence on the programme. This is also the case regarding the representatives from SND and the non-governmental organisation NHO.

How do the participants assess the influence of the politicians? The results in the table above show a relatively clear tendency that the participants regard these actors to be among the least influential ones. This strengthens the general impression of the politicians being relatively absent, or distanced, in this initiative.

What impression do the inhabitants have of the behaviour of the political leaders in this initiative? The respondents in the panel were asked to what extent they felt that the political leaders had communicated with and heeded the interests of the local citizens and organisations when developing this programme.

Table 3.15   *Network governance*

	Mean values*
To what extent did the local political leaders in Oslo keep in touch with local citizens and local organizations when they developed the programme?	2,7
To what extent did local political leaders know about and heed the concerns and demands of local citizens and organizations when they developed the programme?	2,6

* Score is on a scale of 1-4, 1 equals "not at all", 4 equals "very much".
N=13 (panel, all respondents).

These results might be a bit surprising, with other results stressing the distanced role of the politicians in mind. The political leader is to a certain extent seen as being in touch with various actors in the local community, heeding their interests. The distant role underlined above might, however, reflect the formal division of labour between politicians and administrative officers.

What is the actors' impression of the compliance of their own goals? In order to comment the results, it is important to have the objectives of the main actors in mind. The political leaders, the City Commissioner for Urban Development, put emphasise on objectives pertaining to the general improvements of business and commercial

developing, but she especially stressed the importance of the connection between the business sector and the research sector, in addition to enhancing entrepreneurship. The goals of the representatives from governmental organisations were first and foremost the enhancement of innovation, to stimulate the development of the region and the development of networks. As to the representatives from the main (non-governmental) organisations of employers and employees, they emphasised much of the same. The objectives they mentioned included the enhancement of the development of networks, innovation, cooperation between the schools and the business sector, and the protection of employment. These actors' impressions of goal compliance are presented in table 3.16 below.

Table 3.16   *Obtainment of own goals*

To what extent did you reach your own goals or objectives relating to this initiative?	Mean value*
Political leaders	(Refused to answer)
Business	-
Local government representatives	3,3
NGOs, others	3,5

* Score is 1-5, 5 equals highest. N=8 (all respondents).

The City Commissioner for Urban Development in Oslo, Anne Kathrine Tornaas, put emphasis on objectives pertaining to the general improvement of business and commercial development. She especially stressed the importance of the connection between the business sector and the research sector, in addition to enhancing entrepreneurship. However, she refused to answer the question about to what extent this objectives were reached. The representatives from the local government and the NGOs experience that they to a certain extent have obtained their goals.

These answers should be related to the kinds of resources the different groups of actors possessed. How did the respondents assess their own resources and the resources of other actors? All of the representatives of governmental organisations mentioned competence as one of their resources. In addition to this, most of them also mentioned control over available funding, but only one (of six) mentioned their networks. The participants representing the non-governmental

organisations both considered their networks as relevant resources, in addition to information, knowledge and economical resources.

The respondents were also asked *how important* they considered their own resources in the process.

Table 3.17   *Importance of own resources*

	Respondents engaged in initiative as government organisation representative (Mean values*)	Respondents engaged in initiative as non-governmental organisation representative (Mean values*)
Could you indicate the importance of the entire collection of your own resources for other participants in the process?	3,8	3,5

* Score is on a scale of 1-5, 1 equals "not important at all", 5 equals "very important". N=6/2 (all participants in initiative)

The main tendency here is that all the involved actors considered their own resources as quite important in the process.

How did the involved actors look upon the resources of the other actors? What kinds of resources were attributed to the different groups of actors?

The members of *the political bodies* (the City Council and the City Government in Oslo, as well as the County Council in Akershus) were all considered to possess resources like decision-making authority and budgetary control (control over funding). As for the administrative staff in Oslo (Section for Business) and in the County of Akershus (Department for Regional Development), all the participants mentioned professional competence and knowledge about the business sector. Economical resources, networks and information were also mentioned. One of the representatives from a non-governmental organisation also stressed the coupling to the City government as a relevant resource (for the administration staff in Oslo). As to the resources of the National Fund for Business- and Regional Development (SND), all the other actors mentioned competence and funding. The Norwegian Employment Service (Aetat) was assumed to possess resources like competence and knowledge of the labour

market. Among the resources of the main organisation of employers (NHO), the actors involved in the programme most frequently mentioned competence and funding. Their networks and position as a representative of the business sector were also mentioned.

How did the actors involved assess the importance of the resources of other actors?

Table 3.18   *Importance of the resources of others*

Could you indicate the importance of the entire collection of these resources for other participants in the process?	Mean value*
Members of the city parliament	3,6
Members of the city government	4,0
Members of the County Council in Akershus	3,9
Staff, Section for Business, Oslo	4,0
Staff, Department for Regional Development, Akershus	4,0
National Fund for Business- and Regional Development (?)	4,0
National Employment Agency (Aetat)	2,6
NHO (Confederation of Norwegian Business and Industry employers' organization)	3,6
LO (The Norwegian Confederation of Trade Unions)	3,0
Oslo Technopol (a municipal company)	3,4
The County Governor, the Department of farming and forestry	2,5

* Score is on a scale of 1-5, 1 equals "not important at all", 5 equals "very important". N=12/13 (all participants in initiative).

The participants tend to attribute approximately equal importance to the resources of all the other actors. As have been noted, the participants are supposed to possess an equal position in the working group, and with these results it appears that they all are considered bringing in important resources in the network. The only actors deviating from this picture are the representatives from Aetat and the County Governor, as their resources are not seen as important to the process.

Policy outcomes and impact on sustainable development

The main objective of the Programme for Regional Development for the City of Oslo and the County of Akershus is to stimulate regional

development. This rather ambitious objective has been boiled down to a narrow range of specific objectives: To promote entrepreneurship, innovation, building of new competence and international promotion of the area. It is however difficult to establish to what extent the main objective is achieved, due to the long term perspective of the programme. Nevertheless, one indicator of policy outcomes is the impression of the inhabitants. To what degree do the inhabitants think that the programme will contribute to the achievement of the main objectives?

Table 3.19 *Achievement of goals*

	Mean values*
How much would you say that this program will contribute to the achievement of these aims?	2,9

* Score is on a scale of 1-4, 1 equals "not at all", 5 equals "very much".
N=13 (panel, all respondents in the city).

The respondents in the panel are quite optimistic. They tend to assume that the programme will contribute to the compliance of the main goals, at least to a certain extent.

The respondents were also asked about the contribution of the programme to more implicit objectives, related to economic competitiveness in general and ecologically acceptable results.

Table 3.20 *Results of the initiative*

	Mean values*
How much would you say that this program will contribute to an improvement of the city's economic competitiveness?	3,2
How much would you say that this program will provide results that are acceptable from the ecological perspective?	2,5

* Score is on a scale of 1-4, 1 equals "not at all", 4 equals "very much".
N=13 (panel, all respondents in the city).

The results indicate that the respondents are quite optimistic about the effects of the programme on the economic competitiveness of the city.

The expectations related to the ecological perspective are much lower, still leaning towards being optimistic. Related to this, the respondents were also asked their opinion of the programme being compatible with the major economical and ecological policy of the city.

Table 3.21 *Compatibility with economical and ecological policy objectives*

	Mean values*
How much would you say that this programme is compatible with the major economic policy programs in the city?	3,6
How much would you say that this programme is compatible with the major environmental and sustainable programmes in the city?	3,6

* Score is on a scale of 1-4, 1 equals "not at all", 4 equals "very much".
N=13 (panel, all respondents in the city).

These results indicate that the Programme for Regional Development is seen as compatible with major economical and ecological policies of the city. This compatibility may explain the optimism above; when the participants were asked about the results of the initiative. Although this is primarily an economic initiative, it is likely not to harm the environment. The idea is to promote knowledge based development – not polluting industry.

As for the development of the programme, what impressions are reported concerning the role of the actors representing different sector interests? Did the actor play their role right, or did they have too much or too little of a say in the process?

Table 3.22   *Role of different interests*

	Mean values*
The role of representatives of the economic interests in the development of this program	2,2
The role of representatives of the environmental interests in the development of this program	2,6
The role of representatives of the social interests in the development of this program	2,6

* Score is on a scale of 1-3, 1 equals "too large", 2 equals "precisely right", 3 equals "too small". N=14 (panel, all respondents in the city).

The responses on these questions are a bit ambiguous. All the listed kinds of interest are regarded to have had too little impact in the process. However, the environmental and social interests apparently have played a slightly lesser role than the economic interests in the development of the program. This modest role even for economic interests may be explained by the limited scope of the initiative; as pointed out above.

To what degree has the programme ensured input legitimation, throughput legitimation and output legitimation? A certain degree of *input legitimation* is secured by leaving all the formal decision-making to the political bodies. After reaching an agreement in the working group, the annual proposal is decided upon in the executive bodies; in the City Government in Oslo and in the Akershus County Executive Board, while the elected Councils are granting money to the programme. As for authentic representation this has to a certain extent been taken into consideration. In the working group, only two actors from the private sector are included (the two NGOs representing employer and employees). In the wider network however, a broader range of external actors are included, such as partners and co-funders of specific projects. It can be argued that an even wider range of relevant actors from the local community and business sector should have been involved. This might have increased the input legitimation of the network.

As for *throughput legitimation*, the linkage with the representative system in the policy decision phase has secured public access to the draft plan, as well as to the documents from the decision making process in the representative system. Still, the activities in the network

are not public; the meetings of the working group are closed, but it is possible to have access to the minutes from the meetings. Nevertheless, it is not difficult to find out who is accountable for the different elements of the program.

As for *output legitimation* the programme has definitively contributed positively to the economic development in the area. Effects are however limited due to the size of the initiative. A comprehensive cooperation with a broad range of external resource controlling actors has been established, though on project basis (both financing and implementing). External actors thereby provide a major part of the total funding of the programme. It could still be argued that the capacity of the network would have been further increased by the involvement of a higher number of non-governmental actors.

Our observations seem to indicate that the grounds for legitimation of this programme are predominantly related to its outputs. The network includes almost exclusively resource contributors, as participants in the working group or as joint-venture partners on specific projects. According to the participants, the initiative is too small to allow a broader involvement. It could still be argued that a broader base of involvement would have increased the input legitimation as well as the capacity of the network.

Conclusions

A. Leadership style

In the Programme for Regional Development for the City of Oslo and the County of Akershus, the type of leadership can be described as *collective*. The leadership resides with the City Commissioner for Urban Development, Ann Kathrine Tornaas, and the County Mayor in Akershus, Ragnar Kristoffersen. In the parliamentary model, much power resides with the head of the City Government, and this model therefore promotes strong and visible political leadership. Because the City Government has been a minority Government, the collective leadership has been dependent on the support of various opposition parties in the City Council. The style of leadership can be described as *caretaker*, and the political leadership has been largely absent from the initiative. This might be explained by the fact that economic competitiveness has not priority on the political agenda, neither in Oslo nor in Akershus.

B. Community involvement

As for community involvement, the programme has involved co-operation between corporative organisations and governmental

organisations on different levels, excluding actors representing the population in the local society. All the formal decisions are taken in political bodies. The elected bodies in Oslo and Akershus (the City Council and the County Council) have delegated the authority to approve the annual programme to their executive bodies, while retaining the authority to grant funding for the programme. Following this, community involvement has only occurred in the phases of policy development and policy implementation. The policy development phase is the prerogative of the members of the working group. In this phase, the only non-public actors are representatives from the main corporative organisations, of employers and employees. These two organisations are heavily involved in the policy development phase as well as in policy implementation. Both of the organisations are co-funding the programme, but the organisation of employers (NHO) is contributing with far more funding than the organisation of employees (LO), which contribution has a more symbolic character. When it comes to implementation of the projects, the participants of the working group are co-operating comprehensively with a broad range of actors in private sector, like business associations, the Research Council of Norway, EU and research- and educational institutions. These external actors also provide considerable financial contributions to the projects.

C: Policy Challenges and Effectiveness

Whether or not the programme has actually served to promote regional development is hard to say. But the programme has undoubtedly contributed positively to the specific objectives; to stimulate entrepreneurship, innovation, and building of new competence, as well as international promotion of the area.

The procedural challenge of this initiative was low, in terms of the procedure's low degree of complexity. An important challenge was nevertheless to involve the main organisations of employers and employees in the working group. This challenge has been met. A more complicated challenge was to obtain contributions from the participants in the working group, to ensure sufficient funding. This challenge has to a certain extent been met. Some of the participants have however made relatively small contributions in terms of funding, thus limiting the scale and scope of the programme. Even so, quite extensive funding has been secured through cooperation with a broad range of external actors.

The institutional challenge of the initiative has predominantly been met. The institutionalization of the co-operation has been given a

simple form, by the establishment of the working group. This is a long term institution, and according to the participants also an effective one, as decisions are made by consensus by participants regarded as equals. In spite of this informal rule of consensus, most of the participants report that the administrative staffs from Oslo and Akershus have more weight in these decisions, due to their linkage to the political bodies.

D. Conclusions on CULCI

Based on the different indicators of measuring CULCI (agreed upon in the Bristol meeting May 2004), this case gets a relatively low score (4 of 10 possible). The score is the lowest of the four Norwegian cases.

To explain this score we have to describe whether the different indications of CULCI have occurred or not. Ten indicators are identified; half of them are describing the role of the political leader, and the other half describing the involvement and role of the external participants.

Table 3.23   *Indicators of the occurrence of CULCI*

Indicators of the occurrence of CULCI
1. Has the political leader designed institutions for participation?
2. Has the political leader redesigned and reinterpreted existing rules for participation?
3. Has the political leader increased the resource-base of the participants?
4. Has the political leader linked different arenas?
5. Has the political leader ensured the implementation of the goal agreed upon by the participants?
6. Have the participants ensured the implementation of the objectives of the political leader?
7. Has the participation increased the legitimacy of the agenda of the political leader?
8. Has policy innovation through participation increased the ability of the political leader to govern (system capacity)?
9. Have the resources of the participants increased the ability of the political leader to govern?
10. Have the participants been active in the policy-process in interaction with the political leader?

In the Programme of Regional Development for the City of Oslo and the County of Akershus (RUP), the political leaders have not been very visible and strong. Still, the political leadership is identified as the Commissioner for Urban Development, and the County Major, having the overall responsibility of this policy area. The first indicator

of CULCI is whether the political leader has designed institutions (of a permanent character) for participation or not. In the RUP-case this has occurred, the working group is not an ad-hoc group – the intention is that this should be a permanent arena for the development of proposals for the annual programme.

As to the other indicators describing the role of the leader, these features have to a little extent occurred. Neither has the political leader in the RUP- case redesigned rules for participation, nor been very active in linking different arenas together. The political leadership has been quite distanced and invisible, and has not contributed to strengthening the resource base of different groups. Neither has the political leaders played a very active role in ensuring the implementation of the objectives agreed upon in the participation processes.

When it comes to involvement and participation, this initiative can be described as a relatively closed network between administrative officers and representatives of the two major associations for labour and business. It is however important to emphasize that input legitimation to a certain extent is secured by leaving the formal decision-making to political bodies. The inclusion of the main organisations of employers and employees in the working group, as well as relevant governmental institutions also contributes to input legitimacy. In the PLUS framework, five specific indicators are identified to describe how the involvements of the external participants in the cases have contributed to CULCI. One of these indicators is whether the participants have ensured the implementation of the objectives of the political leader or not. In this case, this can be said to have happened, by the very fact that the participants are financing and implementing projects that contribute to regional development. A wider network of external resource controlling actors has been established, which are cooperating with the participant in initiating, co-funding and implementing the projects. In this way, the resources of the participants, both in terms of funding, competence and network, as well as policy innovation through participation, have increased the ability of the political leaders to govern. Nevertheless, the participation of the external actors has not contributed to strengthening the legitimacy of the agenda of the political leader. Nor has an active interaction between the participants and the political leaders occurred in the policy-process.

Related to the conceptual framework of PLUS, it is probably fair to say that this initiative represents CULCI on a rather modest level.

Lessons

There has not been a high occurrence of complementarities between urban leaders and the local community in *The Programme for Regional Development for the City of Oslo and the County of Akershus*. The urban political leadership has been rather invisible, if not absent. The lack of visible and visionary political leadership might be explained by the fact that the role of the local government in regional development is politically controversial. The Programme has therefore been a rather secluded item on the political agenda. Nevertheless, the organization of the programme can be described as based on CULCI, by the strategically inclusion of relevant resource controlling actors in the policy process, while leaving the formal decision making to the political leadership. The political leadership has therefore functioned more like a formal ratifier/ instance of approval of the annual programmes.

The vague political leadership has been complemented by the strategic involvement of a narrow range of recourse controlling actors: mainly governmental institutions. Community involvement, in the sense of involvement from a broad range of actors and stakeholders in the local community has not occurred, except the involvement of the main organisations of employers and employees. Nevertheless, even if the in-put legitimation at first glance seems relatively weak in this case, a broader range of external actors – like private business companies and research- and educational institutions – are included in implementing the specific projects. This cooperation does to a certain degree contribute to stronger in-put legitimation, but the arguments of the strategic inclusion of recourse controlling actors lean heavily on reflections of out-put legitimacy. All the participants in the working group have committed themselves to financial contributions, and are also contributing with their competence and networks.

Still, for the rather ambiguous main objective – to achieve regional development – the content of the programme has been narrowly defined. The lessons might be that to achieve regional development, a broader and more diversified network strategy is necessary. In this case, the actors involved have not had strong visions and ambitions to extend the network, but have rather had the attitude that the programme is to be implemented within the existing economical and thematically framework. Still, the inclusion of a wider spectre of actors might have contributed to more funding and thereby the realization of more projects, which more effectively could have achieved the main objective: regional development. But in order to do

so, the question is whether a stronger and more visionary leadership is required.

3.1.3 Case 2: Social inclusion

Description of the initiative

The *Oslo Regeneration Programme for the Inner City Districts* is a ten year programme for urban development and improvement of living conditions in three of the east-central districts of Oslo: Sagene-Torshov, Grünerløkka-Sofienberg and Gamle Oslo.

In the 1990s there was a growing awareness about problems related to living conditions in Oslo. Documentation about geographical variations in living standards was provided by social research. Several research reports and white papers[9] documented that these differences were so comprehensive that Oslo could be described as a "divided city". The problematic areas were mainly Oslo's East-Central districts, an area containing about 80 000 residents and characterized by problems related to poor living conditions, unemployment, and poor public health.

A regeneration programme was formally initiated by the Norwegian Parliament to address these problems. The programme was a joint effort between the National Government and the City of Oslo, with an annual budget of €12,2 million (100 million NOK) for the 10-year period 1997-2006. These costs are divided in equal shares between the National Government and the City Council.

The programme represents an attempt to actively strengthen the scope, broadness and quality of services in the three districts, and thus achieve an improvement of the living conditions for the inhabitants. The main goals for the ten year program are the following:

- Improving living conditions and residential environments, with a particular focus on families
- Renewal and investment in public meeting places such as streets and parks
- Improved safety in the area

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[9] For example: Hagen, Kåre, Anne Britt Djuve, Pernille Vogt (1994): "Oslo - den delte byen?" FAFO rapport 161, Rapport fra programmet storbyrettet forskning "Levekår i storby", NOU 1993:17 "Levekår i Norge – er graset grønt for alle".

- Strengthening developmental conditions for children, and thus also insuring equal opportunities for children with immigrant backgrounds
- Reducing unemployment and other social problems, with a particular focus on improving cooperation between relevant government agencies
- Strengthen Norwegian language skills among immigrants
- General urban development

A wide variety of governmental organisations from various levels and sectors of public administration co-operate in the programme, in addition to some actors from the private sector.

A large number of projects have been implemented so far. In 2002, 201 projects were running. In addition, a number of projects had already been completed. These projects have predominantly, but not exclusively, targeted living conditions for children and youth. The individual projects draw extensively on Oslo's established system for service provision, in the districts as well as on the city level. The fact that this system is part of the local government clearly gives Oslo considerable leverage within the regeneration programme, although the bulk of municipal services are mandatory by law and subject to various regulations in the form of national standards and guidelines.

Even so, the strategic decision-making structure in the regeneration programme consists of representatives from national government as well as from municipal authorities. Decisions about redistribution and implementation, on the other hand, are taken on the city level and on the district level. The responsibility for managing the programme rests with the Board, composed by representatives from the national government as well as from the city and district levels: Five Ministries from the National Government level, four City Departments, and the District Directors of the three districts. In addition to these administrative representatives, the political leaders of the three districts (the District Councils) also have a seat in the Board. The relatively high representation of the national government in the Board is quite unusual in programmes like these, considering the general competence within this policy area on the hands of the local authorities.

The authority to distribute the grants to individual projects has been divided between the Districts, the Education Authority and the

Municipality of Oslo. However, the share of the grants has varied, shown in percentage of the annual total amount in table 3.23:

Table 3.24 *Distribution formula*

	Share of grants for running expenses					Grants for investments	Grants for administration and evaluation
Year	Sagene – Torshov District	Gamle Oslo District	Grünerløkka – Sofienberg District	Education Authority (Oslo)	The Municipal-ity of Oslo		
1997	2,5%	2,5%	2,5%		92,5%		
1998	16,4%	16,4%	16,4%	16,4%	16,4%		
1999	16,4%	16,4%	16,4%	16,4%	16,4%		
2000	16,5%	16,5%	16,5%	16,5%	16,5%	16,5%	1%
2001	16,5%	16,5%	16,5%	16,5%	16,5%	16,5%	1%
2002	16,5%	16,5%	16,5%	16,5%	16,5%	16,5%	1%
2003	19 %	19 %	19 %	24 %	0	17 %	2 %
2004	13 %	13 %	13 %	24 %	0	34 %	3 %
2005	10 %	10 %	10 %	16 %	0	51 %	3 %
2006	7 %	7 %	7 %	8 %	0	68 %	3 %

Institutional analysis

In the Oslo Regeneration Programme for the Inner City Districts there are many operational arenas. Corresponding to the analytical framework of the PLUS-project, seven arenas can be identified in this case. The large number of arenas is presumably explained by the duration of the programme (1997-2006), and the participation of three levels of government.

Table 3.25 *The Oslo Regeneration Programme for the Inner City*
Districts: Operational arenas

Phase	Arena	Content	Actors involved
Policy develop-ment	Negoti-ation	Negotiations between the State Government and the municipal authorities in the policy development.(1996 – 1997)	-The Minister of Local Government and regional Development - Representatives from the City Government - Representatives from some of the opposition parties in the City Council
Policy develop-ment	Programme develop-ment	Preparing political decisions: Developing and formulating the proposals on the organisation, the main priorities and distribution of money of the programme (1997 – 1999)	- Representatives from the staff of the City administration and from different (State) Ministries, and the District (The working group - the Board)
Policy decision	Priority decision	Deciding the priorities of the Programme in the annual meeting between the Ministry of Local Government and Regional development and the Oslo City Government	- The Chief Commissioner and other commissioners form the Oslo City Government. -The Minister of Local Government and Regional Development
Policy decision	Organiza-tion and content decision	The decisions about organising the programme and the content of the Programme (1999)	- The City Council
Policy develop-ment	Annual allocation decision	The annual process of developing proposals on concretizing the content and distributing the granted money	*Subarena 1* - District administration - Public, private actors and organisations *Subarena 2* - Coordination group *Subarena 3* -The Board *Subarena 4.* - The Education Authority of the City
Policy decision	Budgetary decisions	The annual budgetary process - financing and distributing	-The Parliament - The City Council - The District Councils
Policy implement-tation	Imple-mentation	The annual implementation of the Programme of Development for Oslo's East-Central Districts	- Public, private actors and organisations - The boards secretariat (control)

1. Negotiation arena

In this arena, *the position rules* were to a great extent formal, in the sense that the responsibility for these matters rested with the political leaders of the city, represented by the Chief Commissioner (and other Commissioners) and the Minister of Local Government and Regional Development. *The boundary rules* were defined by the positions in the

City Government and the Ministry of Local Government and Regional Development. Nevertheless, there also existed more informal boundary rules, allowing representatives from some of the opposition parties in the City Council to participate in the negotiations. The reason for this has probably been to give the city of Oslo more weight in the negotiations with the state, signalizing the broad political agreement about the priority area. *The scope rule* on the arena was to reach a formal intentional agreement, committing both the state and the city to grant a considerable amount of money to the programme.

Formal *aggregation rules* did not exist, but there were informal rules. The results of the negotiations rested upon a high degree of consensus between the actors. The representatives of national government and the city representatives depended mutually on each others' active support of the agreement, because the implementation of the agreement depended upon the acceptance of the decision-makers; the Parliament and the City Council, respectively.

As for *information rules*, in negotiations like these, the negotiation partners obviously will have different sources of information. There exists no minutes from the early negotiations, which were informal. Thus, information on the standpoints of the different participations was not open to the public.

Nevertheless, since the actors represented two authority levels, there existed formal information rules as well, such as the Transparency Act, allowing the actors access of information. The *results* of the negotiations were made public, and attracted a lot of attention in the media.

Pay-off rules in this arena are strictly formal, in terms of the salaries of the politicians working full-time, and the regular fee for the other politicians

All in all, although the negotiations took place in an informal way the institutional rules on this arena were relatively formalised. This is due to the hierarchical organisation of the City Government and the Ministry.

 2. Programme development arena

On this arena of policy development, *the scope rules* were formal as well; to develop and formulate proposals which were to be decided upon in a political decision process in the City Council. These proposals were of the following types:

- Proposal for how the programme was to be organised
- Proposal for how the programme was to be financed
- Proposal for how the granted money was to be distributed

The *position rules* were to a certain degree formal. The responsibility for developing a proposal rested with the administration. Key positions here were the members of staff who constituted the secretariat of the Board: Nina Backer Røed and Steinar Daler. *The boundary rules* were to a certain degree formal, defined by employment and positions in the administration of three different authority levels; various national ministries, City Departments and the three DistrictAdministrations. The administrative representatives constituted the important working group, the Board.

The *authority rules* were formal as well, as it is the task of the administration to prepare proposals for political decisions. In the process of developing and formulating the proposals they had to take into account the signals from their political leaders, but they also had the right to address and advise their political leaders – based on the administrative staff's expertise and knowledge. Nevertheless, according to formal *aggregation rules*, the political leadership in the City Government had the last word in preparing and presenting the proposals for the City Council. Since the actors represented three authority levels, there existed formal *information rules* securing the actors access to information.

Pay-off rules in this arena were formal, in terms of the salaries of the administration staffs. These pay-offs were not in any sense related directly to the policy initiative.

3. Priority decision arena

On this decision arena, the *position rules* include the Chief Commissioner (and other commissioners) of the Oslo City Government and the Minister of Local Government and Regional Development. *Boundary rules* are to a certain degree formal, defining the responsibility of deciding the main priorities of the programme to rest on the top political leaders of the two parts responsible for the programme, the City and the state. *Scope rules* define the annual meeting between these political leaders to end up with a formal agreement on prolonging the programme as well as the main priorities. The *aggregation rule* on this arena is consensus. As to *information rules*, there are no evidence of restrictions on information. Since the actors represent the political leadership of two levels of government, there exist formal information rules allowing the actors

access of information. The formal agreement of the main priorities has been made public, but there exists no minutes from the meetings.

Pay-off rules in this arena are strictly formal, in terms of the salaries of the politician leaders.

4. Organization and content decision arena

The position rules on this decision arena include all the members of the City Council. *The boundary rules* are strictly formal and explicit, following the requirements of the parliamentary system of governance. The members of the City Council are elected in the municipal election every forth year. *The scope rules* for this arena were formal as well, defining the City Council to be the body where the most of the important decisions about the programme are taken. Formal *authority and aggregation rules* guaranteed the council members equal right to speak and vote, as well as equal weight in the decision making. Formal *information rules* ensure that all council members have equal and adequate access to all information relevant for the decision making, provided by the city administration. According to the Transparency Act the debates and decisions in the City Council are public, and made widely available – for instance on the municipality's website.

Pay-off rules in this arena are strictly formal, in terms of the salaries of the politicians working full-time, and the regular fee for the other politicians. These pay-offs were not in any sense related directly to the policy initiative.

5. Annual allocation decision arena

The programme involves three levels of government, and this annual process is therefore taking place in different sub-arenas.

Sub arena 5.1. The proposal from the District administration (to be decided in the District Council)

In this sub-arena, the *scope rule* is to develop a proposal for distributing the local share of the grants for running expenses. The share allocated to each District has varied between 2,5 and 19 percent of the total amount of the annual grants. The *position rules* include the district administration, members of the District Council, the Park and Recreational Department of the City, as well as non-governmental actors such as firms, local organizations and associations, such as sports-, culture- and neighborhood associations. Key positions are nevertheless held by the District Directors of the three District administrations. As for *boundary rules* all the above mentioned actors

are free to develop proposals, but formal *aggregation rules* gives the District Administration the right to select the project-proposals relevant for the programme, with the District Directors having the final say. The District Directors, in co-operation with the administration, returns the proposals that are obviously not relevant for the programme. The explicit and formal *authority rules* define the administration staff to develop a proposal of a list of selected projects that will be granted money. Even if they have to take into account the signals from their political leaders in the District Councils, they are also entitled to address and advise their political leaders (based on the expertise and knowledge of the administrative staff). The proposal for the list of projects is presented for the District Council in the proposal for the annual budged.

As for *information rules,* formal and explicit rules guarantee public access to information about the individual project proposals. In addition, the three District Directors in the Coordination group routinely inform each other about their proposals to the list of projects.

Subarena 5.2. Coordination group

The scope rules for the Coordination group are to develop proposals for *distributing the grants for investments*, and *the grants for the central share of the running expenses.* Occasionally the proposals are sent to the District Councils, as inquiries about the degree of support. Following this, the proposals are put before the Board for further elaboration, and subsequently furthered to the City Government, prior to the formal decisions in the City Council and the City Government respectively. This arena of policy development emerged as an informal network among the Districts, in order to have a say in the distribution of these grants. Later on, this network has been formalised in the "Coordination Group", where formal *position rules* define the three District Directors (Chief Officer of the district administration) as key participants, and occasionally representatives from Education Authority and for the Park and Recreational Department (or other relevant City departments). *The boundary rules* are formal, and are defined by the positions in the District administration. Still, more informal boundary rules says that when dealing with cases that are relevant for the Education Authority and for the Park and Recreational Department (or other relevant City departments), representatives from these City departments are also to be included in the group. These boundary rules, nevertheless, give the District Directors the authority to decide in which cases these representatives are to be invited.

As for *aggregation rules,* all the participants have formally equal weight in decisions reached by consensus. Nevertheless, in reality the three District Directors presumably have the most influence.

Concerning *information rules*, the Coordination group function as an arena for exchange of information. There are however no formal rules giving the participants outside this group access to this information. When it comes to public access to information, the minutes from the meetings are public (with a few exceptions), but it is unclear whether the minutes are made widely available.

Pay-off rules in this arena were formal, in terms of the salaries of the administration staffs. These pay-offs were not in any sense related directly to the policy initiative.

Subarena 5.3. The Board

The formal *position rules* include administrative representatives from three levels: different State Ministries (Ministry of Local Government and Regional Development, Ministry of Social affairs, Ministry of Children and Family Affairs, Ministry of Environment and The regional state office for education in Oslo and Akershus), from relevant City Departments (Department of Finance, the Department of Education and Cultural Affairs; Education Authority, the Department of Transport and Environmental Affairs, the Department of Business Development and Urban Planning, Park and Recreational Department), and the District Directors of the three Districts. In addition, the political leaders of the three District Councils are represented. Key positions are the representatives from the Department of welfare and social affairs, holding the formal position of being the secretariat for the Board; Nina Backer Røed and Steinar Daler.

The boundary rules are explicit and formal, defining the participants as administration staff on three different levels, working with related subjects. There has nevertheless been a major discussion about the boundary rules on this arena, and the heart of the matter has been how the inhabitants were to be represented on the Board. The City Government originally had the opinion that the District Directors were to represent the inhabitants, but this was met by heavy protests from the District Councils and neighbourhood associations. After a period of intense discussions and attention in the media, the City Council made a formal decision on the organisation of the programme. This decision gave the leaders of the DistrictCouncil seats on the Board. Members of most of the District Councils are nominated by the City Council, due to the idea that they should mirror the City Council when

it comes to political affiliation. However, one of the three District Councils deviates from this rule, as it is elected.[10]

The *scope rules* are to a certain degree formal, defining the main task of the Board to be responsible to develop proposals on the allocation of the grants for investments and the central share of the running expenses.[11] *Authority rules* define the decisions made in the Board as draft proposals, to be submitted to the City Government which in turn submits the formal proposals to the political bodies for final decision. Additionally, the Board drafts a proposal on the *main priorities* for the whole programme on an annual basis. This document is submitted for final decision-making in the annual meetings between the State and the City.

The *aggregation rules* are to a certain degree formal, giving all the participants the right to express their opinion and to pursue their interests. They are also given equal weight in decisions made by consensus. If they don't reach consensus - final decisions are to be taken on the superior level of administrators and politicians. There is little evidence of any constraints placed on the participants as to what kind of inputs they were allowed to present on this arena.

Pay-off rules in this arena are formal, in terms of the salaries of the administration staffs and the regular fee for the political leaders of the three District Councils. These pay-offs were not in any sense related directly to the policy initiative.

Subarena 5.4. The Education Authority

The Education Authority is distributing a notable share of the annual grants. *The position rules* include administration staff in the Education Authority, where the administrative leader is holding a key position. *The boundary rules* are defined by employment and position in the Education Authority. As for *authority rules*, the Education Authority have a mandate to distribute the grants from the programme. As for *aggregation rules*, the City Government has occasionally given political signals about how the grants are to be distributed. But usually this is for the Education Authority to decide. In general the grants have been shared between the primary schools, the secondary schools and the day care facilities for schoolchildren (SFO) in the area. The grants to the primary schools have been distributed evenly among the

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[10] Elections for District Council have so far only been carried out in four Districts in Oslo.

[11] From 2004 and onwards, the grants for the central share of the running expenses are to be distributed by the three Districts.

schools – an equal amount of money per pupil. As for secondary schools, the grants have been distributed according to objective criteria, for instance the number of pupils speaking minority languages, location and the number of drop-outs. The headmasters have been included (in a working group, also consisting of representatives from the Education Authority) in the discussions and decisions of these objective criteria. The grants for the day care facilities for schoolchildren are distributed both as an equal amount of money per pupil, and for new job positions. New job positions are distributed according to local variations, for example immigrants, a decision made by the Education Authority following strong political signals from the City Government.

As for *information rules*, other actors in the programme have complained about the Educational Authority's lack of openness. According to actors in the Districts administration, it has been difficult to obtain information about the distribution of money, specific results and so on. The Educational Authority has improved its reporting routines, which are now satisfactory.

Pay-off rules in this arena are formal, in terms of the salaries of the administration staffs. These pay-offs were not in any sense related directly to the policy initiative.

6. Annual budgetary decision arena

In the budgetary decision- arena institutional rules largely follow the requirements of the parliamentary system of governance. There exist strictly formal *position rules,* which include the members of the political bodies of three levels – the Parliament on the national level, the City Council and the City Government on the city level and the District Councils on the Districtlevel.

As for *boundary rules,* members of the National Parliament are elected in general elections every four years, while the members of the City Council are being elected in the municipal election, also every fourth years. In accordance with the rules of Oslo's parliamentary system of governance, the City Government (cabinet) is appointed by the City Council. The City Government has the executive authority over the administration. Members of most of the District Councils are appointed by the City Council, due to the idea that the District Council should mirror the political composition of the City Council. However, one of the three District Councils involved in the regeneration programme is popularly elected.

On this decision arena, the strictly formal and explicit *authority rules* regulate the budgetary powers resting with the political bodies on the three levels of government involved in the programme. Both the National Parliament and the City Council are in a position to grant money for the programme. In accordance with earlier political decisions, the City Government, the City Council and the District Councils all have the authority to distribute their share of the grants.

The scope rules are formal end explicit as well, authorizing the political bodies to grant and distribute the funding of the programme. As for *aggregation rules,* all the members of the political bodies have the same right to speak, make remarks and propose amendments to the proposal, and have equal right to vote. There are explicit and formal *information rules* related to these decision-making bodies. According to the Transparency Act, the debates and decisions are public, and made widely available for the public.

Pay-off rules in this arena are formal, in terms of the salaries of the politicians working full-time, and the regular fee for the other politicians. These pay-offs were not in any sense related directly to the policy initiative.

7. Implementation arena.

The *position rules* include all the public actors (schools, social service offices) and private actors (like firms, neighbourhood-, sports- and culture-associations) who get funding for their projects. *The boundary rules* are defined by employment and positions in the City and Districts administrations, as well as by meritocratian criteria, employing people to work on the different projects.

The authority rules (which are closely related to *the scope rules*) are to a certain degree formal, related to realization of the purpose and objectives of the projects that are granted money. Nevertheless, the employees on the projects are given relatively free hands as to how this is to be done. The actors are obliged to submit written reports on the spending of the funds they receive, as well as on goal achievement. The secretary of the Board is also an important actor, as he or she is authorized to control the process of implementation and submit annual reports.

The interviews indicate that the *information rules* have been relatively implicit and unclear the first years of the programme. Nevertheless, the routines for reporting have improved. Formal rules are now securing reports on the progression of the projects to the secretary of

the Board. These reports are made available to the public, for instance on the internet.

Pay-off rules in this arena are formal, both in terms of the salaries of the permanent administration staffs as well as salaries of the staffs that are employed on the specific projects.

Actual behaviour of actors

A. Original actor strategies

Due to the long duration of the program, different persons have been *political leaders* in the regeneration programme. The political leaders of the City have been key actors, especially in the initiation phase, when Chief Commissioner Rune Gerhardsen was the leader of a City Government from the Labour party. However, both the subsequent conservative leaders, leading non-socialist coalition City Governments (Fritz Huitfeldt, as well as the present leader Erling Lae), have been important key actors. The main strategies of the political leaders have been to commit the state to co-fund the programme, at the same time being active in enhancing support from a majority in the City Council to secure the prolongation of the programme. The present political leaders (the Chief Commissioner and the Commissioner for welfare and social services) regard the main objective of the programme as that of reducing geographically defined differences in living standards in the City of Oslo.

Other key actors are the *political and administrative leadership* of the Districts. Their explicit strategy has been to increase the Districts' influence on the programme, especially concerning decisions on the allocation of funds. This strategy was justified not least based on democratic considerations, specifically, the need to strengthen the representation of the inhabitants in the Board (represented by the political leaders in the Districts) and to provide stronger popular influence on the distribution of the money. One leader of a District Council formulated the strategy as follows:

> It is my role to be a spokesman for the inhabitants of my District in the Board, to know the pulse of the inhabitants. It's far from the Districts to the Town hall. In the Town hall they haven't even seen a welfare client!

All the other *governmental organisation actors* on both district level and on municipal level tend to emphasise the long term improvements of living conditions in the area as the programme's main objective. A quite interesting finding is that only a *representative from a private*

organisation mentioned the involvement of the inhabitants as the main objective.

What kinds of strategies have the governmental actors on district and city levels pursued in the regeneration programme?

Table 3.26 *Strategies for governmental actors*

As a governmental representative I should…	Mean value*
…operate on the basis of a clear vision of the organisation about the future of the city (1), vs. … operate on the basis of a vision about the future of the city that has been developed in consultations with the local community (7)	4,9
…concentrate on the implementation of local policies with our own organisational resources (1), vs. …spend the time in going out to mobilise community support and local resources to implement local policies. (7)	3,8
…not compromise in heeding the will of the majority of the local politicians (1), vs. ….strive for broad-based consensus even at the expense of decisive action.(7)	5,0
…act as a representative of my department (1), vs. …represent the city as a whole.(7)	4,1
…actively engage in and stimulate local partnerships and networks, (1) vs. …concentrate on my role as the representative of city government. (7)	3,6

* Score is on a scale of 1-7, 1 equals agree with first alternative, 7 equals agree with last alternative. N=<11,14> (representatives of governmental organisations).

On the average, the governmental representatives, including the District Council leaders, tend to state that their visions are developed in close cooperation with the local community. However, the respondent's attitudes toward networking are less clear-cut. In the two questions related to the development of networks, in general and in the implementation of local politics, the average is just about middle value (3,6 and 3,8), revealing a certain amount of ambiguity concerning this subject. Two of three leaders of the District Councils are clearly in favour of actively engagement in stimulating local networks, while the third have chosen the middle value.

As for using networks in the implementation of public policy this tendency is less clear, with an almost unanimous emphasis on the middle value. Compared to the strategies of the Chief Commissioner and the Commissioner of welfare and social services, the leaders of the District Councils thereby tend to be slightly more network-orientated.

As for the question on majoritarian versus consensual strategies, the governmental representatives tend to prefer a consensual strategy, the average value being as high as 5.

What are the attitudes among governmental actors toward their responsibility to ensure norms like transparency, accountability and participation in the programme?

Table 3.27   Modus operandi *for governmental organisations*

As a governmental organisation we should…	Mean value*
…take care that local decision-making is transparent.	4,8
…take care that those responsible for decisions can be held to account.	4,3
…make sure that the local community can have a direct say over major local policies.	4,3

* Score is on a scale of 1-5, 1 equals "not important at all", 5 equals "highly important". N=<12,13> (representatives of governmental organisations).

On the average, the governmental representatives (including the political leaders of the District Councils) strongly emphasize their responsibility to ensure all these norms. Especially regarding transparency, the mean value is very close to maximum score.

Only one representative of non- governmental organisations has answered the questionnaire, so a direct comparison of the scores might give a distorted view.

This representative is however stating that his organisation must participate actively in the process of setting the local political agenda and making important local decisions. If we should allow a comparison, this representative is more consensus – oriented than the average governmental representative, the former giving this statement the highest score possible while the latter giving a average score on 5,0 (on the scale from 1 to 7). The representatives of non-

governmental organisation was also asked the question about their responsibility to contribute to solving local problems by using its own resources, as well as their responsible to participate in and hold themselves informed about local decision- making. The single participant representing NGO's gave these statements the highest possible score.

B. Patterns of interaction

During the early negotiations with the national government, the City Government succeeded in forging a broad political coalition in the City Council for the programme. The negotiation team consisted of the Chief Commissioner, Rune Gerhardsen, representing the Labour Party, and representatives from two of the largest opposition parties (The Conservative Party and the Progressive Party). This broad coalition gave the City leadership more weight in the negotiations with national government, and at the same time it committed the opposition parties to support the realization of the programme. Midway in the negotiation process, the socialist City Government had to resign. The new City Government, headed by the Conservative Party, was continuing the negotiations with the same commitment as their predecessors. The leadership of both City Governments invoked strong and clear leadership in the process of committing the state to co-fund the programme.

After reaching an intentional agreement between the national government and the City, the operative leadership for the programme was delegated to the administration and the Districts. It nevertheless remains an important task for the city leadership to retain the commitment of the National Government (and the Norwegian Parliament) and the City Council, in terms of securing annual funding for the programme.

In the questionnaire all the respondents involved in the programme were asked to give their opinion about how they considered the strategies of different actor groups in the programme.

Table 3.28   *Majoritarian vs consensual strategies*

Did various actors… …heed the will of the majority without compromise (1), or …strive for broad-based consensus (7)?	Mean value*
Political leaders	4,3
Local government representatives	4,2
Citizens	2,6
Business	1,5
Local NGO's	2,3

* Score is on a scale of 1-5, 1 equals "heed the will of the majority", 5 equals agree with "strive for broad-based consensus". N=<6,12> (all respondents).

Not surprisingly, this table shows that the groups of actors representing the local government are seen as the most consensus-seeking. Actors in the civil society, on the contrary, are to a much lesser degree assumed to be consensus-oriented.

The respondents were also asked whether the various actors pursued their own interest, or if they had the interest of the whole city in mind.

Table 3.29   *Interests pursued by various actors*

Did various actors… …pursue their own interest (5), or …take the interest of the city as a whole into account (1)?	Mean value*
Political leaders	2,1
Local government representatives	2,4
Citizens	3,8
Business	3,7
Local NGO's	3,8

* Score is on a scale of 1-5, 1 equals "the interest of the city as a whole", 5 equals "pursue their own interest". N=<6,11> (all respondents).

According to the table above, the main tendency is that the groups of actors localised in civil society are assumed to be pursuing their own interests more than taking the whole city into account. On the contrary, the representatives from local government, especially the

political leaders, are to a high degree assumed to have the whole city in mind.

The actors involved were also asked which actors who had influenced their own decisions related to the programme.

Table 3.30   *Patterns of influence*

To what extent have the participants named below influenced your own decisions?	Mean value*
DistrictCouncil	4,1
DistrictAdministration	4,1
NGO's	2,4
City Government of Oslo	3,3
Staff, Department of welfare and sosial affairs	2,8
City Council of Oslo	2,3
State/ Ministries	3,4
Education Authority, Park and Recreational Department (or other relevant City departments)	3,0
Project managers	2,6

* Score is on a scale of 1-5, 1 equals "not at all", 5 equals "To a great extent". N=<13,15> (all respondents).

The results here are quite interesting, in light of the disagreements between the different levels of authority. It is the politicians and administrators in the Districts who to the largest extent have influenced the decisions of the actors involved. The representatives from the Ministries and the City Government have exerted a certain influence on the participants' decisions, while the City Council is not assumed to be very influential.

How did the involved actors assess the actual behaviour of the political leader and the local administrators in the programme?

Table 3.31 *Behaviour of local leaders and local administrators (I)*

How can the behaviour of local leaders and local administrators best be described?	Political leaders (mean values*)	Local government representatives (mean values*)
Did they operate on the basis of… …a clear personal vision about the future of the city (1), or …a vision about the future of the city that had been developed in consultations with the local community (5)?	3,6	3,7
Did they… …concentrate on their roles as the leader of city government/representatives of the city administration, or …engage actively in local partnerships and networks?	3,3	3,3
Did they… …manage the implementation of local policies by the local administrative apparatus, or …mobilise community support and local resources to implement local policies?	3,2	2,8

* Score is on a scale of 1-5, 1 equals "to a very small extent", 5 equals "To a great extent" for the second alternative. N=<10,12> (all respondents).

One interesting observation is that there are no notable differences between the scores of the two groups of actors. According to the actors involved, the political leaders and local government representatives operated to a higher degree on the basis of a vision developed in consultations with the local community than on the basis of a personal vision. In other words, their visions are assumed to be deeply rooted in the local community.

As for the question about whether they are actually engaged in networks, in general and in the implementation phase, the tendencies are not so clear. Still, the political leaders and local administrators are described as being slightly more network-oriented than concentrating on their traditional role.

The respondents were also asked to what extent political leaders and local government representatives ensured norms like transparency, accountability and letting the local community influence the decision-making and problem-solving.

Table 3.32 *Behaviour of local leaders and local administrators (II)*

How can the behaviour of local leaders and local administrators best be described?	Political leaders (mean values*)	Local government representatives (mean values*)
Did they make sure that the local community could have a direct say over major local policies?	3,5	3,3
Did they ensure transparency?	4,0	3,9
Did they make sure that those responsible for decisions can be held to account?	3,7	3,9
Did they take care that local problems were being solved?	3,8	3,5

* Score is on a scale of 1-5, 1 equals "to a very small extent", 5 equals "To a great extent". N=<10,12> (all respondents).

There are no notable differences between the two groups of actors on these questions. On average, the political leaders and the local administrators are to a large extent seen as having enhanced transparency and accountability. Regarding the enhancement of the local community's influence over major local politics, the results are less clear-cut. Still, the scores are above middle value. Following this, the transparency of the programme is assumed to be relatively high, but did the citizens actually stay informed? The impression of those involved in the programme is expressed in the table below.

Table 3.33 *Information of citizens*

	Mean values*
Did citizens stay informed?	2,3

* Score is on a scale of 1-5, 1 equals "to a very small extent", 5 equals "To a great extent". N=11 (all respondents).

According to this table, the citizens are not assumed to be very well informed about the programme. This impression is strengthened by the results of the interviews, where local administrators on the city level stressed the inhabitants' lack of knowledge about the

programme. One of their explanations for this phenomenon was the conscious lack of information strategies of the DistrictAdministrations.

How did the actors in the civil society behave in the context of the initiative? The involved were asked about the behaviour of these groups in setting the agenda and decision making, as well as in their involvement in making the policy a success.

Table 3.34   *Behaviour of citizens, business and NGO representatives*

How did citizens, business and NGO representatives behave in the context of this initiative?	Citizens	Business	NGOs
Did these groups… …stick to their narrow roles as citizens, business representatives or representatives of NGOs (1), or …participate actively in the process of setting the local political agenda and the making of important local decisions (5)?	1,9	1,6	2,4
Did these groups… …stick to their own roles[+], or …actively engage in joint efforts with the municipality to make this policy a success?	2,5	2,2	3,0

* Score is on a scale of 1-5, 1 equals "to a very small extent", 5 equals "To a great extent" for the second alternative. N=<10,11> (all respondents).
+: For citizens, *electing leaders and holding them electoral accountable*; for business, *making profits*.

In general, none of these groups are seen as actively engaged in any of the phases of the initiative. Still, the picture can be nuanced. It is especially in the phases of agenda setting and decision-making that these groups are assumed to be absent. When it comes to the implementation phase, the groups are seen as more actively engaged. Business actors are considered to be the least involved, while NGOs are considered as the most involved of these groups. The impression of the relatively low engagement from the civil sector/ local community corresponds to our general impression from the qualitative interviews.

C. Actor influence

Which of the actors are assumed to be the most influential on the outcome of the Oslo Regeneration Programme for the Inner City Districts? How are the participants assessing the influence of other actors?

Table 3.35   *Influence of various actor groups*

To what extent have the participants named below influenced the outcome of this initiative?	Mean value*
District Council	4,2
District Administration	4,2
NGO's	2,2
City Government of Oslo	3,7
Staff, Department of welfare and sosial affairs	2,8
City Council of Oslo	2,8
State/ Ministries	3,4
Education Authority, Park and Recreational Department (or other relevant City departments)	3,7
Project managers	2,9

* Score is 1-5, 5 equals highest. N=<12,13> (all respondents).

The results here correspond to the tendencies mentioned earlier. The disagreements between the different levels of authority should be kept in mind. The Districts are seen as the most influential actors in the initiative. This applies to the politicians in the District Councils as well as members of the District Administrations.

The representatives of the Ministries, the city Education Authority and the Park and Recreational Department are assumed to have had a significant influence on the outcome as well. The results underline the impression of a marginal role and scarce influence for the NGO's. In this table, NGOs are rated as the actors having the least influence on the outcome.

What is the inhabitants' impression of the behaviour of the political leaders in this initiative? The respondents in the panel were asked to what extent they assumed the political leader to have communicated

and heeded the interests of the local citizens and organisations when developing this programme.

Table 3.36 *Network governance*

	Mean values*
To what extent did the local political leaders in Oslo keep in touch with local citizens and local organizations when they developed the programme?	2,8
To what extent did local political leaders know about and heed the concerns and demands of local citizens and organizations when they developed the programme?	3,2

* Score is on a scale of 1-4, 1 equals "not at all", 4 equals "very much".
N=43 (panel, all respondents in the city).

The panel members seem to have a relatively clear impression of the political leaders as being in contact with, and heeding the interests of, the local citizens and organisations.

What have been the goals of the involved actors or their organisations? As for governmental organisation actors on both district level and on municipal level, they all tend to emphasise long-term improvements of the living conditions of the inhabitants as the main objective for their work in the programme. The political leaders share this opinion, considering reduction of the geographical variation in living standard to be the main objective of the programme. A quite interesting finding is that only the representative from a private organisation mentions the involvement of the inhabitants in the project as a main objective.

What is the actors' impression of the obtainment of their own goals?.

Table 3.37   *Obtainment of own goals*

To what extent did you reach your own goals or objectives relating to this initiative?	Mean value*
Political leaders	4,0
Business	-
Local government representatives (local administrators)	3,9
NGOs, others	3,0

* Score is 1-5, 5 equals highest. N=14 (all respondents).

The present political leaders of this case, the Chief Commissioner – Erling Lae – and the Commissioner for welfare and social services – Torger Ødegaard – regard their main objective as being reached. They both regarded the main objective of the programme as that of reducing the geographical difference in living standards in the City of Oslo.

The local government representatives (local administrators) also tend to state that they to a large extent have reached their own goals in the initiative. The representative from the non-governmental organisation is to a lesser degree convinced that his goal has been reached. Still, his score is slightly higher than the middle value.

What kind of resources did the different groups of actors possess? For representatives from different governmental organisations, the resources they themselves considered relevant and important for the programme were: competence, experience from similar programmes or projects, knowledge of the local community, network and the ability to comprehend/understand the political/administrative system. The only representative from a non- governmental organisation considered his competence as the resource most important for the process. The respondents were also asked *how* significant their resources had been in the process.

Table 3.38   *Importance of own resources*

	Respondents engaged in initiative as government organisation representative (Mean values*)	Respondents engaged in initiative as non-governmental organisation representative (Mean values*)
Could you indicate the importance of the entire collection of your own resources for other participants in the process?	3,8	2,0

* Score is on a scale of 1-5, 1 equals "not important at all", 5 equals "very important". N=1/14 (all participants in initiative)

The representatives from governmental organisations valued the importance of their own resources much higher than did the representative from the non-governmental organisation. Still, in this comparison it is important to remember that only one representative from non-governmental organisations has answered the questions.

How did the involved actors look upon the resources of the others? What kind of resources were the different groups of actors assumed to possess? Since most of the respondents were representing governmental organisations, it is first and foremost their impression that will be quoted here (instances of diverging views of the representative from the non-governmental organisation will be commented upon).

The political body in the Districts, *the District Councils,* were thought to possess knowledge about local conditions. This was the resource most frequently mentioned, but resources like decision-making authority, political competence, the position of representing the inhabitants were also mentioned. The representative from the non-governmental organisation saw personal credibility and access to the media as the most important resources of the District Councils. As for the District *Administrations,* their most important resources were considered to be professional competence, the whole administration, and knowledge about local conditions. Control over information and available funds were mentioned by the representative from the non-governmental organisation.

The resources *the non-governmental organisations* were assumed to possess were competence and expertise in their field, ideas, network, the position of representing groups of the inhabitants, manpower and credibility.

Regarding resources held by the *City Government,* the respondents emphasized: competence, the whole administration, their decision-making authority (with authority to overrule the decisions from the District Councils), and especially the authority to allocate available funds. *The staff in the city Department for welfare and social services* was presumed to have expertise and competence, a position close to the decision-making processes, experience from executive work and a comprehensive network. The politicians on the city level, the *City Council,* were assumed to possess decision-making authority (this includes budgetary authority), political experience and contacts in the local community. The representatives from the *National Government / the Ministries* were first and foremost assumed to possess expertise and competence, though overall political signals and control over funds were also mentioned.

The main tendency is that the resources assumed to be held by different actors are closely related to their traditional roles and positions: decision-making powers for the political bodies, expertise and competence for the administrators, networks and community contacts for the non-governmental organisations. All the groups of actors operating in the Districts are assumed to have substantial knowledge about local conditions.

The respondents have been asked to rate the importance of the resources of others in the process. The responses are presented in the table below.

Table 3.39 *Importance of the resources of others*

Could you indicate the importance of the entire collection of these resources for other participants in the process?	Mean value*
District Council	4,2
District Administration	4,5
Non-Governmental organisations	2,8
City Government	3,5
Staff in the city Department for welfare and social services	3,3
City Council politicians	2, 7
National government / the ministries	3,2

* Score is on a scale of 1-5, 1 equals "not important at all", 5 equals "very important". N=12/13 (all participants in initiative)

The findings here are quite interesting, especially as related to the disagreements between different levels of government in the discussion about how to organize the programme. The resources possessed by the Districts are considered to be most important, and this goes for the District Council as well as for the administration. This means that in addition to resources which all political bodies and administrations possess, like decision-making authority and competence, knowledge of local conditions must have been regarded as important resources for both the District Council and the District Administration.

Another interesting observation is that the kinds of resources held by non-governmental organisations are assumed to be among the least important.

Policy outcomes and impact on sustainable development

The main objective of the programme has been the long-term improvement of the living conditions of the inhabitants. To what degree did the inhabitants assume that the programme would contribute to the achievement of these main objectives?

The respondents in the panel made the following assessment:

Table 3.40 *Achievement of goals*

	Mean values*
How much would you say that this programme will contribute to the achievement of these aims?	3,2

* Score is on a scale of 1-4, 1 equals "not at all", 4 equals "very much".
N=43 (panel, all respondents in the city).

The respondents are quite positive. The average score on this question is relatively high, 3.2 of maximum 4, which means that the programme is regarded as a major contribution to the improvements of the living conditions of the inhabitants of the area.

To what degree is the programme assumed to have major impacts on sustainable urban developments in the City? The respondents were also asked about the impact of the programme on economic competitiveness and ecological acceptable results.

Table 3.41 *Results of the initiative*

	Mean values*
How much would you say that this programme will contribute to an improvement of the city's economic competitiveness?	3,3
How much would you say that this programme will provide results that are acceptable from the ecological perspective?	3,3

* Score is on a scale of 1-4, 1 equals "not at all", 4 equals "very much".
N=43 (panel, all respondents in the city).

The main impression of the respondents is that the programme to a large extent will contribute to the improvement of the city's economic competitiveness as well as providing ecological acceptable results.

Does this mean that the programme is considered to be compatible with general economical and ecological policy objectives of the city?

Table 3.42 *Compatibility with economical and ecological policy objectives*

	Mean values*
How much would you say that this programme is compatible with the major economic policy programs in the city?	3,1
How much would you say that this programme is compatible with the major environmental and sustainable programmes in the city?	3,5

* Score is on a scale of 1-4, 1 equals "not at all", 4 equals "very much".
N=41,42 (panel, all respondents in the city).

To a large extent the programme is considered to be compatible with economical and ecological policy objectives. Still, the programme is considered to be slightly more compatible with the environmental and sustainable programmes of the city.

When it comes to the development of the programme, how is the role of the actors representing different sector interests considered by the respondents? Did the actor play their role right, did they have too much of a say in the process, or did they play a marginal role?

Table 3.43 *Role of various interests*

	Mean values*
The role of representatives of the economic interests in the development of this program	2,1
The role of representatives of the environmental interests in the development of this program	2,4
The role of representatives of the social interests in the development of this program	2,3

* Score is on a scale of 1-3, 1 equals "too large", 2 equals "precisely right", 3 equals "too small". N=43 (panel, all respondents in the city).

In this table, the value "2" would indicate that the representatives played their role "precisely right" in the development of the programme. The representatives of the economic interests came closest to this value. On the other hand, the respondents meant that the actors representing ecological and social interests did not play the significant role they should have done. These results seem to indicate that the actors representing ecological and social interests have been insufficiently involved in the development of the programme.

Comments on the legitimacy of the process

The Oslo Regeneration Programme for the Inner City Districts has ensured a certain degree of *input legitimation.* Generally speaking, the initiative has had a top-down character. The objectives, as well as the procedures of the programme, have predominantly been formed by political and administrative bodies outside of the districts, and the three districts have not had much of a say in the early stages of the programme. However, the participants in the development process represented both relevant competence and relevant sectors for a regeneration programme. The Districts have nevertheless strengthened their role and increased their influence during the seven year period the programme has been running.

This is probably the case where the discussions related to input legitimation have been most intense, more specifically related to the question "who are to represent the inhabitants of the area"? After an intense debate, "citizens' participation" was interpreted as participation by the leaders of the District Councils. These councils have gained influence, by being represented on the Board and by having increased their authority over allocation decisions in the programme. Still, one can question the basis of input legitimation for the District Councils, as two of them are appointed (only one of them is elected). A certain input legitimation is nevertheless secured by leaving all the overall decisions to the political bodies on the three levels. Actors in the local community (voluntary associations) have also been included and activated in developing and implementing projects. This has been to a rather limited extent, however, and can not be characterized as a broad- range involvement. Most of the projects are implemented be the established service delivery systems of the Districts.

As for *throughput legitimation,* the programme has a complex structure, making it difficult for ordinary citizens to see who or what level is accountable for what. This structure is nevertheless quite open; especially regarding the decision-making processes that takes

place in the regular political bodies, where the Transparency Act has to be respected. The meetings in the institutions of the network, the Board and the Coordination group, are not public, but minutes are publicly available. In addition to this, the programme has its own website.

As for *output legitimation,* 201 projects were running in 2002, and some had already been completed. These projects undoubtedly have a positive impact on living conditions in the area. Nevertheless the long-term effects of the programme are uncertain.

This initiative is one of the cases in our study being most strongly dominated by governmental organisations. It can first and foremost be characterized as a network between different levels of government and various branches of public administration, and to a very limited extent as a network with interaction between the public sector and the private/civil society. In this way, a relatively high degree of input legitimation is ensured, by the fact that all the phases of the initiative are closely related and coupled to the political-administrative structure.

Conclusions

A. Leadership styles

In the Oslo Regeneration Programme for the Inner City Districts the type of leadership can be described as collective; the leadership resides with the Chief Commissioner (the leader of the City Government) and the City Commissioner for welfare and social services. In the parliamentary model, much power resides with the head of the City Government, and this model therefore promotes strong and visible political leadership. Still, in the period of the programme, the City Governments have been minority Governments, which make the political leadership dependent on support by various opposition parties in the City Council. The style of leadership has tended toward a visionary leader according to the PLUS typology. In the early negotiations with the national government, the City Government succeeded in forging a broad political coalition in the City Council for the programme. The negotiation team consisted of the leader of the City Government, representing the Labour Party, and representatives from two of the largest opposition parties (The Conservative Party and the Progressive Party). This broad coalition gave the City leadership more weight in the negotiations, and at the same time it committed the opposition parties to support the realization of the programme. Midway in the negotiation-process the socialist City Government had to resign. A new City Government,

headed by the Conservative Party, was instigated, continuing the negotiations with the same commitment as their predecessors. The leadership of both City Governments can be described as visionary, invoking strong and clear leadership in the process of committing the state to co-fund the programme. After reaching an intentional agreement between the national government and the City, and following important political decisions concerning the funding and the organisation of the programme, the political leadership is less visible – but still strong. The operative leadership for the programme was delegated to the central administration and the politically headed Districts. Even so, it remains an important task for the city leadership to retain the commitment of the Norwegian Parliament and the City Council, in terms of securing annual funding for the programme.

B. Community involvement

Community involvement was an important focus when the programme was initiated, but has to a large extent been interpreted as the involvement of the District Councils in the planning and running of the programme. Political bodies on the three levels take all the formal decisions in the programme. The programme was designed to encourage actors in the local community to develop project proposals that could potentially be funded by the programme. The idea was that the actors developing the projects where to implement them, and although the development phase and the implementation phase are dominated by public actors, this intention has to a certain degree been met. Still, the direct involvement of citizens and associations cannot be described as broad-ranged. Two types of actors have been involved in developing projects and implementing them; collective actors – like neighbourhood and voluntary associations, churches and sports associations, and to a very limited extent corporative actors – including mercantile associations and business communities.

C. Outcomes: Policy challenges and effectiveness

It is hard to say whether or not the main *substantial challenge* of the programme is met. Due to the complexity of the objectives, it is difficult to assess whether living conditions in the area have improved. Nevertheless, a large amount of money has been raised – €12,2 million per year for seven years now – for carrying out projects in the area. A wide range of projects has been implemented. In 2002, a total of 201 projects were running, and many projects have been completed. These projects have undoubtedly had beneficial effects on living conditions in the area. Even so, it should be noted that the programme

has not had any bearing on several issues vital to living conditions, including housing.

Regarding the *procedural challenges*, the perspective of empowerment was an important idea underlying the programme in the outset. The inhabitants themselves should be involved in the enhancement of living conditions in the area. We find this perspective explicitly expressed in the decision in the Norwegian Parliament. This was, however, only to a certain degree followed up in the deal made between the National Government and the City. This ambition has not been successfully met, if "inhabitants" are defined as individuals and voluntary organisations in the local community. The issue about who exactly were to represent the inhabitants has been highly controversial. In the first proposal concerning the administration of the programme, the head of the District Administration were to represent the inhabitants. This proposal however provoked a tense political and public debate about whether or not this structure ensured *citizens participation.* Local organizations as well as the political leaders of the three District Councils expressed their dissatisfaction with the proposal in the media. They were especially dissatisfied with the relatively marginal role they had played in the development of the program, and with the formulation of this specific proposal. As a result, the leaders of the three District Councils were given seats on the Board – as representatives of the inhabitants. Claiming to be better representatives of the inhabitants in the area, a few voluntary organizations have protested to this, although without success.

Nevertheless, the programme has succeeded in achieving a certain degree of activation of actors in the local community. Many of the projects have been developed and implemented by local actors in the districts, like neighbourhood and sport associations, churches and theatres. The vast majority of the projects funded by the programme have been implemented by the regular service-providing agencies in the districts. When it comes to *cooperation with resource controlling actors*, the cooperation with the most important actor outside the municipality, the state, has definitively been successful.

The programme has been institutionally designed to reflect all three levels of authority and different sectors on each level. We have however registered widespread dissatisfaction concerning the way in which the programme is organized. According to participants on all three levels, the Board has not been able to manage the programme in an effective way. Too many levels and actors are involved, and the mandate of the representatives has not been sufficiently clear. Nevertheless, the programme has been quite flexible and open as to

rearrangement of both the Board (that political leaders of the Districts were included), to formalise network outside the formal structure (The Coordination Group), and when it comes to rearrangement of the authority to distribute the granted funding.

D. Conclusions on CULCI

Based on the different indicators of measuring CULCI, this case gets a relatively high score (6 of 10 possible). The score is among the highest of the four Norwegian cases.

To explain this score we have to describe whether the different indications of CULCI have occurred or not. Ten indicators are identified; half of them describing the role of the political leader, and the other half describing the involvement and role of the external participants.

Table 3.44   *Indicators of the occurrence of CULCI*

Indicators of the occurrence of CULCI
1. Has the political leader designed institutions for participation?
2. Has the political leader redesigned and reinterpreted existing rules for participation?
3. Has the political leader increased the resource-base of the participants?
4. Has the political leader linked different arenas?
5. Has the political leader ensured the implementation of the goal agreed upon by the participants?
6. Have the participants ensured the implementation of the objectives of the political leader?
7. Has the participation increased the legitimacy of the agenda of the political leader?
8. Has policy innovation through participation increased the ability of the political leader to govern (system capacity)?
9. Have the resources of the participants increased the ability of the political leader to govern?
10. Have the participants been active in the policy-process in interaction with the political leader?

The Oslo Regeneration Programme for the Inner City Districts has involved strong and active political leadership, especially in the early negotiation stage. Strong and visible leadership by the City Government (especially the Chief Commissioner) was necessary to commit the National Government to co-fund the programme. This is in accordance with the parliamentary system of governance, in which the City Government have the main responsibility of external relations and external funding. But strong leadership was also needed to build a

broad coalition in the City Council supporting the programme, due to the relatively weak position of the minority Government. When it comes to the occurrence of the different indicators describing the role of the political leaders, the political leaders have designed institutions for participation (the Board), as well as redesigned and reinterpreted existing rules for participation (for example the formalization of the Coordination group). In these new institutions and arenas of participation, the political leaders have linked different political and administrative arenas, first and foremost by linking three political levels (the Districts, the City and the National Government). The political leaders have to a great extent secured the implementation of the objectives agreed upon by the participants, by every year ensuring that the National Government and the City Council are committed to co-fund the programme. However, the political leadership have to a lesser degree played an active role in increasing the resource base of the participants.

Extensive community involvement has been regarded as highly necessary by the political leadership. However, the choice of approach to obtain community involvement has been intensively discussed. Probably because of the institutional structure of the City of Oslo, with its 25 Districts, community involvement has first and foremost been linked to the established district system. Community involvement was evidently interpreted as representation of the District Councils on the Board, and as giving the District Councils influence over a larger share of the funding. Therefore, the community involvement in this case can first and foremost be described as indirect participation, by elected (and appointed) representatives of the inhabitants. Direct participation by individuals and voluntary associations in the local community has also occurred, but to a limited degree and only in the policy development phase and the implementation phase. When it comes to the different indicators of CULCI regarding the participation, these indicators has to a lesser degree occurred. Certainly, the participation – in terms of the involvement of the Districts, as well as the involvement of external actors (like organisations, culture groups) – has contributed to ensuring the implementation of the objectives of the political leadership. Besides, this participation has also increased the legitimacy of the agenda of the political leaders. However, the resources of the participants have to a lesser degree contributed to increasing the ability of the political leader to govern. Nor has policy innovation through participation increased the ability of the political leader to govern. When it comes to the interaction between the political leadership and the participation of external actors, this has to

a certain – but not to a large extent – occurred. The political leadership was predominantly executed on the top level of the municipal organisation – most notably, by the Chief Commissioner – while community involvement was linked to the bottom level; namely, the Districts.

CULCI can in this case be identified by the combination of a relatively horizontal structure of the organisation of the programme (especially in the Board), and the close linkage to the traditional political/administrative system.

Lessons

The Oslo Regeneration Programme for the Inner City Districts is a case where strong and visible political leadership has been complemented by a certain degree, though not extensive, community involvement. The programme can be described as a top – down initiative, initiated and realized in negotiations between the top urban leadership, members of the national parliament and the Cabinet Minister of Local Government and Regional Development. A formal decision in the national parliament, as well as comprehensive research documenting the social challenges of the area, strengthened the position of the urban leadership in the negotiation processes - eventually managing to commit the state to be a co- founder. The Districts were put in the position to implement the programme decided upon by the superior level, but have increased their influence during the eight years the programme has been running, attracting more attention than has the urban leadership of the City of Oslo. The urban leadership still plays a significant role, not so much in running the programme as in committing the state and the City Council to grant the annual funding.

The CULCI in this case has been marked by a strong political leadership, which has been executed by means of a network strategy *within* the formal political system – not a broad networking strategy with external actors. The limited involvement of actors and stakeholders in the local community have mainly occurred in the implementation of specific projects, but a majority of the projects have been implemented through the established systems for service provision in the Districts. The network strategy can therefore be characterized as cooperation between different political and administrative levels, rather than a diversified networking strategy with a broad range of actors from the local community. This might be one of the explanations why the programme has not led to the broad mobilization of the local community as expected. The lesson might be

that in order to mobilize a wide range of actors in the local community, it is necessary for the actors to have a kind of "ownership" to the programme – and this requires extensive involvement also in earlier stages of the policy process. A more extensive community involvement might have increased the legitimacy of the agenda of the political leaders even more. Likewise, even if the out – put legitimation of the initiative must be considered quite strong, due to the considerable amount of funding being invested in the area, it can nevertheless be discussed whether an achievement of the main objective - an improvement of the living condition in the area - requires a stronger involvement of resource controlling actors in the local community.

3.2   Bergen

3.2.1   City context

Economic and social profile

The city of Bergen is Norway's second largest, with a total population of 235 423. Bergen is located in the western part of southern Norway. In the 1970s, several neighboring municipalities were incorporated into the municipality of Bergen. Because of this, the geographical size of the city is high, 465,3 km^2 and slightly larger than Oslo. The population density is quite low, 496,3 people pr. km^2.

Bergen and the county of Hordaland is a leading energy producer on European scale. About 15 000 people are employed in the oil and gas industry. The area is also a major producer of hydroelectric power. The maritime industries employ about 15 000 people, including carrier companies, supply, consulting. The fishing industry employs about 6 000 people, in more than 500 businesses. Bergen has a vital financial community, second to Oslo, which employs about 4 200 people. 8 000 people work in the tourist industry, hosting about 2 million visitors a year. Bergen is also the home of a number of highly profiled companies in the food industry, not least related to the fishing industry and dairy products. Other significant parts of the economy include traditional industry, information technology and media.

Major projects in Bergen in recent years include a large highway project (*Ringvei vest*) aimed at the alleviation of local congestion problems and enhanced accessibility to the locality. The regional hospital in Bergen (*Haukeland*) is undergoing substantial changes.

Plans are being developed for a new suburban railway line, and the development of Bergen harbor.

The population of the municipality of Bergen increased dramatically in the 1970s, when several neighboring localities were incorporated into the city. This rapid growth phase was preceded by a long period of slow growth. In the period 1900 – 1970, the city grew from 72 251 people to 112 745, whereas in 1980, 207 674 people lived in Bergen. The current growth rate is 0,63%.

Currently, the unemployment rate in Bergen is 4,6% among people in the age group 16 – 24 years, and 2,9 % in the group 25 – 66 years. This is only slightly above the national average. In 1999, gross personal income pro capita (over the age of 17) in Bergen was NOK 228 790 (€28 599).

In all, 6% of people in Bergen (16 years or older) are recipients of economic social support. The child welfare services look after 2,2% of all children under 18 years of age. 4,1% of the population of Bergen have origins from countries outside Europe and north America, as compared to 4,2% in the country as a whole. 28% of all inhabitants 16 years or older have higher education (21,5% in the country). Mortality rate is 17 pr. 1000 inhabitants 60 – 74 years of age.

Even though there certainly are challenged neighborhoods in Bergen, it's fair to say that the city is not socially segregated to the extent that Oslo is. The district of Årstad, in the south centre of the city, contains an area called *Løvstakken*. In a 1997 survey of living conditions in Bergen, Løvstakken was identified as one of Bergen's most challenged areas. The housing standard is particularly poor, for historical reasons. In 1916, a great fire created an acute need for housing. In order to provide large volumes of dwellings within a short period of time, many low-standard buildings were erected. These buildings are now worn down. Also, the entrepreneurs of the time did not pay sufficient attention to (or were not aware of) the ways in which the architecture of a locality affects living conditions in a community. Løvstakken's poor reputation as regards the housing standard has coincided with a concentration of various social problems. One contributing factor has been the fact that about 50% of the (subsidized) rental homes owned by the city of Bergen are located in the area, drawing a disproportionate share of Bergen's welfare recipients to the district. Regeneration efforts in Løvstakken constitute Bergen's social inclusion case in PLUS.

Government and governance

A. The municipal authority

The city of Bergen is a municipality, together with 33 others in the county of Hordaland. Services provided by the city of Bergen include day care facilities, child welfare, primary and lower secondary schools, public libraries, primary health care, financial support for welfare clients, care for the elderly and disabled, fire departments, harbors, municipal roads, water supply, sewerage, garbage collection and disposal, organization of land use within the municipality e.g. deciding on land for industrial or commercial use, or housing.

The city's annual budget for 2002 is NOK 5 752 million (€719 million) in net running expenditures, and NOK 1 311 million (€164 million) in capital expenditures. Running expenditures are financed primarily by taxation (48,3%), fees and other own sources of income (26,2%) and grants from national government (25,4%).

Following a reform in January 2000, Bergen was divided into eight urban districts. Each district contained a sizeable administration. Some of the main tasks of the districts included kindergartens, primary schools, social and health services, such as care for the elderly, day care facilities, youth clubs, mental health care facilities and health centers. The districts were also responsible for services for the mentally disabled, treatment and care for alcoholics and drug addicts, and integrating refugees and immigrants into the community.

In the PLUS case study period, the districts were headed by politically appointed District Councils. As of November 2003 the functioning of these councils was discontinued, and the district system is currently being dismantled altogether. However in the social inclusion case, the District Council of Årstad played an important part. References will therefore be made to the District System as it existed in the case study period.

Regarding the expenditures, an amount of NOK 4 623 million was delegated to the urban districts, who took on responsibility for a wide range of primary welfare services (including care for the elderly, primary health care, social services, care for the disabled, primary schools, kindergartens, youth measures, see section 4 below). The bulk of these funds were used to provide services for the elderly and those with particular need for care services, and for primary schools and kindergartens.

The city of Bergen employs a total of 11 625 persons. 9 219 of these worked in the urban districts in the PLUS case study period, 777 in

Department of Technical Services, 620 in the Department of Education and Cultural Affairs.

B. Political management system

In Norway, elections for local governments (municipal and county councils) are carried out every four years. The City Parliament of Bergen was last elected in 2003.

The City Parliament is the highest political authority in Bergen. It consists of 67 members, and is chaired by the mayor, who is elected by the council. In the current election period, the parties have the following numbers of councilors:

Table 3.45   *Composition of the city parliament*

Party	Seats in City Parliament
Høyre (Conservatives)	18
Arbeiderpartiet (Labor)	15
Fremskrittspartiet (Progressive party)	12
Sosialistisk venstreparti (Socialist left)	8
Kristelig folkeparti (Christian democrats)	4
Rød valgallianse (Red Electoral Alliance)	4
Pensjonistpartiet (The Party for the Retired)	3
Venstre (Liberal party)	2
Senterpartiet (Centre, form. Agrarians)	1

The city parliament has four broadly defined standing committees: Committee for Finance, culture and business, Committee for Health and social welfare, Committee for children/youth, Committee for the environment and city development. The committees are responsible for preparing propositions and reports to the City Parliament.

On June 26, 2000, the City Parliament voted to implement a parliamentary system of government. Bergen now has a politically elected City Government which is the city's executive power. The City Government currently has 5 commissioners, and is given extensive executive powers.[12] The City Government heads the municipal

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[12] During the PLUS case study period, the City Government had seven members.

administrations, and is formally responsible of the entire municipal activity.

The City Government relies on the confidence and trust of the City Parliament. The City Parliament can vote to dismiss the City Government or some of the commissioners by a vote of no confidence. Accordingly, the City Government or one or more of the commissioners may choose to withdraw from office or demand a vote of confidence to go on.

The current Chief Commissioner (leader of the City Government) is Monica Mæland of the Conservatives. In the PLUS case study period, the Chief Commissioner was Anne-Grete Strøm-Erichsen from the Labour party. She headed a City Government composed by a "leftist" party (Labour) as well as Christian Democrats and the Centre party, traditionally located on the "right" wing in Norwegian politics. The City Government headed by Strøm-Erichsen was a minority government, relying on support from various parties in the City Council. This is also the case concerning the present City Government. Every Commissioner is the political leader of a department, which is comparable to the national government ministries.

C. Governance

As previously mentioned, Bergen is a part of the county of *Hordaland*, which has a total of 34 municipalities and 438 312 people. The other municipalities in the county are relatively small; the biggest, *Askøy,* holds 20 096 people.

The County Authorities are responsible for upper secondary schools, child welfare institutions and institutions for the care of drug and alcohol abusers, county roads, transport and museums.[13]

In the Norwegian system of local government, the counties and the municipalities are supervised primarily by the regional offices of national government. There is one office for the County Governor in every county, except for Oslo and Akershus, where there is a joint Governor. The Governor is appointed by, and acts on behalf of the national government. The various branches of this office scrutinize decisions made by local governments, not least on spatial planning and economic management. The County Governor is empowered to block local decisions and demand to enter into negotiations about

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[13] This has changed after 01.01. 2004.

these decisions. If an agreement is not reached, issues may be forwarded to the national level.

The county governor is the recipient of several kinds of complaints pertaining to local government decisions. This function is mandated in several laws that regulate local government activities, for instance the law on spatial planning. Furthermore, the office of the County Governor co-ordinates national policy measures within its geographical sphere of jurisdiction.

The counties also have some (relatively minor) coordinating and supervisory powers over the municipalities. In the near future, decisions will be made that may alter the division of functions between the County Governor and the County Government. One possible outcome is that the counties will take over two branches of the County Governor's office (environment and agriculture). The intention of this proposal is to strengthen the counties. According to widespread sentiment, the counties came one step closer to extinction when national government took over their chief task, the hospitals, in January 2002.

Regarding the relationship with the state, national government has consistently increased its involvement in local affairs throughout the 1990s. An increasing amount of national grants are earmarked for particular purposes, thus limiting the discretionary powers of local governments. Several large-scale national policy initiatives related to local government services have been introduced, more often than not involving detailed prescriptions of measures to be implemented locally.

The City of Bergen is member of several international organizations in a broad range of fields, including Eurocities, the Union of Baltic Cities, the Hanseatic League, Organisation of World Heritage Cities, Les Rencontres, European Cities Against Drugs (ECAD) and International Network for Urban Development (INTA). Bergen also has agreements of co-operation in specific fields with the following cities: Ihla de Mocambique (City Network Project), Baukau (East-Timor), Guanajuato, Lubeck, Newcastle/Gateshead and Quebec.

Because Norway is not a member of the European Union, the relationship between Bergen and the various branches of the EU probably differ substantially from that of all the other cities in the PLUS project except Oslo. In May 2003 the city of Bergen together with a number of local and regional authorities in western Norway opened The West-Norway European Office in Brussels. The objectives of the office is to establish and maintain a Western Norway

presence in Brussels and provide services and facilities for the region, to promote Western Norway as an interesting partner to other European regions, to keep the partner governments informed of policy development, new initiatives and funding opportunities of direct relevance to them, and to assist the partners and other institutions to participate effectively in EU programmes and initiatives.

D. Public participation and community involvement

People in Bergen have a reputation for being fond of a good argument. Minor as well as major issues have a tendency to give rise to rather hot public controversies, and these occasions seems to be cherished by the majority of the city's inhabitants. This is to a great extent reflected in local political life. Public debates tend to be lively, especially pertaining to culture, sports and spatial city development.

In 2003, turnout for local government elections in Bergen (City Parliament) was 60,9%, a slight increase from the 59,2% turnout in 1999 and somewhat above the national average of 58,8%. Turnout in elections in Bergen has however decreased in later years. In 1983, 67,8% voted.

As is the case in Oslo, the system of decentralized government (the eight districts) has been a key item in Bergen's strategy for enhancing public participation and community involvement. The explicit purpose of the reform of January 2000 was to enhance participation. As the District Councils have been terminated this strategy has now been abandoned. In the PLUS case study period, however, the Districts were still arenas for political participation on the sub-municipal level.

E. Urban leadership

Traditionally, the mayor of Bergen has been a highly visible figure in city politics. He still is, however following the parliamentary reform in 2000, the role of the mayor is less significant in terms of political decision-making. The mayor has no formal role vs. the municipal administration. He is expected not to promote specific political issues. He does however lead the meetings in the City Parliament, and is the most prominent representative of the city, responsible for representing Bergen at public events and receptions. The current mayor is Herman Friele, a well-known businessman.

The chief commissioner is now the most powerful political figure. The members of the city government, the commissioners, all have prominent and visible positions. Strong executive leadership has been a stated goal for the introduction of city parliamentarism. At the same

time, all City Governments in Bergen so far have been minority governments. This poses strong challenges in terms of executive leadership.

F. Policies on social inclusion and economic competitiveness

Social services were provided by the eight Districts in the PLUS case study period, as well as services for children, youth and families with challenged welfare situations. As is the case in Oslo, the local offices of the social services (in the districts) provide advice and assistance, economic and otherwise.

The social services were under the auspices of the Districts since 1989. This system enabled the social services to be firmly rooted in the local communities, thus facilitating social inclusion. The intention of the reform of January 2000 was to provide the Districts with increased powers and broader functions, as well as to further enhance community participation in district politics. As noted, this intention has been reversed.

Norwegian authorities generally take on a wide-ranging responsibility for the welfare of the citizens. The quantity of welfare services provided by the government is very high, compared to any country in the world. The bulk of these services are provided by the local governments. Because of this, it is fair to say that social inclusion in Norway is less a matter of specific policies and initiatives than an ongoing responsibility of a large, established administrative apparatus.

As for economic competitiveness, is should be noted that Bergen is Norway's second largest city. According to sources in the city government, the position of second largest city can often be challenging. On the one hand, Bergen has found it hard to compete with Oslo in terms of attracting corporate headquarters and private service provision companies. On the other hand, in cases when national government decides to move agencies out of the capital, these are more often than not relocated to smaller places than Bergen. In Norwegian politics, there is a great emphasis on supporting the vitality of rural areas. The political slogan *distriktspolitikk* – rural politics – is a source of legitimacy whenever it can be applied to policy measures. There is however no political gain to be made by moving agencies to Bergen, because Bergen is the second largest city and not considered a "rural" area.

In later years, economic growth in Bergen has been very modest. In order to address the challenges of economic competitiveness, Bergen initiated the development of a strategic plan for business development

in the mid 90s. Private enterprises and business associations were heavily involved in the process of developing this plan. Three main business areas were identified and given priority: the fishing industry, the maritime industries and tourism.

Among the most important measures implemented as a consequence of the plan, was the establishment of six policy units, also labelled "network organisations". These units are organised as foundations, each with their own boards and a modest staff. In each policy unit there are representatives from private enterprise, public government and research/development. The idea is to bring actors from these sectors together in order to facilitate developments in the various areas of business, as well as to provide policy initiatives.

The policy units include *Maritime Bergen*, *Hordaland Oil and Gas centre, Bergen tourist board, IT-vest (*to promote information technology enterprises), *Education in Bergen* and *Bergen media*.

Bergen is also an active participant in other networks promoting urban and regional growth. There is a regional forum for economic development, including representatives from governments, business and research/development in the western part of Norway. In this network, Bergen has recently suggested the establishment of an office in Brussels.

Political culture

The political culture in Bergen is characterised by a moderate level of trust. (See Appendix 1 for the formulations of the questions quoted in this section.) Trust scores in our panel are slightly below the middle value of 3. Scores for collaboration between the city and citizens are slightly higher than the middle value. This is also the case concerning collaboration between the city and business. This score indicates that collaboration is on a medium level – not very small, but neither very extensive.

Panel results on expectations on political leaders show that citizens expect a majoritarian leadership style. Given the choice between a preference for majority decisions and consensus seeking, the mean score is closest to the former. Even so, the panel members quite strongly expect leaders to build local networks with business and NGOs. The Bergen panel as a whole is undecided (medium average value) on whether they expect political leaders to take the interests of the entire city into account, or just the interests of the party or the electoral groups that they happen to represent.

The panel is also undecided as to whether they expect citizens to seek consensus or to go for majority decisions in political issues; however they tend to expect *business* to adopt a consensus strategy. Also, the panel quite strongly expects business to take the interests of the entire city into account, not just the interests of the business community. To a rather smaller extent they expect *citizens* to take the interests of the entire city into account.

3.2.2 Case 1: Economic competitiveness

Description of the initiative

For a number of years, the city of Bergen has devoted substantial resources to measures relating to its profile as a "city of culture". As Norway's second largest city, Bergen boasts a vibrant cultural and artistic life, with a theatre of national prominence, a big concert hall and several museums and galleries. Bergen also hosts several well-known annual music festivals. The area of *Bryggen,* the old wharfside area built in the Hanseatic period, was in 1980 designated by UNESCO as a Cultural World Heritage Site. In 2000, Bergen was a European City of Culture. The strategic decision to promote the city as a city of culture was taken not least with the potential for economic regeneration in mind. Although relatively prosperous by European standards, periods of rising unemployment as well as certain challenges relating to its status as second largest city has commanded a certain degree of political attention to the need for measures to stimulate the local economy.

With this and other aims in mind, the city of Bergen in 2000 initiated a process to develop a strategic plan for culture. The city parliament decided to put the city government in charge of the development process. The city department for culture started out by carrying out several case studies and a survey among artists getting support from the Municipality, in order to map out the impact of the cultural sector for the city economy.

Following this, the city department organised ten working groups, each numbering eight to ten members. A broad range of actors from the cultural sector and the private business sector were invited to contribute to the development process of the strategic plan by attending these working groups. The groups dealt with various aspects of the cultural sector, including such subjects as children, urban development, theatre, dance and music, new technology, museums and cultural institutions, city festivals, interaction between culture and business. This grouping structure was decided by the department,

based on certain tentative criteria of selection: The groups were to be in some sense representative for the cultural sector and the business sector. The participants had to be outspoken, and known to the department. Some emphasis was put on involving actors that had been active but didn't easily get heard. Individual artists as well as representatives from organisations and institutions including private enterprises were invited. Two or three meetings were held in each working group.

The deliberations in the working groups provided input for the city department for culture as it drafted a proposal for the strategic plan. The text was written by members of the staff of the city department. The proposal for a strategic plan was put before the City Council in December 2002, and was decided upon by a large majority, nevertheless with a few remarks. The remarks didn't question the content of the plan, but rather complemented it.

Institutional analysis

The progression of this policy initiative essentially took place on two operational arenas, corresponding to the policy development and policy decision phases. The operational arena for the policy development phase will however in the following be divided into three sub-arenas, as the institutional rules and the involvement of various actors alternated to a considerable degree between these sub-arenas. The arenas are presented in Table 3.46 below.

Table 3.46   *Strategic plan for culture: Operational arenas*

Phase	Arena	Content
(Initiation)		
Policy development	Research	Case-studies Survey
	Interaction	Participatory working groups
	Drafting	Writing of draft plan
Policy decision	Decision	Deliberation and decision in the city parliament

1. The "research" arena

In the research arena, *position rules* were to a great extent formalised and explicit, in the sense that the responsibility rested with the city department and was co-ordinated by officers and staff according to their formal positions in the hierarchy. The Chief Commissioner was formally in charge of the process, however the key positions in terms

of the actual work were those of the Director for art and culture Bjørn Holmvik and the Chief Officer in the section for culture Øyvor Johnsen. Several members of staff in the section for culture were involved in this arena as well. In addition to the actors with positions in the city administration, the arena included positions as external experts, notably Professor Ove Osland of the Norwegian School of Economics and Business Administration. Osland worked with the survey, as well with advising the City department about the case studies.

Apart from prof. Osland's position, *boundary rules* in this arena were defined by employment and position in the city department. Prof. Osland was included in the arena as specialist, based on his previous research efforts on the economic impact of cultural activities.

Authority rules were largely informal, and may be related to the purpose of the research arena, which was to gather information and insights relevant to the process. The section for culture was given relatively free hands in deciding how to do this, and apparently chose to carry out the case studies as well as involving Prof. Osland. The authority rules pertaining to Prof. Osland's efforts relate to the paid commission he was given. This commission involved carrying out the survey and reporting the results. The section for Culture interacted with Prof. Osland in formulating the questions for the survey. Following this, although Prof. Osland was given the authority to carry out the survey, the authority rules did allow the section for Culture to give inputs and exert influence over the survey. As for the case studies, these authority rules were reversed. The Section for Culture had the authority to carry out the studies, but Prof. Osland were authorised to advice the effort.

The *scope rules* were informal, and to a great extent followed informal deliberations in the Section for Culture. The systematic gathering of information in an early stage of the planning process is very much in line with common practice in Norwegian public administration, especially so in national government but also in local governments – not least in the bigger and more resourceful ones like Bergen. Being in charge of producing a draft plan, the Section for culture would be authorised to organise the process largely based on their own judgement.

Aggregation rules did not really exist in this arena. The results of the research were not incorporated into the plan in this phase, because the draft was produced at a later stage.

As for *information rules*, there is no evidence that restrictions on information applied in this arena. The results of the case studies as well as of the survey were made available to interested parties. *Pay-off rules* in this arena were formal, and may be related to the salaries of the officers and members of staff in the City Department, as well as the consultancy fee paid to the Norwegian School of Economics and Business Administration for Prof. Oslands efforts.

All in all, the institutional rules in this arena were either highly formalised, relating to the hierarchical organisation of the City Department or the status of commissioned experts, or informal/absent because of the considerable room for discretion given to the Section for Culture in terms of deciding how the initial phase of policy development should be carried out. There is little or no evidence concerning conflicts or differing understandings of the rules.

2. The "interaction" arena

The main events in the interaction arena were the proceedings in the participatory working groups. The *position rules* were unaltered as regards the chief officers in the City Department and in the Section for Culture, however several members of staff became more actively involved and some of them obtained positions as co-ordinators for individual working groups. Staffers from the Section for Business were also involved in this stage. As for the members of the working groups, their positions related to the initiative were homogenous, because the organisation of the groups did not specify different positions. Outside the context of the policy initiative, however, participant's positions were highly heterogeneous.

Access to the working groups was regulated by Section for Culture, who invited a wide variety of actors to participate. Individual members of the staff were put in charge of each working group. In this capacity, they were responsible for inviting participants based on their own discretion. Even so, some tentative, informal *boundary rules* were in operation. According to informants, the aim was to ensure that all relevant actor groups in the cultural sector were represented. For instance, there should be at least one representative of the music festivals, one from the orchestras, one independent artist, one from the art galleries and so forth. The motivation for this boundary rule apparently was twofold. Firstly, it was thought that this procedure would provide the plan with grounds for belief in its legitimacy, due to the quasi-representative basis for participation. In short, a theatre manager not taking part in the process should feel that his views were somehow represented all the same, because the roster of the working

groups would include the name of some other theatre manager. Secondly, it was assumed that the broad participation in the working groups would make sure that the final text of the plan would reflect the broad variety of positions on the issues it covered, further strengthening the legitimation basis.

Authority rules on this arena were implicit in the mandate of the working groups, which was to provide an arena for the exchange of views on various issues pertaining to culture and to culture as business. There is little evidence of any constraints placed on the participants as to what kinds of inputs they were allowed to put forward. However, respondents differ in their evaluation of the proceedings in the groups. Some participants described the proceedings as very open-ended, to the point of causing ambiguity about the purpose of the discussions. Others felt that the members of staff in the City Department were using the groups as a sounding wall for various issues, making the deliberations less open-ended. Yet others felt that the discussions were open and constructive. Because of this, no authority rules seems to have been operative in this arena.

As for the *scope rules*, it should be noted that the process was supposed to produce inputs for a *strategic* plan, not a programme of specific measures to be implemented at a later stage. The decision to produce a strategic plan in stead of a programme of specific measures was taken in the Section for Culture prior to the establishment of the working groups. It seems however that this scope rule did not restrict the deliberations of the working groups: Participants would as readily discuss specific measures as go into debates about overarching, "strategic" issues.

Aggregation rules did not apply on this arena, apart from the fact that inputs from the working groups were written down in the form of minutes. The aggregation of the inputs into a plan took place on the following operational arena described below. As for *information rules*, it is unclear whether the minutes were made widely available or not. However the interviews do not indicate that the participants in any way felt restricted about discussing the proceedings in the groups with others external to the process.

Pay-off rules are hard to identify precisely, due to the fact that the deliberations in the groups were not supposed to end up with binding decisions on specific measures or allocation of resources. Even so, many actors may have felt that their material interests were at stake, and may thereby have been induced to promote solutions which would favour their particular segment of the cultural business sector. But this

general observation do not amount to a *rule* for pay-offs, as the process was not supposed to allocate pay-offs at all.

3. The "drafting" arena

In this arena, *boundary rules* included only members of the Section for Culture. Key *positions* include the Director for Art and Culture Bjørn Holmvik and the chief officer in the Section for Culture Øyvor Johnsen. In writing the various chapters of the plan proposal, several members of staff in the section for culture were involved as well. *Authority rules* apparently followed the hierarchical organisation of the Section for Culture, leaving the distribution of tasks to the discretion of the chief officer in the section.

The *scope rules* in this arena are closely related to the *aggregation rules*, because the purpose of the arena was to produce a plan proposal through the aggregation of inputs from the two preceding arenas. The chief aggregation rule, which applied to the members of staff who actually wrote the various chapters of the plan, was that the text should be strategic in nature, and should not include specific measures. Because the deliberations in the working groups, as previously noted, did include discussions on specific measures, the members of staff were instructed to "aggregate" the inputs to a higher level of generality, that is, to extract generalised formulations about strategy from the frequently quite specific inputs. Apparently, the aggregation procedure did not put any specific requirements to the writers of the chapters concerning how the inputs were to be aggregated into the document, the selection of these inputs or about how inputs could be "converted" to a higher level of generality or transformed otherwise.

The *information rules* seem to have been quite strict in this arena. Interviews suggest that draft chapters for the plan were not made available to persons outside the Section for Culture prior to the presentation of the plan proposal. These constraints on information access apparently applied even to members of staff in other sections of the Chief Commissioner's department who had been involved in the plan on an earlier stage. Because the number of interviews is limited, we cannot assess with any accuracy whether this rule was enforced universally. It is also unclear whether any deliberate decision was made concerning restrictions on access to this information. However, the Section for Culture appears to have kept the process internal to the Section in this phase.

As have been noted, the plan was quite broad-ranging and covers a very wide selection of cultural issues. It does not seem to favour any

particular segment of the sector. Because of this, it is hard to identify any *pay-off rules* in this arena.

4. The "decision" arena

In the decision arena, institutional rules largely follow the requirements of the parliamentary system of governance. Key *positions* include the Chief Commissioner and the members of the City Parliament. A distinction should be made between the members of the City Parliament's standing committee on Culture, Sports, Children and Youth and the other members of the City Parliament, because the former group received the plan proposal prior to the decision.

Following the parliamentary system of governance, the City Government's *authority rule* is to submit proposals to the City Parliament, which is in turn authorised to decide upon the proposal. *Scope rules* are wide, as the City Parliament is the city's highest political authority, and may make decisions on a wide range of issues. In this case, however, the scope rule points at the plan proposal, as well as comments and dissents submitted by members of the City Parliament during the decision-making procedure.

Aggregation rules are in this case the voting procedure in the City Parliament. *Information rules* are formalised through the Transparency Act, which stipulates that all documents and minutes pertaining to decisions in elected bodies should be publicly available, as are the meetings, subject to certain restrictions. As for *pay-off rules*, members of the City Parliament receive a modest compensation. City Commissioners are full-time salaried officials.

Actual behaviour of actors

A: Actors and strategies

The political leader of this initiative was the Chief Commissioner, Anne-Grete Strøm-Erichsen. Key actors in the process include the leaders and staff of the Section for Culture, as well as staff in the Section for Business Development. The leader of the Section for Culture is Director for art and culture Bjørn Holmvik, however Chief Officer in the section for culture Øyvor Johnsen was in charge of the process. Another key actor was prof. Ove Osland of the Norwegian School of Economics and Business Administration (NHH).

The actors cite various goals they wanted to pursue relating to this initiative. The Chief Commissioner emphasised that citizens of Bergen should feel that culture is a thing of real value to them – not

just some sort of embellishment. In this sense, the purpose of the initiative was to increase people's awareness about the value of culture. At the same time, she saw the need for a strategy for the long term development of the cultural life of Bergen, which could say something sensible about how Bergen should be developed to make culture an important sector of business.

Representatives of governmental organisations quoted a variety of goals relating to the initiative. Whereas some emphasised the perspective on developing culture as a sector of business, others more broadly wanted cultural policies to become a fundamental aspect of the city, a thing that could improve the quality of living in Bergen. This idea was related to the values of participation and democracy. Furthermore, some respondents pointed out that cultural policies should correspond with strategic aims in general city development policies, so that public resources can be used in an integrated and co-ordinated fashion. Somewhat more specifically, governmental organisation representatives put emphasis on the need to enhance the quality of cultural products, make cultural life more diversified, and provide better working conditions for artists.

Three business representatives were interviewed. They emphasised the need for a practical strategy which could realistically be implemented. Also, their goal was to establish viable and durable cultural enterprises able to sustain themselves economically and spur further growth and establishment of new enterprises.

The goal of the only representative of a non-governmental organisation that was interviewed, an artists' guild, was to create visions about future developments and establish arenas where cultural production could thrive through the obtainment of synergies.

What strategies did the actors use in this initiative? Some dimensions of the strategies of governmental actors are presented in

Table 3.47   *Strategies for governmental actors*

As a governmental representative I should… As a political leader I should…	Representatives of governmental organisatons (Mean value*)	Political leader*
…operate on the basis of a clear vision of the organisation about the future of the city (1), vs. … operate on the basis of a vision about the future of the city that has been developed in consultations with the local community (7)	5,2	4
…concentrate on the implementation of local policies with our own organisational resources, vs. …spend the time in going out to mobilise community support and local resources to implement local policies.	4,7	4
…not compromise in heeding the will of the majority of the local politicians, vs. ….strive for broad-based consensus even at the expense of decisive action.	6,0	6
…act as a representative of my department, vs. …represent the city as a whole.	3,3	4
…actively engage in and stimulate local partnerships and networks, vs. …concentrate on my role as the representative of city government.	1,5	1

* Score is on a scale of 1-7, 1 equals agree with first alternative, 7 equals agree with last alternative. N=6 (representatives of governmental organisations).

On average, representatives of governmental organisations tend to say they should develop their vision in close co-operation with the local society; however three out of six respondents said that they equally preferred following their own visions. The political leader also indicated that both strategies were viable. Regarding the question about mobilizing local resources or using the city's own resources, three out of six governmental representatives equally preferred both – the political leader also saw the need for utilising the municipal administration as well as mobilising local resources. Furthermore, all six governmental respondents as well as the political leader leaned heavily towards adopting a consensus strategy. They were as a whole undecided as to whether they should represent their own organisation

or the entire city – this question apparently was a source of ambiguity, as was apparent in the course of the interviews. Regarding the question of developing local networks or focus on their own formal positions, the respondents were unanimously in favour of the networking strategy, including the political leader.

All of these respondents said it was important for them to try to achieve openness and accountability, as well as making sure the local community was able to exert influence (see Table 3.48 below). There were however some small dissent considering openness: Two respondents ticked off values 3 or 4 on this question, not 5. These respondents felt that total openness should not be the ideal in all phases.

Table 3.48   Modus operandi *for governmental organisations*

As a governmental organisation we should…	Representatives of governmental organisatons (Mean value*)	Political leader*
…take care that local decision-making is transparent.	4,5	5
…take care that those responsible for decisions can be held to account.	4,8	5
…make sure that the local community can have a direct say over major local policies.	4,8	5

* Score is on a scale of 1-5, 1 equals "not important at all", 5 equals "highly important". N=6 (representatives of governmental organisations).

In sum, the strategy of the staff seems to have been one of networking and consensus seeking. Even so, there are traces of ambiguity as many of the staff members interviewed felt that they equally preferred working through the city's administration as by mobilizing local resources. Also, many felt that their affiliation to a specific branch of the city administration should be at least equally important as "representing" the entire city.

As for voluntary organisations, only one representative was interviewed using the standardised questionnaire. She described her strategy as one of active involvement, actively joining forces with the municipality to make the initiative a success, also to strive for

consensus and trying to take the interests of the whole city into account.

B: Patterns of interaction

In the interviews, the actors in this initiative were asked a number of questions relating to the patterns of interaction. The first question had to do with whether various actor groups adopted majoritarian or consensual approaches.

Table 3.49   *Majoritarian vs consensual strategies*

Did various actors… **…heed the will of the majority without compromise (1), or …strive for broad-based consensus (7)?**	Mean value*
Political leaders	3,7
Local government representatives	4,1
Citizens	1,0
Business	2,3
Local NGO's	2,6

* Score is on a scale of 1-5, 1 equals "heed the will of the majority", 5 equals agree with "strive for broad-based consensus." N=<3,7> (all respondents).

These response values indicate that the consensus approach was quite prominent with local government representatives and to a somewhat lesser extent with political leaders (unspecified in the formula). On the other hand, citizens, business and partially NGO's were seen as more "majoritarian". This is reflected in another question, relating to what interests the various actors pursued (see Table 3.50).

Table 3.50 *Interests pursued by various actors*

Did various actors… … take the interest of the city as a whole into account (1), or … pursue their own interest (5)?	Mean value*
Political leaders	2,1
Local government representatives	2,3
Citizens	4,0
Business	4,0
Local NGO's	4,3

* Score is on a scale of 1-5, 1 equals "the interest of the city as a whole", 5 equals "pursue their own interest". N=<4,8> (all respondents).

Apparently, citizens and representatives of business and NGOs are perceived as majoritarians pursuing their own interests, whereas political leaders and local government representatives are seen as consensus-seeking and taking the interest of the city as a whole into account.

The respondents have evaluated the actual behaviour of political leaders and local government representatives using the same response values as were used when these actors assessed their own strategies (see above).

Table 3.51 *Behaviour of local leaders and local administrators (I)*

How can the behaviour of local leaders and local administrators best be described?	Political leaders (mean values*)	Local government representatives (mean values*)
Did they operate on the basis of… …a clear personal vision about the future of the city (1), or …a vision about the future of the city that had been developed in consultations with the local community (5)?	3,4	3,4
Did they… …concentrate on their roles as the leader of city government/representatives of the city administration, or …engage actively in local partnerships and networks?	3,9	4,0
Did they… …manage the implementation of local policies by the local administrative apparatus, or …mobilise community support and local resources to implement local policies?	3,4	3,9

* Score is on a scale of 1-5, 1 equals "to a very small extent", 5 equals "To a great extent" for the second alternative. N=<7,9> (all respondents).

As the value "3" is the median response value, the evaluation of "political leaders" (not specified in formula) is equivocal. In the context of the initiative, political leaders were seen as operating about as much on the basis of personal visions as visions developed in consultations with the local community. There is however a tendency to assess the leadership in terms of networking, since the mean response value of the second question leans towards the second alternative – "engage actively in local partnerships and networks". The somewhat ambiguous assessment concerning implementation is probably due to the fact that the plan hasn't actually been implemented yet. Taking these limitations into account, however, the political leadership is portrayed as "visionary networking".

Regarding the local government representatives, the results in Table 3.51 are similar, except the score for mobilisation of community support is more clear-cut.

These findings concerning political leaders and local government representatives can be contrasted with assessments of other actor

groups involved in the initiative. Table 3.52 presents assessments concerning the actual behaviour of citizens and representatives of business and NGOs, respectively.

Table 3.52   *Behaviour of citizens, business and NGO representatives*

How did citizens, business and NGO representatives behave in the context of this initiative?	Citizens	Business	NGOs
Did these groups… …stick to their narrow roles as citizens, business representatives or representatives of NGOs (1), or …participate actively in the process of setting the local political agenda and the making of important local decisions (5)?	1	2,3	2,9
Did these groups… …stick to their own roles[+], or …actively engage in joint efforts with the municipality to make this policy a success?	1	1	5

* Score is on a scale of 1-5, 1 equals "to a very small extent", 5 equals "To a great extent" for the second alternative. N=<1,8> (all respondents).
+: For citizens, *electing leaders and holding them electoral accountable*; for business, *making profits*.

According to these results, citizens played a very modest part in the initiative. This is in accordance with the unstructured parts of the interviews – this initiative did not really involve citizens as such, but rather various organised groups or corporate actors. Business representatives are seen as not engaging very actively, whereas representatives of NGOs are seen as being much more actively involved.

The networking strategy adopted by political leaders seems to have been especially successful in relation to local organisations, or at least more so than relating to business. The impression of political leaders actively engaging local organisations is confirmed in the panel survey.

Table 3.53   *Network governance*

	Mean values*
To what extent did the local political leaders in Bergen keep in touch with local citizens and local organizations when they developed the plan for culture?	3,3
To what extent did local political leaders know about and heed the concerns and demands of local citizens and organizations when they developed the plan for culture?	2,9

* Score is on a scale of 1-4, 1 equals "not at all", 4 equals "very much".
N=25 (panel, all respondents in the city).

Apparently, there is a widely shared impression of network governance as a strategy relating to this initiative, not only among those directly involved in the culture plan but also among broader segments of the city.

C. Actor influence

The relative influence of actors can be assessed in several ways. Firstly, the actors were asked to make an assessment of their own influence over the plan.

Table 3.54   *Obtainment of own goals*

To what extent did you reach your own goals or objectives relating to this initiative?	Mean value*
Political leaders	5
NGOs, others	5
Local government representatives	3,7
Business	3,5

* Score is 1-5, 5 equals highest. N=10 (all respondents).

This self-assessment can be contrasted with the responses reported in Table 3.55, where the actors assess the influence of other actors:

Table 3.55   *Influence of various actor groups*

To what extent have the participants named below influenced the outcome of this initiative?	Mean value*
Members of the city government	4,6
Representatives of art institutions	3,5
Members of the city parliament	3,3
NGO's	3,1
Business representatives	3,1
Individuals	3
Individuals from research institutions	2,7

* Score is 1-5, 5 equals highest. N=<6,8> (all respondents).

These ratings show that the most influential actors in the process leading up to a plan for culture were the City Government, including the Chief Commissioner. On second place, the differences between the various groups are tenuous. The high rating of NGOs in Table 3.54 is the self-assessment of one single actor, and the result cannot be seen as representative. Table 3.55 seems to indicate that representatives of art institutions were somewhat more influential than others.

In yet another approach, the actors were asked to assess to what extent other actors influenced their own actions. The mean responses to these questions give some impression of the patterns of influence

Table 3.56   *Patterns of influence*

To what extent have the participants named below influenced your own decisions?	Mean value*
Individuals/artists	3,8
Members of the city government	3,6
Representatives of art institutions	3,3
Business representatives	3,2
Individuals from research institutions	3,0
NGO's	2,6
Members of the city parliament	2,3

* Score is on a scale of 1-5, 1 equals "not at all", 5 equals "To a great extent".
N=<7,9> (all respondents).

To a great extent these findings support and elaborate the patterns discerned from the responses on the other questions. The actors who are rated highest in terms of influencing one's own decisions are individual artists/representatives of art institutions, and members of the city government.

Variations in influence may be explained in terms of the resources brought into the process by various actors, and the relative importance of these resources. Bearing in mind the patterns of influence identified so far, the resources of the city government as well as those of artists/art institutions and NGOs seems to be particularly important. The actors in the process were asked what these resources actually are, in an open-ended question. As for NGOs and individual artists, the respondents seemed to agree that the combination of experience and commitment are crucial resources. These actors are competent in terms of their professional affiliation as well as relating to their practical experience. As for the members of the City Government, a variety of resources are quoted – not unexpectedly, considering the key position of this body in the governance system of Bergen. Important resources attributed to members of the City Government include *power* – to make decisions, shape the terms for decisions, or to veto decisions. Furthermore, members of the City Government are seen as possessing personal credibility, commitment, attitudes and visions. Finally, they are in a position to utilize the resources of other actors, including the staff of the City Departments as well as external actors like research institutions, art- and culture institutions.

Working paper 2004:108

The relative importance of these and other actor's resources have been assessed by the actors who were interviewed.

Table 3.57   *Importance of the resources of others*

Could you indicate the importance of the entire collection of these resources for other participants in the process?	Mean value*
Staff in the Chief Commissioner's department	4,8
Members of the City Government	4,6
Representatives of art institutions	3,8
Members of the city Parliament	3,6
Individuals/artists	3,6
NGO's	3,3
Business representatives	3,3
Individuals from research institutions	2,9

* Score is on a scale of 1-5, 1 equals "not important at all", 5 equals "very important". N=7/8 (all participants in initiative)

These response values confirm the impact of the combined resources of the City Government and artists/art institutions on the strategic plan. However, the members of staff in the Chief Commissioner's department are evidently seen as proprietors of the most important resources. Which important resources are attributed to these actors? According to the interviews, these resources include the staff's close contacts with a variety of actors including policy making bodies, artists, organisations and cultural institutions, furthermore; their professional expertise and experience, their commitment and attitudes and finally their capability to shape the premises of decisions and proceedings.

All in all, a pattern emerges from these findings that could shed important light on the developments in this policy initiative. The complimentarity between urban leadership and community involvement – the CULCI – in this case can be described as a complimentarity of different resources controlled by three key actors – the members of the City Government, the staff of the City Departments and the artists and their organisations and institutions. Assumingly, the expertise, commitment and extensive network resources of the staff has served to direct the visionary leadership of

the Chief Commissioner (and possibly other members of the City Government) and the expertise and commitment of the non-governmental actors in the cultural sector into the planning process. This tentative observation elaborates the simple assessment of influence by providing an explanation based on the differing resources controlled by these actor groups. Clearly, each of them was able to bring into the process resources that complemented the resources of the other actors, thus achieving gains that would not have been attainable for any of them in isolation.

Policy outcomes and impact on sustainable urban development

Because the plan for culture has yet to be implemented, assessments concerning the actual outcomes of this policy initiative would be premature. It is however possible to provide some indications based on the best judgement of the actors who were involved in the planning process. Furthermore, these assessments can be put in perspective by relating them to the totality of findings and observations from the rather intensive case-studies that have been carried out.

The heading "Policy outcomes and impact on sustainable urban development" may cover a quite diverse range of effects. In the following, the focus will be on effectiveness (goal achievement), sustainability and legitimacy.

A. Effectiveness

Will the plan achieve its goals, pertaining to economic competitiveness and cultural development? At this stage, probably the best indication concerning this question can be found in the assessments made by the panel, composed by citizens of Bergen representing a broad array of sectors, interests and outlook.

After having been asked about the goals of the culture plan, the panel members were asked to indicate whether the plan, in their opinion, would contribute to the achievement of those goals. The results are reported in Table 3.58 below.

Table 3.58 *Achievement of goals*

	Mean values*
How much would you say that this program will contribute to the achievement of these aims?	3,56

* Score is on a scale of 1-4, 1 equals "not at all", 5 equals "very much".
N=25 (panel, all respondents in the city).

It turns out that the panel members are highly optimistic concerning the plan: On a scale from 1 – 4, the mean score is 3,56.

B. Sustainability

The concept "sustainable urban development" is elsewhere defined as a composite of four related dimensions; the ecological, economical, social and governmental dimensions respectively. To what extent have these dimensions been taken into account in the plan for culture? The panel members were asked to assess whether the plan would, in their opinion, contribute to an improvement of the city's economic competitiveness, and provide results that are acceptable from the ecological perspective.

Table 3.59 *Results of the initiative*

	Mean values*
How much would you say that this program will contribute to an improvement of the city's economic competitiveness?	3,6
How much would you say the program is compatible with the major economic policy programs in this city?	3,5
How much would you say that this program will provide results that are acceptable from the ecological perspective?	3,1
How much would you say the program is compatible with the major environmental and sustainability programs in this city?	3,6

* Score is on a scale of 1-4, 1 equals "not at all", 4 equals "very much".
N=25 (panel, all respondents in the city).

The panel clearly expects the plan to deliver, especially in terms of improvement of economic competitiveness. Apparently, the panel believes that the plan will contribute to the city's economy as well as to its environmental standard. The plan is also seen to be highly compatible with economic policy as well as environmental and sustainability programs in Bergen.

C. Legitimacy

An important dimension of the legitimacy of the plan is *the principle of inclusion*. In the case of the culture plan, attempts were not made to

include *all* relevant actors. In stead, the officers in the chief commissioner's department invited community actors to take part in the working groups based on a strategy of including a range of actors that could be said to be *representative* for the cultural sector. The use of the concept of representation in this context is interesting, because the selection was not made by means of any sort of election among those who were said to be "represented". The decisions were made by officers in the chief commissioner's department, based on their professional and personal knowledge of the cultural sector. One of the respondents formulated the choice like this:

> When filling the positions in the working groups, we would say that we wanted someone from the festivals, someone from the institutions of performing arts, someone from the art galleries, one or two independent artists and so forth.

The purpose of this procedure was twofold. Firstly, the officers wanted to make sure that any actor from the cultural sector, even if not himself having been included in the process, would be able to look at the rosters of the working groups and be satisfied that actors "like himself" had been involved. For instance, a theatre director would be able to identify at least one other theatre director on the rosters. Thus, the principle of inclusion suggests deliberate attempts to achieve some sort of *procedural legitimation,* even though following a strategy quite different from the all-inclusiveness observed in the Løvstakken plan.

Secondly, the officers believed that the principle of inclusion would result in inputs that could shape the content of the plan in such a way that most or all actors in the cultural sector would be able to agree with it substantially. The officers we have interviewed claimed to possess intimate knowledge concerning divisions and points of disagreement among actors in the city's cultural life, on specific questions as well as matters of general perspective. This would include for instance the differences in outlook and opinion between the figurative and the abstract arts, or between the independent theatrical groups and the big institutions. They would take care to involve actors from both sides of such lines of division, thus attempting to include potentially conflicting viewpoints in the plan. Although this also suggests attempts at achieving procedural legitimation of some sort, it can also be said to constitute a form of output-based legitimation.

Because it had been decided that the plan should not include specific measures, but rather give a strategic, over-arching perspective, all

specific suggestions were, furthermore, edited by the officers. One of the officers stated in an interview that they had to "aggregate" the inputs to a higher level of generality, focusing on general perspectives in stead of specific measures. Apparently, this procedure largely took place within the Section for Culture in the Chief Commissioner's department. One could argue that the lack of transparency and the absence of formal procedures in this stage would jeopardize the input- and throughput legitimation of the plan. However, these observations really serves to emphasise the somewhat novel form of output legitimation that the local government expected: As long as the output (the text of the plan) could be recognised as substantially representative for the various positions on cultural issues held by relevant actors, it would not matter if the procedure for producing the plan was less than stringent in the application of interest-representing procedures for inputs and transparency.

Conclusions

A. Leadership style

The leadership of the process can be described as collective/visionary. The *collective* aspect refers to the fact that Anne-Grete Strøm-Erichsen has performed her leadership in the capacity of being the leader of the City Government. Bergen has a collective executive leadership. Even so, the idea of promoting Bergen as a "city of culture" with the aim of stimulating not only local identity and artistic "output" but also economic development, was clearly a major political issue for Strøm-Erichsen in her time as Chief Commissioner. In this sense, her leadership should also be described as *visionary*: She has been able to establish innovative policies by combining strong leadership with capacity generation by bringing different sides together.

Strøm-Erichsen reorganised the City Government in such a way that the Section for Business Development and the Section for Culture were integrated into the chief commissioner's department. Thus, in contrast with Oslo, the leader of the City Government in Bergen has had her own executive portfolio. The integration of these particular sections in the chief commissioner's department strongly signifies the very high political priority given to these issues by Strøm-Erichsen. Furthermore, it should be noted that the initiative has been a priority issue for the Section of culture. The organisation of the participatory process as well as the actual writing of the draft plan has been carried out by this section. The close proximity between the section and the

Chief Commissioner has provided a significant linkage between the administrative procedure and the political leadership.

B. Community Involvement

Community involvement has been extensive in the policy development phase. Early in the process, the city department for culture (prior to the reorganisation of the City Government) carried out several case studies and a survey among artists getting support from the municipality, in order to map out the impact of the cultural sector for the city economy. Following this, the department organised ten working groups. A broad range of actors from the cultural sector and the private business sector were invited to contribute in the development process of the strategic plan by attending these working groups, each numbering eight to ten members. The groups dealt with various aspects of the cultural sector, including such subjects as children, urban development, theatre, dance and music, new technology, museums and cultural institutions, city festivals, interaction between culture and business. This grouping structure was decided by the department, based on certain tentative criteria of selection: The groups were to be in some sense representative for the cultural sector and the business sector. The participants had to be outspoken, and known to the department. Some emphasis was put on involving actors that had been active but did not easily get heard. Individual artists as well as representatives from organisations and institutions including private enterprises were invited. Two or three meetings were held in each working group.

The policy decision in itself was made by the City Parliament, and did as such not involve community involvement.

C. Policy Challenges

The *substantial policy challenge*: The Culture plan is, tentatively, distributive, in the sense that it purports to increase municipal spending on Culture. Also, it aims to mobilise resources from the business sector, in co-ordination with the city's efforts.

Furthermore, the plan is highly complex in that it includes a wide variety of goals, relating to as many as nine dimensions of the "Cultural Business" sector in Bergen. These include festivals for art and culture, culture and tourism, Bergen as a regional growth centre in cultural and economic terms and so forth.

The *procedural challenges* relate to the fact that the plan cannot be implemented without the active support of actors in the culture sector

and in business life. The city authorities have been highly conscious about this fact, and this is the reason why the planning process had to include such extensive collaboration with private-sector actors. One might say that the procedural challenge has been to carry out the planning process in such a way as to maximise support and legitimacy for the plan among private actors.

The plan did not involve institution building beyond the temporary establishment of ten working groups, each of which carried out two or three meetings. The process has been carried out in the context of the established parliamentary system of governance. Accordingly, there is no institutional challenge in the defined sense.

D. Outcomes: Policy Challenges and Effectiveness

Because the plan has yet to be implemented, it is premature to make judgements concerning its substantial effectiveness. Also, the plan did not involve institutional innovation. The best basis for the assessment of outcomes therefore is related to the procedural challenges.

As for the procedural challenges involved, these seem to a large extent to have been met. It should be noted that the City Government successfully has solicited the participation and involvement of a very broad range of actors in Bergen's cultural sector as well as in the business community (these two groups coincide at least partially). An extensive network has been established. The idea of promoting Bergen's profile as a city of culture, as a step towards a more prominent position for the cultural sector in the city's economy has been consolidated. We would expect this to be highly significant for the implementation of the strategic plan, although this cannot be assessed at present.

E. Outcomes and Legitimacy

The plan was decided upon by the City Parliament. Accordingly, the plan can draw on *input legitimation* provided by the representative system.

The interviews did however reveal interesting attempts on behalf of the Chief Commissioner's department to provide what may be interpreted as an alternative basis for input legitimation. These attempts have to do with the policy development phase, and the involvement of private sector actors. Firstly, attempts were made to solicit the participation of a selection of actors who could be seen as "representative" of the cultural sector. For instance, the Chief Commissioner's department wanted to include at least one person

from the music festivals, someone from the art galleries, one independent artist and so forth. In this way, anyone from the cultural sector should be able to look at the rosters of the working groups, and recognise somebody from the same "category" as himself or herself. Secondly, when writing the draft plan, attempts were made to take into account the various (and partially adversary) positions on culturally relevant issues in such a way that anyone reading the plan should have a reasonable chance to recognise his or her own position. According to informants in the chief commissioner's department, they were able to do this partially because of the broad and quasi-representative selection of participants in the groups, partially because the civil servants themselves claim to possess quite detailed knowledge about the lines of division within the cultural communities.

This legitimating strategy can be interpreted in two ways. One the one hand, it can be seen as an attempt to achieve a sort of informal procedural legitimation through the participatory elements in the policy development phase. On the other hand, respondents indicate that they expect the content of the plan to be generally endorsed by resource-controlling actors because of the attempts to take all positions into account. In this way; the participation might also contribute to output-legitimation.

As for throughput legitimation, the linkage with the representative system in the policy decision phase has secured public access to the proposal for the plan in advance of the decision. Furthermore, the broad networking process as well as the consultations with City Parliament during the policy development phase does indicate a quite strong transparency. The least transparent phase was probably the aggregation of the inputs from the workgroups into a draft plan. Minutes from the meetings in the workgroups do not seem to have been made public in all cases. According to the informants, the Chief Commissioner's department moreover tried to aggregate the inputs into a more general level, as the plan was not to include specific measures. The aggregation procedure seems to be least transparent, as it took place largely in the Section for Culture. It is hard to assess how and to what extent the inputs from the private actors were actually included in the text of the plan.

Because the plan has not been implemented yet, output legitimation cannot be assessed at this point.

F. Conclusions on CULCI

The Strategic plan for culture involved visionary and highly visible political leadership, most notably personified by the Chief

Commissioner Anne-Grete Strøm-Erichsen. Extensive community involvement in the form of a broad range of actors from the cultural sector as well as the business community has been seen as integral to the achievement of the plan's strategic objectives. The interviews reveal a very explicit recognition of the limitations to the power and resources available for unilateral action by the city authorities in this context. As a consequence, attempts towards the achievement of economic development relating to Bergen as a "City of culture" has taken place through co-ordinated efforts in a network including a broad range of actors. Although it is too early to assess the substantial effects of the plan, this initiative illustrates a practical approach to CULCI as a strategy for achieving collective action through collaboration between urban authorities and the local community.

Lessons

The Strategic Plan for Culture has been a process in which highly visible, visionary urban leadership has been complimented by quite extensive community involvement, in the form of representatives of a broad range of actors in the culture and business segments. Being a strategic plan, the process has in itself not involved extensive commitments in terms of resources, and the eventual effectiveness of the process is hard to assess. The purpose of the CULCI in the context of the Culture Plan has been, rather, to lay the groundwork for continued efforts. Firstly, the broad consultation process, as well as other elements of the strategy including the use of research methods, has served to elaborate and disseminate a political vision concerning the several functions of culture in the urban society. That is, not only in terms of artistic quality but also related to economic competitiveness and quality of life. Furthermore, and at least important, the Culture Plan has served to redefine conceptions about the role and *modus operandi* of municipal authorities, in relation to the local community. Much attention has been devoted to the idea of achieving concerted and co-ordinated efforts involving public and private resources, with a mind to implications of these efforts on a broad range of policy issues. For instance, the Culture Plan has to a great extent highlighted the connections between spatial planning, economic development and cultural capability. By promoting the establishment of various enterprises in the culture segment in specific locations, making use of urban development resources (parks and green spaces) and public decision-making powers in conjunction with real estate owners and other interested parties, powerful synergies may emerge. In other words, the lesson is that CULCI have impacts on the development of urban politics, administration and public-private relations that can have profound effects on future policy alternatives.

Working paper 2004:108

Whether this will come true, however, is to a great extent decided by the involved actors' capacity and will to follow up and implement the strategic plan.

3.2.3   Case 2: Social inclusion

Description of the initiative

In the mid 1990s, partially due to findings from social research, certain areas of Bergen came to be recognised as socially challenged. There was in particular a growing awareness of problems that had been developing in the former working class area of Løvstakken. In this area, a lion's share of Bergen's public housing was located. The Løvstakken area was marked by problems related to poor living conditions, environmental issues, unemployment, and poor public health.

In 1998 this awareness led to a political decision in the Executive Committee of the City Council of Bergen, initializing the development of a program for improving the living conditions in the area. The initiative originated with the political leader of the District Council in Årstad. The Executive Committee decided that a program for the improvement of living conditions was to be developed, and that the District of Årstad was to be responsible for the program. It was also recommended that local community actors were to be mobilized in the process.

Open meetings were frequently arranged in the process of developing the program. All local organisations, civil initiatives and other local actors in the area of Løvstakken were invited to present their ideas and proposals at these meetings. Based on the ideas and proposals from the organisations, the representative from the administration of the District formulated a program proposal. The political leader of the District Council acted like a political coordinator in this development process. She was active in making proposals and in initiating open meetings, and she frequently had meetings with the representative from the administration responsible for formulating the proposal. The proposal to *The Program of Development for the area of Løvstakken* was politically decided upon in a unanimous District Council in May 2000. The goals and strategies of the programme is presented in the table below.

Table 3.60   *The Program of Development for the area of Løvstakken*

Goals	Strategy	Responsible	Goal achievement*
1. Improvement of the physical environment in Løvstakken, to reach the same level as the rest of the city	1. Improvements in traffic and thoroughfares	Bergen Parking Corporation, City Government	
	2. Restrictions on parking	Bergen Parking Corporation	
	3. Sound insulation of buildings	City Government	
	4. Continuation of efforts related to urban renewal and habitations	Bergen Urban Renewal Service (BBB), Årstad District	*
	5. Commence work on House for Culture adjacent to a local school	Årstad District	
	6. Bicycle paths	City Government	
	7. Development of areas for parking and leisure	Årstad District	
	8. Pedestrian paths	Årstad District, City Gov.	
	9. Usage of tennis field	Årstad District	*
	10. Premises for marching band	Årstad District	*
2. Improvements in public housing	1. Efforts to clients	Årstad District, BBB	*
	2. Arrangements for clients with habitation related problems	Årstad District, BBB	*
	3. Decrease the number of clients with problems related to substance or alcohol abuse	City Government	
3. Good conditions for upbringing	1. Continuation of primary school project (Stakken)	Årstad District	
	2. Develop co-operation with neighbourhood council (Løvstakken nærmiljøutvalg)	Årstad District	*
	3. Increased co-operation with community groups	Årstad District	*
	4. Services to foreign language children	Årstad District	*
	5. New kindergartens	City Government	*
4. Services for foreign language speaking parents and single parents	1. Efforts to promote language skills	Årstad District	
	2. Services towards minority group families with small children	Årstad District	*
5. Refugees, immigrants and integration	1. New methods	Årstad District	*
	2. Job training for minorities	Årstad District	*
	3. Citywide dispersion of habitation of foreign language groups	City Government	
6. Services for long-term welfare recipients	1. Develop services across administrative boundaries	Årstad District	*
	2. New methods for the office for social services towards long-term welfare recipients	Årstad District	*
	3. Improved health services for long-term welfare recipients	Årstad District	
7. Services for substance and alcohol abusers	1. Develop multi-service co-ordination	Årstad District	*
	2. General plan, specific measures to improve living conditions for abusers	Årstad District	*
	3. New position as fieldworker	Årstad District	

* Goal achievement has been assessed by the leader of the District Council (Borghild Lieng) and the District Director of the Urban District, Aagot Himle.

Originally, this program was meant to be a joint effort for improving the living conditions in the area of Løvstakken. The idea was that the

funding costs were to be divided between the national government, the Municipality and the District. On the basis of the program developed and decided upon in the District, an action program was formulated by a joint working group of representatives from the District (including local organisations) and the Municipality of Bergen. *The Action Program for the area of Løvstakken* formed the basis for an application for 50 million NOK from the Ministry of Local Government and Regional Development over a period of five years, sent by the City Government of Bergen in June 2001. The money was however not granted.

In spite of the refusal of the application, many of the projects have subsequently been implemented. Nevertheless, it hasn't turned out to be the grand scale effort the District was hoping for when they started out developing the program. One of the main problems of implementing the program has been a general lack of interest in the area from the Municipality of Bergen. In spite of active political leadership in the District, there have been examples where initiatives and applications apparently have been slowed down by the responsible Commissioner in the City Government, with the possible result of loosing the money the District was applying for. Another example is that the City Council recently redistributed funds they originally had allocated to sell out public flats in the District of Årstad. The aim of this fund was to reduce the amount of public housing in the area of Løvstakken, to achieve a more equal distribution among the Districts. Both representatives from the local organisations, the District administration and the political leader of the District Council report about this lack of interest and lack of priority of the area.

Even if most of the projects implemented have been small-scale projects, the local organisations have been invited to participate in the implementation of some of them. Open meetings have been held about the use of a planned community house (before having been granted enough money to build it), and about renewal and investment in public meeting places such as streets and parks.

Institutional analysis

We have chosen to describe the progression of this policy initiative as taking place in four operational arenas (in addition to the initiation phase, which is not analysed as an operational arena), of which two arenas are divided into sub-arenas. The arenas are presented in Table 3.61 below.

Table 3.61   *Løvstakken regeneration plan: Operational arenas and
             sub-arenas*

Phase	Arena	Content
(Initiation)		
Policy development arena	1. District planning arena	Consultation with local groups. Planning.
Policy decision	2. District decision arena	Decision in District council.
Policy implementation arena	3.1 Action program subarena	Planning on level of city government. Lobbying. Decision in Ministry of Local Government and Regional Development.
	3.2 Sales of social dwellings subarena	Search for alternative sources of funding.
	3.3 Community house subarena	Implementation of measures in the District administration.
	3.4 District measures subarena	Co-operation between District and city government agencies. Consultation with local groups.

Several of these arenas were in function simultaneously. Following
the decision in the District council, implementation of the measures
included in the plan were sought by means of a diverse strategy,
involving different actors but predominately promoted by key actors
in the Urban District.

1. The District planning arena

In this arena, *position rules* apply to a few prominent persons in the
District as well as to community actors who were involved in the
broad consultation process. In the urban district, the most important
positions were those of the Leader of the District council, Borghild
Lieng, the District Director, Aagot Himle, and the chief planner
Sverre Hoiness. Also, lay Members of the District council took part.
Apart from these, the position of Community group representative
applies to a number of participants from the Løvstakken area.

Boundary rules on this arena were as follows. The Leader of the
district council as well as lay members of the council were appointed

by the City Parliament (these positions have recently been discontinued). The District Director is employed by the City Government. The chief planner was employed by the District administration. Community groups were invited to attend based on a supposedly all-inclusive list of local groups, compiled by the Urban District. The inclusion of local groups was partially due to a statement in the initial decision of the Executive Committee of the City Council prior to the policy development phase, saying that the regeneration efforts should be continued in co-operation with a committee of representatives of local groups.[14] The District did however eventually secure the inclusion of a much broader range of local groups than initially stated by the council, and so the boundary rules were to a greater extent decided upon by the Urban District.

Regarding the *authority rules*, the chief planner was given the task of writing the plan based on the inputs from participating actors. The process was co-ordinated jointly by the chief planner, the leader of the District Council and the District Director. Community group representatives were allowed to give input without any restrictions - there is no evidence of any subjects having been inadmissible.

The *scope rules* were to some extent determined by the decision in the Executive Committee of the City Council[15] prior to the policy development phase. In this decision, the District was asked to "continue the efforts concerning projects in the Løvstakken area". Thus, the actual decision did not even stipulate specifically that a plan was to be developed at all.[16] As a consequence, the decision did not impose rigorous restrictions on the District in terms of the contents or structure of this plan. For instance, the District was at liberty to decide whether to focus on general problems and aims, or to include specific measures (a great number were eventually included).

The most important *aggregation rules* applied to the writing of the plan proposal by the Chief Planner, Sverre Hoiness. According to Hoiness, it was decided that *all* inputs from the local groups were to be included in the plan. This assertion has not been contended. The

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[14] *Naermiljoutvalget*, a collegiate body of a few representatives of local groups.
[15] The term city council is used because the decision was made prior to the reform introducing a parliamentary form of government.
[16] The Chief Officer of the City Administration (CAO) (*Raadmannen)* submitted a proposal to the Executive Committee stipulating that a plan was to be developed, however the majority of the Committee voted in stead for an alternative proposal made by the Leader of the District Council, Borghild Lieng, in which the term "plan" was replaced by the formulation cited above.

plan proposal did include a large number of measures, however, most of which were of a quite specific nature.

As for *information rules*, default conditions seems to apply. There is no evidence that any information whatsoever pertaining to the process was made subject to restrictions.

Pay-off rules in this arena were partially formal, in terms of the salaries of the members of the District administration and the regular fee of the Leader of the District Council. These pay-offs were not in any sense related directly to the policy initiative. As for the community group representatives, no payments or compensations were made.

2. District decision arena

The plan was decided upon in the District Council on the 11th of April 2000. Specifically, The District Council decided to "take the plan into consideration".

Position rules in this arena include the District Director, Aagot Himle, and the members of the District Council. *Boundary rules* for these positions were unaltered from arena 1.

As for *authority rules*, these follow the organisation of the District system. The District Director is authorised to put proposals before the council, and the council is authorised to take a vote. In this case, the decision was unanimous. The *scope rules* were highly formalised. The District Council decided to vote for the proposal. In addition, members of the District Council may put forward new proposals or proposals involving amendments to other proposals. In this case, a proposal was put forward in addition to the proposal of the District Director, namely a proposal to ensure that the positive experiences of the different regeneration projects should be made applicable to the entire Urban District. This proposal probably reflects the concerns of those members of the District Council who were residents of other parts of the District than Løvstakken, which covers only a portion of the Urban District's territory.

Aggregation rules on this arena are similar to authority and scope rules. As for *information rules*, default conditions applied. *Pay-off rules* were unaltered from arena 1.

3.1 Policy implementation phase: Action program subarena

As described above, a decision was made to approach the Ministry of Local Government and Regional Development to secure co-funding

for the implementation of the regeneration efforts. These aspirations were clearly encouraged by the quite substantial funding granted relatively few years earlier to the *Oslo Regeneration Programme for the Inner City Districts*, which is the PLUS case for social inclusion in Oslo presented above. According to informants, contacts were initiated between representatives of the relevant Districts in the two cities. The City Government decided to establish a working group, in order to produce an application. This application was termed *The Action Program for the area of Løvstakken*. It contained a total of eleven focal issues. Compared to the strategic plan of the Urban District, these issues were a bit more broadly defined and thus covered most of the issues set down in the strategic plan. The application was for a total of 50 million NOK (approx. €5,8 million) over a period of six years.

The application was submitted on the 28th of June 2001. At the time, the minister for Local Governments was Sylvia Brustad of the Labour party. Later the same year, however, there was a change of government and Brustad was replaced by Erna Solberg of the Conservative party. Solberg turned the application down, but suggested that the Norwegian State Housing Bank should be approached as an alternative source of funding.

Position rules: In the urban district, the most important positions were those of the Leader of the District council, Borghild Lieng, the District Director, Aagot Himle, and the chief planner Sverre Hoiness. Himle and Hoiness were members of the working group that drafted the Action Program. Other key positions were those of the other members of this working group: Members of staff in the City Department for Environmental affairs and Urban Development, the City Department for Culture, Sports and Education, the City Department for Health and Social Services, inhabitants of Løvstakken and a representative from BBB – the municipal agency for housing and rehabilitation. *Boundary rules* were formal, as inclusion in the group was determined by the City Government.

Other key positions include those of the City Commissioner for Environmental affairs and Urban Development, Nils Arild Johnsen, and of the Minister of Local Government and Regional Development.

The *authority rules* and *scope rules* of this arena corresponded to the decision in the City Government about making an application. It should be noted however that the key actors in the District made further efforts to promote the application. Lieng, Himle and Hoiness set up meetings with high-ranking political representatives of the

Ministry of Local Government and Regional Development and the Ministry of Children and Family Affairs.

The Leader of the District Council (Borghild Lieng) was a member of the Labour party. After the change of government occurred and the Labour minister was replaced, she was to a much smaller extent able to influence the outcome of the application. This can perhaps partially explain the negative outcome.

Aggregation rules relate to the efforts put down in the working group. These were quite informal, to the extent that default conditions largely apply. There were open-ended discussions in the working group about what issues from the strategic plan to include in the action program. In these discussions, some attempts were made to identify areas in which national government funding was most likely to be found. These included housing measures.

3.2 Sales of social dwellings subarena

The strategic plan for Løvstakken noted that a disproportionate share of Bergen's "social dwellings" were located in the Løvstakken area. These are dwellings owned by the municipal authorities and rented out to users of social services. About 600 such dwellings were located in Årstad, amounting to as much as roughly 50% of all such dwellings in Bergen. According to the plan, the accumulation of such dwellings contributed to widespread and composite problems relating to living conditions, affecting the entire community and not just the individuals who actually inhabit the dwellings. Accordingly, the plan called for increased efforts directed towards the individual clients, the establishment of alternative dwelling solutions and a gradual reduction of the amount of clients with problems relating to alcohol and drug abuse inhabiting the dwellings.

These measures were included in the Action program. As the application for funding of this programme was turned down by the Ministry of Local Government and Regional Development, the issue was subsequently addressed by the City Parliament in Bergen. In December 2001, the City Parliament voted to establish a "package" for the social dwellings in the District of Årstad. Total funding was 50 million NOK (approx. €6,5 million). Among the goals included in this package was the intention of selling a share of the social dwellings in Løvstakken, and buy new flats in other parts of the city. Funding was needed because real estate prices in Løvstakken are lower than in most parts of Bergen.

In spite of this decision, little progress was made. According to the City Commissioner for Environmental affairs, Urban Development and Technical Services, Nils Arild Johnsen, it turned out to be difficult to find buyers for the dwellings. In addition, the City Parliament decided to divert the funds allocated to the "package for social dwellings" to other purposes. In order to secure a majority for its budget proposal for 2003, the City Government decided to allocate the 50 million NOK to finance the purchase of dwellings for the mentally disabled in stead. Thus, the decision to reduce the share of social dwellings in Årstad became even harder to implement.

Position, boundary and authority rules in this subarena are determined largely by the organisation of local government. The Leader of the District Council, Borghild Lieng, again played a key role. Lieng was a member of the City Parliament as well as Leader of the District Council.[17] As a member of the working group, she opted to get the housing matter included in the *Action Program*. When the application failed, she was the one who successfully put the proposal about a package for social dwellings before the City Parliament. Other positions include the District Director, Aagot Himle, and the Chief Planner of the Urban District, Sverre Hoiness, both members of the working group for the Action Program. Finally, the positions of Member of City Parliament and the position of Chief Commissioner should be noted, as two decisions in the City Parliament were involved – in 2001, the decision of adopting the package for social dwellings; in 2002, the decision to divert the funds to other purposes.

As for *scope rules*, the brief history presented above suggests that the key actors used alternating strategies to pursue a specific goal. It can be argued that the decision of the City Government to establish a working group in order to produce the application for funding of the *Action program* constituted a scope rule, in the sense that the housing issue was defined as a matter to be included in the plan. As the application was turned down, the Leader of the District Council raised the issue in the City Parliament of Bergen in stead. Although this was done in accordance with the system of governance in Bergen (which in this sense constitutes the scope rules), there were no rules actually *requiring* her to do so. It is perhaps most accurate to say that key actors pursued their goals by selecting among the various strategies offered by the formal system of governance.

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[17] In the District system in Bergen, only members of the City Parliament were eligible as leaders of District Councils.

The strategic plan itself can be said to constitute an informal *aggregation rule*, because the definition of the housing problem originally was put down in this plan. The definition of appropriate solutions was however somewhat altered in subsequent phases, not least in the senses that the "housing package" put more emphasis on selling out social dwellings than the strategic plan did. This cannot be described as rule-based behaviour, and so default conditions can be said to have applied.

As for *information rules*, default condition applied. In line with rules put down in legislation, documents pertaining to public decisions of this kind are open to the public.

3.3 Community house subarena
Because this subarena has passed through a somewhat complex sequence of events, the institutional analysis will be introduced by an elaboration of the case history. The strategic plan included a proposal to commence efforts to build a "House for culture" adjacent to the local primary school in Løvstakken. This project was in the implementation stage re-defined to be a "community house", in line with the terminology in certain regulations pertaining to the available sources of funding. When the Ministry of Local Government and Regional Development turned down the application for funding of the *Action Program for the area of Løvstakken,* the ministry suggested that The Norwegian State Housing Bank should be approached as an alternative source of funding. This bank has a regional office in Bergen, and the Community House project was seen as falling within the bank's sphere of competence. Because Districts cannot apply for such funding, the application had to be forwarded by the City Government.

The Community house subarena can be characterised as a governance process involving key political and administrative figures in the District of Årstad, two City Commissioners and members of staff in the City Departments, as well as top representatives and staff of the Norwegian State Housing Bank. Roughly drafted, the process started in the District as a working group prepared a draft application in 2001 – 2002. In this stage, there was interaction between the District and representatives of the Housing Bank, including a visit in the District by the regional board of the Housing Bank as well as informal contacts with the Regional Manager, Gunnar Wisth. The draft application was in May 2002 forwarded to the City Department for Environmental Affairs and Urban Development, headed by City Commissioner Tom Knudsen. In the fall of 2002, the Housing Bank made inquiries in The City Department about the expected

application, only to find that it was still being processed. According to some informants, when the application eventually came in, certain deadlines had been passed and as a result the Housing Bank had allocated the funds in question to projects elsewhere. Some informants claim that the Housing Bank originally intended to allocate about 6-7 million NOK (close to 1 million €) to the project. Because of the delayed application that eventually was put forward by the City Department, the final sum was reduced to 2 million NOK. This contention cannot be wholly verified, because the original estimate of 6-7 million was based on informal signals from the Housing Bank.

The City Parliament has planned to allocate a total of 15 million NOK to the Community House in 2007 – 2008. In the mean time, the District has established a new working group to elaborate the plans for the design and use of the community house, as well as to further the funding process. This working group has involved representatives of community groups, the principal and the parent's board (FAU) of the primary school, the Office for Parks and Green Spaces in the City Government, as well as the local police office and the office for Culture in the District Administration. An architect from BBE has produced a drawing of the building, using inputs from the working group.

Position rules in the subarena apply to actors in the Urban District, the City Department, the Housing Bank and community groups. In the Urban District, important positions are those of the Leader of the District Council and the District Director, as well as the members of the Working group who prepared the original draft proposal. In the City Government, main positions are the City Commissioners Tom Knudsen and (at a later stage) Nils Arild Johnsen.[18] The main position in the Housing Bank was that of the Regional Manager, Gunnar Wisth.

Boundary rules were to some extent determined by the formal roles occupied by the positions in the respective governmental bodies. Even so, there appears to have been considerable leverage on all levels in this respect. In all stages, the matter has been handled by key persons in the various governmental bodies, for instance the Regional Board of the Housing Bank. Apart from some unavoidable instances of formal boundary rules (for instance, the signing of the application by the City Commissioner) the governmental bodies seems to have had

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[18] In October 2002, issues pertaining to environmental affairs and city development were transferred to Johnsen's portfolio as Knutsen's department was terminated, in order to trim the City Government.

the competence to decide what persons to involve based on their own discretion. As the matter moved between governmental bodies according to formal procedure, these bodies to a great extent made independent decisions about who was to be involved.

Authority rules can to a great extent be related to the distribution of authority embedded in the positions and the formal roles of the (largely) governmental bodies they belong to. The actors in the District had to forward the draft application to the City Government, because an application to the Housing Bank had to be made by the City Government. There is no evidence that formal procedure was omitted, however the process included several instances of informal contacts across levels of government as well. Thus, the formalised authority rules were complemented by informal, less rigorous rules, allowing for what can be described as networking activities.

Scope rules were largely determined by the decision to put forward an application to the Housing Bank. Following this decision, there was little or no ambiguity concerning the ultimate aim of the proceedings. This also applies to the *aggregation rules*. As for *information rules*, default conditions seems to have applied. *Pay-off rules* relate to the salaries and fees offered to the participants on a regular basis, and were in no way particular to this specific policy initiative.

3.4 District Measures Subarena

In this arena, *position rules* include the District Director, Aagot Himle, as well as various subordinate leaders and members of staff in the District Administration. *Boundary, authority, scope* and *pay-off rules* were determined by formal positions. *Aggregation rules* can be interpreted as the rules for developing the proposals in the plan into implemented measures.
In the PLUS case studies, this subarena has not been made subject to detailed inquiries. This is not least due to the fact that the measures implemented unilaterally by the District Administration were very diverse as well as numerous. The strategic plan included seven broad aims, with 29 specific measures. The measures to be implemented by the District Administration can to a great extent be described as proposals relating to the on-going chores of the various branches of service-provision. Such proposals included for instance the establishment of a cross-sectoral team to co-ordinate efforts towards drug addicts, or to increase efforts pertaining to the integration of immigrants in the labour market. Because these and other measures were carried out within the administrative apparatus, this subarena doesn't really contain leadership or community involvement, and so

they were omitted from the analysis.
Even so it should be noted that most of these measures were eventually implemented, contributing greatly to the overall success of the plan.

Actual behaviour of actors

A: Actors and strategies

The political leader of this initiative was the Leader of the District Council, Borghild Lieng. In all phases of the initiative, including the rather differentiated implementation processes, she was the driving political force. Other key actors throughout were the District Director, Aagot Himle, and the Chief Planner of the Urban District, Sverre Hoiness.

A substantial number of other actors were involved to a smaller or greater extent. These include representatives of community groups in the area, the City Commissioner for Environmental affairs and Urban Development, Nils Arild Johnsen, and members of staff in Johnsen's City Department as well as in other departments. Finally, the Regional Manager of the Norwegian State Housing Bank, Gunnar Wisth, played a key role in one of the implementation sub-arenas.

The diversity of actors external to the District should not cloud the impression of this policy initiative as primarily a bottom-up initiative. The driving force of the initiative has been situated mainly in the Urban District, and the involvement of other actors has to a great extent occurred as a result of local initiatives. Because of this, it is especially relevant to quote the goals and strategies of these key actors.

The Leader of the District Council described her goals as following: To achieve a greater degree of social equality, to improve the neighbourhood and to provide good conditions for the upbringing of children and youth. These formulations are highly compatible with the goals cited by the District Director. She emphasised the improvement of Løvstakken in terms of the housing standard as well as socially. She also accentuated the goal of supporting voluntary efforts, and to contribute to a better local community for children and youth. The Chief Planner cited the goals included in the strategic plan.

Other representatives of governmental organisations who were interviewed expressed goals corresponding to these. The two representatives of community groups who were interviewed using the standardised questionnaire, put emphasis on living conditions for children and youth, as well as the goals stated in the strategic plan.

What strategies did the actors use in this initiative? Some dimensions of the strategies of governmental actors are presented in Table 3.62 below.

Table 3.62   *Strategies for governmental actors*

As a governmental representative I should…	Representatives of governmental organisations (Mean value*)	Political leader *
…operate on the basis of a clear vision of the organisation/personal vision about the future of the city (1), vs. … operate on the basis of a vision about the future of the city that has been developed in consultations with the local community (7)	5,6	4
…concentrate on the implementation of local policies with our own organisational resources, vs. …spend the time in going out to mobilise community support and local resources to implement local policies.	4,6	4
…not compromise in heeding the will of the majority of the local politicians, vs. ….strive for broad-based consensus even at the expense of decisive action.	5,3	6
…act as a representative of my department/my voters, vs. …represent the city/the population as a whole.	1,5	6
…actively engage in and stimulate local partnerships and networks, vs. …concentrate on my role as the representative of city government.	3,0	4

* Score is on a scale of 1-7, 1 equals agree with first alternative, 7 equals agree with last alternative. N=<3,5> (representatives of governmental organisations).

Generally speaking, the governmental organisation representatives emphasise consultations, consensus-seeking, and mobilisation of local resources. These strategies are also held by the political leader. The leadership strategy put a bit more emphasis on the personal vision, but at the same time the consensus-seeking strategy is accentuated even stronger.

Working paper 2004:108

Whereas representatives of governmental organisations quite strongly take departure in their formal positions in the government organisation, the political leader is quite adamant about representing the whole population of the District and not just her own voter groups.

As for the choice between a "partnership" and a "government" strategy, attitudes are somewhat ambiguous. This would seem to reflect a certain degree of belief in the resources and capabilities of local government to solve problems unilaterally. But the need for partnership building gets a somewhat higher score nevertheless. Not least in the context of Løvstakken initiative, partnership building apparently has been a quite attractive option.

All of these respondents stated that it was important for them to try to achieve openness and accountability, as well as making sure the local community was able to exert influence.

Table 3.63   Modus operandi *for governmental organisations*

As a governmental organisation we should…	Mean value*	Political leader*
…take care that local decision-making is transparent.	5	5
…take care that those responsible for decisions can be held to account.	4,8	5
…make sure that the local community can have a direct say over major local policies.	4,3	5

* Score is on a scale of 1-5, 1 equals "not important at all", 5 equals "highly important". N=<3,5> (representatives of governmental organisations).

As for voluntary organisations, four representatives were interviewed but only two of them using the standardised questionnaire. Their strategies unambiguously involved active participation and joint efforts with the municipality. As for consensus-seeking, however, they were of two minds. Majoritarian strategies based on the views of their own organisations scored as high as consensus-seeking with the entire population in mind.

B: Patterns of interaction

In the interviews, the actors in this initiative were asked a number of questions relating to the patterns of interaction. The first question had to do with whether various actor groups adopted majoritarian or consensual approaches. The results are presented in Table 3.64 below.

Table 3.64 *Majoritarian vs consensual strategies*

Did various actors… …heed the will of the majority without compromise (1), or …strive for broad-based consensus (7)?	Mean value*
Political leaders	4,4
Local government representatives	4,5
Citizens	5,0
Business	1,5
Local NGO's	2,8

* Score is on a scale of 1-5, 1 equals "heed the will of the majority", 5 equals agree with "strive for broad-based consensus." N=<1,5> (all respondents).

The respondents indicated that they perceived most of the key actors as adopting a predominantly consensus-seeking strategy. Local business actors were to a very limited extent involved, and so the low score on this question is not very relevant. It should however be noticed that local groups were seen as more "majoritarian" than others.

These results are reflected in another question that was included in the questionnaire, namely whether the various actors pursued their own interest, or whether they took the interest of the city as a whole into account (Table 3.65).

Table 3.65 *Interests pursued by various actors*

Did various actors… …pursue their own interest (1), or …take the interest of the city as a whole into account (7)?	Mean value*
Political leaders	2,3
Local government representatives	2,0
Citizens	4,5
Business	5,0
Local NGO's	3,8

* Score is on a scale of 1-5, 1 equals "the interest of the city as a whole", 5 equals "pursue their own interest". N=<1,6> (all respondents).

Political leaders and local government representatives are seen as taking the interests of the entire city into account. This is very much in line with the perceptions about a consensus-seeking strategy on part of these actors, as a majoritarian approach would run the risk of favouring some interests at the expense of others.

As noticed previously, the Løvstakken initiative was driven predominantly by a few key actors in the Urban District. The broad consultation process and the open inclusion of inputs from community groups into the strategic plan correspond to the impression left by the responses to these questions. A broad array of interests appears to have been taken into account, and efforts were made to obtain consensus.

The respondents have evaluated the actual behaviour of political leaders and local government representatives using the same response values as were used when these actors assessed their own strategies (see above). The responses are presented in Table 3.66.

Table 3.66   *Behaviour of local leaders and local administrators (I)*

How can the behaviour of local leaders and local administrators best be described?	Political leaders (mean values*)	Local government representatives (mean values*)
Did they operate on the basis of… …a clear personal vision about the future of the city (1), or …a vision about the future of the city that had been developed in consultations with the local community (5)?	4,0	3,7
Did they… …concentrate on their roles as the leader of city government/representatives of the city administration, or …engage actively in local partnerships and networks?	4,4	4,3
Did they… …manage the implementation of local policies by the local administrative apparatus, or …mobilise community support and local resources to implement local policies?	4,3	3,9

* Score is on a scale of 1-5, 1 equals "to a very small extent", 5 equals "To a great extent" for the second alternative. N=7 (all respondents).

Results are quite similar concerning political leaders and local government representatives. Apparently, small distinction is made between them, and this is not surprising considering the close co-operation between the Leader of the District Council, the District Director and the Chief Planner. No doubt this trio was perceived as acting in trio rather than as separate actors.

The responses to these questions support the impression left by other sources. Leaders and local government representatives are clearly seen as consultative concerning the development of visions, as engaging in the building of partnerships and as keen on mobilising community support.

These findings, related to political leaders and local government representatives, can be contrasted with assessments of other actor groups involved in the initiative. Table 3.67 presents assessments concerning the actual behaviour of citizens and representatives of business and NGOs, respectively.

Table 3.67   *Behaviour of citizens, business and NGO representatives*

How did citizens, business and NGO representatives behave in the context of this initiative?	Citizens	Business	NGOs
Did these groups… …stick to their narrow roles as citizens, business representatives or representatives of NGOs (1), or …participate actively in the process of setting the local political agenda and the making of important local decisions (5)?	2,4	1,7	3,7
Did these groups… …stick to their own roles[+], or …actively engage in joint efforts with the municipality to make this policy a success?	2,3	1,6	3,3

* Score is on a scale of 1-5, 1 equals "to a very small extent", 5 equals "To a great extent" for the second alternative. N=7 (all respondents).
+: For citizens, *electing leaders and holding them electoral accountable*; for business, *making profits*.

Again, it should be noted that local business played a marginal role, if any, in this initiative. This score is therefore of little relevance. As for citizens and NGOs, the latter group seems to have been far more

actively involved than the latter. Most respondents say that few citizens outside the organised groups were directly involved at any stage. As for the non-governmental organisations however, several organised community groups engaged in the various stages of the initiative. This role is at least partially confirmed by the results quoted above. NGOs are on average seen as to some extent participating actively in the process of setting the local political agenda and the making of important local decisions. The response values on this and the other question are in the middle of the scale however, suggesting that the involvement is not seen as highly extensive nor really making the initiative "a success". Considering the mixed output from the different sub-arenas, this assessment seems realistic.

The partnership-building strategy attributed to political leaders and local government representatives should in particular be related to community groups. This contention is supported by the panel, composed by a wide variety of respondents (see Table 3.68).

Table 3.68   *Network governance*

	Mean values*
To what extent did the local political leaders in Bergen keep in touch with local citizens and local organizations when they developed the plan for Løvstakken?	3,0
To what extent did local political leaders know about and heed the concerns and demands of local citizens and organizations when they developed the plan for Løvstakken?	2,9

* Score is on a scale of 1-4, 1 equals "not at all", 4 equals "very much".
N=23 (panel, all respondents in the city).

To a great extent the panel confirm the impression of a networking strategy vs. the local community in Løvstakken on part of the key figures in the Løvstakken efforts.

C. Actor influence

How should the actors be rated in terms of relative influence? The actors were asked to make an assessment of *their own* influence over the plan, and these responses give some subjective indication.

Table 3.69   *Obtainment of own goals*

To what extent did you reach your own goals or objectives relating to this initiative?	Mean value*
Political leaders	5
Business	-
Local government representatives	3,6
NGOs, others	3,5

* Score is 1-5, 5 equals highest. N=7 (all respondents).

As it turns out, the political leader rated own influence most positively, while Local government representatives and community group representatives all in all rated themselves a bit lower. There is however a certain degree of ambiguity pertaining to this question. If the respondents feel that the Løvstakken initiative has been less than successful, they may rate their own goal obtainment negatively even though they had substantial influence on the definition of goals and other aspects of the plan.

This self-assessment can be contrasted with the responses reported in Table 3.70, where the actors assess the influence of other actors:

Table 3.70 *Influence of various actor groups*

To what extent have the participants named below influenced the outcome of this initiative?	Mean value*
Members of the District Council	3,9
District Administration staff who were involved	4,6
NGO's	4,0
City Department for Environmental Affairs, Urban Development and Technical services	2,7
Members of the City Parliament	2,0
The Norwegian State Housing Bank	2,3
Others	2,7

* Score is 1-5, 5 equals highest. N=<3,7> (all respondents).

Unfortunately, the questionnaire did not make a distinction between the Leader of the District Council and the other members; however most respondents actually made this distinction themselves as they filled in the form – orally or as a written remark. The quite different assessments concerning the influence of the leader vs. the other members of the District Council, who are widely perceived as having been rather passive concerning this initiative, can possibly explain the difference between the scores for "Members of the District Council" and "Urban District Administration staff who were involved".

In any case, the respondents do describe this initiative as being dependent on a trio of actor groups based in the Urban District, including politicians, the District Administration and local NGOs. Representatives of city government are seen as very much less influential, again corresponding to other findings.

The actors were furthermore asked to assess to what extent other actors influenced their own actions. The mean responses to these questions give an alternative approach to the question about patterns of influence.

Table 3.71   *Patterns of influence*

To what extent have the participants named below influenced your own decisions?	Mean value*
Members of the District Council	3,0
District Administration staff who were involved	3,9
NGO's	3,6
City Department for Environmental Affairs, Urban Development and Technical services	2,4
Members of the City Parliament	1,3
The Norwegian State Housing Bank	2,6
Others	2,3

* Score is on a scale of 1-5, 1 equals "not at all", 5 equals "To a great extent".
N=<3,7> (all respondents).

The respondents indicate that representatives of city authorities to a little extent have influenced the involved actors' decisions. The same pattern as above is confirmed, concerning the predominance of key actors in the Urban District. Again, the lack of distinction between the Leader of the District Council and the lay members can probably explain the lower score on "Members of the District Council" compared to the following two groups.

How can these variations in influence be explained? Following the PLUS conceptual framework, influence is partially a function of resources. A policy initiative may be described as a process in which the different resources of a number of actors are brought together. Some of these resources may turn out to be especially important, to the other actors as well as to the obtainment of the stated goals of the initiative. The actors who possess relevant resources may be said to be more powerful than others.

The findings so far indicate that the resources of key actors in the District have been especially important in the context of the Løvstakken plan, in addition to the resources of community groups. The actors in the process were asked what these resources actually are, in an open-ended question.

Concerning the District Council, important resources include the resources traditionally associated with representative bodies: Agenda

setting power, budgetary powers, and decision-making competence. It is also stated that commitment to the locality is an important resource for the District Council politicians, as well as the ability to act as a driving force for local initiatives. Regarding the District Administration, the respondents cite not least the extensive local networks of the administration, the ability to be responsive vs. citizens and community groups, as well as relevant knowledge concerning local particularities. Some respondents say that these resources enable the District Administration to take on a pro-active role in terms of agenda setting and leadership. Interestingly, these are to a considerable extent the same resources that many attribute to the District Council. It seems as if the respondents put little emphasis on the formal differences between the roles of politicians and administrators in the Urban District.

The main resources attributed to community groups include local networks and knowledge about local affairs, but perhaps most importantly their ability to mobilize the commitment and voluntary effort of local citizens.

As for city government actors, the lists of important resources become shorter, less diverse and somewhat mingled with critical remarks. The City Department for Environmental Affairs, Urban Development and Technical services is credited with competence, planning resources and the ability to take on a holistic approach. It is however stated in the same sentences that the commitment of the City Department has been inadequate, and that their resources are rather narrow. Members of the City Parliament are attributed with decision-making power and budgetary resources. The Norwegian State Housing Bank is credited with competence and most importantly, financial means.

The respondents have been asked to rate the relative importance of these resources for other actors involved in the plan for Løvstakken. These assessments are presented in Table 3.72.

Table 3.72   *Importance of the resources of others*

Could you indicate the importance of the entire collection of these resources for other participants in the process?	Mean value*
Members of the District Council	4,4
District Administration staff who were involved	4,6
NGO's	4,5
City Department for Environmental Affairs, Urban Development and Technical services	2,8
Members of the City Parliament	2,6
The Norwegian State Housing Bank	4,5
Others	3,8

* Score is on a scale of 1-5, 1 equals "not important at all", 5 equals "very important". N=<5,7> (all participants in initiative).

In line with other observations so far, the resources of the key actors in the District are considered to be most important. However, it is noteworthy that the resources of The Norwegian State Housing Bank are credited with equal importance. Recall that these resources were primarily related to the financial aspect of the plan. Clearly, the respondents put great weight on the potential for financing important measures through the resources of the Housing Bank.

Put together, these findings clearly portray the Løvstakken plan as a bottom-up initiative, in which the interaction between key actors in the District and community groups, plus the Housing Bank, has been the driving force. CULCI emerges as a pattern of interaction based on the commitment of local actors combined with attempts to solicit the support and resources of actors on other levels of public government, including the City Parliament, the City Government and the City Departments, the regional branch of The Norwegian State Housing Bank and ultimately the Ministry of Local Government and Regional Development. The deficiencies in terms of substantial outcomes in some of the implementation subarenas does not seem to indicate failures of CULCI, but rather failures in the inter-level governance processes which were required to implement many of the aims and measures that were developed locally.

Policy outcomes and impact on sustainable urban development

As indicated in the description of the initiative and in the institutional analysis, parts of the plan have been implemented whereas other parts are still pending. Most of the measures that had to do with the "internal" affairs of the District have been implemented. Some progress has been made in terms of improving the physical environments of the Løvstakken area, especially in terms of parks and green spaces. The disproportionate amount of social dwellings in the area, and the very biased socio-demographic composition of the population which can partially be attributed to this fact, are however yet to be addressed with efficient measures. Also, the community house is still not erected. But these matters have not been put to rest. The strategic plan is a point of reference for new planning initiatives related to the area, and the community involvement which was triggered in the planning process still provides inputs to the regeneration effort. For instance, efforts are being made to develop a new spatial plan for *Puddefjorden*, the fjord which demarcates the Løvstakken area from the city centre. In documents pertaining to this process, references have been made to the strategic plan, the problems identified by the plan and the community involvement triggered by this process. All in all, the long term effects of the plan are still to some extent an open question.

A. Effectiveness

In light of this, a relevant indication of the success of the plan is the opinion of the panel. As noted previously, this panel is composed by citizens of Bergen representing a broad array of sectors, interests and outlook. After having been asked about the goals of the Løvstakken plan, the panel members were asked to indicate whether the plan, in their opinion, would contribute to the achievement of those goals. The results are reported in Table 3.73.

Table 3.73   *Achievement of goals*

	Mean values*
How much would you say that this plan will contribute to the achievement of these aims?	3,4

* Score is on a scale of 1-4, 1 equals "not at all", 4 equals "very much".
N=23 (panel, all respondents in the city).

Apparently, the panel is quite optimistic about the prospects of the plan. The score of 3,4 is close to the maximum level of optimism, which is 4. It is of course impossible to judge how well grounded the opinions of the panel members are. Considering the problems of implementation identified above, the assessment may seem a bit optimistic.

B. Sustainability

The concept "sustainable urban development" is elsewhere defined as a composite of four related dimensions; the ecological, economical, social and governmental dimensions respectively. To what extent have these dimensions been taken into account in the Løvstakken plan? The panel members were asked to assess whether the plan would, in their opinion, contribute to an improvement of the city's economic competitiveness, and provide results that are acceptable from the ecological perspective.

Table 3.74   *Results of the initiative*

	Mean values*
How much would you say that this program will contribute to an improvement of the city's economic competitiveness?	3,3
How much would you say the program is compatible with the major economic policy programs in this city?	2,9
How much would you say that this program will provide results that are acceptable from the ecological perspective?	3,3
How much would you say the program is compatible with the major environmental and sustainability programs in this city?	3,3

* Score is on a scale of 1-4, 1 equals "not at all", 4 equals "very much".
N=25 (panel, all respondents in the city).

The panel members apparently are optimistic about the effects of the plan on sustainable urban development. Again, it is hard to assess the weight that should be put on this assessment. In light of the limited scope of measures that have actually been implemented, the potential effects of the strategic plan on the city's economic competitiveness would appear to be modest.

As for the ecological perspective, it seems less doubtful that the strategic plan will provide ecologically acceptable results, or that the plan is "compatible with the major environmental and sustainability programs in the city". Judging from the analysis so far, the effects of the plan on sustainable urban development from the ecological would appear to be modest. However the plan did include measures relating to the physical environments of the Løvstakken area, and those measures would be in line with ecological aspects of sustainability.

C. Legitimacy

The Løvstakken regeneration plan was developed in close co-operation with civil society actors. A very broad range of actors were asked to get involved, including local NGO's ranging from the sports clubs to the Salvation Army, as well as the local school, police and so forth. Several community meetings were held, and many suggestions were forwarded. However, this constitutes only a medium level of involvement. This notwithstanding, local community actors have stated that they think of their regular efforts as parts of the community regeneration initiative.

The interviews have had a focus on the conceptions about legitimation on the part of the local government actors. Key figures in the District had a keen awareness about the significance of legitimation, and how this – in their opinion – should affect the decision-making process. In Løvstakken, the officer in charge of the planning process[19] went to great lengths to ensure that *all* organised community actors were invited to take part in the process. This included housing associations, soccer clubs, and so forth. Using multiple sources for information, an exhaustive list was compiled, including all in all 23 organised groups. Although not all of these actually chose to become involved, the Løvstakken plan was developed under circumstances of full inclusion in terms of participation *rights*. Furthermore, efforts were made to ensure that all inputs from the local groups were included in the final draft plan that was submitted for decision in the District council. There were, accordingly, no attempts to "filter" inputs from the local groups; the procedure for aggregating them into the plan was all-inclusive. The over-arching goals of the plan were formulated *after* all the specific inputs were taken into account, and in accordance with these. The chief planner claims that he had no set conceptions regarding the nature of these goals before the consultation process started. The chief objective was to come up with a plan that reflected the opinions of local groups to the greatest extent possible, and to

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[19] The chief planner in the District of Årstad, Sverre Hoiness, was in charge.

make sure that no actors would be able to look at the final plan and claim that their opinions had not been included.

This inclusive procedure indicates that the legitimation of the regeneration plan rested heavily on procedural grounds. The District in reality went to great lengths to produce a plan that would be accepted and supported by the local community by means of strong *input legitimation.* The development process can thus be said to constitute an alternative source of procedural legitimation to the one offered by the representative political system – a "direct democracy" with distinct if informal democratic procedures. In this sense, the Løvstakken plan would seem to comply with the prerequisites of democratic governance.

The legitimacy of the plan has not been contended from the perspective of input legitimation. Neither have serious objections been voiced to counter the impression of solid grounds for *throughput legitimation.* The transparency of the process seems high, and there is little evidence of restrictions imposed on the flow of information. Throughput legitimation has partially been achieved as a result of the strategy involving very open consultation with non-public actors, partially by the strict legal codes pertaining to public access to documents in public decision-making in Norway.

If there is a legitimation problem in the Løvstakken case, it has probably more to do with *output legitimation*. The interviews have revealed a considerable degree of impatience concerning the relative lack of tangible results from the extensive participatory processes. This is not least apparent in the interviews with representatives of community groups in Løvstakken. One of these persons made the following remark:

> I've attended citizen's meetings, but in the end nothing comes out of the issues that are addressed. (…) [The discussions] focused on political decisions which are terribly cumbersome. I haven't involved myself overmuch in these meetings – are you supposed to sit there for years without seeing tangible results?

Among the key actors in the Urban District, there has correspondingly been voiced a concern about "keeping up the steam" in the participatory process. They feel it is highly important for the people in the area to retain an optimistic attitude concerning the outcome of the process, and they fear that attitudes like those cited above will spread, if there is a lack of substantial results.

Conclusions

A. Leadership style

The urban leader in the Strategic plan is Borghild Lieng, the leader of the District Council of Årstad. Her leadership style in the context of this case most closely resembles the *consensual facilitator* in PLUS typology. Her strategy clearly was to generate capacity through persuasion and by making local others identify and develop ownership to the regeneration plan. Furthermore, the leadership should be termed as *collective,* since Lieng acts out of her capacity as leader of the District Council.

It must be noted that Lieng was a member of the City Parliament (and prior to the reform, the city council). Accordingly, she was in a position to put the Løvstakken issues on the agenda on the central political level in Bergen. However in many phases the process was headed by a trio consisting of Lieng, the District Director, Aagot Himle, and the chief planner, Sverre Hoiness. Thus, Lieng's individual political leadership seems to have alternated with a more collective approach. The lay members of the District Council seem as a general rule to have played a quite passive role in the planning effort.

Lieng and the other two members of this trio demonstrated a highly pro-active leadership style. Because the regeneration effort had to rely on funding and support from actors external to the urban district, much effort was devoted to the generation of such support. Indeed, apart from the development of the plan, this is where the major leadership effort can be identified. These efforts included personal meetings with representatives of agencies in the city administration, local branches of national agencies as well as representatives from the political leadership in two ministries.

B. Community Involvement

A number of community actors have been involved through the duration of the initiative. Apart from Lieng, the District Director Aagot Himle, and the chief planner, Sverre Hoiness, appears to have played a pivotal role in soliciting the involvement of community actors. In the *policy development* phase, Hoiness went to great efforts to identify all the organised groups in the Løvstakken area. A roster of 23 organisations was compiled, and all of these were invited to take part in the planning process. The District hosted a number of meetings to provide channels for input from the local groups. Also, the issue was debated in the District Council. The meetings in this body are

open to the public. Additionally, Hoiness carried out interviews with a variety of actors in the local community, including the parish priest, the board for community affairs and representatives of tenants in public dwellings.

When writing the draft plan, all inputs from the local groups appears to have been included. As a consequence, it is only partially correct to label the plan a strategic plan – it does include a quite extensive number of highly specific measures.

The policy decision in itself was made by the District Council, and did as such not involve community involvement. However, in the policy implementation phase, local groups were again activated.

C. Policy Challenges

The general goal of the regeneration effort has been to improve living conditions in Løvstakken, in terms of social as well as spatial and environmental factors. These goals can be related to the 29 measures that are listed in the Løvstakken regeneration plan.

According to the informants, a total of 15 measures have been implemented, a total of about 50%. This does indicate a degree of substantial effectiveness. However, several important measures have yet to reach the implementation stage. Notably, the measures that require funding and support from actors outside the District have only to a very limited extent been implemented:

- The "community house" has still not been built. There are reasonable prospects for obtaining the necessary funding for this project within the next 3-5 years; but this cannot be verified.
- The district's high share of Bergen's social dwellings has not been reduced significantly. The City Council at one point set aside funds to cover the expenses associated with this measure, but these funds were subsequently reallocated to other purposes.
- A number of parks and public spaces were to be established or upgraded. At least one of these projects has been implemented, others have not.
- The objectives relating to intra-district measures have to a great extent been implemented.

The shortcomings in terms of the substantial challenges associated with the plan clearly have much to do with the *procedural challenges.* Concerted efforts from Årstad to build partnerships with other authorities have to a great extent been foiled, at least partially due to a lack of interest or waning commitment from municipal authorities.

After having received positive signals from a certain agency concerning funding for the community house, the application for funding prepared by the District (which had to be forwarded by the City Government) was delayed in the City Government administration. The funds set aside for the selling out of social dwellings in Årstad were reallocated to other purposes by the City Council. According to some informants, the City Government assumed a rather passive role in the lobbying process towards national government, and this effort was not successful. An application for approx. €6 million was turned down.

The initiative did not involve institutional design, however the (at the time) newly implemented District system has had a strong bearing on the progress of the initiative. Highly successful in terms of identifying local problems, implementing relevant measures with the use of its own resources and not least, highly able to mobilise involvement from local groups, it has nevertheless not proved effective in terms of building alliances with resource-controlling actors of municipal decision-makers.

D. Outcomes and Legitimacy

Analysing the strategic plan, the conclusion on legitimacy is that *input legitimation* and *throughput legitimation* has been secured to a very great extent. An inclusive strategy based on transparency, along with several instances of representative decision-making, makes it difficult to find severe faults relating to these types of legitimation. The most serious legitimation problems can possibly be attributed to the relative lack of tangible results on some of the implementation sub-arenas. The strategic plan quite clearly runs the risk of losing its grounds for *output-based legitimation*.

E. Conclusions on CULCI

The policy process in this initiative has, through its distinctive phases, mirrored the strengths as well as weaknesses related to the District Council system. On the one hand this institutional structure, combined with highly visible and proactive leadership locally, has succeeded in soliciting the participation of a variety of actors in the local community. On the other hand problems relating to funding and support from actors external to the District has illustrated the limitations associated with a strategy in which leadership is exerted on the sub-municipal level. Although CULCI has successfully been achieved in Årstad, the procedural challenges related to building networks and soliciting support from resource-controlling actors on a bottom-up basis have proved severe.

Lessons

The Løvstakken regeneration plan is a case of visionary urban leadership executed by means of a diversified networking strategy. The leader of the District Council and her closest associates, not least including the District Director and the Chief Planner, have hardly left a stone unturned in their pursuit of resources, co-operation and support for the regeneration efforts. In this sense, their calls for community involvement can be regarded as one of several strategies for accumulating political clout behind the demands for recognition of Løvstakken's problems. At the same time, the involvement of the local community has served to elaborate the understanding of the problems in the area, and as a source of specific proposals about how to address these problems. It is highly noteworthy that all inputs from the community representatives apparently were included without omissions, and that an all-inclusive strategy was used. The implication of these choices is a strong input legitimation for the plan in the local community. As for output legitimation, however, the relative lack of tangible results have caused considerable impatience among many community groups, and it has reportedly been hard to "keep up the steam" in the initiative.

The Løvstakken plan reflects the strengths and weaknesses of a decentralised system of urban government. On the positive side, the proximity between district officials and the local community has undoubtedly been highly beneficial in terms of involving the community groups. In this sense, the CULCI of Løvstakken has been marked by a minimal distance between leaders and community, providing a highly fruitful arena for the complementarity between them. Furthermore, the district officials have moved quite effortlessly between levels and branches of public government, making direct contacts with various branches of city government, national government and regional branches of national government. On the downside, however, although extensive these efforts have not been highly successful in terms of soliciting funding and other kinds of support. The lesson is probably that there is often a gap between communities, their problems and the means to solve these problems, not least in the case of deprived neighbourhoods. Therefore, the ability to solicit community involvement *and* funding may be a dilemma. The Districts may in this sense have been close enough to the community end of this "gap" to obtain community involvement, but at the same time too remote from the resource controlling centre to be able to secure substantial commitment.

4 Comparative conclusions

4.1 The cities

Although similar in many respects, the four policy initiatives studied in this report seems to indicate considerable differences between the cities of Bergen and Oslo at least in their approach to the governance of emerging policy initiatives. The methodological approach of PLUS does not permit conclusions on whether or not the four policy initiatives deviate substantially from the regular *modus operandi* of urban politics in the two cities. The report does however demonstrate that the complementarity of urban leadership and community involvement – CULCI – has occurred in quite different ways in the context of two cities of roughly the same size, with very similar government structures and within the same national system of local government.

Bergen and Oslo are the two largest cities, and as such they tend to stand a bit apart from most of the other local governments in Norway. This has to a substantial degree been reflected in the development of government structures in the two cities. When Bergen implemented the parliamentary system in 2000, Oslo was the only municipality that had already done so. Furthermore, both cities retained and elaborated on their systems of Districts throughout the 1990s and in the early 2000s, even though many smaller cities chose to abandon this form of intra-municipal decentralisation. Although Bergen is currently dismantling its District system, it is noteworthy that Bergen and Oslo for some years (including the PLUS case period) were the only municipalities in Norway to combine a parliamentary system with Urban Districts. In various contexts, administrators as well as elected officials have stated that the big cities have more to learn from each other in terms of the development of political and administrative systems, than they do from the smaller municipalities. Contacts between the two cities have been extensive, on several levels.

Because the organisation of government is so similar in the two cities, at least in general outline, it is apparently necessary to look for other variables to explain the rather striking differences in CULCI observed in this report. These differences may be summed up as follows:

Firstly, it is interesting to note that the initiatives in Bergen systematically have involved less formalised and permanent networks than is the case in the Oslo initiatives. Secondly, community involvement has been more extensive by far in Bergen than in Oslo, in the sense that a much greater number of non-public actors have been involved. The contrast between the cities in terms of CULCI may accordingly be described as one between community involvement in broad, informal networks in Bergen and narrow, formalised networks in Oslo.

Because the Plan for Culture in Bergen was a strategic plan, and had not been converted into action programmes during the PLUS case studies, it is unfair to assess variations in policy effectiveness between this initiative and the others. It can however be noted that the broad, informal networks in the two Bergen cases to a much smaller extent than the more narrow and formalised networks in Oslo have involved the mobilization of resources, especially funding. In the case of the plan for Culture, it can be argued that this was as intended. Even so, Bergen was of course at liberty to choose a fundamentally different strategy. Facing challenges related to economic competitiveness, Bergen chose to implement a policy initiative marked by extensive consultations and visionary leadership, related to ideas concerning culture as business and the more general potential for urban development and improvement of quality of life inherent in cultural activities. Specific measures and obtainment of funding came in second place. In Oslo, in contrast, we have analysed an approach characterised by low political visibility and a narrow range of involvement and consultation. It is hardly an exaggeration to say that the Programme for Regional Development (RUP) has been a quite secluded item on the political agenda in Oslo. But this is not to say that the Programme will eventually turn out to be less effective in terms of enhancement of economic competitiveness than the plan for Culture in Bergen (assuming such a comparison could realistically be made). In RUP, only resource controlling actors were invited to join. These actors did furthermore commit themselves to contribute, albeit on a limited scale.

As regards the social inclusion cases, the comparison between the cities is not least interesting because both of them involve the Urban Districts, as well as other levels of government, including the national

level. Furthermore, the two policy initiatives have much in common substantially. This is evidentially due to the fact that the Løvstakken initiative to some extent was inspired by the Oslo Inner City Districts initiative, and used this as a model. Moreover, both areas faced problems of a roughly comparable nature, related to deprivation and social marginalisation. The progression of the two initiatives, as well as the outcomes, seems however to differ substantially. In Oslo, the inhabitants of the inner city districts have benefited from numerous projects to the annual cost of €12,2 million starting in 1997 and planned to be continued until 2006. The inhabitants of Løvstakken have received more modest benefits from their programme. This difference illuminates the very different conditions for the operation of CULCI in the two urban regeneration initiatives. The key role played by the Districts in the Oslo Inner City Districts initiative should not conceal the fact that the programme was initiated and developed by national government and municipal authorities before it was launched. In contrast to this, municipal authorities in Bergen had to a much lesser extent committed themselves to the Løvstakken plan in advance. Whereas the Districts involved in the Oslo plan were put in the position to implement a programme decided upon by superior levels, the District of Årstad had to direct much of their efforts towards attempts to secure support from other levels of government – a support that turned out to be quite evasive, especially in the case of the Ministry of Local Government and Regional Development, but also as regards the City Government of Bergen. Perhaps most importantly, funding for the Oslo plan was secured as part of the initiation of the programme, whereas in Bergen this was not the case.

In light of this, urban leadership as well as community involvement had to face up to quite different challenges in the two social inclusion initiatives. The urban leader in the Løvstakken case – the Leader of the District Council – was not in a position to implement the plan by means of resources and authority endowed by her formal position. Hence the extensive networking strategies of urban leadership in this case, including the broad range of community involvement (at least partially), can be seen as a means to accumulate political clout behind the push for external support. In Oslo, the conditions for urban leadership were quite different, not least because of the widespread recognition on national as well as urban level concerning specific social challenges in the city. Deservedly or not, the urban challenges in Bergen have never commanded anything like the national-level attention and concern devoted to Oslo's inner eastern districts.

4.2   The policy areas

Social inclusion in both cities seems to draw more heavily on the established system for service provision than is the case concerning economic competitiveness. Independently of the two inclusion initiatives, the cities devote a very substantial share of their resources on services and measures relevant to social inclusion. This has to do with the role Norwegian municipalities hold as the chief instrument for implementation of the "welfare state", a term that denotes the very extensive responsibilities for public welfare taken on by the Norwegian state. As a consequence, the Oslo Regeneration Programme for the Inner City Districts had a strong focus on co-ordination between levels and sectors of government. Although the projects funded by the programme are identifiable entities and should not be regarded simply as additions to the running expenditures of local government branches, they have been implemented by a very elaborate system with long-standing traditions prior to the programme. It was therefore seen as crucial that the projects emerging from the programme should interact favourably with the multitude of services already established on a regular basis. This is not least relevant related to the projects implemented in local schools. The schools play a very important role in all communities, not only in terms of learning but also as a key element in the socialization of children and youth, and in terms of building civil society. In this sense, the school related projects were intended to support a number of goals already associated with the school system.

This picture stands in rather stark contrast to the impression given by the competitiveness initiatives. Economic competitiveness is not very prominent on the political agenda in Oslo. Therefore, the existing institutional structure, as well as the funding, of this sector of local government does not provide such a strong foundation for the implementation of emerging initiatives as is the case in the inclusion segment. In Bergen, competitiveness does seem to be a higher political priority than in Oslo. All the same, the city has quite limited resources available for this purpose. It is important to bear in mind the fact that most of the services provided in the "inclusion segment" are mandatory by law, whereas the strive for competitiveness is totally up to the local government to deal with. Efforts devoted to this issue must by and large be financed by spare funds. These funds are scarce, in Bergen even more so than in Oslo. Because of this the stronger political emphasis on competitiveness in Bergen must still compete with the very extensive resources devoted to inclusion measures.

This difference may be of consequence in terms of CULCI. In Bergen, informants quite explicitly stated that the limited resources available to economic competitiveness policies made the community involvement strategy indispensable. A similar line of reasoning is found in Oslo, albeit on a more narrow scale. These observations serve to underline a key assumption in the PLUS project, namely that there is not necessarily any contradiction between participation and effective governance.

5   Executive summary

5.1   Introduction

The purpose of the executive summery is to give a brief summery of the content of the National Report. Originally prepared for the PLUS Advisory Board meeting in Turin, Italy November 2003, the summary is reprinted in this report.

The Participation, Leadership and Urban Sustainability (PLUS) project, funded by the European Commission, examines how leadership and community involvement can combine to lead to better policies for cities. The cross-national project has involved research in 18 cities from 9 countries. In each city, there have been two case studies of policy areas relevant to all cities – social inclusion and economic competitiveness. The two Norwegian cities are Bergen and Oslo. In Bergen, the economic competitiveness case is the "Strategic Plan for Culture" which is an attempt to enhance economic competitiveness by means of co-ordinating activities in the cultural sector. The social inclusion case is the development and subsequent implementation of a plan for the regeneration of the challenged area of Løvstakken. In Oslo, the competitiveness case study is the "Regional Development Plan", which is an initiative made jointly by the city of Oslo and the neighbouring county of Akershus. The inclusion case in Oslo is a 10-year "Action Programme for Inner City Districts" which is co-funded by the city and national government.

5.2   General Norwegian context

Norwegian local government consists of 434 municipalities and 19 counties. The size of the municipalities varies extremely, ranging from 228 to more than 500 000 inhabitants in Oslo. In Norway, local government is two tier with functions split between municipal and

Working paper 2004:108

county government. The only exception from this rule is Oslo, which does not belong to a county. The municipalities are not subordinate to the counties. The counties do not exert direct authority over the municipalities, although they do perform certain functions as regards regional co-ordination.

Municipalities and counties are required through legislation to provide a number of specific services. The bulk of local government activities are mandatory. Also, a voluminous body of state-imposed regulations provides quite specific prescriptions on the planning, organising and execution of these services if economically possible. Local government can, however, also initiate tasks on their own accord. The relationship between state government and local and regional authorities may most accurately be described as integrated, in the sense that state government has adopted a highly active role in relation to local and regional authorities. Local governments employ about a quarter of the entire Norwegian work force.

As a general rule, grants from central government are block grants. Local and regional authorities themselves decide how to allocate their budgets. However, considerable portions of national grants are earmarked. These funds are to be allocated to certain specific purposes, limiting the discretionary powers of the local and regional authorities.

According to the Local Government Act local governments may choose between two models of political organisation in Norway, the traditional model and the parliamentary model. As of today, Oslo and Bergen are the only municipalities with a parliamentary system. In a parliamentary system, the *City Council,* in Bergen the *City Parliament* is the highest political authority. The City Council elects a *City Government*, in the same way as in national politics. The City Government may consist of one or several parties, and it must resign if there is a majority vote of no confidence in the council. The members of the City Government – the commissioners – are responsible for implementing decisions made in the council, and they have executive portfolios.

The mayor leads the meetings in the City Council. In a parliamentary system, the mayor is less powerful than in other systems, because much power resides with the head of the City Government.

Oslo and Bergen have implemented a decentralised structure of government, in which large shares of municipal tasks are delegated to *Urban Districts*. Each of these districts has their own administration, and a politically appointed District Council heads each. These systems

are responsible for a lions' share of the city budget – as much as 75% in Bergen, and about 40% in Oslo. The services provided by the Districts are primarily related to care services for the elderly, services for children and youth including kindergartens and schools (in Bergen), social services and health. During the fall of 2003, the District councils in Bergen have been reformed and have thereby lost a great deal of political power. Because this reform took place in the aftermath of the empirical research in the PLUS-project, this change has no bearing on the analysis.

In Norway, the Transparency Act stipulates that all documents used in administrative proceedings are public, except in particular circumstances. Similarly, according to the Local Government Act, all meetings in elected bodies shall be open to the public.

5.3   Local initiatives: Bergen

5.3.1   The Bergen context

In Bergen, the parliamentary system was introduced in 2000. As a consequence, the city still has less than four years of experience with this form of government. For the period of time when the case-studies were carried out, the Chief Commissioner has been Anne-Grete Strøm-Erichsen from the Labour party. She has headed a City Government composed by a "leftist" party (Labour) as well as Christian Democrats and the Centre party, traditionally located on the "right" wing in Norwegian politics. The City Government headed by Strøm-Erichsen has been a minority government, relying on support from various parties in the City Council. Following local elections posterior to the period of our case-studies, a new government headed by Monica Mæland from the Conservative Party has replaced the City Government of Anne-Grete Strøm-Erichsen.

The political culture in Bergen is characterised by a moderate level of trust. Trust scores in our panel are slightly below the middle value of 3. Scores for collaboration between the city and citizens are slightly higher than the middle value. This is also the case concerning collaboration between the city and business. This score indicates that collaboration is on a medium level – not very small, but neither very extensive.

Panel results on expectations on political leaders show that citizens expect a majoritarian leadership style. Given the choice between a

preference for majority decisions and consensus seeking, the mean score is closest to the former. Even so, the panel members quite strongly expect leaders to build local networks with business and NGOs. The Bergen panel as a whole is undecided (medium average value) on whether they expect political leaders to take the interests of the entire city into account, or just the interests of the party or the electoral groups that they happen to represent.

The panel is undecided on the question about whether they expect citizens to seek consensus or to go for majority decisions in political issues. They tend, however, to expect *business* to adopt a consensus strategy. The panel quite strongly expects business to take the interests of the entire city into account, not just the interests of the business community. The extent to which they expect *citizens* to take the interests of the entire city into account is limited.

5.3.2   Social inclusion:"Regeneration plan for Løvstakken"

Background and the initiative context

The Regeneration Plan for Løvstakken was a policy initiative to improve living conditions in the former working class area of Løvstakken, near the city centre of Bergen. The Løvstakken area was marked by problems related to poor living conditions, environmental issues, unemployment, and poor public health. The initiative originated with the political leader of the District Council in Årstad. The Executive Committee of the city council[20] decided that a program for the improvement of living conditions was to be developed, and that the district of Årstad was to be responsible for the program. It was also recommended that local community actors were to be mobilized in the process.

This initiative was not associated with any national programme, but attempts were made to involve the national government by means of an application for additional funding. As Norway is not a member of the European Union, there is no European link for this initiative.

The *local-central governmental power relations* in the context of this initiative are essentially of a dual nature. On the one hand, the policy initiative originated in the District of Årstad, and has remained predominantly the responsibility of the urban district. The District has

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[20] The initiative was made prior to the implementation of the Parliamentary system of governance.

made attempts to secure funding and support from national government as well as from the municipal authorities. In this way, the local-central governmental power relations can be characterised as "bottom-up", in the sense that national government has not made attempts to substantially control or influence the initiative. On the other hand, the initiative has involved co-ordinated efforts involving public services that are provided by the urban district, with delegated authority from the City Council. These services are to a large extent mandatory through legislation, including for instance social services, care services and the integration of refugees. Because national government has implemented a variety of rules concerning the provision of these and other services, there is an indirect element of central government control involved. However, local governments are supposed to exercise a considerable degree of discretionary power in the actual service provision. It is difficult to pin-point exactly the impact of central government control on the regeneration plan, not least because it involves a broad range of services, with separate sets of central regulations.

As for the *horizontal local government power relations*, the bottom-up character of this initiative is again crucial. After having decided that Årstad should be in charge of the planning process, the municipal authorities largely occupied a remote, deactivated position in the process. To the extent that the City Government or other municipal authorities have been involved in the regeneration effort co-ordinated by the plan, this has taken place on the initiative of the urban district. In terms of the contents of the plan, Årstad has certainly had wide powers of discretion. On the other hand, the implementation of several measures included in the plan has relied on the support of various municipal authorities. It has proven difficult for Årstad to secure support and funding from these authorities, so in this respect the horizontal power relations has not worked to the advantage of Årstad.

The power-relations within the District of Årstad as well as in the city of Bergen are collective. In the Urban District, political leadership resides with the District Council. Although the leader of the District Council has a prominent role, he or she does not enjoy any kind of executive privilege in terms of being authorised to make binding decisions on his or her own behalf. As for the City Parliament, the normal mode of decision-making is voting.

The *local state-society relations* are decisively shaped by the decentralised system of governance in Bergen. One of the chief reasons for implementing the District reform was to strengthen the interface between municipal authorities and civil society. By

decentralising competences to the urban district, it was argued that the city as a whole could benefit from a better fit between service provision and local variations in wants and needs. Also, the establishment of District Councils should facilitate and broaden the political dialogue between the city and its inhabitants. In Årstad, and in the context of this initiative, the District was indeed able to establish a very broad dialogue with individuals and organisations locally.

Policy Challenges

The *substance* of the regeneration plan for Løvstakken is *distributive,* at least from the perspective of the urban district. The plan involved attempts to secure national funding for the regeneration effort, as well as a search for various sources of funding within the local government of Bergen. These funds included grants from the City Council to cover the expenses associated with sales of social dwellings in Årstad, and the subsequent purchase of new dwellings in other districts (where real estate prices would be higher). Furthermore, funding has been sought for the construction of a "community house" to be made available for local community activities.

Following this, most participants within the District would probably regard the initiative as a positive-sum game. If successful, the initiative would bring "fresh" funds to the district, and there would be little need for redistribution and cutbacks in other areas. However the prospective providers of these funds would naturally see this differently. For instance in the City Council, granting funds for selling out social dwellings would by necessity involve giving less priority to other tasks. In this sense, the initiative is clearly redistributive. Indeed, the *procedural challenge* of the regeneration plan was not least to secure funding for the various measures that came to be proposed. In addition, the procedural challenge is related to getting the local civil society involved in the planning process.

The initiative is highly *complex*, in terms of the number of issues addressed by the plan and the multitude of specific measures proposed. It did not, however, involve *institutional* innovation.

Leadership style and Community Involvement

The urban leader in the inclusion case is Borghild Lieng, the leader of the District Council of Årstad. Her leadership style in the context of this case most closely resembles the *consensual facilitator* in PLUS typology. Her strategy in this case clearly was to generate capacity through persuasion and identifying the best in others. Furthermore, the

leadership should be termed as *collective,* since Lieng acts out of her capacity as leader of the District Council.

It must be noted that Lieng was a member of the City Council. Accordingly, she was in a position to put the Løvstakken issues on the agenda on the central political level in Bergen. However, in many phases the process was headed by a trio consisting of Lieng, the District Director, Aagot Himle, and the chief planner, Sverre Hoiness. Thus, Lieng's individual political leadership seems to have alternated with a more collective approach. However, as a general rule, the lay members of the District Council have played a quite passive role in the planning effort.

Lieng and the other two members of this trio demonstrated a highly pro-active leadership style. Because the regeneration effort had to rely on funding and support from actors external to the urban district, much effort was devoted to the generation of such support through persuasion. Indeed, apart from the development of the plan, this is where the major leadership effort can be identified. These efforts included personal meetings with representatives of agencies in the city administration, local branches of national agencies as well as representatives from the political leadership in two ministries.

Regarding *community involvement*, a number of community actors have been involved through the duration of the initiative. Apart from Lieng, the District Director, Aagot Himle, and the chief planner, Sverre Hoiness, appears to have played a pivotal role in soliciting the involvement of community actors. In the *policy development* phase, Hoiness went to great efforts to identify all the organised groups in the Løvstakken area. A roster of 23 organisations was compiled, and all of these were invited to take part in the planning process. To provide channels for input from the local groups the District hosted a number of meetings. The issue was also debated in the District Council. The meetings in this body are open to the public. Additionally, Hoiness carried out interviews with a variety of actors in the local community, including the parish priest, the board for community affairs and representatives of tenants in public dwellings.

When writing the draft plan, all inputs from the local groups appears to have been included. As a consequence, it is only partially correct to label the plan as a strategic plan – it does include a quite extensive number of highly specific measures.

The policy decision in itself was made by the District Council, and did as such not involve community involvement. However, in the policy implementation phase, local groups were again activated.

Outcomes: Policy Challenges and Effectiveness

The general goal of the regeneration effort has been to improve living conditions in Løvstakken, in terms of social as well as spatial and environmental factors. These goals can be related to the 29 measures that are listed in the Løvstakken regeneration plan.

According to the informants, a total of 15 measures have been implemented, a total of about 50%. This does indicate a degree of substantial effectiveness. However, several important measures have yet to reach the implementation stage. Notably, the measures that require funding and support from actors outside the District have only to a very limited extent been implemented:

- The "community house" has still not been built. There are reasonable prospects for obtaining the necessary funding for this project within the next 3-5 years, however this cannot be verified beyond doubt.

- The district's high share of Bergen's social dwellings has not been reduced significantly. The City Council at one point set aside funds to cover the expenses associated with this measure, but these funds were subsequently reallocated to other purposes.

- A number of parks and public spaces were to be established or upgraded. At least one of these projects has been implemented, others have not.

The shortcomings in terms of the substantial challenges associated with the plan clearly have much to do with the *procedural challenges.* Concerted efforts from Årstad to build partnerships with other authorities have to a great extent been foiled, at least partially due to a lack of interest or waning commitment from municipal authorities. After having received positive signals from a certain agency concerning funding for the community house, the application for funding prepared by the District (which had to be forwarded by the City Government) was delayed in the City Government administration. The funds set aside for the selling out of social dwellings in Årstad were reallocated to other purposes by the City Council. According to some informants, the City Government assumed a rather passive role in the lobbying process towards national government, and this effort was not successful. An application for approx. €6 million was turned down.

The initiative did not involve innovative institutional design. The (at the time) newly implemented District system has, however, had a strong bearing on the progress of the initiative. Highly successful in terms of identifying local problems, implementing relevant measures

with the use of its own resources and not least, highly able to mobilise involvement from local groups, it has nevertheless not proved effective in terms of building alliances with resource-controlling actors of municipal decision-makers.

Outcomes and Legitimacy

The *input legitimation* of the Løvstakken plan has been secured in two ways; both are at least slightly problematic. Firstly, the District Council of Årstad decided upon the plan. The District Council is however appointed by the City Council, and does not really have any particular bond of representation to the people in Løvstakken. The local citizenry has not elected the members, and local political opinion has had little bearing on its composition. The input legitimation provided by the decision is therefore contestable, as it is highly indirect. Secondly, the development of the plan involved a number of local groups. In this way, the plan was indeed based on authentic participation. Because of the extensive efforts to include all relevant groups, and because all inputs from these groups were included in the plan, the consultation procedure should contribute strongly to the procedural legitimation of the plan.

As for *throughput legitimation*, the use of public meetings with local groups indicates a high degree of transparency. Also, the fact that meetings in the District Council are open to the public, and that all documents pertaining to the matter are available, contributes to this.

The *output legitimation* of the regeneration plan appears to be rather precarious, due to the delayed or foiled implementation of some of the key elements of the plan. Informants have noted the efforts involved in "keeping up the faith" among local groups in the urban district.

Conclusions on CULCI

The policy process in this initiative has, through its distinctive phases, mirrored the strengths as well as weaknesses related to the District Council system. On the one hand this institutional structure, combined with highly visible and proactive leadership locally, has succeeded in soliciting the participation of a variety of actors in the local community. On the other hand problems relating to funding and support from actors external to the District has illustrated the limitations associated with a strategy in which leadership is exerted on the sub-municipal level. Although CULCI has successfully been achieved in Årstad, the procedural challenges related to building networks and soliciting support from resource-controlling actors on a bottom-up basis have proved highly challenging.

5.3.3 Economic competitiveness: "Strategic plan for Culture 2002 – 2012"

Background and the initiative context

The city of Bergen in 2000 initiated a process to develop a strategic plan for culture. As Norway's second largest city (population approx. 225 000), Bergen boasts a vibrant cultural and artistic life, with a theatre of national prominence, a big concert hall and several museums and galleries. Bergen is also the home of a well-known annual music festival. The area of *Bryggen,* the old wharfside area built in the Hanseatic period, was in 1980 designated by UNESCO as a Cultural World Heritage Site. In 2000, Bergen was a European City of Culture. The strategic decision to promote the city as a city of culture was taken not least with the potential for economic regeneration in mind. Although relatively prosperous by European standards, periods of rising unemployment as well as certain challenges relating to its status as second largest city has commanded a certain degree of political attention to the need for measures to stimulate the local economy. The plan was developed through extensive participation of a broad range of actors in the cultural sector, as well as local businesses and real estate holders.

The *local-central governmental power relations* in this case can be characterised as decoupled. There are no political requirements made by central government on the municipalities concerning policies for local economic competitiveness, so it's for the cities to decide whether they want to get into this area or not. As for the cultural sector, the situation is similar: Municipalities may choose to devote resources to culture. They are however not required to do so, and there are few if any central government regulations in this area. Because many local governments are financially strained, the amount of resources available for these purposes will often be quite limited, and this is certainly the case in Bergen.

The *horizontal local governmental power relations* in the context of this initiative are very much in line with Bergen's parliamentary system of governance. After having debated the City Government's proposal for developing the plan, the City Parliament decided to let the City Government be in charge of the planning process. Because the Section for Economic Development as well as the Section for Culture are located in the Chief Commisioner's Department, this department played a pivotal role through the various stages of the process.

Although the City Parliament was consulted, the City Government had a quite autonomous role during the various stages of the planning process. This is in accordance with the regular procedure in parliamentarism: The issue resides with the executive until it is brought before parliament.

The City parliament decided upon the plan with relatively minor amendments. In this phase, the power resided with the City Parliament. Because the plan has not yet been implemented, power relations in this phase cannot be established yet.

Policy Challenges

The *substantial policy challenge*: The Culture plan is, tentatively, distributive, in the sense that it purports to increase municipal spending on Culture. Also, it aims to mobilise resources from the business sector, in co-ordination with the city's efforts.

Furthermore, the plan is highly complex in that it includes a wide variety of goals, relating to as many as nine dimensions of the "Cultural Business" sector in Bergen. These include festivals for art and culture, culture and tourism, Bergen as a regional growth centre in cultural and economic terms and so forth.

The *procedural challenges* relate to the fact that the plan cannot be implemented without the active support of actors in the culture sector and in business life. The city authorities have been highly conscious about this fact, and this is the reason why the planning process had to include such extensive collaboration with private-sector actors. One might say that the procedural challenge has been to carry out the planning process in such a way as to maximise support and legitimacy for the plan among private actors.

The plan did not involve institution building beyond the temporary establishment of ten working groups, each of which carried out two or three meetings. The process has been carried out in the context of the established parliamentary system of governance. Accordingly, there is no institutional challenge in the defined sense.

Leadership style and Community Involvement

The leadership of the process can be described as collective/visionary. The *collective* aspect refers to the fact that Anne-Grete Strøm-Erichsen has performed her leadership in the capacity of being the leader of the City Government. Bergen has a collective executive leadership. Even so, the idea of promoting Bergen as a "city of culture" with the aim of stimulating not only local identity and artistic

"output" but also economic development, was clearly a major political issue for Strøm-Erichsen in her time as Chief Commissioner. In this sense, her leadership should also be described as *visionary*: She has been able to establish innovative policies by combining strong leadership with capacity generation by bringing different policies together.

Strøm-Erichsen reorganised the City Government in such a way that the Section for Business Development and the Section for Culture were integrated into the chief commissioner's department. Thus, in contrast with Oslo, the leader of the City Government in Bergen has had her own executive portfolio. The integration of these particular sections in the chief commissioner's department strongly signifies the very high political priority given to these issues by Strøm-Erichsen. Furthermore, it should be noted that the initiative has been a prioritised issue for the Section of culture. The organisation of the participatory process as well as the actual writing of the draft plan has been carried out by this section. The close proximity between the section and the Chief Commissioner has provided a strong linkage between the administrative procedure and the political leadership, which is highly significant.

Community involvement has been extensive in the policy development phase. Early in the process, the city department for culture (prior to the reorganisation of the City Government) carried out several case studies and a survey among artists getting support from the municipality, in order to map out the impact of the cultural sector for the city economy. Following this, the department organised ten working groups. A broad range of actors from the cultural sector and the private business sector were invited to contribute in the development process of the strategic plan by attending these working groups, each numbering eight to ten members. The groups dealt with various aspects of the cultural sector, including such subjects as children, urban development, theatre, dance and music, new technology, museums and cultural institutions, city festivals, interaction between culture and business. This grouping structure was decided by the department, based on certain tentative criteria of selection: The groups were to be in some sense representative for the cultural sector and the business sector. The participants had to be outspoken, and known to the department. Some emphasis was put on involving actors that had been active but didn't easily get heard. Individual artists as well as representatives from organisations and institutions including private enterprises were invited. Two or three meetings were held in each working group.

The policy decision in itself was made by the City Parliament, and did as such not involve community involvement.

Outcomes: Policy Challenges and Effectiveness

Because the plan has yet to be implemented, it is premature to make judgements concerning its substantial effectiveness. Also, the plan did not involve institutional innovation. The best basis for the assessment of outcomes therefore is related to the procedural challenges.

As for the procedural challenges involved, these seem to a large extent to have been met. It should be noted that the City Government successfully has solicited the participation and involvement of a very broad range of actors in Bergen's cultural sector as well as in the business community (these two groups of course coincide at least partially). An extensive network has been established. The idea of promoting Bergen's profile as a city of culture, as a step towards a more prominent position for the cultural sector in the city's economy has been consolidated. We would expect this to be highly significant for the implementation of the strategic plan, although this cannot be assessed at present.

Outcomes and Legitimacy

The plan was decided upon by the City Parliament. Accordingly, the plan can draw on *input legitimation* provided by the representative system.

However, interesting attempts on behalf of the Chief Commissioner's department to provide what may be interpreted as an alternative basis for input legitimation are revealed. These attempts have to do with the policy development phase, and the involvement of private sector actors. Firstly, attempts were made to solicit the participation of a selection of actors who could be seen as "representative" of the cultural sector. For instance, the Chief Commissioner's department wanted to include at least one person from the music festivals, someone from the art galleries, one independent artist and so forth. This way, anyone from the cultural sector should be able to look at the rosters of the working groups, and recognise somebody from the same "category" as himself or herself. Secondly, when writing the draft plan, attempts were made to take into account the various (and partially adversary) positions on culturally relevant issues in such a way that anyone reading the plan should have a reasonable chance to recognise his or her own position. According to informants in the chief commissioner's department, they were able to do this partially because of the broad and quasi-representative selection of participants

in the groups, partially because the civil servants themselves claim to possess quite specific knowledge about the lines of division within the cultural communities.

This legitimating strategy can be interpreted in two ways. One the one hand, it can be seen as an attempt to achieve a sort of informal procedural legitimation through the participatory elements in the policy development phase. On the other hand, respondents indicate that they expect the content of the plan to be generally endorsed by resource-controlling actors because of the attempts to take all positions into account.

As for throughput legitimation, the linkage with the representative system in the policy decision phase has secured public access to the proposal for the plan in advance of the decision. Furthermore, the broad networking process as well as the consultations with City Parliament during the policy development phase does indicate a quite strong transparency. The least transparent phase was probably the aggregation of the inputs from the workgroups into a draft plan. Minutes from the meetings in the workgroups do not seem to have been made public in all cases. According to the informants, the Chief Commissioner's department moreover tried to aggregate the inputs into a more general level, as the plan was not to include specific measures. The aggregation procedure seems to be less than transparent, as it took place largely in the Section for Culture. It is hard to assess how and to what extent the inputs from the private actors were actually included in the text of the plan.

Because the plan has not been implemented yet, output legitimation cannot be assessed at this point.

Conclusions on CULCI

The Strategic plan for culture involved visionary and highly visible political leadership, most notably personified by the Chief Commissioner Anne-Grete Strøm-Erichsen. Extensive community involvement in the form of a broad range of actors from the cultural sector as well as the business community has been seen as integral to the achievement of the plan's strategic objectives. The interviews reveal a very explicit recognition of the limitations to the power and resources available for unilateral action by the city authorities in this context. As a consequence, attempts towards the achievement of economic development relating to Bergen as a "City of culture" has taken place through co-ordinated efforts in a network including a broad range of actors. Although it is to early to assess the substantial effects of the plan, this initiative illustrates a practical approach to

CULCI as a strategy for achieving collective action through collaboration between urban authorities and the local community.

5.4 Local initiatives: Oslo

5.4.1 The Oslo context

City hall politics in Oslo has for many years been characterised by a rather consistent division between left-wing and right-wing parties. Since the introduction of parliamentarism in 1986, the composition of the City Government has strictly followed this cleavage. There have been no more than five Chief Commissioners, and only one of them has not been a Conservative. Most of the City Governments have been minority governments – having a relative weak position, relying on various parties in the City Council. The current Chief Commissioner is Mr. Erling Lae from the Conservative Party, who became Chief Commissioner in November 2000.

The political culture in Oslo is characterised by a moderate to low level of trust. The average trust score in our panel is 2.5 on a scale from 1 to 5. Scores for collaboration between the city and citizens are slightly lower than the middle value. This is also the case concerning collaboration between the city and business. This score indicates that collaboration is on a medium level – not very small, but neither very extensive.

Panel results on expectations on political leaders show that citizens expect a majoritarian leadership style. Given the choice between a preference for majority decisions and consensus seeking, the mean score is closest to the former. Even so, to a moderate extent the panel members expect leaders to build local networks with business and NGOs, not just to concentrate on their formal roles. The Oslo panel as a whole is undecided (medium average value) on whether they expect political leaders to take the interests of the entire city into account, or just the interests of the party or the electoral groups that they happen to represent.

On the question of whether they expect citizens and business to seek consensus or to go for majority decisions in political issues, the average score for the Oslo panel is slightly closer to consensus than to majority. The panel is however undecided as for whether citizens and business should take the interests of the entire city into account, or just their own interests.

5.4.2 Social inclusion: "Oslo Regeneration Programme for the Inner City Districts"

Background and the initiative context

The *Oslo Regeneration Programme for the Inner City Districts* is a ten year programme for urban development and improving of the living conditions in three of the east-central districts of Oslo: Sagene-Torshov, Grünerløkka-Sofienberg and Gamle Oslo. This area is marked by problems related to poor living conditions, unemployment, and poor public health. The programme is a joint effort between the National Government and the City of Oslo, with an annual budget of € 12,2 million (100 million NOK) for the 10-year period 1997-2006. These costs are divided in equal shares between the National Government and the City Council. The programme is an attempt to actively strengthen the scope, breadth and quality of services in these districts, and thus improve living conditions for the inhabitants. A large number of projects have been implemented so far, 201 projects were running in 2002 – and some projects had already been completed. These projects have predominantly, but not exclusively, targeted living conditions for children and youth. A wide variety of governmental organisations from various levels and sectors of public administration co-operate in the programme, in addition to some actors from the private sector.

Concerning *local – central governmental power relations,* the programme is a typical example of multi-level governance. The individual projects draw extensively on Oslo's established system for service provision, in the districts as well as on the city level. The fact that this system is part of the local government clearly gives Oslo considerable leverage within the regeneration programme, although the bulk of municipal services are mandatory by law and subject to various regulations in the form of national standards and guidelines.

Even so, the strategic decision-making structure in the regeneration programme consists of representatives for national government as well as for municipal authorities. Implementation decisions on the other hand are taken on the city level and the district level. The responsibility for managing the programme rests with the Board, composed by representatives from the national government as well as from the city and district levels: Five Ministries from the National Government level, four City Departments, and the administrative leaders of the three districts. In addition to these administrative representatives, the political leaders of the three districts (the District Councils) also have seats on the Board. The relative high

representation of the national government on the Board is quite unusual in a programme like this one, considering the general competence within this policy area on the hands of the local authorities. The extensive involvement by the national government may be explained by the fact that the regeneration programme was initiated by the Norwegian Parliament.

As for the *horizontal local governmental power relations*, the bulk of welfare services are provided by the Urban Districts, by authority delegated from the City Council. However, services related to schools, parks and recreational issues are provided by agencies supervised by the City Government, namely the Education Authority and Recreation and Leisure Service. Different sectors from both the municipal level and the district level are represented on the Board, the managing body of the programme, and some of the tensions between the levels have come to the surface. The tension has been especially intense between the district level and the city level, and has been occasioned not least by claims made by the Districts for representation of their political body on the Board – a claim that was met by the City Council. In addition to this the districts formed their own network, consisting of their administrative leaders and the Education Authority and Recreation and Leisure Service of the City. The aim of the network was to promote the interests of the Districts more effectively in the allocation of the budget. This network has been formalised as the Coordination Group.

Policy Challenges

The *substantial challenge* of the regeneration programme in Oslo may be characterised by the involved actors as *distributive* policy. The funds – €12,2 million per year – are earmarked transfers to the programme. From the viewpoint of the participants, the cooperation between the Oslo City Council and the National Government represents a plus-sum game. The funds are not distributed to the districts by way of the regular budgetary procedure, but go directly to the projects.

This policy initiative can be described as *complex*, in terms of the goal structure. The programme has a wide range of goals, most notably:

- Improving living conditions and residential environments, with a particular focus on families
- Renewal and investment in public meeting places such as streets and parks
- Improved safety in the area

- Strengthening developmental conditions for children, and thus also ensuring equal opportunities for immigrant children
- Reducing unemployment and other social problems, with a particular focus on improving co-operation between relevant government agencies
- Strengthen Norwegian language skills among immigrants
- General urban development

Also in terms of the effects of the programme, this case is complex. The main objective of the programme is regeneration of a deprived area – which is difficult to measure due to uncertainty about the long-term effects.

The main *procedural challenge* for the political leadership of the City of Oslo has been to involve and activate the inhabitants of the three inner city districts, in the policy development phase and in decision-making as well as in the implementation phase. In the formal initiative, which was a unanimous decision in the Norwegian Parliament, activation of the inhabitants was emphasized. Co-operation with resource – controlling actors besides the state has not been high on the agenda, probably because the state and municipal authorities initially shared the responsibility for the funding costs of the programme.

An important *institutional challenge* was that the programme had to be institutionally designed to reflect the cooperation between three levels of authority: The state, the City of Oslo and the districts. An additional challenge was that different sectors on each level had to be involved for the programme to be successful. This required new and innovative institution building, nevertheless on medium term. The institutions are to be dissolved following the termination of the programme.

Leadership style and Community Involvement

The *type of leadership* in this initiative can be described as collective; the leadership resides with the Chief Commissioner (the leader of the City Government) and the City Commissioner for welfare and social services. In the parliamentary model, much power resides with the head of the City Government, and this model therefore promotes strong and visible political leadership. Still, because the City Governments have been minority Governments, the political leadership have been dependent on support by various opposition parties in the City Council.

The *style of leadership* has tended toward a *visionary* leader according to the PLUS typology. In the early negotiations with the national government, the City Government succeeded in forging a broad political coalition in the City Council for the programme. The negotiation team consisted of the leader of the City Government, representing the Labour Party, and representatives from two of the largest opposition parties (The Conservative Party and the Progressive Party). This broad coalition gave the City leadership more weight in the negotiations with national government, and at the same time it committed the opposition parties to support the realization of the programme. Midway in the negotiation-process the socialist City Government had to resign. A new City Government, headed by the Conservative Party, was instigated, continuing the negotiations with the same commitment as their predecessors. The leadership of both City Governments can be described as visionary, invoking strong and clear leadership in the process of committing the state to co-fund the programme.

After reaching an intentional agreement between the national government and the City, and following important political decisions concerning the funding and the organisation of the programme, the political leadership is less visible – but still strong. The operative leadership for the programme was delegated to the administration and the Districts. Even so, it remains an important task for the city leadership to retain the commitment of the Norwegian Parliament and the City Council, in terms of securing annual funding for the programme.

Community involvement was an important focus when the programme was initiated, but has to a large extent been transformed in to involvement of the District Councils in the planning and running of the programme. Political bodies on the three levels take all the formal decisions in the programme. The limited direct community involvement we have registered has only occurred in the policy development and policy implementation phases. The programme was designed to encourage actors in the local community to develop project proposals that could potentially be funded by the programme. The idea was that the same actors developing the projects where to implement them, and although the development phase and the implementation phase is dominated by public actors, this intention has to a certain degree been met. Two types of actors have been involved in developing projects and implementing them; collective actors – like neighbourhood and voluntary associations, churches and sports associations, and to a very limited extent corporative actors – including mercantile associations and business communities.

Outcomes: Policy Challenges and Effectiveness

Whether or not the main *substantial challenge* of the programme is met is hard to say. Due to the complexity of the objectives, it is difficult to assess whether living conditions in the area have improved. Nevertheless, a large amount of money has been raised – €12,2 million per year for seven years now – for projects in the area. A wide range of projects has been implemented, 201 projects were running in 2002, and many projects have been completed. These projects have undoubtedly had beneficial effects on living conditions in the area. Even so, it should be noted that the programme has not had any bearing on several issues vital to living conditions, including housing.

As for the *procedural challenges*, in the outset the perspective of empowerment was an important idea underlying the programme. The inhabitants themselves should be involved in the enhancement of living conditions in the area. We find this perspective explicitly expressed in the decision in the Norwegian Parliament, but it was not followed up in the deal made between the National Government and the City. This ambition has not been successfully met, if "inhabitants" are defined as individuals and voluntary organisations in the local community. The issue about who exactly were to represent the inhabitants has been controversial. In the first proposal concerning the administration of the programme, the head of the District Administration were to represent the inhabitants. This proposal provoked a tense political and public debate about whether or not this structure ensured *citizens participation.* Local organizations as well as the political leaders of the three District Councils expressed their dissatisfaction with the proposal in the media. They were especially dissatisfied with the quite marginal role they had played in the development of the program, and with the formulation of this specific proposal. As a result, the leaders of the three District Councils were given seats in the Board – as representatives of the inhabitants. Claiming to be better representatives of the inhabitants in the area, a few voluntary organizations have protested to this, without success.

Nevertheless, the programme has succeeded in achieving a certain degree of activation of actors in the local community. Many of the projects have been developed and implemented by local actors in the districts, like neighbourhood and sport associations, churches and theatres. The vast majority of the projects funded by the programme have been implemented by the regular service-providing agencies in the districts. When it comes to *cooperation with resource-controlling actors*, the cooperation with the most important actor outside the municipality, the state, has definitively been successful.

The programme has been institutionally designed to reflect all three levels of authority and different sectors on each level. We have, however, registered widespread dissatisfaction concerning the way in which the programme is organized. According to participants on all three levels, the Board has not been able to manage the programme in an effective way. Too many levels and actors are involved; and the mandate of the representatives has not been sufficiently clear. Nevertheless, the programme has been quite flexible and open to rearrangement of both the Board (that political leaders of the Districts were included), to formalising network working outside the formal structure (The Coordination Group), and when it comes to rearrangement of the authority to distribute the granted money.

Outcomes and Legitimacy

Concerning the *input legitimation,* this initiative generally speaking has a top-down character. The objectives, as well as the procedures of the programme, have predominantly been formed by political and administrative bodies outside the districts, and the three districts haven't had much of a say in the early stages of the programme. Following an intense debate about who were to represent the inhabitants of the area, "citizens' participation" has been interpreted as participation by the political body in the Districts, the District Councils. The District Councils have increased their influence in the programme, by having seats on the Board and by increased authority over allocation decisions. Still, one can question the basis of input legitimation for the District Councils, two of them being appointed, while only one of them is elected. A certain input legitimation is nevertheless secured by leaving all the overall decisions to the political bodies on the three levels. Actors in the local community (voluntary associations) have to a certain degree been activated in developing and implementing projects, but involvement is quite limited.

When it comes to *throughput legitimation,* the programme has a complex structure, making it difficult for ordinary citizens to see who or what level is accountable for what. This structure is nevertheless quite open; especially regarding the decision-making processes that takes place in the regular political bodies, where the Transparency Act has to be respected. The meetings in the institutions of the network, the Board and the Coordination group are not public, but minutes are publicly available. In addition to this, the programme has its own website, where information of the program can be found.

Regarding *output legitimation,* 201 projects were running in 2002, and some were already completed. These projects undoubtedly have a positive impact on living conditions in the area. Nevertheless the long-term effects of the programme are uncertain.

Conclusions on CULCI

The Oslo Regeneration Programme for the Inner City Districts has involved strong and active political leadership, especially in the early negotiation stage. Strong and visible leadership by the City Government (especially the Chief Commissioner) was necessary to commit the National Government to co-fund the programme. This follows the parliamentary structure, where the City Government have the main responsibility of external relations and external funding. But strong leadership was also needed to build a broad coalition in the City Council supporting the programme, due to the relatively weak position of the minority Government.

Extensive community involvement was seen as highly necessary by the political leadership – but in which form has been intensively discussed. Probably because of the institutional structure of the City of Oslo, with its 25 Districts, community involvement was first and foremost linked to the established district system. Community involvement was evidently interpreted as representation of the District Councils on the Board, and giving the District Councils influence over a larger share of the funding. Therefore, the community involvement in this case can first and foremost be described as indirect participation, by elected, and appointed, representatives of the inhabitants. Direct participation by individuals and voluntary associations in the local community has also occurred, but to a limited degree and only in the policy development phase and the implementation phase. CULCI can in this case be identified by the combination of a relatively horizontal structure of the organisation of the programme (especially the Board), and the close linkage to the traditional political/administrative system. The complementarity of urban leadership and community involvement resides in the system of governance, in the sense that political leadership predominantly was executed on the top level of the municipal organisation – most notably, by the Chief Commissioner – while community involvement was linked to the bottom level; namely, the Districts.

5.4.3 Economic Competitiveness: "The Programme of Regional Development for the City of Oslo and the County of Akershus"

Background and the initiative context

The Programme for Regional Development for the City of Oslo and the County of Akershus (RUP) is a joint effort by the Municipality of Oslo, the County of Akershus, and different governmental institutions to promote regional development in the area. The main organisations of employers and employees in the private sector are also included, though community involvement beyond this hasn't occurred. The program therefore represents cooperation between institutions, not between representatives from the population in the area. The total budget of the program was about €1,6 million (13 million NOK) in 2003, and the 13 projects included in the program are mostly small-scale projects.

Local-central governmental power relations: The Ministry of Local Government and Regional Development have since 1997/8 strongly recommended that all Counties develop Programmes of Regional Development. The ministry has also strongly signalled its intentions concerning the kinds of institutions that are to be included in such programmes. The county authorities of Akershus developed their first Programme of Regional Development in 1998, and had revised their programmes three times before the co-operation with the City of Oslo started. This co-operation was formally initiated by the elected bodies; the County Council of Akershus in 1998 and the City Council of Oslo in 1999.

The Programme of Regional Development is an example of multi-level governance, in which three levels of authority; the state, the County and the Municipality, are involved in the process of formulating an annual programme, as well as in financing and implementing the projects that are included in the programme.

A working group is responsible for managing the program. In this group, substantial and allocative decisions are made jointly. As mentioned above, the Ministry has given strong signals regarding who is to be included in the cooperation. In accordance with these signals, the working group consists of the Oslo city administration, Akershus County administration, Oslo Technopol which is an inter-county corporation, Norwegian Industrial and Regional Development Fund (SND), The County Governor, The Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry, and Aetat which is the national employment agency. In

addition to the institutions recommended by the Ministry, the regional offices of the main organisation of employees – the Confederation of Norwegian Business and Industry (NHO) and the Norwegian Confederation of Trade Unions (LO) are represented.

As for *horizontal local governmental power relations* the programme represents comprehensive cooperation between the County of Akershus and the City of Oslo, and all the projects in the programme have to be relevant for both of them to be accepted. This horizontal relationship is also reflected in the decision structure of the programme: All the formal decisions have to be decided upon in the political bodies in both Oslo and Akershus.

Policy Challenges

The substantial policy challenge: The substance of this initiative is distributive policy. Every participant has a joint responsibility for the funding of the programme, and the aim is also to mobilise resources from other actors in the business and research sectors. In spite of the quite ambitious objective of the programme – to stimulate regional development – the initiative can be described as limited. The general objective has been boiled down to a narrow range of specific objectives: To promote entrepreneurship, innovation, building of new competence and international promotion of the area. The programme is relatively small-scale in budgetary terms.

The procedural challenge of this initiative was low, in terms of simplicity of procedure. As noted, the Ministry strongly signalled which actors were to be involved. The number of these actors was low however, and most of them were public actors. Nevertheless, cooperation with the main organisations of employers and employees was seen as a necessary precondition for the implementation of the programme. Another challenge was to obtain contributions from the participants, to secure the funding of the programme. Besides this, ambitions concerning the activation of other actors in civil society were absent.

The institutional challenge of the initiative was to develop a new, innovative institution for the cooperation – the working group. The ambition was to give this institution a simple form, in order to make the co-operation as effective as possible.

Leadership style and Community Involvement

The *type of leadership* in this initiative can be described as collective; the leadership resides with the City Commissioner for Urban Development in Oslo, Ann Kathrine Tornaas and the County Mayor in

Akershus, Ragnar Kristoffersen. In the parliamentary model, much power resides with the head of the City Government, and this model therefore promotes strong and visible political leadership. Still, because the City Government has been a minority Government, the leadership has been dependent on support by various opposition parties in the City Council. *The style of leadership* can be described as *caretaker*, and the political leadership has been largely absent from the initiative. This might be explained by the fact that economic competitiveness is not a priority on the political agenda, neither in Oslo nor in Akershus.

When it comes to *community involvement*, the programme represents co-operation between institutions, not between representatives from the population in the area. All the formal decisions are taken in political bodies; the elected bodies in Oslo (the City Council) and Akershus (County Council) has delegated the authority to approve the annual programme to their executive bodies, while they still have to authority to grant funding for the programme. Therefore the community involvement has only occurred in the phases of policy development and policy implementation. The policy development phase is the prerogative of the members of the working group. In this phase, the only non-public actors are representatives from the main organisations of employers and employees. These two NGOs can be categorized as corporative actors. They are heavily involved in the policy development phase as well as in policy implementation, and are co-funding the programme. When it comes to implementation of the projects, the participants of the working group have a comprehensive cooperation with broad range of actors in private sector, like business associations, the Research Council of Norway, EU and research and educational institutions. These external actors also provide considerable financial contributions to the projects – and are responsible for the main part of the total funding of the programme.

Outcomes: Policy Challenges and Effectiveness

Whether or not the programme has actually served to promote regional development is hard to say. The programme has undoubtedly contributed positively to the specific objectives in a positive way; to stimulate entrepreneurship, innovation, building of new competence and to international promotion of the area.

The procedural challenge of this initiative was low, in terms of simplicity of procedure. An important challenge was nevertheless to involve the main organisations of employers and employees in the working group, which has been met. A more complicated challenge

was to get contributions from the participants in the working group, to ensure the programme sufficient funding. This has to a certain extent been met, but some of the participants provide relatively small contributions – which limits the scale and scope of the programme. Nevertheless, a comprehensive cooperation with a broad range of external actors when it comes to financing and implementing the projects has provided for extensive funding of the programme.

The institutional challenge of the initiative has predominantly been met. The institutionalization of the cooperation has been given a simple form, by the establishment of the working group. This is a long term institution, and according to the participants also an effective institution; where decisions are made by consensus by participants regarded as equals. In spite of this informal rule of consensus, most of the participants report that the representatives from the Municipality of Oslo and the County of Akershus have more weight in these decisions, due to their linkage to the political decision-makers.

Outcomes and Legitimacy

A certain degree of *input legitimation* is secured by leaving all the formal decision-making to the political bodies in the two Counties. After reaching an agreement in the working group, the annual proposal is decided upon in the executive bodies; in the City Government in Oslo and in the Akershus County Executive Board, while the elected Councils are granting money to the programme.

As to *authentic representation* this has to a certain extent been taken into consideration. In the working group, only two actors from private sector are included, the two NGOs representing employer and employees. Still, a broad range of external actors are included in the wider network, as cooperation partners and co-funders of specific projects included in the programme. According to the overall goal of the programme, to stimulate regional development, a wider range of relevant actors from the local community and business sector could nevertheless have been involved. This might have increased the input legitimation of the network.

As for *throughput legitimation,* the linkage with the representative system in the policy decision phase has secured public access to the draft plan from the working group, as well as the documents from the decision making process in the representative system. Still, it is possible to have access to the minutes form the meetings, but the activities in the network are not public and the meetings of the working group are closed. Nevertheless, it is not difficult to find who is accountable for the different elements of the program.

Regarding *output legitimation* the programme has definitely contributed positively to the economic development in the area, but effects are limited due to the size of the initiative. A comprehensive cooperation with a broad range of external resource controlling actors has been established, though on project basis (both financing and implementing). External actors thereby provide for a major part of the total funding of the programme. Still, a relevant question is whether the capacity of the network could have been further increased by involving even more external actors.

Conclusions on CULCI

In the Programme of Regional Development for the City of Oslo and the County of Akershus political leadership is almost absent. Still the political leadership is identified as the Commissioner for Business and Urban Development, and the County Major, having the overall responsibility for this policy area. Assessing community involvement, a certain degree of input legitimacy is secured by leaving the formal decision-making to political bodies. The inclusion of the main organisations of employers and employees in the working group, as well as relevant Governmental institutions also contributes to input legitimacy. In addition to that, a wider network with external resource controlling actors has been established, through a comprehensive cooperation on co-funding and implementing the projects.

Related to the conceptual framework of PLUS, it is fair to say that this initiative represents CULCI on a rather modest level. Urban leadership is collective to the extent that it is executed mainly through the relevant branch of City Government, with the backing of the Commissioner. It is, however, not subject to highly proactive individual leadership. In this sense, the complimentarity between leadership and community involvement occur in the form of a rather closed network between administrative officers and representatives of the two major associations for labour and business.

5.5   Comparative analysis

5.5.1   Political culture

In both cities, there is a medium level of trust, and medium scores for collaboration between the city and citizens, as well as between the city and business. Taken as a whole, the results for the two cities are quite similar.

On average, the panels in both cities tend to expect a majoritarian leadership style, and they are undecided as to whether they expect leaders to take the interests of the entire city into account. This may indicate that the political culture is not alien to a partisan approach to leadership in either city. At least there is nothing to indicate a strong preference for consensus-building.

These expectations nearly mirror the expectations on citizens in both cities. The panels seems to feel that citizens may as well pursue their own interests as take the interests of the entire city into account, and they are not strongly expected to adopt a consensus approach.

However, corresponding attitudes towards the business community differ between the cities. In Oslo as well as in Bergen, panel members tend to expect business to adopt a consensus strategy. In Bergen, however, the panel quite strongly expects business to take the interests of the entire city into account. These expectations are not to the same extent shared in Oslo.

5.5.2   Inter-city comparison

It is interesting to note that the initiatives in Bergen systematically involve less formalised and permanent networks than is the case in the Oslo initiatives. At the same time, community involvement is more extensive by far in Bergen than in Oslo, in the sense that a much greater number of non-public actors have been involved. The contrast between the cities may accordingly be described as one between community involvement in broad, informal networks in Bergen and narrow, formalised networks in Oslo.

5.5.3   Intra-city comparison

Social inclusion in both cities seems to draw more heavily on the established system for service provision than is the case concerning economic competitiveness. Independent of the two inclusion initiatives, the cities devote a very substantial share of their resources on services and measures relevant to social inclusion. This has to do with the role of Norwegian municipalities as the chief instrument for implementation of the "welfare state", a term that denotes the very extensive responsibilities for public welfare taken on by the Norwegian state. As a consequence, the Oslo Regeneration Programme for the Inner City Districts had a strong focus on co-ordination between levels and sectors of government.

This picture is a rather stark contrast to the impression given by the competitiveness initiatives. Economic competitiveness is not very prominent on the political agenda in Oslo, and the existing institutional structure (as well as the funding) of this sector of local government does not provide such a strong foundation for the implementation of emerging initiatives as is the case in the inclusion segment. In Bergen, competitiveness does seem to be a higher political priority. All the same, the city has quite limited resources available for this purpose. It is important to take into consideration the fact that most of the services provided in the "inclusion segment" are mandatory by law, whereas competitiveness is not mandatory. Efforts devoted to this issue must by and large be financed by spare funds. As funds are scarce, in Bergen even more so than in Oslo, the stronger political emphasis on competitiveness in Bergen must still compete with the very extensive foundations of resources devoted to inclusion measures.

This difference may be of consequence in terms of CULCI. In Bergen, informants quite explicitly stated that the limited resources available made the community involvement strategy indispensable. A similar line of reasoning is found in Oslo, albeit on a more narrow scale.

Appendix 1

Formulations of questions from survey on political culture

 1. Hvordan vil du generelt beskrive tilliten mellom politikere, befolkningen, næringslivet og frivillige organisasjoner i Bergen [/Oslo]?

2. Hvordan vil du generelt beskrive graden av samarbeid mellom...

... kommunen og lokale organisasjoner?

... kommunen og næringslivet?

3. Bør ledende Bergenspolitikere [/Oslopolitikere] gå inn for at

a) flertallets vilje legges til grunn for den politikken som føres, selv om mindretallet er uenig,

eller

b) bør de prøve å skape bred enighet om den politikken som føres, selv om dette kan gjøre det vanskeligere å få fattet beslutninger?

4. Bør ledende Bergenspolitikere [/Oslopolitikere]

a) legge vekt på å utvikle lokale nettverk, for eksempel med næringsliv og lokale organisasjoner,

eller

b) bør de konsentrere seg om sine formelle posisjoner i det politiske systemet?

5. Bør ledende Bergenspolitikere [/Oslopolitikere]

a) legge vekt på at de representerer et bestemt parti, eller en bestemt velgergruppe,

eller

b) bør de legge vekt på at de representerer *hele* befolkningen?

6. Når grupper av innbyggere [/næringslivet] går inn for en politisk sak, bør de

a) forsøke å få støtte kun fra et flertall, selv om mindretallet er uenig,

eller

b) bør de forsøke å skape bred enighet rundt saken, selv om det kan gjøre det vanskeligere å få saken gjennom?

7. Er det akseptabelt at innbyggerne [/næringslivet]

a) fremmer kun sine egne interesser

eller

b) bør de ta hele byens interesser i betraktning?