



Einar Braathen

A Participatory Pathbreaker?

Experience with Poverty Reduction
Strategy Papers from four
South African countries

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Experiences with Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers
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Author: Einar Braathen

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Abstract: The study examines experiences of Rural Producer Organisations in four countries – Malawi, Zambia, Tanzania and Uganda - from the Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP) processes. It synthesises and compares information based on reports from research partners in the Business Experience Exchange Programme (BEEP) – these sub-studies are included in this publication as attachments. The study concludes that participation varied much from one country to another. However, participation did not go very deep into the membership of the rural producer organisations in any country, and civic participation did not reach the level of real (joint) decision-making. Issues for follow-up action and research are suggested.

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Gaustadalléen 21, Box 44, Blindern
N-0313 OSLO

Telephone (+47) 22 95 88 00
Telefax (+47) 22 60 77 74
E-mail: nibr@nibr.no
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Preface

This study has been carried out within a short period of time, from October to December 2005. It was commissioned by the Royal Norwegian Society for Development (Norges Vel). Einar Braathen, NIBR, has been the Project Leader.

The following partner organisations within the already established Business Experience Exchange Programme (BEEP) (www.beepafrica.com) network were approached:

Center for Agricultural Research and Development, Bunda College of Agriculture/University of Malawi.

Agri-Business Forum, Zambia.

Department of Agricultural Economics & Agribusiness, Makerere University/Uganda, .
Moshi University College of Cooperative and Business Studies/Tanzania.

We are grateful for their positive responses and willingness to partake in the study. Their contributions have been written by: Teddy O. Nakhumwa (Malawi), Felix Chizhuka and Sula Mahoney (Zambia), Johnny Mugisha and Mildred Barungi (Uganda) and Samuel M. Jonathan and Emrod Kimambo (Tanzania).

They are extensively quoted and referred to in the report written by Einar Braathen. Their country studies are included as appendices to the report.

Einar Braathen has also taken part in data collection in Malawi.

We thank the contributors and Norges Vel represented by Ragnhild Salomonsen for a fruitful co-operation.

Oslo, October 2006

Arne Tesli
Research Director

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Summary

Einar Braathen

Powerty Reduction Strategy Papers

- a participatory path breaker?

NIBR Working Paper 2006:122

Powerty Reduction Strategy Papers (PRSP) - a participatory path breaker? looks into the situation in four countries: Malawi, Zambia, Uganda and Tanzania. The Paper describes various aspects of the PRSP process – its antecedents, formulation (from 1999), implementation and reformulation (from 2004). The focus is on participation from non-state actors, in particular rural producer organisations. The depth, scope and height (level) of their participation in the PRSP process is assessed and compared.

The Malawian Rural Producer Organisation present reasons to be *very* satisfied. The Zambian and Ugandan RPOs have reasons to be quite satisfied. The Tanzanian RPOs convey messages that they are very dissatisfied with their participation in the PRSP process.

In terms of good experience, the government in Malawi to a large extent seemed to accommodate non-state participation. The civil society in Zambia showed how to mobilise itself and tap into the policy dialogue during early formulation as well as final evaluation of the policy. Uganda had a participatory set up for monitoring the policy implementation.

However, participation did not go very deep into the membership of the rural producer organisations in any country, and civic participation did not reach the level of real joint decision-making. Besides, there are no signs that the PRSP has contributed to reduce poverty in the studied countries. Nevertheless, the national RPOs report that the PRSP has changed the way of governance and policy-making in a more democratic-participatory direction. The few sub-national RPOs consulted in the Tanzania study did not share this uplifting. Issues for follow-up action and research are suggested.

1 Introduction

The *Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers* (PRSPs) may best be understood as the outcome of several interlinked processes in international development assistance (McNeill et al, 2004).. First of all we saw a process to restore the legitimacy of international financial institutions like IMF and WB. The neo-liberal Structural Adjustment Programmes faced increasing popular and intellectual critique in the 1990ies, with mounting evidence that poverty increased. Thus, IMF dropped its series of Enhanced Structural Adjustment Facilities (ESAF) and adopted instead Poverty Reduction and Growth Facilities (PRGF) as its main instrument. Also the World Bank made ‘attacking poverty’ its priority no.1. Accompanying this shift of policy style was the increasing tendency for bilateral and multilateral donors to co-ordinate their policies and their financial support. A third process is the HIPC (Heavily Indebted Poor Country) Initiative, under which countries are granted debt relief and further finance provided they prepare a comprehensive framework of national development policies which demonstrates a serious commitment to the reduction of poverty. This commitment is more specifically manifested in the form of a ‘Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper’ (PRSP). These strategic documents are to be prepared by each country, following a process within the country in which the different stakeholders are actively involved, so as to ensure genuine ‘ownership’ of the resultant document.

It is worth placing these new trends within the context of democratisation in sub-Saharan Africa and the role of popular participation in development. Although participatory democracy has been recommended to complement existing arrangements by leading theorists of democracy (Pateman, 1970; Dahl, 1985; Held 1987), it has had problems to gain ground in most of the Western democracies. Representative-electoral systems became thoroughly institutionalised and its main proponents saw participatory democracy as a radical threat. However, the last 10 years there have been an increasing number of experiences and analyses of participatory or deepened democracy (Fung and Wright, 2003). In the more recently emerging multi-party democracies, like in the sub-Saharan Africa after 1990, the emphasis was first on economic liberalisation, privatisation and rolling back of states deemed to be repressive and/or ineffective. Technocrats, and not the people, were in the driving seat. However, by the end of the 1990ies even key institutions pushing for economic liberalisation, like the World Bank, had realised that the public - the democratised state and the *demos* (the people) – had a key role to make policies right and effective. They have recognised that in an era of global economic liberalisation and fiscal constraints, more proactive and participatory governments have a critical role to play in equity-enhancing development (Heller, 2002). Participatory democracy has become a salient element of good governance.

In most developing countries agriculture plays a major role for the economy, and as well provides a basis for livelihood to a dominant part of the population. Therefore, when formulating national strategies for the reduction of poverty, specific strategies for the development of the agricultural sector should be elaborated – in a deeply participatory

way. The needs of the rural population and, in particular, the rural producers have to be reflected. The launching of PRSPs unleashed participatory processes that have to be evaluated and learnt from.

The intention of the report presented here is to establish reliable documentation on the participation of the agricultural sector, represented by Rural Producer Organisations (RPOs), in the PRSP processes in the selected countries in the Southern and Eastern region of Africa. Has the PRSP paved the way for a new and more democratic-participatory way of governance and policy-making, or was it just an ad hoc gimmick promoted by the donor community? Has it contributed to effective poverty reduction in the rural population?

2 Methodology

2.1 The proceedings of the study

The following countries were selected for the study: Malawi, Zambia, Tanzania, Uganda.¹

A joint design was implemented by separate research teams in each country. The design of the research was that of *participatory retrospective evaluation*: the main informants were representatives of Rural Producer Organisations in the mentioned countries, and these representatives participated actively in providing documentation and evaluative viewpoints underlying the research in each country. The focus was experiences from processes in the past (retrospection), although two of the countries – Zambia and Malawi – were during the time of research at an early stage of formulating the second national poverty reduction strategy. Hence, for these two countries the study resembled formative process research in the sense that the studies have the potential to inform on-going change processes. Uganda and Tanzania had already finished formulating the revised poverty strategy. In Tanzania the research design was slightly different from the other three countries, since the data collected were mainly from this second ‘PRSP’ process and the informants were mainly from the regional and local level RPOs.

The first step of the study was the production of a brief profile for each of the above mentioned countries. The profile featured basic elements such as type of government system, population – given as size of total population and as divided between rural and urban areas, economy – given as GDP per capita, percentage of economy based on agriculture, percentage of population depending on agriculture, illiteracy rate and life expectancy.

The second step was to compile a brief status report on the processes regarding PRSP for each of the above mentioned countries. Which governmental institutions/ministries were responsible for the development process? When did the process of formulating a PRSP start, and when was it completed? What were the main pillars and contents of the resulting PRSP? What have been the key plans or programmes to follow-up the PRSP for the agricultural sector? How was the monitoring and reporting system for the implementation of the PRSP? What have been the findings and conclusions of evaluations/reviews of the PRS/PRSP already carried out? Last but not least: who were the Civil Society Organisations, including RPOs, that were represented in the main participatory venues of the PRSP process?

¹ The study made use of an already formalised network of RPOs and researchers in these four countries and in Norway, namely the Business Experience Exchange Programme (BEEP), in which the Royal Norwegian Society for Development and NIBR took part. See: www.beepafrica.com

The third step was, based on dialogue with RPOs in the countries, to carry out an evaluative analysis of the process. A list of criteria for satisfactory participation in the PRSP processes was agreed upon. An inquiry (mini-survey) was carried out among key RPO-leaders from the four countries.² The country reports have then been compiled and elaborated into a comparative analysis. Our own data have been sought triangulated with findings and conclusions from other studies.

2.2 Dimensions of participation

The agreed list of criteria for satisfactory participation were centred around the three main dimensions of participation: depth, scope and altitude (level) of participation (Fung and Wright; 2003). The sub-dimensions are indicated by the following questions to be examined:

Depth of participation: To what extent were marginalised or disadvantaged groups (in RPOs) incorporated into the PRSP processes through the available arrangements of civil society participation? Did the process include any in-depth studies/group work? Which measures did the RPOs themselves take to deepen participation?

Scope of participation: What is the range of social and economic issues and services that the RPO representatives dealt with in the participatory process? Did they participate solely on agricultural issues, or were they also dealing with general policies (macroeconomics), crosscutting issues (e.g. HIV/AIDS and gender concerns) and/or other sector-specific policies (microeconomics). Was there any expansion during the process, and was this due to initiatives taken by the RPOs?

Height (level) of participation: McGee and Norton (2000) suggest that a ‘ladder of participation’ can be used as a tool to evaluate the PRSP processes. The ladder consists of four steps:

- i) Information sharing
- ii) Consultation
- iii) Joint decision-making
- iv) Initiation and control by stakeholders.³

At what level in the hierarchy of decision-making was the RPO participation conducted? Was RPO participation limited to consultations or comments given on individual basis, or were the RPOs taking part in deliberation and as such having influence in the elaboration of proposals through work groups and committees? To what extent did RPOs participate up to authoritative decision-making level (veto rights in the adoption of the final paper)? On which issues (see scope)? Did/do RPOs participate in the follow-up process and implementation of poverty reduction strategy, through institutionalised consultation or participatory monitoring? Have there been advancements or set-backs in this regard during the process?

² Gathered at the BEEP Annual Regional Workshop in Lilongwe, Malawi, November 7-10, 2005. In addition, sub-national RPO-leaders were inquired in the Tanzanian country study.

³ For PRSP, the level iv. “initiation” is less appropriate, since the initiative clearly came from the IMF and the World Bank. However, “control” can be referred to as control of the implementation process, with participatory mechanisms of monitoring in place, along with norms of public accountability of the programme.

If little or no satisfactory participation was found, the research should attempt to establish an explanation or a set of reasons for why there was a lack of participation. Was it due to *internal* factors – the capacity or information/access to information, and/or general organisational weakness? Or were they due to *external* factors, which we could categorise as *politics of participation* – decisions by designers and managers of the PRSP, or priorities of participation made within the larger social structure of ‘civil society’ itself?

3 The PRSP process

3.1 Antecedents of PRSP: Four countries

Table 3.1 *Country profiles*

	Malawi	Zambia	Tanzania	Uganda
Government system	Multi-party democratic (since 1995)	Multi-party democratic (since 1991)	Multi-party democratic (since 1995)	'No-party democratic' ⁴ (since 1986)
Population (rural/urban)	12 million, 90% rural (1998)	11 million, 55% rural	34 million, 80% rural (2002)	26 million, 75% rural;
GDP per capita	160 USD (2003)	435 USD	294 USD	280 USD
Agriculture share of GDP	34%	15%	46%	38%
Population dependent agriculture	84%	72% (2000) ⁵	82%	75%
Illiteracy rate	42% (1998)	33%	32% ⁶	29.4% ⁷
Life expectancy	39 years ⁸	38 years ⁹	51 years ¹⁰	45 years
Population living in extreme poverty	65 % ¹¹	70%	36 % ¹²	35% ¹³

Sources: Chizhuka and Mahoney, 2005; Jonathan and Kimambo, 2005; Mugisha and Barungi, 2005; Nakhumwa, 2005. Figures from 2004/2005 if not other year indicated.

As we see in the table above, the government system is very similar in the four countries. Uganda has been an exception in sub-Saharan Africa with its relatively liberal 'no party' democracy since 1986, and with emphasis on participatory 'grassroots' democracy. However, recent constitutional changes may, with president and parliament elections scheduled for March 2006, make Uganda a multi-party democracy like the other countries (Mugisha and Barungi, 2005).

⁴ Uganda's 1995 constitution was changed in 2005 to allow for a multiparty system of governance. Multiparty elections are scheduled for March 2006

⁵ Up from 49% in 1990

⁶ Tanzania mainland. For the Zanzibar isles 37%

⁷ 20 % illiteracy among adult males, 40 % among adult females

⁸ Year 2000. Dropped from 43 years in 1996 due to the HIV/AIDS epidemic

⁹ Down from 50 years in the early 1970ies

¹⁰ Tanzania mainland; 57 years on Zanzibar isles.

¹¹ Malawi according to IHS (1998) 65.3% categorised as poor and 28.7% extreme poverty

¹² Proportion below the national basic needs poverty line, according to the household survey of 2000-2001

¹³ Down from 56% in 1992, but up again to 38% in 2005.

The demographic and socio-economic picture of the four countries varies to some extent. Zambia stands out as the most urbanised country in the region (only 55 percent of the population live in rural areas), and the GDP per capita is consequently in average twice as high as in the other three countries. Malawi is the most rural country, with 90 percent of the population, and with the far lowest per capita GDP. However, the levels of human poverty in the two Southern African countries, measured in life expectancy and population living in extreme poverty, are quite similar and extremely low. The level of poverty in the two East African countries is somewhat less severe.

All four countries saw initiatives to combat poverty long before the PRSP. The Malawi Poverty Alleviation Program (PAP) from 1994,¹⁴ Tanzania National Poverty Eradication Strategy from 1997, Uganda's Poverty Eradication Action Plan (PEAP) from 1997 and, Zambia's National Poverty Reduction Action Plan (NPRAP) from 1998 are examples of that.

These initiatives were inspired by the World Conference on Social Development (UN) held in Copenhagen in March 1995. One of the main resolutions of this conference was that every country must set itself a time-bound target for poverty reduction and institute measures for the attainment of that target. In Zambia for instance, the Government appointed the Ministry of Community Development and Social Services (MCDSS) in November 1997 to: (a) Serve as a focal point for all poverty-related programmes in the country; (b) Coordinate all poverty-related interventions in the country; and (c) Spearhead the preparation of a comprehensive, coherent National Poverty Reduction Action Plan (NPRAP). MCDSS was supported by the UNDP. Following consultations with key stakeholders including civil society and the donors, the Government presented its action plan at the Consultative Group meeting in Paris in May 1998. However, this homegrown process got overwhelmed when the IMF announced the replacement of its Enhanced Structural Adjustment Facility (ESAF) by the new Poverty Reduction and Growth Facility (PRGF). It now became a requirement for every developing country to prepare a PRSP before it could access the new concessional borrowing facilities, including debt relief. In Zambia the Ministry of Finance and Economic Development (MOFED) was to be the overall coordinator for the PRSP in place of the MCDSS (Chizhuka and Mahoney, 2005).

3.2 Formulation of PRSP: the participation dimension

As we see in the table below, the formulation process was done earlier and at a much higher pace in Tanzania and Uganda than in Zambia and Malawi. The ministry of finance was responsible for the process, except in Tanzania where a Poverty Reduction Unit at the Vice President's Office pulled the strings. On the paper, RPOs were equally well represented in the main venues of the PRSP process. However, when going into how the PRSP formulation was practised, *Malawi*, and perhaps *Zambia* and *Uganda*, stand out as countries where the process was quite open and participatory. The participation seems to have left a lot to desire in Tanzania.

¹⁴ In Malawi, the National Smallholder & Farmer Association of Malawi (NASFAM) was fortunate to have developed its Policy Platform through a very participatory process among its grassroot members, before PRSP, in connection with Malawi Agriculture Sector Investment Programme (MASIP) which was launched in 1999. (The development director, National Smallholder & Farmer Association of Malawi (NASFAM). Interview with the author, Lilongwe, 04/11/05)

Table 3.2 *The organisation of PRSP formulation process*

	Malawi	Zambia	Tanzania	Uganda
PRSP formulation started	October 2000	June 2000	October 1999	January 2000 (Revision of PEAP)
PRSP formulation completed	May, 2002	May 2002 ¹⁵	October 2000	May 2000
Gov't institutions responsible for the process	Ministry of Finance & Economic Planning	Ministry of Finance and Economic Development	Vice President's Office (Poverty Reduction Unit)	Ministry of Finance, Planning & Economic Development
RPOs represented in the main venues of the PRSP process	NASFAM; Civil Society Agriculture network CISANET)	Zambia National Farmers Union; Agriculture Consult-ative Forum (ACF)	Mviwata (national); Angonet (Arusha region);	UCA, UNFFE, UCFA, through: the Private Sector Foundation.

Sources: Chizhuka and Mahoney, 2005; Jonathan and Kimambo, 2005; Mugisha and Barungi, 2005; Nakhumwa, 2005.

Malawi: The first stage in the preparation of the PRSP document was the planning itself of the whole process and the production of an 'Issues Paper' by the Technical Committee, based on pre-existing documents. The Issues Paper (October 2000) quoted the list of groups in poverty contained in the policy framework for the Poverty Alleviation Programme (PAP).

The 'mobilisation' stage of the PRS began in January 2001 with the official launch of the process, followed by discussions based on the Issues Paper. This led to the launching of the Thematic Working Groups (TWGs), of which altogether 21 were established and given specific Terms of Reference (ToR). The selection of topics for TWGs was no doubt influenced by the Issues Paper and by PRSP processes undertaken in other countries. It was also to some extent influenced by pressure groups within Malawi. In response to demands by NGOs (with backing from donors) civil society organisations were also invited as members of TWGs, and, finally, two members of the drafting committee were NGO representatives.

The 'consultation' stage was initially planned to be very short, but in response to demands, mainly from the NGO community, this was considerably extended – from 3 to 18 months. The extension of the time period also allowed more opportunity for consultations during 2001. These were (in chronological order): District Consultations (February); commenting workshops (May); stakeholders (May); drafting of MPRS (September–October); commenting workshop (October); Principal Secretaries' comments on draft (October); Members of Parliament comments (October); briefing and comments by Cabinet (November); donors' comments (November); national symposium (January 2002). The final draft was ready in April 2002 (McNeill et al, 2004).

Zambia: The government set up eight working groups to carry out consultation, each with representation from civil society, the government and the private sector.¹⁶ The Zambian government had plans for extending its consultations on PRSP throughout the country. At

¹⁵ Approved by the Cabinet

¹⁶ See Appendix 2 (the report of Chizhuka and Mahoney, 2005) with list of Zambian organisations participating.

the same time, it acknowledged that civil society had already begun to pave the way. A coalition called Civil Society for Poverty Reduction (CSPR) was set up by Jubilee 2000-Zambia, the campaign for debt cancellation (Chizhuka and Mahoney, 2005).

During most parts of 2000, the CSPR undertook a series of regional conferences in eight districts. The stated objectives of the conferences were: to facilitate meaningful civil society participation in the PRSP process in Zambia; to sensitize local communities on the PRSP process and the debt issue; and to mobilize local communities toward the PRSP process and the debt cancellation campaign of Jubilee 2000-Zambia. The conferences built on the existing and extensive network of the Catholic Commission for Justice and Peace (CCJP). Indeed it was the CCJP groups that opened the doors in each community for the conferences to take place. Four provinces were selected to be consulted for input to the PRSP, two districts in each province. Locally based CSOs participated in each district, with approximately 50 persons. Women arrived in larger numbers than men; in some cases 60% were women. Participants were representatives of marketeer's associations, peasant farmers, women's organisations, churches, traditional leaders, CSOs and local government civil servants.

Summing up proposals from the provinces, CSPR presented its proposals in "Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper for Zambia – a Civil Society Perspective" in 2001. It called for long-term agricultural policy reforms, such that would meet the needs of the majority of the population being peasant farmers.

In addition, Zambia had the Agriculture Consultative Forum (ACF). ACF come out of the Zambia's Agricultural Sector Investment Programme (ASIP) consultative forum that started in 1996. ASIP, among other things sought to achieve a disengagement of the public sector direct involvement in the provision of agro-services in order to achieve accelerated economic growth. The ACF was to pioneer agricultural sector stakeholder participation in the process of policy formulation, among others and contribute to reform the agricultural sector by fostering Public/Private sector partnerships (Chizhuka and Mahoney, 2005).

Tanzania: The process of formulating the PRSP started in October 1999. A committee of 12 ministers and the governor of Bank of Tanzania was formed to steer a process of preparing the PRSP. The PRSP process was coordinated by the Vice President's Office through its Poverty Reduction Unit. The technical Committee prepared the final draft PRSP and organized consultation through the zonal and national PRSP workshops (Jonathan and Kimambo, 2005).

Uganda: In the PRSP process, the Ministry of Finance, Planning and Economic Development (MFPED) was the lead government institution. The ministry was involved in consultations to develop macroeconomic framework projections, studies and reviews such as the Uganda Participatory Poverty Assessment Project (UPPAP), sector reviews, Uganda National Household Survey (UNHS) and National Integrity Survey, and mobilization of consultative group meetings, working group discussions and all stakeholder consultation workshops. It was also the lead agency in document drafting (Mugisha and Barungi, 2005).

Table 3.3 *RPO perceptions of participation in the PRSP formulation*

Statement	Malawi	Zambia	Tanzania ¹⁷	Uganda
(1) "Our RPO participated very well in the PRSP process"	5	2	3 (2)	4
(2) "Ordinary members in our RPO were well incorporated into the PRSP process"	4	3	2 (1)	3
(3) "Ordinary members participated well through measures made by our own RPO"	4	3	2 (4)	2
(4) "Ordinary members participated well through arrangements of civil society participation made available by others (e.g. PRSP workshops in the districts)"	4	2	3 (2)	1
(5) "Our key representatives in the PRSP had a significant influence in agricultural issues"	5	3	4 (2)	3
(6) "Our key representatives in the PRSP had a significant influence in cross-cutting issues"	5	3	3 (3)	3
(7) "Our key representatives in the PRSP had a significant influence on the overall priorities and (macro-economic) policies"	4	2	4 (3)	2

Scores 1 to 5: 1=strongly disagree, 5=strongly agree

Source: Enquiry among select RPO-leaders, November 2005.

The table above indicates that national RPO-leaders in Malawi are more satisfied with their extent of participation than their colleagues in the three other countries. Between the respondents in Zambia, Tanzania and Uganda there were only minor differences – the Ugandan representatives thought their RPO participated quite well in the PRSP, while the Tanzanian representatives thought they had a significant influence in agricultural issues as well as in the overall priorities and (macro-economic) processes. Any way, the least satisfied is our sample small of RPO-leaders at the sub-national level (with scores written between brackets, in Tanzania).

Malawi: Other reports confirm that in Malawi the process was generally a participatory one, although some NGOs claim they had to be rather active to secure their place at the table, and were not always well kept well informed. (Jenkins and Tsoka, 2003; Bwalya et al, 2005). NGO representatives were members of several working groups, and even the drafting committee after intense lobbying. The planned timetable was certainly extended (by 15 months) to allow more consultation and deliberation (McNeill et al, 2004).

There were two RPO-representatives among the 10 members of the thematic working group on agriculture. One of them recalls she influenced the process quite a bit: "We were asked to produce an issue paper to contribute to Pillar 1, Pro-poor growth. The process was quite open, but some were more active than others. We [NASFAM] presented our policy platform to the working group, and this influenced the resulting issue paper".¹⁸

However, the RPO representation did not go deep into the organisation. The NASFAMs board of directors, with eight farmers and meeting every three months, discussed PRSP only once, when green light was given to bring the policy platform of the association into the process.¹⁹

¹⁷ Figure in brackets: indicates the assessment of a leaders of 5 selected RPOs in Tanzania: 4 micro-level RPOs and 1 branch of a macro NGO (Jonatahn & Kimambo)

¹⁸ The development director, National Smallholder & Farmer Association of Malawi (NASFAM). Interview with the author, Lilongwe, 04/11/05

¹⁹ Ibid.

Zambia: Also in Zambia there was extensive non-state participation. The participation process in the formulation of PRSP has been characterised as reasonably good by an international research team (Bwalya et al, 2005). However, much of the participation was due to initiatives from the civil society itself (see above). The participation did not reach up to the level of the drafting committee. In the PRSP Working Group of Agriculture, there were 20 participants: 10 government technocrats, 5 representatives from donor agencies, and 5 representatives of the civil society/private sector: Zambian National Farmers Union (ZNFU), Agriculture Consultative Forum (ACF), National Union of Plantation and Agricultural Workers (NUPAW), Women for Change, and Programme against Malnutrition. The two latter were NGOs advocating mainly the interests of the peasant farmers, and they were linked to the Civil Society Poverty Reduction (CSPR) campaign that had set up a Consultative Group for Agriculture and Food Security. In this group there were 9 organisations represented, most of them NGOs and advocacy groups. Nevertheless, the outgrower arrangements were not part of this process, and it is claimed that "the RPOs were not adequately consulted" (Chizhuka and Mahoney, 2005).

Tanzania: The zonal workshops were mainly aimed at soliciting views from the grassroots stakeholders. They were concurrently conducted during the 11th and 12th May 2000 in seven zones of mainland Tanzania. The zones include Lake zone, Western zone, Northern zone, Central zone, Southern Highland zone, Southern zone and Eastern zone. Each district was represented by 4 villagers (sampled randomly from 2 villages), one district councillor, one town councillor and one District Executive Director (DED). For every zonal workshop civil society was represented by 5 NGO (One person each). The national workshops were conducted through working group sessions, followed by plenary presentations. To ensure active participation villagers were grouped according to regions and gender, councillors by region, DEDs by region and NGOs by zones (Jonathan and Kimambo, 2005).

Although the non-state participation at the final consultation stage was quite massive, the lack of inputs at the prior stages and absence of civil society (and RPO) representatives in the final drafting committees made participation less impressive. One of the main findings of Gould and Ojanen's study of the PRSP process in Tanzania was that the actual consultations were "shallow and tendentious". "The informed and professional input of the main non-state advocacy coalition was sidelined when it raised issues that were out of step with the donor/state consensus. 'Zonal' meetings for rural citizens were thrown together in an ad hoc fashion for a haphazard assembly. The wish-lists of village representatives were recorded in the policy paper, but the underlying causes of these needs were not analysed or reflected in the formulation of the policy" (Gould and Ojanen, 2003:7).

Uganda: The NGO Forum was a key player in the PEAP revision and PRSP formulation. The Forum carried out inter-CSO and CSO-Local governments consultations. The CSOs were represented by the Civil Society Task Force on the steering committee, with the Uganda Debt Network plying a leading role (Mugisha and Barungi, 2005).

Among the RPOs that participated are Uganda Cooperative Alliance (UCA), Uganda National Farmers Federation (UNFFE), Uganda Commercial Farmers Association (UCFA), and Agricultural Council of Uganda (ACU). Clearly, the period between PRSP drafting and producing the final document was too short to allow effective participation of all the RPOs or their representatives countrywide. As such, most of their views were solicited and presented by the Private Sector Foundation (PSF). The RPOs that participated reported that they were satisfied with the performance of PSF. This, however, means that the level of participation was limited to submitting views rather than debating

them in the process. Representatives of RPOs did not participate up to authoritative decision making level. Their input was up to draft level and the final draft was largely a government decision. To some extent, however, they had an influence in some issues, especially agricultural issues.

But even then, the small RPOs and ordinary members continue to be under represented. The participation of ordinary members was limited because the time was short, the RPOs lacked funds to facilitate measures within their organizations to deepen participation, and there were many other interest groups joining the process, hence the reduction of the number of participating RPO members. According to UCA, consultations were mainly at upper levels due to financial constraints, implying limited reach of the ordinary members. The issue of incorporating the marginalized or disadvantaged groups within RPOs was not discussed during the consultation workshops, but this was considered within the civil CSOs (Mugisha and Barungi, 2005).

Table 3.4 *The main 'pillars' of the resulting PRSP*

Malawi	Zambia	Tanzania	Uganda
1.Rapid sustainable pro-poor economic growth and structural transformation.	1.Sustained economic growth and employment, with agriculture as main engine	1.Economic growth & reduction of income poverty	1.Economic growth and transformation
2.Human capital development.	2.Target the poor and shield them against the adverse impacts of economic reforms	2.Improved quality of life and social well being	2.Good governance and security
3.Improving the quality of life of the most vulnerable.	3.Crosscutting themes: HIV/AIDS, gender and environment	3.Good governance and accountability	3.Increasing the ability of the poor to raise their incomes
4.Good governance.			4.Directly increase the quality of the life of the poor

Sources: Chizhuka and Mahoney, 2005; Jonathan and Kimambo, 2005; Mugisha and Barungi, 2005; Nakhumwa, 2005.

Never mind the different forms and degrees of civil society participation, the PRSP processes seem to have resulted in the same conclusions and 'pillars' in the four countries, as summarised in the table above. This might indicate that 'framing' of the process across the countries by the transnational institutions like IMF and World Bank was quite effective (Prestegard, 2005). PRSP involved, necessarily, complex trade-offs between different objectives and interests. On the one hand were those with a 'welfarist' approach, taking a certain level of state resources (including donor funds) as a given and seeks to distribute them fairly with a bias in favour of expenditure on social sectors such as health and education, as well as food security. (McNeill et al, 2004). They might also be more concerned with 'livelihood improvements of the poor' including food security (Prestegard, 2005: 115-116).

On the other hand were the advocates of 'growth' (Prestegard, *ibid.*). They argued that poverty is indeed the crucial issue, but unless the PRS contributed to an increase in national economic growth, Malawi would effectively condemn itself to a permanent state of international welfare recipient. Some argued strongly that the PRSP does not accord

enough attention to economic growth and that investment in, for example, tourism and infrastructure could be labelled ‘Poverty Priority Expenditure’ (McNeill et al, 2004).²⁰

3.3 Implementation of PRSP

Table 3.5 *RPO perceptions of participation in the implementation of PR*

Statement	Malawi	Zambia	Tanzania²¹	Uganda
(8) “Our RPO has participated well in the follow-up process and implementation of the Poverty Reduction Strategy, through an institutionalised consultation or participatory monitoring”	4	3	3 (1)	3

Scores 1 to 5: 1=strongly disagree, 5=strongly agree

Source: Enquiry among select RPO-leaders, November 2005.

Also in the implementation of the Poverty Reduction Strategy the national RPO leaders in Malawi are more satisfied with their extent of participation, while the sub-national RPO-leaders (in Tanzania) are strongly dissatisfied (table above).

²⁰ In practice, of course, the implications of the choice between these two approaches are not clear-cut. Expenditure on primary education, for example, can certainly be seen as both pro-poor and an investment in the future of the country with good economic returns. The same could be said for health. Thus, these sectors have come out as the biggest ‘winners’ of the PRSP process.

²¹ Figure in brackets: indicates the assessment of a leaders of 5 selected RPOs in Tanzania: 4 micro-level RPOs and 1 branch of a macro NGO (Jonatahn & Kimambo)

Table 3.6 *PRSP monitoring and evaluation*

	Malawi	Zambia	Tanzania	Uganda
The monitoring and reporting system for the follow-up of the PRSP	Review processes include stakeholders workshops, district workshops, and thematic working groups.	-Intermediate and final indicators -Gov't led M+E	-Tanzania social –economic data base	Established National Integrated Monitoring and Evaluation Strategy (NIMES).
The main M&E outputs	Annual progress reports -2002/3 (2004) -2003/4 (2005)	Progress reports -March 2003 -December 2004	-3 annual progress reports - various participatory poverty assessment -Research reports	National Policy and Program Performance Status Reports produced (every 6 months); Sectoral Joint Review Reports (every 6 months)
Any overall evaluation of the PRSP? If so, by whom/when?	September 2005 by Ministry of Economic Planning and Development	1.Ministry of Finance & National Planning (MFNP) , 2004 2.Civil Society for Poverty Reduction (CSPR), 2005 ²²	Review in 2004, by the Poverty Reduction Unit under the Vice President Office	Evaluated and revised in 2004 (2004/05-2007/08 Plan) MFPED

Sources: Chizhuka and Mahoney, 2005; Jonathan and Kimambo, 2005; Mugisha and Barungi, 2005; Nakhumwa, 2005.

As to final evaluations or reviews, *Zambia* stands out as a country with solid contributions from non-state actors: the Civil Society for Poverty Reduction (CSPR) coalition and the Agriculture Consultative Forum (ACF). The latter entity also saw to, alongside a contribution from the Monitoring Team of the responsible Ministry, that there was a separate review of the agriculture sector in the PRSP (Chizhuka and Mahoney, 2005).

The remaining part of this sub-section will present the main (follow-up) activities of the PRSP, with particular reference to the agriculture sector, the overall evaluation of these activities, and the second wave after 2004 of poverty strategies.

²² In addition, there were separate agriculture-based evaluations of the PRSP carried out by the Monitoring Team of the Ministry of Finance & National Planning in 2004 and of the Agriculture Consultative Forum in 2005 (?), respectively.

Table 3.7 *PRSP follow-up activities*

	Malawi	Zambia	Tanzania	Uganda
Key plans or strategies for the agricultural sector	Malawi Agriculture Sector Investment Programme (MASIP)	2002-2005: Agricultural Commercialisation Programme (ACP)	2000-2005: Agriculture Development Programme	Plan for Modernization of Agriculture (PMA), 2000
Key plans or strategies across sectors	2006-2010: Malawi Economic Growth Strategy (MEGS)	2002-2005: Transitional National Development Plan (TNDP) 2006-2011: 5 th National Dev. Plan	2005-2010: National Strategy for Growth and Reduction of Poverty ('MKUKUTA')	Revised PEAP/PRSP 2004

Sources: Chizhuka and Mahoney, 2005; Jonathan and Kimambo, 2005; Mugisha and Barungi, 2005; Nakhumwa, 2005.

Malawi: The Malawi Agriculture Sector Investment Programme (MASIP) from 1999 actually preceded the PRSP. Key plans or specific strategies for the agricultural sector included increasing agricultural incomes, input subsidy and other safety net programs, and sustainable utilisation of natural resources. Also relevant were plans to boost agro-processing industry, tourism and small-scale mining. Equally important for rural development was a Decentralisation/local government reform programme and a Public Sector Investment Plan (PSIP).

Like in other countries with PRSP, the government defined certain expenditure items as Poverty Priority Expenditure (PPE) to show the donors and the general public that it takes the PRSP seriously. When the HIPC funds were integrated into the budget it was a stringent World Bank condition to retain the PPE. The PPE criteria should not be changed until the comprehensive PRSP review three years after its inception. The PPEs in Malawi account for about 20 per cent of the budget and are supposedly protected from cuts within the volatile cash budget context. "The first progress report showed that there were changes in the budget allocations after PRSP. There was a net increase in the PPE".²³

However, as stated earlier, the PRSP involved complex trade-offs between different objectives and interests, and these were to some extent glossed over in the implementation and subsequent state budgets. A RPO-representative acknowledged that in the first budget after PRSP was launched, for 2002/03, there was a real link to the PRSP priorities. Unfortunately, "*after that the steam went out of the process..* There was no new inflow of resources to agriculture. Agricultural productivity was not looked into. Food security, safety nets, and subsidies became more important, probably because of the pending national elections".²⁴

The review carried out in September 2005 by Ministry of Economic Planning and Development highlighted that outcome and output lacked comparable targets against which to measure progress of implementation, and that there was.

1. little adherence to implementation of Malawi PRSP activities,

²³ Asst. Chief Economist. Malawi Ministry of Economic Planning & Development . Interview with the author, Lilongwe, 07/11/05.

²⁴ The development director, National Smallholder & Farmer Association of Malawi (NASFAM). Interview with the author, Lilongwe, 04/11/05

2. lack of guidelines to assist sectors translate PRSP activities into the budget,
3. diversion of resources meant for PRSP activities to fund non-priority other recurrent expenditures.

A key civil servant summarises: “In general our monitoring system is weak, from grassroots and upwards. The implementation was hampered by the fact that the main donors were freezing the grants. Mainly the IMF and WB, followed by the others, withheld support.”²⁵

Although the Malawi PRSP outlined various activities and strategies for achieving pro-poor growth, it did not articulate in detail how this growth will be brought about. The new Growth Strategy Paper (GSP) outlines a Malawi Economic Growth and Development Strategy (MEGS) for 2006-2010. It identifies those sectors and sub-sectors with growth potential, and outlines necessary actions that need to be undertaken in order to exploit this growth potential (Nakhumwa, 2005). “In order to make food security sustainable, we must look at agricultural productivity through irrigation etc., the income side. That is higher on the agenda now., in the new Growth Strategy”.²⁶ “The previous focused mainly on small scale production. Now we also work with large scale production, trade and export promotion (...) We are optimistic now, because Malawi this year reached the HIPC Completion Point. Our macro-economic management is now deemed sound, in terms of debt level, inflation level etc. More funds will now be released for growth and development.”²⁷

Zambia: The key plans for the agricultural sector 2002-2005 were embodied in the Agricultural Commercialisation Programme (ACP). It emphasised farm productivity (input pack support programme, extension services, land & infrastructure development), outgrower Schemes, crop diversification and market competitiveness (maize marketing) (Chizhuka and Mahoney, 2005).

The Ministry of Finance & National Planning carried out a participatory assessment among selected rural communities in 2004. It concluded that the goals of PRSP are still valid, although with more emphasis needed on food security. The Agriculture Consultative Forum concluded in its review that although the government’s inputs had been marginal, support to outgrower schemes had positive effects, particularly the tobacco schemes in the Central and Southern provinces. Agricultural commodity markets have developed

Across sectors, a Transitional National Development Plan (TNDP) was elaborated for the 2002-2005 period to coordinate the poverty reduction interventions. The Civil Society for Poverty Reduction held that the level of achievement can best be described as modest. The implementation of the PRSP had been slow due to a number of bottlenecks such as weak capacities in implementing agencies, and slow and intermittent flow of funding. Besides, poverty reduction was implemented as monotype interventions, and therefore did not holistically address issues of poverty.

However, the Transitional National Development Plan laid the foundations for the 2006-2011 Fifth National Development Plan (FNDP) (Chizhuka and Mahoney, 2005).

²⁵ Asst. Chief Economist. Malawi Ministry of Economic Planning & Development. Interview with the author, Lilongwe, 07/11/05.

²⁶ The development director, National Smallholder & Farmer Association of Malawi (NASFAM). Interview with the author, Lilongwe, 04/11/05

²⁷ Asst. Chief Economist. Malawi Ministry of Economic Planning & Development. Interview with the author, Lilongwe, 07/11/05.

Tanzania: The key strategies for the agricultural sector 2000-2005 was the agriculture development programme. It was supported by an agricultural marketing policy, a national micro finance policy, a rural development strategy, and a small and medium enterprise development policy. Also important for rural development has been the Local Government Reform Programme (2000-2008) (Jonathan and Kimambo, 2005).

The PRSP process after year 2000 was reviewed in 2004 by the Poverty Reduction Unit under the Vice President Office. The review led to the formulation of the National Strategy for Growth and Reduction of Poverty (abbreviated 'Mkukuta' in Swahili) for 2005-2010, launched in June 2005²⁸ (Jonathan and Kimambo, 2005).

Uganda: A key element of the PRSP (PEAP) was Plan for Modernization of Agriculture (PMA), 2000:, with aim of "eradicating poverty by transforming subsistence agriculture to commercial agriculture". The PMA was assisted by a programme for National Agricultural Advisory Services (NAADS), and the Ministry of Agriculture, Animal Industry & Fisheries was responsible in tandem with the Ministry of Finance, Planning & Economic Development (Mugisha and Barungi, 2005).

PEAP and PA were evaluated and revised by the Ministry of Finance, Planning & Economic Development in 2004, with plans until the 2007/08 budget year. The evaluation held that conflict related issues had not been adequately addressed, and that grouping of actions into four pillars (for the 2000 PEAP) did not fully reflect the institutional structure of government. The revised PEAP/PRSP 2004 contained five pillars: 1) Economic management; 2) Enhancing production, competitiveness and incomes; 3) Security, conflict resolution and disaster management; 4) Good governance; and 5) Human development (Mugisha and Barungi, 2005). It seems that the review process in Uganda has not been participatory in the sense that it has not incorporated extensive critique from the civil society and RPOs:

RPO representatives feel that follow up and implementation was ineffective due to two factors: (i) misallocation of funds and right out corruption because of political influence (interference from local political leaders), (ii) poorly designed programmes, coupled with bias among the highly ranked programme officials. They are not well acquainted with the real farming situation on the ground. As such they usually package the policy messages in ways inappropriate for efficient utilization by the rural poor, majority of whom are not educated. As a result, it was reported that the services hardly ever get to the intended beneficiaries (rural poor). The RPOs are of the view that PMA should be spearheaded or otherwise owned by farmers on the ground, with government and donor agencies simply providing financial and technical support (Mugisha and Barungi, 2005).

²⁸ See: United Republic of Tanzania, 2005.

4 Assessments of the impacts of PRSP

4.1 Impacts on poverty

Table 4.1 *RPO perceptions of PRSP's impact on poverty*

Statement	Malawi	Zambia	Tanzania ²⁹	Uganda
(11) "Overall, the PRSP has been followed by effective implementation and productive measures to reduce poverty in our country"	4	4	5 (2)	5

Scores 1 to 5: 1=strongly disagree, 5=strongly agree

Source: Enquiry among select RPO-leaders, November 2005.

The positive view of PRSP among national-level RPO-leaders, as shown in the table above, that "the PRSP has been followed by effective implementation and productive measures to reduce poverty in our country", is not supported by evidence.

In Malawi, the Integrated Household Survey from 2004 indicates that poverty has not reduced in the past 10 years (Nakhumwa, 2005). "There was no serious implementation of the PRSP. It had no impacts, poverty has not been reduced".³⁰

In Zambia, the evaluation carried out by Civil Society for Poverty Reduction (CSPR) concluded that poverty had not been reduced 2002-2004 (Chizhuka and Mahoney, 2005).

In Tanzania, the government declares that there has only been a "modest decline in poverty" the recent years, without referring to data later than 2001/1 (United Republic of Tanzania, 2005:4-5). 'Basic needs poverty' decreased from 38.6 percent in 1991/92 to 35.7 in 2000/01, according to Household Budget Surveys. This modest decline in poverty is accrued to "low annual average per capita real growth of only 0.6 percent during the 1990ies" (op.cit: 5). Although the GDP growth rate was 6.2 percent 2002, 5.6 percent in 2003 and 6.7 percent in 2004 (op.cit:1), growth has been mainly urban-based (op.cit.: 5)

In Uganda, the evaluation carried out by the Ministry of Finance, Planning & Economic Development claimed that poverty reduction strategy was on truck, in spite that poverty increased from 35% in 2000 to 38% by 2003 (Mugisha and Barungi, 2005). However, the Poverty Reduction Strategy "has not been followed by effective implementation and productive measures to reduce poverty in the country. This is instantly recognizable from the status of the poor, which has remained the same (if not worsened)." (Mugisha and Barungi, 2005).

²⁹ Figure in brackets: indicates the assessment of a leaders of 5 selected RPOs in Tanzania: 4 micro-level RPOs and 1 branch of a macro NGO (Jonatahn & Kimambo)

³⁰ The development director, National Smallholder & Farmer Association of Malawi (NASFAM). Interview with the author, Lilongwe, 04/11/05

In other words, there is no evidence in any of the four countries that poverty has been substantially reduced with the PRSP after year 2000.

4.2 Impacts on governance and policy-making

Table 4.2 *RPO perceptions of PRSP's impact on governance*

Statement	Malawi	Zambia	Tanzania ³¹	Uganda
(9) "Overall, the PRSP allowed for the most participatory policy-making process ever in our country"	5	2	3 (3)	5
(10) "Overall, the PRSP has made permanent changes afterwards in the way of governing and organising policy processes in our country"	4	5	5 (2)	5

Scores 1 to 5: 1=strongly disagree, 5=strongly agree

Source: Enquiry among select RPO-leaders, November 2005.

Among the RPO leaders, there is some disagreement as to whether "the PRSP allowed for the most participatory policy-making process ever in our country". This positive statement has full support in Malawi³² and Uganda³³, but only 50/50 support in Tanzania and Zambia. However, there is an agreement that "the PRSP has made permanent changes afterwards in the way of governing and organising policy processes in our country", except among sub-national RPO leaders (in Tanzania).

Malawi: "The PRS process appears to have increased strengthened the role of NGOs in society and in policy-making (...). NGOs do commission and use research in their lobbying, either directly vis-à-vis the civil service or indirectly through parliament (...). This assessment of activism is qualified by the fact that NGOs are also dependent on foreign funding and influenced by foreign personnel." (McNeill et al, 2004).

"The civil society is more pro-active in policy making now. The Civil Society in Agriculture Network CISANET initiated by NDI/USAID - is very important. In the follow up of PRSP, there have been some interaction between the Ministry of Agriculture and the RPO representatives, in ad hoc meetings. The cross-sector communication we experienced with the government in 2001 has been absent, though."³⁴

The preparations to the second PRSP has been quite participatory, according to the civil servant responsible for the process: "we have worked with two CSOs to capture data from the civil society and to draft the review of the first PRSP period.. The draft will be discussed in meetings in January with subsequently principal secretaries, donors, stakeholders, parliamentarians, and then we produce the final report". However, the Malawi Economic Growth and Development Strategy has been drafted by a small group

³¹ Figure in brackets: indicates the assessment of a leaders of 5 selected RPOs in Tanzania: 4 micro-level RPOs and 1 branch of a macro NGO (Jonatahn & Kimambo)

³² "Indeed, the PRSP was the most participatory process we ever had". The development director, National Smallholder & Farmer Association of Malawi (NASFAM). Interview with the author, Lilongwe, 04/11/05

³³ "The PRSP/PEAP allowed for the most participatory policy making process ever in Uganda because it was the very first time RPOs were called upon to express their views" (Mugisha and Barungi, 2005).

³⁴ The development director, National Smallholder & Farmer Association of Malawi (NASFAM). Interview with the author, Lilongwe, 04/11/05

of government officers. It is planned extensive consultations in the districts etc, and there will be thematic working groups on smaller themes within the agriculture. “We’ll include CISANET and Nasfam.” – “Any more participants?” – “No, there are so many players. We don’t have resources to accommodate them all. We use those with biggest own resources.”³⁵ Again, the civil society representation is there, albeit not very deep.

Zambia: Although the RPOs were not adequately consulted, there seem to be a general consensus among stakeholders that the PRSP has been a useful guiding document for the purpose of national development planning and economic management and poverty reduction. The two non-governmental evaluations of the process, point to the fact that the PRSP has been an attempt to target resources from the annual budgets to some development activities such as out grower schemes. It differed from the initial development plans that were not attached to the resource envelop (Chizhuka and Mahoney, 2005).

Even with the modest level of achievement, the additionality of the PRS approach is that it has at least led to a sharper focus on poverty reduction and a more open participatory process by the government and donors than was previously the case (Chizhuka and Mahoney, 2005).

Hence, the Fifth National Development Plan (FNDP) for 2006-2011 has been formulated through a widely consultative process. Work has predominantly been undertaken by the Sector Advisory Groups (SAGs) – which gave a big opportunity for stakeholders engagement (Chizhuka and Mahoney, 2005).³⁶

Tanzania: The review in 2004 carried out by the Poverty Reduction Unit under the Vice President Office was a bit more critical. It pointed out that

- popular and civil society participation in PRSP was ad hoc and limited
- CSOs lacked access to key documents and adequate feed-back mechanisms;
- there was inadequate capacity in CSOs as well as in key government institutions to engage in policy dialogue
- Inadequate analysis of the ‘voices of the poor’ (Jonathan and Kimambo, 2005).

Since the government recognised that economic growth has been mainly urban-based, the new strategy emphasises that “initiatives to support rural-oriented sectors will be emphasised to empower the rural populations to increase their productive capabilities” (United Republic of Tanzania, 2005:5). Hence, the RPOs seem to have kept up influence on the government’s policy statements.

However, in other aspects of policy-making, Tanzania seems to leave a lot to desire. The RPO informants in the Tanzanian country study referred to their participation in the 2004 review process leading to the formulation of the National Strategy for Growth and Reduction of Poverty for 2005-2010 at subnational – regional and district – levels (Jonathan and Kimambo, 2005), unlike in the other country reports where they referred to the formulation process starting in 1999 or 2000 and at the national level only. Thus, the Tanzanian RPOs’ lack of participation in 2004 indicates that the 1999-2000 process did

³⁵ Asst. Chief Economist. Malawi Ministry of Economic Planning & Development . Interview with the author, Lilongwe, 07/11/05.

³⁶ The zero draft of the plan was presented in September 2005. The launch of the plan: 1st week of January 2006.

not break new paths. It was very limited and did not institutionalise that new practices of deep-going stakeholder participation in policy-making .

Uganda: We have already referred to the participatory monitoring system set up after PRSP/PEAP revision in 2000. However, more documentation is needed on the extent of participation during the 2004 revision of PRSP/PEAP. It seems that the review and revision process in Uganda has not been participatory in the sense that it has not incorporated extensive critique from the civil society and RPOs.

5 Conclusive remarks

5.1 The experiences of the RPOs

To what extent were there variations as to ‘satisfactory participation’ by RPOs between the countries? The table below summarises our findings:

- The Malawi RPOs present reasons to be *very* satisfied
- The Zambian and Ugandan RPOs have reasons to be quite satisfied
- The Tanzanian RPOs convey messages that they are very dissatisfied.

Table 5.1 *Summary of civil society/RPO participation in the PRSP process*

	Malawi	Zambia	Uganda	Tanzania
Depth of participation	1	0	0	0
Scope of participation	1	1	1	0
Height of participation, Formulation phase	1	½	½	0
Height of participation, Implementation	0	½	½	0

Score: 1 = satisfied, 0 = dissatisfied, ½ = half satisfied, half dissatisfied.

‘Depth’ of participation refers to extent of grassroots involvement; ‘scope’ refers to involvement in more general and cross-cutting issue apart from rural/agricultural; and ‘height’ indicates how far up in the decision making process the RPO got – the extent of influence. In the implementation phase we refer to influence on the main monitoring and evaluation activity.

We suggest that only the Malawi RPO experienced participation of some depth. RPOs in Malawi, Zambia and Uganda enjoyed a relatively wide scope of participation. RPOs in Malawi and to less extent Zambia and Uganda feel they had some influence in the formulation process, while only in Zambia and Uganda they had a hand on the implementation process. The statements of influence are of course questionable; not even for Malawi is there strong evidence that the RPOs took part in joint decision-making beyond consultation.

Malawi: The PRSP process was experienced by the RPOs as the most participatory policy making process ever in the country; the RPOs participated in the thematic working groups, had a direct influence on a PRSP issue paper, and had indirect influence on the final plan through two CSO representatives in the drafting committee. Participation was deep - the main RPO had mobilised a great deal of its grassroots in advance of the PRSP, in the production of its own policy platform.. “The NGO community is widely considered

to have been empowered by the PRS process.” (McNeill et al, 2004). However, implementation was very weak, as was the monitoring system. Nevertheless, participation picked up in the review and revised PRS formulation process.

Zambia: The process was reasonably participatory. The Civil Society for Poverty Reduction (CPRS) campaign was very active, and the PRSP process contributed probably to the empowerment of the NGOs. The CSPR concluded that the PRSP process can essentially be taken to be an “eye-opener”, as development is not an overnight affair but a learning process, and that the PRSP was a useful guiding document for national development. There was a working group on agriculture with ample civil society representation. However, member-based RPOs played a less active role, in particular lower levels and local RPOs. (Chizhuka and Mahoney, 2005). The implementation process was not too bad. There was an active non-state participation in the review process, and the revised PRS has a participatory outlook.

Uganda: like in Malawi, the PRSP formulation process was experienced as the most participatory policy making process ever in the country, although the RPOs had no direct representation or influence on the working groups and committees drafting the plan, and only the upper levels of the RPOs were involved. Still, the civil society participated in a coordinated way. Implementation was very weak and could not be rescued by a well functioning monitoring system that was quite inclusive, if not participatory and transparent. However, the ultimate review process was not very participatory and responsive to CSO and RPO critique, although participation in the revised PRS formulation process in 2004 is deemed fair.

Tanzania: the sub-national RPOs selected for interviews “had no idea of PRSP” of year 2000, they had seen no effective policy measures to reduce poverty in the country, and the subnational RPO leaders were very little impressed by their participation and influence on the PRS revision process of year 2004 (Jonathan and Kimambo, 2005).

In terms of good practices, the government in Malawi seemed to accommodate non-state participation to a large extent. The civil society in Zambia showed how to mobilise itself and tap into the policy dialogue during early formulation as well as final evaluation of the policy. Uganda had a quite participatory set up for monitoring the policy implementation.

5.2 Patterns across countries

At the end of the day, has the PRSP paved the way for a new and more democratic-participatory way of governance and policy-making, or was it just an ad hoc gimmick promoted by the donor community?

There are different opinions of the PRSP process in the research community. If we distinguish between formulation and implementation phase of policy making, reports on Malawi and Tanzania provide two extreme opposites in viewpoints.

Policy formulation

In Malawi, the World Bank maintained a relatively ‘hands-off’ posture throughout the process, “although, as with others PRSPs, the document is heavily influenced by the guidelines and models available from the World Bank which create an expectation of what a PRSP would look like”. Overall, the process was a generally participatory one (McNeill et al, 2004).

In Tanzania, by contrast, the PRSP was “representing the views of a small, homogenous ‘iron triangle’ of transnational professionals based in key Government ministries and donor agencies”. Participation was ‘shallow and tendentious’ (Gould and Ojanen, 2003:7).

In our study the findings for the three countries Malawi, Uganda and Zambia are closer to McNeill et al’s observations than to those of Gould and Ojanen. Nevertheless, the latter’s critical assessments of Tanzania are shared by the sub-national RPO respondents from that country. Unlike the other RPO-leaders in our sample, they have not observed that PRSP has made any permanent changes in the way of governing and organising policy processes in Tanzania (Jonathan and Kimambo, 2005). On the other hand, the Tanzanian respondents may indicate the difference of organisational level rather than difference of country. They express the grassroots leaders’ viewpoints, not the national RPO leaders.

Policy implementation

McNeill et al report that they were frequently told in their interviews with both local and foreign respondents that “Malawi has excellent policies; the problem lies in their implementation. One respondent put it bluntly like this: ‘There is no government culture of delivery on policy’”. “The implementation problem was sometimes expressed as a problem of ‘political will’ but this probably simplifies the issue. It is not an unusual situation in government for there to be a gap between stated policy and actual performance, but this is especially pronounced in donor-dependent countries such as Malawi, where the gap is, in many cases, between the policies that the rulers favour and those that donors wish them to pursue” (McNeill et al, 2004). This applies not only to specific policies fields but also to the budget process itself (Rakner et al, 2004).

This problem was confirmed by our RPO respondent from Malawi, stating that “*there was no serious implementation of the PRSP. It had no impacts*”.³⁷

This ‘implementation problem’ is by Gould and Ojanen regarded as a symptom of deeper political-structural problem across the African continent: “[T]he sites and structures of policy implementation are overseen by a de facto single-party political establishment driven by clientelistic relations and procedures. In this context, public assets allocated for the reduction of poverty are highly susceptible to fungibility and abuse as the local politico-administrative elite can distribute resources among themselves via weakly regulated mechanisms of direct expenditures and subcontracting”.

Thus, in the assessments of the implementation problems there seem to be a convergence between McNeill et al, Gould and Ojanen, and the researchers contributing to our study. The analysis of Uganda comes close to Gould and Ojanen’s conclusions: The PRSP implementation was very poor because of interference from local political leaders leading to misallocation of funds and right out corruption (Mugisha and Barungi, 2005). However, more research is needed in order to relate all four countries in this study to the various suggested patterns of ‘participation politics’.

³⁷ The development director, National Smallholder & Farmer Association of Malawi (NASFAM). Interview with the author, Lilongwe, 04/11/05

5.3 Issues for follow-up action & research

From this study one can see three new issues for follow-up action and research:

1. Rural poverty: Has poverty not been reduced since 1999/2000? As we concluded earlier, there is no evidence in any of the four countries that poverty has been substantially reduced with the coming of PRSP. In particular, we need to establish the changes in the level of poverty in the rural population.
2. Governance: Have new paths for a more participatory governance and policy making been broken? If so, which lessons can be drawn for RPOs in other countries?
3. The linkage: Have eventual changes of governance had any impact on policy implementation and the level of poverty?

For the governance issue, it is recommended (i) to focus on the 2nd generation of Poverty Reduction Strategy (after 2004) and (ii) to compare Malawi and/or Zambia with Uganda and/or Tanzania in these policy processes.

Zambia and Malawi were at the time of research at an early stage of formulating the second national poverty reduction strategy. Hence, for these two countries the study could be the starting point for formative process research in the sense that the studies have the potential to inform on-going change processes. As McNeill et al (2004) point out, the 2000-2002 PRSP process empowered the NGOs, and this was to a large extent because of their commissioning and use of research. Could our research contribute to strengthening the RPOs influence in the policy making process? If so, what characterised the relationship between policy interventions and research?

Uganda and Tanzania had already finished formulating the revised poverty strategy. As we showed for Tanzania, the local RPOs' lack of participation in 2004 indicates that the 1999-2000 process did not break new paths. It was very limited and did not institutionalise any new practices of deep-going stakeholder participation in policy-making. Are the findings from Tanzania peculiar to that country, or may local RPO-leaders provide similar evidence for the other countries, too? The Uganda and Tanzania study could also look into what we above described as the 'implementation problem'. One could think that there are two sets of factors shaping the RPO influence: on the one hand its 'knowledge power' or capability to monitor and evaluate policy implementation and feed its members and the public with reliable own information; on the other hand the mechanisms of accountability built into rural-oriented poverty interventions.

The follow-up research should choose RPOs or group enterprises (associations, co-operatives, clubs etc.) that are producer oriented associations, have sufficient weight and a broad working arena. They should be membership organisations and part of the International Federation of Agricultural Producers. Both national, provincial and local levels of the RPO should be addressed. The questions could be related to the politics of participation in the following way:

- (i) Within the main RPO (or within other RPOs) To what extent was there a shallow or closed open participation from the RPO side – only full time professionals and/or elected national leaders, or extended to local and provincial grassroots leaders, rank and file activists? What was the size and composition of participants in terms of gender, age, social/occupational group, place/area of residence, political/social movement or background?

(ii) Among the RPOs, which organisations representing the most marginal and disadvantaged participated in the process? Which were excluded at different stages and levels of participation? Did one organisation act as the representative for all the RPOs at certain stages/levels? To what extent were the other RPOs satisfied with the performance of that main RPO?

(iii) Who were the overall organisers/facilitators of the policy process, and how were they recruited/trained for the purpose? To what extent was there a domination of the process by certain type of actors – like technocrats (including the consultants hired by the World Bank), certain professional NGO-leaders, representatives of local social and economic elites – and of certain sectors (mining, agriculture) or social interests (employers, labour)?

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Appendix 1

The PRSP process in Malawi

Malawi Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper-Status Report Draft Report

Teddie Oliver Nakhumwa (PhD)

University of Malawi

Bunda College of Agriculture

Center for Agricultural Research and Development

Box 219, Lilongwe-Malawi

Background Information

Malawi has a total surface area of 9,427,400 hectares of which 5.3 million ha can be put to agricultural use. The country is ranked 157th out of 174 countries in its human development, making it one of the poorest in the World. Malawi's annual per capita GNP was estimated at US\$160 in 2003 (World Bank, 2003).

The total population

Type of government

In 1994, Malawi transformed into a multi-party democratic system of government from previously one party dictatorial rule. The country adopted a new democratic constitution in 1995. The constitution established the institutions of democracy and enshrines fundamental freedoms and rights and established a number of constitutional watchdogs (for example, Office of the Ombudsman, Malawi Human Rights Commission). Since 1994, Government has moved to consolidate the fundamental transformation that introduced multiparty democracy.

Population, Illiteracy, Life Expectancy and Poverty Levels

According to the 1998 population census carried out by the National Statistics Office (NSO), Malawi has a total population of about 11 million people and 90% of the population lives in rural areas. The country has a low adult literacy rate, which was estimated at 58 percent in 1998. The low literacy rate is combined with gender disparity, with the female literacy rate estimated at 44 percent. There is very little difference between poor and non-poor households in regard to the proportion of primary school-aged children who are currently in school. However, poor children are likely to drop out of school before reaching Standard 5. Drop-out rates increase with the educational ladder and are higher for girls and in rural areas. The male drop-out rate was estimated at 9.5 percent while the female rate was at 14.1 percent³⁸.

Life Expectancy

Life expectancy in Malawi has dropped from 43 years at birth in 1996 to 39 years in 2000, partly as a result of the HIV/AIDS epidemic. Infant, child and maternal mortality rates in Malawi are high by global standards. In 2000, infant and under-five mortality rates were estimated to be 104 and 189 deaths per 1,000 live births, respectively. The maternal mortality rate in 2000 was 1,120 deaths per 100,000 live births³⁹. This might be due to limited access to health services as evidenced by a low percentage of births attended by health workers of 43 percent.

Poverty Levels

Although Malawi's agriculture sector has undergone some policy reforms, poverty continues to worsen. Key causes of poverty include limited access to land, declining soil fertility, low agricultural productivity, low education, poor health status, limited off-farm employment and a lack of access to credit. Poverty is more prevalent in rural areas than in urban areas. It is estimated that 66.5 percent of the rural population live in poverty as compared to 54.9 percent for urban areas. The poor, in this case, are defined as those whose consumption of basic needs (both food and non-food) is below the minimum level estimated at MK 10.4740 per day in 1998. However, nationally 28.7 % of the population

³⁸ Government of Malawi (2000) *Demographic and Health Survey*

³⁹ Government of Malawi (2000) *Malawi Demographic and Health Survey 2000*

⁴⁰ Average Exchange Rate in 1998 was MK31.1 = 1 US Dollar.

is categorised as living in extreme poverty (HIS, 1998). While as many as 90 percent of the population live in rural areas, 91.3 percent of the poor and 91.5 percent of the ultra poor also live in rural areas⁴¹.

The Southern Region has the highest proportion of poor households compared to the other two regions in the country. Using 1998 IHS data, 68.1 percent of the population in the Southern Region were poor as compared to 62.8 percent for the Central Region and 62.5 percent for the Northern Region. The Southern Region's poverty situation can partly be explained mainly by migration into the Region and by the small size of cropland holdings per capita estimated at 0.176 hectares compared to 0.257 hectares and 0.256 hectares for Central and Northern regions respectively.

Agricultural Sector in Malawi

Malawi lacks the mineral resource endowments of its neighbouring countries (Zambia, Mozambique and Tanzania). Agricultural land therefore, constitutes the primary natural resource for the Malawi economy. Agriculture in Malawi is characterized by a degree of dualism that has dichotomised the sector into smallholder and estate sub-sectors (Mkandawire et al, 1990). The dichotomy is essentially reflected in the tenurial systems under which land is cultivated. Smallholder agricultural production is predominantly on customary land. Under this system, land is the property of the community with individual user rights. Under customary land system, chiefs and village headmen are the custodians of land. Smallholder farmers usually have small, scattered and usually fragmented lands emanating mostly from population pressure and other socio-economic factors. The smallholder sub-sector is the backbone of Malawian agriculture occupying about two thirds (1.98 million hectares) of the total harvested agricultural land (FAO, 1998). Maize is the main crop grown under this predominantly subsistence farming system. This crop alone comprises 75 per cent of the total smallholder agricultural land in Malawi (Barbier and Burgess, 1992a). Other major subsistence crops include cassava, sorghum and sweet potatoes. Smallholder farmers also grow a number of cash crops such as burley tobacco, grain legumes (beans and groundnuts), cotton, coffee and spices.

Estate production occurs mainly on leasehold or freehold land. Estates are exclusively involved in cash crop production. Main cash crops are tobacco (dominant export crop), tea, coffee, sugarcane and macadamia nuts.

Agriculture accounts for over 80 per cent of Malawi's export revenue predominantly from tobacco, tea, sugar, and coffee. On the average, agricultural sector contributes about 34 per cent of the GDP. By 2001, the total labour force in Malawi was about 4.5 million and almost 84 per cent of this is engaged in agriculture. Over 90 per cent of the population that is engaged in agriculture lives in rural areas (GoM, 2001). The slow growth of the manufacturing sector in Malawi means that the agricultural sector will continue to shoulder the burden of providing a livelihood for a large proportion of the country's growing population.

The Malawi Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (MPRSP)

To consolidate its agricultural policies and enhance capacity, the Government embarked on the Malawi Agriculture Sector Investment Programme (MASIP) since the early 1990s. MASIP was based on coherent macroeconomic and sectoral policies, an appropriate

⁴¹ Government of Malawi (2000) *Profile of Poverty in Malawi: Poverty Analysis of the Integrated Household Survey 1998*

institutional framework and focused on priority activities resulting from a detailed public expenditure review. Among the problems it sought to address were:

- Insufficient local ownership and commitment;
- Lack of noticeable trickle-down effect from some individual projects;
- Projects not sustainable or maintained after initial implementation;
- Confusion and dissipation of effort caused by different approaches pushed by different donors;
- Excessive number of expatriate technical assistance personnel;
- Weakening of government capacity by the creation of donor-financed project units;

The Malawi Government launched the Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP) in June 2002. The PRSP in Malawi involved an extensive participatory process from 2000 that involved consultation and active participation of many stakeholders from all parts of Malawian society including key Rural Producer Organisations (RPOs) such as the National Smallholder Farmer Association of Malawi (NASFAM). Such extension consultation and participation was only possible due to the willingness of participants to volunteer their time and ideas, and the dedication of the Technical Committee and Drafting Team. The strategy is based on the submissions from the 21 Thematic Working Groups, led by relevant Ministries with membership from Government, Parliament, NGOs, faith based organisations, academia, employers associations and the donor community. Financial support from the donor partners was also crucial in ensuring the success of the process. Table 1 below shows perception of the MPRSP process in Malawi by RPOs.

The MPRSP recognises that increasing agricultural incomes is key to poverty reduction, growth and employment and its strategy focuses on expanding access to agricultural inputs; improving research and extension services, introducing smallholder friendly technologies, improving access to markets; reducing land shortage and degradation; increasing investment in irrigation and developing farmer co-operatives and associations.

The MPRS is built around four strategic pillars. These pillars are the main strategic components grouping the various activities and policies into a coherent framework for poverty reduction. The first pillar contains strategies that will enhance rapid sustainable pro-poor economic growth and structural transformation. In the second pillar, strategies focus on human capital development. The third pillar captures strategies on improving the quality of life of the most vulnerable. The fourth pillar covers issues of good governance. Cross cutting issues including HIV/AIDS, Gender, Environment and Science and Technology, are mainstreamed in all four pillars of the MPRS.

Table 1: *RPOs Participation (the case of NASFAM)*

Statement	Malawi
Scores 1-5; 1=strongly disagree 2= disagree 3=agree 4=strongly agree 5=don't know	
"Our RPO participated very well in the PRSP process"	4
"Ordinary members in our RPO were well incorporated into the PRSP process"	3
"Ordinary members participated well through measures made by our own RPO"	3
"Ordinary members participated well through arrangements of civil society participation made available by others (e.g. PRSP workshops in the districts)"	3
"Our key representatives in the PRSP had a significant influence in agricultural issues"	4
"Our key representatives in the PRSP had a significant influence in cross-cutting issues"	4
"Our key representatives in the PRSP had a significant influence on the overall priorities and (macro-economic) policies"	3
"Our RPO has participated well in the follow-up process and implementation of the Poverty Reduction Strategy, through an institutionalised consultation or participatory monitoring"	3
"Overall, the PRSP allowed for the most participatory policy-making process ever in our country"	4
"Overall, the PRSP has made any permanent changes afterwards in the way of governing and organising policy processes in our country"	3
"Overall, the PRSP has been followed by effective implementation and productive measures to reduce poverty in our country"	3

MPRSP Pillars

Pillar One:-Pro-Poor Growth

Pillar 1 is divided into two main elements: the promotion of specific sectoral sources of pro-poor growth, and the creation of an enabling environment for pro-poor growth. It is recognised that the driving force for growth will be the private sector. The role of Government, NGOs and donors is merely to facilitate this growth, by creating an enabling environment and providing specific support for the identified specific sectoral sources of pro-poor growth. This support is generally focussed on economically empowering the poor and supporting Micro, Small and Medium enterprises and sectors in which the poor are active. However, such support is unlikely to be sufficient in generating the level of economic activity necessary for sustainable poverty reduction and lessening dependence on donor financing. Thus, the MPRS does not neglect the crucial role of the large scale private sector in generating investment, employment, tax revenue and foreign exchange. Growth prospects also depend on developments in the other Pillars. For example, issues of education and health contained in Pillar 2 are critical for medium to long term growth prospects through improvements in human capital and productivity. Improving on issues of corruption, governance, parastatal reform, security and the rule of law (especially property rights), all covered in Pillar 4, are similarly crucial for the investment climate. Sustainable pro-poor growth also requires the mainstreaming of cross-cutting issues in all interventions. Government, development partners and the private sector must take measures to address the HIV/AIDS pandemic if productivity, savings rates and human capital are not to decline.

The key specific sectoral source of pro-poor growth in the medium term is agriculture. Efforts will also be made to diversify into sectors with greater value-addition, especially through Micro, Small and Medium Scale Enterprises (MSMEs). The key sectors

identified for diversification are natural resources, manufacturing, tourism and small-scale mining.

Pillar Two:- Human Capital Development

It is believed that a healthy and educated nation leads to increased productivity, better income distribution and a generally improved standard of living. A deteriorating health situation undermines the ability of individuals to lift themselves out of poverty and leads to a general decline in productivity. Similarly, an uneducated population does not understand and appreciate the need and means for achieving higher incomes, reducing infant mortality and population growth as well as improving nutrition and health. Functionally, the major economic sectors of agriculture and industry demand an educated, skilled and healthy workforce to take on the new challenges and aspirations of the sectors. At the same time, with appropriate human capital, the public and private sectors, civil society and poor people themselves will be able to positively influence and impact on processes and outcomes of the entire poverty reduction strategy.

Statistics show that there is much room for improvement on human capital in Malawi. The country faces one of the highest illiteracy rate which stands at 42%, lack of skills development due to inappropriate education curricula at all levels and low access and intake into technical, entrepreneurial and vocational training institutions and, low life expectancy at birth (39 years) mainly due to the HIV/AIDS epidemic. Malnutrition is also high among children resulting into about half of all the children being stunted and 30 percent underweight.

In order to address these problems, this pillar has four goals, ensuring the development of human capital through implementation of education, technical, vocational and entrepreneurial education and training (TEVET), health, and nutrition programmes.

Pillar Three:- Improving the Quality of Life of the Most Vulnerable

The overall goal of the third pillar is to ensure that the quality of life of the most vulnerable is improved and maintained at an acceptable level by providing moderate support to the transient poor and substantial transfers to the chronically poor (safety nets).

The most vulnerable are broadly defined to include individuals or households affected by disasters; households headed by orphaned children, elderly and single-parents (especially female headed); persons with disabilities; under-five children, lactating and pregnant mothers; orphans in streets, orphanages, foster homes and extended family member households, the unemployed and underemployed in urban areas; the land constrained in rural areas; and technology-constrained small-scale farmers. It is noted, however, that this general categorisation does not mean that all people or households falling under these categories are the most vulnerable. The determining factor is their ability to meet their basic needs.

Pillar Four:-Good Governance

Even with the best strategies for pro-poor growth, human capital and safety nets, poverty will not be reduced unless there is development-oriented governance. Good governance in this sense consists of three elements: political will and mindset, security and justice, and responsive and effective public institutions. For example, the technical design of the MPRS will be irrelevant unless there is the political, bureaucratic and popular will to implement it. The poor must also be protected from crime, violence, arbitrary state power and injustice. Finally, public institutions must be transparent and held accountable (including through checks and balances) so that they are responsive to the needs of the poor and effective in the implementation of the strategies outlined in this paper. The

overall objective of Pillar 4 is therefore to ensure that public institutions and systems protect and benefit the poor.

MPRS Implementation, Monitoring and Evaluation

Monitoring and evaluation of the MPRS implementation is key to the achievement of the goals of the MPRS. MPRS implementation has been monitored using various indicators provided in the action plan for each component of the MPRS. Monitoring and evaluation of these various levels of indicators is done at national, district and local levels. The monitoring and evaluation were done through annual reviews. Review process included stakeholders' workshops, district workshops, and thematic working groups.

MPRSP has been reviewed at least two times since its launch in 2002. The first review brought in light a number of challenging issues during implementation period. These challenges included; little adherence to implementation of MPRSP activities, lack of guidelines to assist sectors to translate MPRSP activities into budget and diversion of resources meant for MPRSP activities to fund non-priority other recurrent transactions related expenditures (GoM, 2003). MPRSP first phase came to an end in June 2005. Evaluation of the MPRSP was in progress as of September 2005. Although findings of the MPRSP evaluation have not come out, 2004 Integrated Household Survey (HIS) results indicate that despite the launch of the MPRSP, poverty has not reduced in the past 10 years.

The central philosophy of the MPRSP is economic empowerment and nowhere in the strategy paper is this better manifested than in pillar one, which focuses on pro-poor growth. The tenet of this pillar is that one sure way of reducing poverty is to stimulate growth in Malawi's key productive sectors and ensuring that such growth takes place to the direct benefit of the poor. However, although MPRSP outlines various activities and strategies for achieving pro-poor growth, it does not articulate in detail how this growth will be brought about. It is for this reason that the government developed a Growth Strategy Paper (GSP). The GSP identifies those sectors and sub-sectors with growth potential, and outlines necessary actions that need to be undertaken in order to exploit this growth potential. It is believed that Pillar one of the MPRSP will be collapsed together with the Malawi Growth Strategy and tapping from the experiences drawn from MPRSP evaluation, will input into a new strategy formulation for the next phase.

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Attachment: Membership of Thematic Working Groups (MPRSP)

Agriculture Thematic Working Group

Dr.	C.B.	Chizonda (Chair)	Ministry of Agriculture
Mr.	S.	Jobe	Action Aid
Mr.	D.B.	Maluwa	ADMARC
Dr.	M.	Kwapata	Bunda College of Agriculture
Dr.	Harry	Potter	DFID
Ms.	S.	Grange	EU Delegation
Mr.	Bart	Messinne	EU Delegation
Dr.	G.	Chinkhuntha	Freedom Gardens
Mr.	Ian N.	Kumwenda	MASIP
	E.	Manda	MASIP
	Jollam	Banda	Ministry of Agriculture
	R.J.	Chapweteka	Ministry of Agriculture
Mr.	Z.D.	Chikhosi	Ministry of Agriculture
Dr.	E.	Chilembwe	Ministry of Agriculture
Dr.	D.O.	Chinombo	Ministry of Agriculture
	Masozi	Kachale	Ministry of Agriculture
Mr.	D.	Kamputa	Ministry of Agriculture
Mr.	Ben	Mkomba	Ministry of Agriculture
Mr.	E.K.	Mphande	Ministry of Agriculture
Mr.	A.R.E.	Mwenda	Ministry of Agriculture
	M.H.L.	Sande	Ministry of Agriculture
	F.W.	Kaimila	MRFC
Mrs.	Betty	Chinyamunyamu	NASFAM
	B.B.	Kaunda	SCFT
Mr.		Chirambo	TAMA
Mr.	Francis W.	M'buka	World Bank

Appendix 2

The PRSP process in Zambia

Review of the PRSP process in Zambia and of the involvement of Rural Producer Organizations.

**Agri-business Forum
December 2005**

**Prepared by
Felix Chizhuka and Sula Mahoney**

Acronyms

ACP	Agricultural Commercialisation Programme
CS	Civil Society
CSO	Civil Society Organisation
CCDJP	Catholic Commission for Justice, Development and Peace
CCER	Civil Coordinator for Emergency and Reconstruction
CSPR	Civil Society for Poverty Reduction
FSP	Fertiliser Service Product
FRA	Food Reserve Agency
HIPC	Highly Indebted Poor Country
I-PRSP	Interim Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper
JCTR	Jesuit Centre for Theological Reflection
MTEF	Medium Term Expenditure Framework
NDP	National Development Plan
NGO	Non Governmental Organisation
OSP	Outgrower Support Programme
PR	Poverty Reduction
PRP	Poverty Reducing Programmes
PRSP	Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper
RPOs	Rural Producer Organisations
SAP	Structural Adjustment Programme
SPHFSP	Southern Province Household Food Security Programme
TNDP	Transitional National Development Plan (TNDP)
WB	World Bank

1. Country Profile - Zambia

Type of Government

Zambia became independent on October 24th 1964 from the British Government. As such, procedures and systems in the executive, judicial and legislative branches of Government are based on the British systems. In addition, Zambia is a member of the Commonwealth. As such, parliamentary procedures are based on those of the Commonwealth.

Zambia started as a multi party democracy until in 1972 when the then ruling party, the United National Independent Party (UNIP) declared the country as a One Party Democracy. In 1991, Zambia returned to multi partyism. To date, the country is a multi-party democracy.

Population

Zambia, with an estimated population of 11 million people is sparsely populated. The total land area is approximately 752,000 square kilometers. The average number of persons per square kilometer is 14.6. Zambia is one of the highly urbanized countries in sub-Saharan Africa with an estimated 45 percent of its population living in the urban areas. This is largely due to urban drift in the 1960s and 1970s, driven mostly by the developments in the mining sector.

Structure of the Zambian Economy: GDP and per capita GNP

Between 1994 and 2002, the Zambian economy has largely been driven by agriculture, manufacturing and mining which have averaged 16.4%, 10.3, and 10.0% respectively, as shares of real GDP. Trade, financial insurance and intermediaries, real estates and transport and communications have been key secondary sectors with their shares averaging 17.2%, 8.5%, 7.8% and 6.0% respectively. On the lower end of the shares are construction, energy and water, and tourism which averaged 5.0%, 3.0% and 1.9%, respectively.

In 2004, the Zambian per capita GNP was estimated at US\$ 435.

The agricultural sector contribution to GDP is depicted in Table 1 below:

Table I *Sector contribution to GDP, 2001 – 2004.*

Sector	2001	2002	2003	2004
Agriculture	15	15	15.2	15
Mining	7.0	7.9	7.7	8.4
Tourism	2.3	2.3	2.4	2.4
Manufacturing	10.4	10.7	10.9	10.4
Construction	5.3	6.0	6.9	7.0

Source: Central CSO (2005)

Until about a decade ago, the agricultural sector was heavily controlled by the Government through interventions such as input and output subsidies channeled through state parastatal companies that seriously distorted production systems, created a false sense of security and among other things, inhibited private sector investment and growth. The Government, in 1991, decided to introduce reforms to enhance the sector's growth through development of free market policies. In 1996, Government adopted the Agriculture Sector Investment Programme (ASIP), aimed at restoring broad-based agricultural growth, rural development and food security in Zambia. ASIP has since

ended and the sector's strategic plans are in the National Development Plan and the PRSP. According to the PRSP, about 75 percent of the Zambian population derive their livelihood from agriculture. The sector's contribution to formal employment was estimated 49.8% and 71.6% in 1990 and 2000 respectively. The sudden jump in the sector's contribution to formal employment has been as result of the declining performance of the mining sector and industry.

Illiteracy rate

Mining, the driving force in the Zambian economy declined for a long time, pulling down other sectors that depend on it. This has resulted in failure by the Government to provide basic services like education, health and water. For example, the illiteracy rate for people of 15 years and above has continued to be quite high as can be seen in Table II below:

Table II: *Illiteracy rate in %, 1990 and 2000.*

Year	Illiteracy rate (%)
1990	34
2000	32.7

Source; CSO 20001(?), Census of population and Housing

Life Expectancy

At the time when public resources were already low, HIV/AIDS has increased the disease burden beyond the individual level to adversely impact on the economics of the family, the health system, the working environment as well as the human capital. For example, the current estimate of life expectancy is 37.5 years, down from over 50 years in the early 1970s.

Background

The 1990s witnessed the advent of the Structural Adjustment Programme (SAP) in Zambia. SAP began slowly but steadily gathered momentum. The mid nineteen eighties saw a vigorous though brief phase of implementation of SAP policies amidst great debate and controversy. The politically unmanageable consequences of the SAP, for example, the food riots at the end of 1986 as a result of lifting subsidies on maize meal compelled the then Zambian Government to revert to controls. By this action, the Government alienated itself from the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and many of the bilateral donors.

Resource constraints, however, brought in the realization that controls too were no longer sustainable. It was in view of this that the Zambian Government decided to renew friendly relations with the World Bank and IMF and other donors. This was a cautious attempt to bring back SAP. SAP policies began to resurface again in the form of partial price liberalization, crawling pegs, etc. Political liberalization and the ushering in of a Third Republic based on multi-partyism from a one Party State in the early nineties provided a conducive environment for re-launching SAP. The euphoria among the populace generated by the overthrow of the Kaunda regime enabled the new Chiluba Government to embark on full-scale implementation of SAP in terms of a wide array of stabilization, adjustment and transition policies without encountering any major public dissent. At this stage, the Zambian economy underwent a major face change from a predominantly monopolistic system based on centralized controls and public ownership to a market-oriented, liberalized, privatized and competitive system.

The renewed implementation of SAP, however, did not result into the expected benefits in terms of sustained growth and human development. This brought in the realization not

only within Zambia but also among Zambia's cooperating partners, notably the World Bank and the IMF, which have been among the main advocates of SAP, that there was need for a fresh approach to the development agenda. In addition, SAP was also seen to lack ownership by Zambians. It was largely perceived to be an imposition by the IMF and the World Bank. Clearly, no policies can succeed solely on the basis of agreements signed between governments and the multilateral institutions. Effective implementation of policies requires the consent and cooperation at all levels down to the grassroots. This can happen only when there is national ownership of the development agenda.

According to Professor Sheshamain(2002), in a country like Zambia where the large majority are poor, national ownership would require two things: (i) The core of the development agenda must shift from mainly technical objectives such as the realization of macroeconomic balances to those of poverty alleviation and reduction to which the majority can more easily and readily relate; (ii) The development agenda must not be prepared solely by the technocrats within Government in collaboration with other technocrats from the World Bank and the IMF, as has normally been the case with the Economic and Financial Policy Framework Papers (PFPs) associated with SAP. It must be prepared through a wider consultation with all the major stakeholders in the country.

It is in recognition of the above two imperatives that in September 1999, the IMF and the World Bank endorsed a new framework for poverty reduction. Developing countries were to prepare nationally owned Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers (PRSPs) before they could access concessional finance, including debt relief.

Zambia's poverty reduction initiatives prior to the PRSP

Zambia was one of the participants at the World Conference on Social Development (UN) held in Copenhagen in March 1995. One of the main resolutions of this conference was that every country must set itself a time-bound target for poverty reduction and institute measures for the attainment of that target. In keeping with this resolution, the former President of Zambia announced in 1997 that poverty levels in Zambia must be reduced from the then prevailing level of 70% to 50% by 2004.

In November 1997, the Zambian Government appointed the Ministry of Community Development and Social Services (MCDSS) to: (a) Serve as a focal point for all poverty-related programmes in the country; (b) Coordinate all poverty-related interventions in the country; and (c) Spearhead the preparation of a comprehensive, coherent National Poverty Reduction Action Plan (NPRAP).

With support of the UNDP, MCDSS undertook the tasks of preparing a National Poverty Reduction Strategic Framework (NPRSF) and the NPRAP. The NPRSF was prepared in May 1998 and endorsed by the Government. Further, following consultations with key stakeholders including civil society and the donors, the Government presented the NPRSF at the Consultative Group meeting in Paris in May 1998.

The above process, however, got overwhelmed when the IMF announced the replacement of its Enhanced Structural Adjustment Facility (ESAF) by the new Poverty Reduction and Growth Facility (PRGF). It now became a requirement for every developing country to prepare a PRSP before it could access the new concessional borrowing facilities, including debt relief. Zambia too embarked on the preparation of the PRSP. The Ministry of Finance and Economic Development (MOFED) was now to be the overall coordinator for the PRSP in place of the MCDSS.

3.0 PRSP Review

The PRSP process was officially launched at a stakeholders' workshop, 28 - 30 June 2000. The final draft of the PRSP was approved by the Cabinet in May 2002 and subsequently by the Board of the IMF and the World Bank. The PRSP was officially launched in the first week of July 2002.

3.1 Institutional developments related to the PRSP

Initially, the PRSP Management Structure was to consist of:

- a) A PRSP Steering Committee consisting of ministers of social and economic sectors;
- b) A PRSP Technical committee consisting of permanent secretaries (PS), with the PS of MOFED and MCDSS as co-chairs; and
- c) PRSP Focal Points: these were persons from relevant ministries such as education, health, agriculture, etc. who would facilitate the preparation and implementation of the PRSP.

There would also be a Technical Secretariat consisting of officials from MOFED, MCDSS and Bank of Zambia (BoZ) and based in MOFED. The Secretariat was to be the main functional unit of the PRSP and would provide logistics and documentation and coordinate the activities of the Technical Committee.

In effect, however, the Steering Committee and the Technical Committee never came into operation. This was probably due to the urgency and the pressure to have an Interim PRSP (IPRSP) ready as quickly as possible. The Secretariat was *de facto* in charge of the formulation of the PRSP. Focal points came in the form of mainly Directors of Planning in the various relevant ministries in addition to chairpersons of the Working Groups that were formed.

In order to enable Zambia access debt relief under HIPC by reaching the Decision Point, an IPRSP was expeditiously prepared with virtually no stakeholder consultation. The IPRSP was approved by the IMF and the World Bank and Zambia reached the Decision Point in December 2000.

Poverty reduction is essentially a long-term process that requires planning. In the wake of this realization, planning has once again been brought to the fore in terms of institutional reorganization. In 1991, when the country moved towards economic liberalization and adopted a market-oriented approach, planning was felt to be unnecessary and the long-existing National Commission for Development Planning (NCDP) was abolished. Planning has since been re-established and towards the end of 2001, MOFED was changed to Ministry of Finance and National Planning (MFNP). A new department, Planning and Economic Management Department (PEMD) was created in January 2002 in order to coordinate the national strategic planning process. In addition, a special section within PEMD known as the Strategic and Operational Planning Unit (SOPU) was established. SOPU was set up to specifically focus on planning, implementing and monitoring the PRSP, the Transitional National Development Plan (TNDP) and thereafter the Five-year National Development Plans (FNDPs).

3.2 The content of the PRSP

Zambia's PRSP is for the period 2002 to 2004.

The PRSP document consists of 17 chapters. The first four chapters deal with the Macroeconomic Situation, Poverty Profile, Governance Issues and National Goals and

Objectives of the PRSP. The next four chapters deal with the economic sectors of Agriculture, Industry, Tourism and Mining. These chapters are followed by chapters on the two key social sectors - Education and Health. Then follow three chapters dealing with infrastructure development: Water and Sanitation, Energy, and Transport, Communication & Roads. The next chapter, Chapter 15 discusses the cross-cutting issues of HIV/AIDS, Gender and Environment. The last two chapters are on the PRSP Implementation Mechanisms and Structures and on Monitoring and Evaluation.

The content in the above chapters revolves around three main themes: the economic theme, the social theme and the cross-cutting theme. These themes are related to two main approaches to achieve the overall goal of poverty reduction. The first approach is to generate sustained economic growth and employment. Agricultural development is regarded as the main engine of growth (since it can provide the best opportunities for enhancing the livelihoods of the poor). Agriculture is to be complemented by other sectors that are considered to have high growth-stimulating potential, namely, Tourism, Industry, Mining and Energy. The issues dealing with the growth of the economy are termed the economic theme of the PRSP.

The high levels of poverty in Zambia, however, cannot be brought down solely by the trickle-down effects from growth. Hence, there is also need to adopt a second approach that provides for complementary measures that directly target the poor and shield them against the adverse impacts of economic reforms and other internal and external factors. The PRSP, therefore, also stresses the importance of basic education, basic health and social safety nets such as the Public Welfare Assistance Schemes (PWAS), Social Recovery Fund, Project Urban Self Help (PUSH), Food for Work Programme and entrepreneurial development and training for the retrenched employees. These areas constitute the social theme of the PRSP.

In addition to the above, there are also issues that impact on both the growth and the direct interventionist measures. These are the cross-cutting themes - HIV/AIDS, gender and environment.

The PRSP document recognizes that Zambia's development is constrained by a tripod of barriers that are mutually reinforcing namely high levels of poverty, high debt burden and the high incidence of HIV/AIDS. It therefore stresses the need to complement efforts at poverty reduction with efforts to address the problems of debt and HIV/AIDS.

3.3. PRSP interventions in the agriculture

Contribution of the agriculture sector to broad-based economic growth has been limited due to the dual nature of Zambia agriculture. Low productivity subsistence farming contracts with emerging and large-scale farming systems. There are about 800,000 small-scale subsistence farmers in Zambia (with average size of 1 to 5 hectares) who cultivate about 80% of land. They utilize low input, low output production technology and depend on family labor and hand tools, but with limited use of oxen. This group produces mainly maize and other staple food crops such as cassava, sorghum, millet, groundnuts, and mixed beans. Then, there are some 50, 000 emergent farming households at various degrees of commercialization (5-50 ha), who use modern inputs and farm machinery. This group produces maize, sunflower, soya beans, tobacco and cotton. Higher forms of commercialization also exist, such as about 700 large-scale commercial farming operations (50-250 ha) and large corporate operations, which grow cash crop in plantations, characterized by the use of the modern technologies and have a capacity to access regional and global markets.

According to the PRSP, the failure for agriculture to provide for secure livelihoods is considered as a major factor contributing to poverty in Zambia. Agriculture in Zambia has the potential to enhance growth and reduce poverty. PRSP sees the sector as one of the driving engines for the anticipated economic growth that is required to reduce poverty. The PRSP sees the restoration of its high and sustained growth as constituting a critical step for reducing poverty in Zambia. Zambia is abundantly endowed with resources that are required to stimulate agricultural and rural development, in general, and poverty reduction in particular. Out of a landmass of approximately 752,000 square kilometers 47 % is suitable for arable use. However, only about 14% of the arable land is cultivated. The country therefore, has abundant arable land, good climate, labour and plenty of water resources. The current Agricultural policy emphasizes liberalization aimed at revitalizing the agriculture sector. The policy, which was much more biased towards maize, failed to provide sufficient incentives for increased output by farmers, and also discouraged private sector-led agricultural development especially in the input and output markets. Increasingly, from 1994 all the consumer subsidies on maize and maize products were eliminated and prices totally freed. Exports of all agricultural commodities, as long as they adhered to health regulations, became free and permissible and in order to expose Zambia to the competitive external market, imports of agricultural commodities and inputs were allowed and at the same time tariffs were cut off.

The PRSP recognizes that the initial impact of liberalization on Zambia's smallholder farmers has been negative due to limited opportunities to access both agricultural inputs and credit. Under such conditions, a major national challenge under the PRSP is to work out how best to help smallholders, particularly those in the outlying areas, to benefit inputs and credit under uncertain conditions regarding how market forces alone could correct this imbalance in delivery.

In this respect the PRSP will invest effort in understanding how best to bring in the private sector and community-based organized/associations in the provision of the needed financial services that are so strategic to empowering the poor's productivity.

The integration of outlying areas is considered by the PRSP as an important step towards enhancing the productivity of the poor. For the PRSP initiatives in the agricultural sector to succeed in integrating smallholders into the market, an additional effort will be made in facilitation of timely, reliable, and relevant information flowing to all the main stakeholders as well from the stakeholder to the major implementation/coordinating agencies.

Under the PRSP, involvement by government in the creation of a market economy is perceived to be indirect and supportive rather than direct and competitive. This implies government's preparedness under the PRSP to be involved in some transitional functions such as those related to the provision of support services and guaranteeing of national food security.

The overall objective of the proposed interventions in the agricultural sector was "to promote a self-sustaining export-led agricultural sector, which ensured increased household income and food security," (PRSP, p.157). The sector was expected "to generate income and employment through increased agricultural production and productivity, to contribute to production and productivity through land and infrastructure development, to ensure national and household food security .. and to ensure that the existing agricultural resource base is maintained and improved upon," (Ibid. 157f).

3.4 Stakeholder Consultation – The civil society and Rural Producer Organizations

The government of Zambia set up eight working groups to carry out that consultation, each with representation from civil society, the government and the private sector (*See Appendix 1*). The Zambian government had plans for extending its consultations on PRSP throughout the country. At the same time, it acknowledged that civil society had already begun to pave the way.

During most parts of 2000, Jubilee 2000-Zambia undertook a series of regional conferences in eight districts. The stated objectives of the conferences were: to facilitate meaningful civil society participation in the PRSP process in Zambia; to sensitize local communities on the PRSP process and the debt issue; and to mobilize local communities toward the PRSP process and the debt cancellation campaign of Jubilee 2000-Zambia. The conferences built on the existing and extensive network of the Catholic Commission for Justice and Peace (CCJP). Indeed it was the CCJP groups that opened the doors in each community for the conferences to take place.

Church leaders, either from the CCJP or from other denominations typically inaugurated the conferences. In each case a government representative was also present and available to field questions, sometimes very challenging ones, from the participants. The participants themselves typically consisted of community leaders from various walks of life: teachers, church workers, civil servants, union leaders, and farmers. Representatives from the both the opposition and ruling parties, NGO staffers, and others. (*Jubilee 2000 – Zambia*)

In each of the four provinces selected to be consulted for input to the PRSP, locally based CSOs (ZAW, Zambia Alliance of Women in Western, NGOCC in North Western, etc.) invited app. 50 persons. Women arrived in larger numbers than men; in some cases 60% were women. Participants were representatives of marketeer's associations, peasant farmers, women's organisations, churches, traditional leaders, CSOs and local government civil servants.

Summing up proposals from the provinces CSPR called for *long-term agricultural policy reforms*, such that would meet the needs of the majority of the population:

- Assistance to small-scale farmers
- Assistance to micro, small and medium enterprises
- Support to informal sector operators
- Women in the urban informal sector

Interventions should reflect that women, farmers as well as petty traders, are more likely to spend income generated on the entire household. A wide range of proposals were suggested; ranking highest in all provinces was:

- Reintroduction of subsidies on farming inputs
- Broadening opportunities for women to access loans and property ownership
- Abolition of user fees
- Improvement of agricultural marketing policies.

While at national level CSPR over and again urges government to play a key role in regulating and coordinating agricultural support programmes, of greatest and particular concern to participants in the provinces appeared to be the fate of *peasant farmers*. The

CSPR document regrets prevailing 'negative attitudes towards agriculture' (CSPR, 2001:221), representatives of local CSOs specify:

To meet needs of peasant farmers, the provincial reports suggested that urgent action be taken in the following six areas:

- Establish credit facilities with minimal interest
- Encourage growing indigenous crops to cover local food security
- Utilise local production (cassava, pineapple, etc.) for local agro-processing industry
- Support marketing of local agricultural products
- Improve infrastructure (esp. roads) to help marketing across provinces
- Allocate arable land to peasants – property ownership for women.

Members of CSO's who have been involved in the provincial hearings repeatedly reaffirmed these demands in interviews. 'For villagers land is a critical concern, and this has not been included in the PRSP.' 'This country rely on the production peasant farmers, women in particular. Yet the Zambia PRSP is far too silent on this point – while at the same time favouring better off farmers, i.e. 'outgrower schemes' for less vulnerable commercial farmers.' (Lipalile, M (UNZA), Tafira, L (ZAW), Macina H. (ZLA), Makaha, G (JCTR) in interviews, 2003).

In what appears to be a recognition of the wider national interest in these priorities, raised in the North Western province, the CSPR document included as key recommendation to government: 'Government should not be biased in favour of particular provinces in the construction of infrastructure', and it should ensure provision and maintenance of good road and communication networks. (CSPR, 2001: 242/247)

The RPOs were not adequately consulted. Only two farmer representatives were consulted (ZNFU and the peasants association). The outgrower arrangements did not partake in this process.

3.5 PRSP Monitor and Reporting

Monitoring and evaluation (M&E) were envisaged to be part and parcel of the PRSP. This was "in order to ensure that the implementation of the PRSP is on course and the desired results are achieved (PRSP, p. 136). The PRSP also worked out an appropriate mix of both intermediate and final indicators that were to be used in monitoring its interventions. However, the monitoring team did not go out with a list of already worked out indicators and set them up before the research participants. The results of the Monitoring Team are summarized in table II, in item 3.7.1.

The Ministry of Finance and National Planning covering the period January 2002 to February 2003 produced the first PRSP Implementation Progress report in March 2003.

The second report was produced in December 2004 covering the period July 2003 to June 2004. The report recorded improvements in funding to priority PRPs. Major improvements in public finance management were achieved in the first half of the budget year 2004, mainly due to the introduction of the MTEF and Activity Based Budgeting.

3.6 Other Key National Plans

The hierarchy of the planning process in Zambia has been as follows. A National Long-term Development Vision, Vision 2025 was developed to guide the medium-term strategic plans. The umbrella objective of the Vision 2005 was to reduce poverty. The

medium-term plans such as the PRSP, TNDP and FNDPs would be and are being operationalized through the annual budgets.

Development planning was reintroduced because of a number of shortcomings that were perceived after the abolition of the NCDP. These are:

- No medium term programme within which to lay down public investment priorities for implementation;
- No planning framework that could serve as a basis for cooperation with donors;
- No organ to oversee, initiate and coordinate cross-cutting national programmes among ministries;
- No organ to coordinate and monitor plans at the provincial and district levels and link them with priorities at the national level;
- A private sector that was too slow to undertake some of the market-related functions, necessitating Government interventions, which could only be well articulated within a planning framework; and
- The budgeting process, which took centre-stage, was done with no clear reference to medium term goals, plans or long-term vision.

A confidential draft of the Transitional National Development Plan (TNDP) for the period 2002 - 2005 was prepared. The TNDP is a comprehensive document that subsumes the PRSP. Additionally, it also covers those sectors that are not adequately covered in the PRSP. These are: Judiciary, Law and Order; Foreign Relations; Defense and Security; Policy-Making; Science and Technology; Information Services; Population and Development; Regional Development; and Local Government, Housing and Urban Development. The starting year of the TNDP has been kept at 2002 in order to allow full coverage of the PRSP programmes whose time frame is from January 2002 to December 2004. But the TNDP's terminal year has been extended to 2005 in order to enable the smooth dovetailing of the subsequent five-year National Development Plans, which are scheduled to begin in 2006.

In order to achieve a realistic estimate of the resources for the PRSP, TNDP and the FNDPs, it needs to be embedded in a Medium Term Expenditure Framework (MTEF). But since the aim is to have the MTEF correspond to FNDP, the TNDP has been based on an Interim MTEF (I-MTEF) with forecasts based on statements of the medium term macroeconomic fiscal and foreign assistance policy objectives to be achieved. The full-fledged MTEF will be formulated when the full-fledged FNDP will be initiated in 2006.

A description of some of these key national plans is given below:

i) **Fifth National Development Plan(FNDP).**

Government of Zambia through the Ministry of Finance and National Planning has finalized the Fifth National Development Plan. The FNDP is a medium term planning instrument intended to focus Government's policy and programming towards a desired objective or objectives set in a specified time frame. The national planning has been reintroduced upon realizing that an annual budget was not a sufficient tool for long-term national development planning.

- **Time-Frame:** Covers a period of 6 years (2006-2011) which has been adopted as a result of the three-year budgeting cycle of the Medium Term Expenditure Framework (MTEF).

- Basis of FNDP Design: Within realistic annual and medium-term budget process that will keep in line with the policy of decentralization and reflect broad-based consultations
- Rational behind the FNDP: Is a build-up to the implementation of the first Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP 2002-2004) and the Transitional National Development Plan (TNDP-2002-2005).

Proposed Themes of the National Development Plan

- Aiming at achieving Pro-Poor growth and development with equity
- Achieving Pro-poor growth, job creation and equity
- Achieving pro-poor growth through rural development and
- technological advancement

Strategic Focus of the FNDP

- Regionally balance rural development
- Provision of accessible quality social services
- Provision of affordable infrastructure
- Advancement in science and technology
- Achieving Public Safety

Priority Issues of the FNDP

- Agriculture, Tourism, Mining, Manufacturing, Transport and Communication

Guides around developing the FNDP

- Will be formulated through a consultative process
- Work will be predominantly be undertaken by the Sector Advisory Groups (SAGs) – opportunity for stakeholders engagement
- Zero draft will be ready between the 12th and 16th September 2005
- Launch of the plan – 1st week of January 2006
- The HIPC Expenditure Monitoring Team: Has not been entirely abandoned but merely suspended. The SAGs can make suggestion on how best the tem can be re-introduced fitting in all the legal requirements.

Joint Assistance Strategy: Is not donor conditionality but a partnership between Government and the donor community. The key agreement under this strategy is that only programmes contained in the NDP will be funded.

- ii) **Agricultural Commercialisation Programme (ACP) 2002-2005 through the Ministry of Agriculture.**

The ACP was designed to complement government efforts to uplift the living standards of different categories of farmers and those who are unable to take advantage of the opportunities emerging from the liberalized environment through programmes like Food Security pack, ZAMSIF and SPHSP.

ACP Components:

- i) Marketing, Trade and Agri-business Promotion;
- ii) Agricultural Finance and Investment;
- iii) Agricultural Infrastructure and Land Development
- iv) Technology Development and Dissemination;
- v) Agricultural Sector Management and Coordination

In Agriculture, major PRSP interventions were the Input Pack Support Programme, out-grower schemes, land and infrastructure development, technology development, agriculture extension and maize marketing in support of small-scale farmers.

3.7 Evaluations of PRSP

Three sets of evaluations were reviewed:

- Government
- Civil Society for Poverty Reduction
- The Agricultural Consultative Forum

3.7.1 Government evaluation of the PRSP process and Impact

The Government review of the PRSP on agriculture was to assess whether or not the content of the PRSP were still valid, in view of the fact that the consultative process was fast tracked. The evaluation method, the qualitative participatory research tools, allowed the various study communities to set the agenda for evaluation in terms of stating their concerns. The issues noted as important by the communities in this process were often identical to the PRSP objectives and the desired results. Table III below summarizes the perceptions of communities in the 5 study sites regarding the most important concerns in agriculture development. The fields were selected from 5 different provinces of Zambia.

Table III: *Major Community Concerns Regarding Agriculture by Study Site*

CONCERN	Kalomo	Petauke	Mwinilunga	Samfya	Senanga
Food security	x	X	x	x	x
Farm implements	x		x	X	x
Produce markets		X	x	x	x
Extension services	x	X	x		
Farm inputs			x	x	x
Access to credit			x	x	x
Poor roads	x	X		x	
Farm power	x			x	x

Source: MOFND 2004.

Clearly, food security was a major concern in all the study communities. The PRSP was set out to specifically address the issue of food security. Similarly, issues of inadequate access to farm implements, farm power, inputs, credit and markets were said to be important aspects of the PRSP as their resolve would contribute to improvement in food security in the study sites. The communities cited the high cost of and untimely delivery and/or availability of inputs as being a major cause of crop failure. In addition, Poor roads

were associated with and blamed for the inadequate access to markets, farm inputs and extension services.

Without concluding that the PRSP has had little impact on the intended outputs, especially food security and poverty reduction, the study results seem to suggest so.

3.7.2 Civil Society evaluation of the PRSP process and impact

Civil society played an important role in the formulation of the PRSP. An umbrella organization called the Civil Society for Poverty Reduction (CSPR) was established, which became a medium through which civil society participated both in the official Government consultative framework as well as its own independent and parallel framework that led to the formulation of the strategy.

The CSPR carried out an in-depth evaluation of the process and impact of the PRSP. The evaluation observed as follows:

THE Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP) has not helped in improving people's livelihoods. While PRSP was a credible blueprint for poverty reduction and development planning, weak capacities among implementing agencies and resource constraints made the Programme fail.

The level of achievement of the PRSP can best be described as modest as implementation of Programmes have been considerably slow due to a number of bottlenecks such as the intermittent flow of funding to Poverty Reduction Programmes (PRPs).

“Although no national survey has been undertaken during implementation of the PRSP to determine whether there has been poverty reduction resulting from PRSP, an educated conclusion is that poverty has not been reduced during this short time period.

Despite claims that PRSP has succeeded, its impact on people's livelihoods has been minimal. The main problem was that most PRPs were implemented as monotype interventions and therefore did not holistically address issues of poverty.

In many communities, PRPs implemented were, maybe, rehabilitation of a clinic or financing a women's club. This approach did not address all the facets of poverty in communities and consequently, most people interviewed did not perceive their situation as getting better.

The CSPR evaluation also observed that the problem of impact of the PRSP was compounded by the fact that the HIPC monitoring team, sectoral advisory groups and provincial and district development coordinating committees, which participated in the implementation of PRPs, lacked a legal framework needed to supervise, police and guide implementation.

3.7.3 Agriculture Consultative Forum (ACF) evaluation of the utilization of the PRSP's funds on Agriculture

The ACF come out of the Zambia's Agricultural Sector Investment Programme (ASIP) consultative forum that started in 1996. ASIP, among other things sought to achieve a disengagement of the public sector direct involvement in the provision of agro-services in order to achieve accelerated economic growth. In 2000, the ASIP Consultative Forum was transformed into the Agricultural Consultative Forum (ACF). The ACF was to pioneer agricultural sector stakeholder participation in the process of policy formulation, among others and contribute to reform the agricultural sector by fostering Public/Private sector partnerships.

The main objective of the ACF evaluation was to assess the status of PRSP and non-PRSP supported outgrower schemes. The selected out grower schemes receiving GRZ support Under PRSP were for coffee, tobacco, cotton, fresh vegetables and paprika.

The major observations were that:

The PRSP support to out grower schemes organized around Rural Producer Organizations were well received by the stakeholders as it was generally said to have provided a framework for targeting small holder farmers. In addition, the support organized around agricultural commodity markets was seen as Government's demonstration that went beyond recognizing the private sectors as partners in poverty alleviation.

Vulnerability to weather continues to be a Major limiting factor for smallholder agriculture;

The Monitoring and Evaluation among managers of the PRPs resources was noted to have been low on their priority list;

The need for macroeconomic stability was cited as a key to the success of the PRSP support to outgrower schemes and that

Generally, the report concluded that Government financial support to the Agricultural sector continued to be marginal through out the PRSP period, in spite of 100 percent of the budgeted funds being released during 2 financial periods. However, the support was said to have up-scaled farmer owned outgrower outfits such as the tobacco schemes in Central and Southern produces who almost doubled annual production. Support to outgrower schemes operated by large agribusinesses was less visible, in the cotton sub sector for instance. Such agribusiness however appreciated the intention of Government.

4.0 Conclusions

There seem to be a general consensus among stakeholders that the PRSP has been a useful guiding document for the purpose of national development planning and economic management and poverty reduction. The two non Governmental evaluations(CSPR and ACF), of the process, point to the fact that the PRSP has been an attempt to target resources from the annual budgets to some development activities such as out grower schemes. It differed from the initial development plans that were not attached to the resource envelop. However, the level of achievement can best be described as modest since implementation of the PRPs have been slow due to a number of bottlenecks such as weak capacities in implementing agencies, and slow and intermittent flow of funding.

The CSPR concluded that the implementation of PRSP can essentially be taken to be an "eye-opener", as development is not an overnight affair but a learning process. Even with the modest level of achievement, the additionality of the PRS approach is that it has at least led to a sharper focus on poverty reduction and a more open participatory process by the government and donors than was previously the case.

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Attachment I

INTERVIEWS:

Mr. A. Mwila	-	Fusenet
Dr H. Hantuba	-	Ministry of Agriculture Food and Fisheries
Dr A. Mwanaume	-	Food Security Research Project
Dr K. Droppelmann	-	Agricultural Consultative Forum Secretariat
Mr. J.J Shawa	-	Ministry of Agriculture Food and Fisheries
Mr. M. Lungu	-	Ministry of Finance and National Planning
Mr. P. Bwalya	-	Ministry of Finance and National Planning
Fr. P. Henriot	-	Catholic Commission for Justice and Peace
Dr Njobvu	-	UNZA

Attachment II

PRSP Working Group – Agriculture

MOFED

Ministry of Commerce and Industry

Ministry of Agriculture, Food, and Fish

Ministry of Energy and Water Development

Ministry of Gender in Development

Land Ministry of Zambia

Food and Agriculture Organization

World Bank

ZNFU

Export Board of Zambia

Agriculture Consultative Forum (ACF)

NUPAW

Women for Change

Programme against Malnutrition

UNZA

Government of Germany

Government of Holland

Government of Japan

Civil Society Consultative Group Agriculture and Food Security

Programme Against Malnutrition

Women in Agriculture

National Association of Peasant and Small-Scale Farmers of Zambia

KEPA-Zambia

Africare

Micro - banker's Trust

Zambian Council for Social Development

Primary Societies Development Project

CARE International

Appendix 3

The PRSP process in Uganda

Rural Producer Organisations in PRSP processes in Uganda

Draft Report

By

Johnny Mugisha and Mildred Barungi
Department of Agricultural Economics & Agribusiness,
Faculty of Agriculture
Makerere University
Kampala, Uganda

November 2005

List of Abbreviations

BWI	Bretton Woods Institutions
CSO	Civil Society Organization
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
HIPC	Highly Indebted Poor Countries
IMF	International Monetary Fund
MFPED	Ministry of Finance, Planning and Economic Development
MTEF	Medium-Term Expenditure Framework
NAADS	National Agricultural Advisory Services
PEAP	Poverty Eradication Action Plan
PMA	Plan for Modernization of Agriculture
RPO	Rural Producer Organization
PSF	Private Sector Foundation
PRS	Poverty Reduction Strategy
PRSP	Poverty Reduction Strategy paper
UPPAP	Uganda Participatory Poverty Assessment Project

1.0 Criteria for satisfactory participation in the PRSP process

Participation is the process through which stakeholders influence and share control over priority setting, policy-making, resource allocations and access to public goods and services. Participation plays a role in many different contexts, different projects and for different purposes. However, in whatever context or reason they are used, participatory processes or civic engagement in the poverty reduction strategy process allows countries to begin exchanging information with other stakeholders and thereby increase the transparency of their decision-making. This in turn will improve government accountability to the people and, as a result, increase the overall governance and economic efficiency of development activities⁴². To date, most participatory processes take place at the micro or project level and have become increasingly innovative as methods become more established and sophisticated. However, to achieve participatory outcomes at the macro-level, it is necessary to use participatory approaches at the micro and macro level in a complementary manner for in order to realize the greatest effectiveness.

Several guiding principles for participation, that lead to more inclusive and equitable processes for formulating, implementing and monitoring poverty reduction strategies have been suggested over time. Satisfactory participation process is characterized by outcome orientation, inclusion, transparency and continuous reviewing. To Rural Producer Organizations (RPOs), good representation at macro and micro levels and involvement in policy formulation (debates), participation in decision-making process, and inclusion in policy implementation are considered the key criteria for satisfactory participation in the PRSP process.

2.0 Uganda profile

The Republic of Uganda is a democratic one party state since 1986 when the National Resistance Movement (NRM) came to power under the presidency of Yoweri Kaguta Museveni. The country's 1995 constitution was, however, reviewed in 2005 to allow a multiparty system of governance. Multiparty elections are scheduled for March 2006.

⁴² S. Tikare, D. Youssef, P. Donnelly-Roark and P. Shah, 2001. "Organizing the participatory processes in the PRSP. Draft comments.

Uganda's population is estimated at 25.6 million⁴³, with a growth rate of 2.96%. Of this population, 75% lives in the rural areas (Table 1) and earn livelihood from agriculture. Agriculture contributes the biggest portion to Uganda's total GDP estimated at 38%⁴⁴. The country has recovered from the economic devastation brought by former president Idi Amin, realizing an average economic growth rate of 5% for the last 10 years.

Table 1: Some socio-economic and demographic indicators of Uganda

Indicators variables	
Population, total:	25.6 million
Population growth rate (annual):	2.96 %
Urban population:	15 %
Rural population:	75 %
Life expectancy:	44.9 years
GDP per capita:	\$280
Percentage of illiterate adult males:	20 %
Percentage of illiterate adult females:	40 %

Source: World Development Indicators Data Base, August 2005.

The total nominal GDP at market price was estimated at 15,134 billion shillings (about US\$ 8.4 billion) for the financial year 2004/2005⁴⁵. Real GDP growth was estimated at 5.9% in 2004. This was attributed to the better performance of the agricultural sector, which grew at 5.2% in the same year⁴⁶. It was also attributed to Uganda's commitment to poverty reduction as indicated in the Poverty Reduction Strategy and contributions of the World Bank and other Development Partners.

The percentage of the population living in poverty fell dramatically from 56% in 1992 to 35% in 2000, but shot up to 38% by 2005. The security situation in northern Uganda is a source of concern, and social indicators such as health indicators remain very low. For instance, malnutrition among children under 5 is very high (39% by 2001), and life expectancy is low (44.9 years). Poverty has actually edged up in the last few years with a GDP per capita of US\$280. This underlines the necessity of further economic structural reforms, on which basis the Poverty Eradication Action Plan (PEAP) was reviewed and revised in 2004.

Partly attributed to government policy on education (Universal Primary Education), there are relatively good indicators of literacy levels. However, this is mainly among the male population despite the government's affirmative action to promote girl education.

3.0 PRSP status report

As a way of enhancing Highly Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC), the board of governors of the IMF and World Bank approved the introduction of the Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP) as a basis on which poor countries would receive increased debt relief. Under this arrangement, aid recipient countries were required to prepare a PRSP before it could access financial support from IMF and World Bank.

⁴³ World Development Indicators Data Base, August 2005

⁴⁴ Ministry of Finance, Planning and Economic Development (MFPED), 2004. "Background to the Budget, 2003/2004." Kampala, Uganda.

⁴⁵ <http://www.ubos.org/>

⁴⁶ Ministry of Finance, Planning and Economic Development (MFPED), 2004. "Background to the Budget, 2003/2004." Kampala, Uganda.

The PRSP provides a framework for IMF lending and World Bank's country assistance strategy (CAS). The CAS covers the Bank's medium-term business plan and its proposed lending operations. The PRSP articulates the government's commitment to developing poverty reduction policies through a consultative process (participation). A comprehensive PRSP includes poverty diagnostics based on good indicators of poverty and its reduction. It presents a shared communal vision of desired poverty reduction goals, reached through a participatory process and lays out participatory processes to monitor policy implementation and progress in poverty reduction⁴⁷. Governments are supposed to formulate PRSPs in participatory manner, involving consultations with other stakeholders such as civil society organization (CSO) as partners in development.

3.1 Uganda PRSP

As a policy framework to eradicate poverty, Uganda formulated a Poverty Eradication Action Plan (PEAP) in 1997. This was much earlier before the need to have a country PRSP. The 1997 PEAP was a three-year poverty eradication strategy initiated and drafted by the Ministry of Finance, Planning and Economic Development. Its formulation took two years of extensive consultations and participation of civil society organizations and development partners including the World Bank and International Monetary Fund (IMF).

The PEAP was revised in 2000 incorporating new findings from Participatory Poverty Assessments (PPAs) in which some RPOs participated, and other research work by Research Institutions. During this revision period, there was a demand by the Bretton Woods Institutes (BWI) that Uganda prepares a PRSP if it was to benefit from the enhanced Highly Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) initiative for debt relief. The first PEAP influenced the original proposals for PRSPs⁴⁸. However, stakeholders who joined at this stage including some RPOs such as Uganda Cooperative Alliance (UCA), Uganda national Farmers Federation (UNFFE), Uganda Council of Agriculture (UCA), Uganda Commercial Farmers Association (UCFA) and NGO-Forum made some modifications. The Government of Uganda and donors then agreed that the revised PEAP constitutes the country's PRSP⁴⁹.

Extensive joint consultative meetings of government officials, civil society and donors started in January 2000. Two consultative workshops were held and in March 2002, the government presented to the donors the first draft of the revised and a draft of PRSP; and it was agreed that Uganda's PEAP becomes its PRSP. In May 2000, the government produced a final/full operational PRSP which included inputs from various stakeholders. It became the basis for the budget expenditure frame work and budget allocations. In the agricultural sector, budget allocations have since increased from 4% to 12%, a change that some RPOs acknowledge.

In the PRSP process, the Ministry of Finance, Planning and Economic Development (MFPED) was the lead government institution. The ministry was involved in consultations to develop macroeconomic framework projections, studies and reviews such as the Uganda Participatory Poverty Assessment Project (UPPAP), sector reviews, Uganda National Household Survey (UNHS) and National Integrity Survey, and mobilization of consultative group meetings, working group discussions and all stakeholder consultation workshops. It was also the lead agency in document drafting. Clearly, the period between PRSP drafting and producing the final document was too

⁴⁷ <http://www.worldbank.org/poverty/strategies/index.htm>.

⁴⁸ International Monetary Fund (2003) *Staff report for the 2002 consultation with Uganda*,

⁴⁹ Gariyo, Zie (2001) *The PRSP process in Uganda*, Kampala: Uganda Debt Network.

short to allow effective participation of all the RPOs or their representatives countrywide. As such, most of their views were solicited and presented by the Private Sector Foundation (PSF).

NGO Forum was another key player in the PEAP revision and PRSP formulation. The Forum carried out inter-CSO and CSO-Local governments consultations. The CSO was represented by the Civil Society Task Force on the steering committee, with the Uganda Debt Network plying a leading role.

In addition to the government, civil society and donors, research institutions such as the Economic Policy Research Centre (EPRC) and Makerere Institute of Social Research (MISR) actively participated in PRSP formulation.

4.0 PEAP/PRSP evaluation process and conclusions

4.1 Evaluation process

The PEAP/PRSP sets the long-term goal of reducing the incidence of income poverty in Uganda to less than 10% by 2017. However, poverty increased from 35% in 2000 to 38% in 2005. The 2000 PEAP/PRSP was established on four major pillars: Creating a framework for economic growth and transformation; Ensuring good governance and security; Directly increasing the ability of the poor to raise their incomes; and Directly increasing the quality of the life of the poor. Evaluation of the progress of PRSP reveals a number of issues.

Because of adverse economic shocks, the interim growth and inflation targets have not been met. Besides, private investment continues to be slow in responding to the opportunities that are available in the Ugandan economy. The government is therefore, within agriculture, focusing its expenditures on activities which clearly have the nature of public goods, and which complement private sector activity or correct market failures⁵⁰. The key priority areas are agricultural research; agricultural advisory services; disease control; support to agricultural marketing and cooperatives; district and community forests; business development services; industrial parks; rural financial services; rural electrification; community roads; and urban and community infrastructure improvement.

The population affected by emergency, both drought in some parts of the country and the civic conflicts, increased during the 1990s, representing more than 5% the population. The number peaked in 2000 and has since started to fall. Persistent poverty in the northern part of the country has been largely attributed to insecurity that has made social and economic development virtually impossible in some areas. Efforts to combat this have included international peace initiatives, and improving service delivery.

Apart from the northern region, rural incomes in general, and agricultural incomes in particular increased in the 1990s. There has, however, been insufficient diversification of economic activity, with much of the economic growth coming from expansion of area cultivated.

Under the pillar of increasing the quality of the life of the poor, the government's objective was to improve the quality of life of the poor in terms of better health, education, nutrition, and access to clean drinking water. There has been an enormous increase in gross primary enrollments, but this has in turn created problems and challenges, especially maintaining the quality of the schooling delivered. The PEAP/PRSP targets for pupil-teacher, pupil-classroom and pupil-textbook ratios have not

⁵⁰ Ministry of Finance, Planning and Economic Development, 2004. Poverty Eradication Action Plan 2004/05-2007/08. Kampala, Uganda

yet been realized. In addition, health indicators are still below the target levels. Child malnutrition has declined and HIV/AIDS and malaria continue to pose serious health threats to Ugandans. There has been a major improvement in water supply and access to safe water has increased. However, the PEAP/PRSP interim targets for the number of springs and shallow wells protected are not yet achieved.

Based on the above evaluation, the PEAP/PRSP was revised in 2004 coming up with five pillars. These are: 1) Economic management; 2) Enhancing production, competitiveness and incomes; 3) Security, conflict resolution and disaster management; 4) Good governance; and 5) Human development⁵¹.

In the economic management pillar are three key priorities namely: maintenance of macroeconomic stability, fiscal consolidation, and boosting private investment. In the pillar for enhancing production, competitiveness and incomes, modernization of agriculture is one of the key priorities. It is under this priority area that the Plan for Modernization of Agriculture (PMA) is operationalized. The other priorities are preservation of the natural resource base, particularly soil and forests (which is also agriculture related); infrastructure including roads, railways and electricity; and enhancing private sector skills and business development.

The pillar of security, conflict-resolution and disaster-management has three key priorities: ending rebel insurgency, by peaceful means if possible; ending cattle-rustling; and dealing with internal displacement and abduction, which are major sources of distress in contemporary Uganda. Under the governance pillar, human rights and democratization; development of a better legal system; and transparency, accountability and the elimination of corruption are the key priorities.

The fifth pillar (Human development) highlights education, health and community empowerment as the key areas. Primary and secondary education focusing on quality and the ultimate objective of learning is the target. There is a deliberate target of public expenditure on secondary education at those who could not otherwise afford it. Focus is also on improving health outcomes, community empowerment including adult literacy, and increasing people's ability to plan the size of their families.

It is, however, indicated that the identification of an area as a priority does not necessarily mean that spending on this area will increase.

As key plans and strategies to implement and follow up the PRSP, each sector has developed own sector strategic plans, and sectoral joint review reports are written every 6 months. In addition, national policy and program performance status reports are also produced every 6 months. These are coordinated by the National Integrated Monitoring and Evaluation Strategy (NIMES) unit. Furthermore, the government put in place the Plan for Modernization of Agriculture (PMA). PMA is the country's framework within which commercial agriculture can thrive and ordinary people have the opportunity to move away from subsistence agriculture⁵². National Agricultural Advisory Services (NAADS) was also instituted to promote demand-driven extension services to farmers.

⁵¹ Ministry of Finance, Planning and Economic Development, 2004. Poverty Eradication Action Plan 2004/05-2007/08. Kampala, Uganda

⁵² <http://www.pma.go.ug/>

4.2 Participation of RPOs in the formulation, implementation and monitoring of PRSP/PEAP

The PRSP participatory process was led by the Ministry of Finance Planning and Economic Development (MFPED). Different RPOs were invited and briefed by the Private Sector Foundation (PSF) to gather and present their views as regards PEAP in a 2 day workshop. The PSF was the lead organization although there was general sharing of ideas through presentations and discussions preceding the presentations. Among the RPOs that participated are Uganda Cooperative Alliance (UCA), Uganda National Farmers Federation (UNFFE), Uganda Commercial Farmers Association (UCFA), and Agricultural Council of Uganda (ACU).

In this study, views on RPOs' participation in PRSP process were solicited from UCA, UNFFE and UCFA. Discussions were also held with officials of Environmental Alert and Uganda Debt Network (Civil Society Organizations) who actively participated in the PRSP process, to verify some of the information collected from the RPOs.

The RPOs that participated reported that they were satisfied with the performance of their lead organization/representative, the PSF. The Foundation compiled views from all participants, documented them and submitted them to the Ministry of Finance Planning and Economic Development to be referred to during the subsequent PEAP reviews. This, however, means that the level of participation was more or less limited to submitting views than debating them in the process.

By and large, the government and donors dominate but this time round there was a great recognition and consideration of the RPOs input into the process. But even then, the small RPOs and ordinary members continue to be under represented. The participation of ordinary members was also limited reportedly because the time was short, the RPOs lacked funds to facilitate measures within their organizations to deepen participation, and there were many other interest groups joining the process, hence the reduction of the number of participating RPO members. According to UCA, consultations were mainly at upper levels due to financial constraints, implying limited reach of the ordinary members. Discussions were held at national level (mainly in Kampala city) which resulted in RPOs closer to Kampala participating more effectively and consistently. Although no RPO was directly excluded from the process, this factor and probably the methodology used could have indirectly barred them from effective participation.

According to the RPOs, the issue of incorporating the marginalized or disadvantaged groups within RPOs was not discussed during the consultation workshops, but this was considered within the civil CSOs. For example, the National Union of Disabled Persons of Uganda strongly presented views of people with disabilities. Also, women and children organizations participated in the process.

During the PRSP/PEAP participatory process, representatives of various RPOs dealt mainly with agricultural issues and other cross cutting issues such as taxation, poverty, gender in relation to employment, and HIV/AIDS. Participation by RPOs was limited to presentation and discussion of their views during the workshops. Representative of RPOs did not participate up to authoritative decision making level. Their input was up to draft level and the final draft was largely a government decision. To some extent, however, they had an influence in some issues, especially agricultural issues.

The PRSP/PEAP is implemented through programmes such as National Agricultural Advisory Services (NAADS) under the Plan for Modernization of Agriculture (PMA) framework, Local Government Development Programmes (LGDP), Universal Primary Education (UPE), and Primary Health Care (PHC), among others.

Regarding the follow up process and implementation of Poverty Reduction Strategy, after the workshops RPOs do not participate adequately. It was agreed by the government and World Bank that the Anti-Corruption Coalition be contracted as the only organization to carry out monitoring and evaluation, but definitely consults the sectors and RPOs. It was reported that Uganda Debt Network has been one of the lead organizations in monitoring of the PEAP. It is currently monitoring service provision in Kamuli, Bugiri, Bushenyi, Kanungu, Iganga, Tororo, Rakai and Mayuge districts. Some RPO members also have been attending joint reviews of PMA, while others are members of PMA Steering Committee and PMA Monitoring and Evaluation Committee.

RPO representatives feel that follow up and implementation would only be effective if funds are not misallocated. They are of the view that PMA should be spearheaded or otherwise owned by farmers on the ground, with government and donor agencies simply providing financial and technical support.

Despite the good intentions of PRSP, particularly using the debt relief, it was reported that the services hardly ever get to the intended beneficiaries (rural poor). Highly ranked programme officials are not well acquainted with the real farming situation on the ground. As such they usually package the policy messages in ways inappropriate for efficient utilization by the rural poor, majority of whom are not educated. Consequently, the Poverty Reduction Strategy is simply a government policy not known by the intended targets but rather a document often discussed and reviewed during conferences and workshops attended by government officials and representatives of the donor agencies.

Advancements in the follow up and implementation process are not very evident apart from adjustments in budget allocation in favour of the agricultural sector. Some set backs were reported mainly attributed to corruption and poorly designed programmes. It was, for instance, reported that PMA was designed without consultations with the poor farmers on the ground. This policy framework, for example, had abolished cooperatives in favour of farmer groups. Unfortunately, the farmers groups were not successful and now PMA has just realized that it would have been better to amend the cooperatives rather than scrap them.

Nonetheless, the PRSP/PEAP allowed for the most participatory policy making process ever in Uganda because it was the very first time RPOs were called upon to express their views. However, the Poverty Reduction Strategy has not been followed by effective implementation and productive measures to reduce poverty in the country. This is instantly recognizable from the status of the poor, which has remained the same (if not worsened). RPOs jointly felt that the way forward was to prioritize agriculture. They asserted that unless corruption is eliminated from the equation, these policy issues will remain hidden in government documents. The Uganda Debt Network and Environment Alert similarly pointed out that some efforts have been made to ensure effective implementation but there exists a number of limitations especially political influence and corruption. The implementation is reportedly poor mainly because of inappropriate linking of programmes to the national budget. Moreover, political interests overrun the PEAP. Politics should be separated from development. Technocrats should be left to do their work and politicians theirs too. More public sensitization about PRSP and capacity building for effective implementation and monitoring of the PRSP were also recommended.

The cross section of Rural Producer Organisations (RPOs) and Civil Society Organisations (CSOs) consulted during the PEAP revision process

A) Rural Producer Organisations and other lead agencies

1. Agricultural Council of Uganda
2. Electro Commission (EC)
3. Enterprise Uganda
4. Environmental Alert
5. Federation of Uganda Employers
6. Foundation for Assistance of Small Enterprises and Rural Technologies
7. International Institute for Development Policy and Management
8. Ministry of Finance, Planning and Economic Development (MoFPED)
9. National Union of Coffee Agribusinesses and Farm Enterprises (NUCAFE)
10. NGO Forum Uganda
11. Pan African Movement (PAM)
12. Private Sector Foundation Uganda (PSFU)
13. Royal Norwegian Embassy
14. Uganda National Chamber of Commerce and Industry (UNCCI)
15. Uganda Association of Consulting Engineers (UACE)
16. Uganda Beef Producers Association
17. Uganda Coffee Farmers Association
18. Uganda Coffee Traders Federation
19. Uganda Commercial Farmers Association (UCFA)
20. Uganda Cooperative Alliance (UCA)
21. Uganda Export Promotion Board (UEPB)
22. Uganda Debt Network (UDN)
23. Uganda Fish Processors and Exporters Association (UFPEA)
24. Uganda Fisheries and Fish Conservation Association (UFFCA)
25. Uganda Floriculture Association
26. Uganda Floriculture Association
27. Uganda Flower Exporters Association
28. Uganda Honey Bee Keepers Association
29. Uganda Importers, Exporters and Traders Association
30. Uganda Insurers Association
31. Uganda Manufacturers Association (UMA)
32. Uganda Micro Entrepreneurs Association (UMEA), Jinja
33. Uganda Micro Entrepreneurs Association
34. Uganda Motor Industry Association
35. Uganda National Bureau of Standards (UNBS)
36. Uganda National Farmers Federation
37. Uganda Renewable Energy Association (UREA)
38. Uganda Saloon Operators/Hair Dressers Association
39. Uganda Small Scale Industries Association (USSIA)
40. Uganda Small Scale Industries Association Gatsby Masaka
41. Uganda Small Scale Industries Association Mbale
42. Uganda Small Scale Industries Association Women Desk, Masaka
43. Uganda Women Finance Trust Ltd
44. United States Agency for International Development (USAID)
45. Wilsken Agencies

B) Civil Society Organisations

46. A.R.Kiiza Associate Management Consultants
47. ABATEGANDA
48. Aduku Sound Tailors

49. AGRI.Association
50. Akony Kon Oil Mill
51. Alito-Ajaligabo
52. Amolatar Development Association
53. AO Consultants
54. Apac District Farmers Association
55. Bee Farmers Association
56. Bivamuye Orphanage, Masaka
57. BKT Agroforestry Group
58. BM Group of Companies
59. Bugiri District Tukaibolu Bee Keepers
60. Bugiri TUNADO
61. Bumatanda N.P. F. A
62. Bunambutye ACE Sironko District
63. Bushenyi Coffee District Farmers Association
64. Bushenyi Dairy Industry
65. Bushenyi District Farmers Association
66. Bwikhonge 'B' PFA
67. D.B.Electrical Ibanda
68. Dekolo Villa Savings & Credit
69. Diary Cooperation
70. ECRP Simimity C.S.Ltd, Kapchorwa
71. Elgon Cooperatives Society
72. Excel Insurance Co. Ltd Bushenyi
73. Galiwango Foundry Mbale
74. Good Service (U) Ltd
75. Gulu Farmers Association
76. Guru Nanak Oil Mills
77. HORTEXA
78. Inter Africa Coporate DANIDA PSD Programme.
79. JOBE Fashions
80. Jowas Enterprise
81. Kabale District Farmers Association
82. Kasese Farmers Association
83. Kashare Environmental Protection Project, Mbarara
84. KEEWA Systems
85. Kitugum District Farmers Association
86. KONG Apor GCS
87. Kula Kula Management Consult
88. Kumi District FarmerS Association
89. Kyada Co.
90. Kyagaju Twimukye
91. Kyangenyi Coffee Farmers
92. Leather Sector Aduku Apac/Lira
93. Lira District Farmers Association
94. Lira District Unity Farm
95. Lyokanyo Farmers Association
96. Masaba Coffee Farmers Association
97. Masiindi District Farmers Association
98. Mbale Bee Keepers Association
99. Mbale BUKHOFU P. F.A
100. Mbale Bunabutiti P.Farmers Association
101. Mbale District Farmers Association
102. Mbale District Local Government
103. Mbale Gatsby Enterprise
104. Mbale IMSAT
105. Mbale Information Department

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106. Mbale United Bee Keepers
 107. Mbarara District Farmers Association
 108. Mbarara District Farmers Association
 109. Metro Wheels Health Care
 110. Monitor
 111. Muhame Cooperative Ltd
 112. Nabbongo Farmers Association
 113. National Union of Coffee Agribusinesses and Farm Enterprises, Tweheyangenyi
 114. Nawe Parish Group
 115. New Lugazi Ent.
 116. New Vision
 117. NGO Forum, Sironko
 118. North Bukedi Co. Ltd
 119. Oreim Lira
 120. Oruibuza Women Cooperative
 121. Ox-Plough Organisation, Lira
 122. Premium Consult Ltd
 123. Radio West
 124. Rafula P. F. Association
 125. Rakai District Farmers Association
 126. Rhino Lira
 127. Rwebikoona Biik Oguze
 128. Sheema Tweheyo Group
 129. Sheta Group
 130. Sironko Bee Farmers
 131. Sironko Farmers Association
 132. Sironko Nagadi Halasi Farmers Association
 133. Sironko Valley Integrated
 134. Soroti District Farmers Association
 135. Super F.M
 136. Syanyonja Cooperatives Financial Services
 137. Top Radio
 138. Tororo District Farmers Association
 139. Transparent Wood Industry Ltd
 140. Uganda National Chamber of Commerce and Industry Ntungamo District Branch
 141. Uganda National Chamber of Commerce and Industry, Mbarara Branch
 142. Uganda Cooperative Alliance, Mbarara

Appendix 4

The PRSP process in Tanzania

**TANZANIA COUNTRY STUDY ON RURAL PRODUCER ORGANIZATIONS IN
PRSP PROCESSES**

Samuel M. Jonathan

Emrod E. Kimambo

Moshi University College of Cooperative and Business Studies.

1. Background Information

The Business Experience Exchange Programme (BEEP) is a collaborative effort of rural producer organizations and research institutions, formed in order to develop small-scale agricultural activities, within the new national and international economic framework. BEEP operates in the four countries of Malawi, Tanzania, Uganda and Zambia.

The overall objective of BEEP is that the participating Rural Producer Organizations (RPOs) in the four countries, inspired by exchange of business experiences between the RPOs, will enhance their business performance and thereby contribute to increased income and hence reduce poverty at farm level.

With the launching of PRSPs from the World Bank and IMF, participatory processes have been highlighted and evaluated. BEEP intends to establish reliable documentation on the participation of the agricultural sector, represented by RPOs in the PRSP processes in the countries of operation.

The concept of RPOs is used in this context as a generic term to cover all types of institutional arrangements that regulate individual and collective actions by rural producers in order to safeguard and promote their economic, social, and political interests (Bee, 2004:12).

2. Tanzania: Macroeconomic Context

Tanzania is a multi-party democratic state with an executive presidency. It has 26 administrative regions and 130 districts.

In 2004 Tanzania's economy grew by 6.7 percent in real terms. The increase in growth rate was attributed to the increase in growth of the agricultural sector. So far agriculture plays a major role in the economy. It contributes 46 percent to the gross domestic product (GDP); it provides a basis of livelihoods to 82 percent of the population; and it also accounted for 60 percent of the foreign currency earnings⁵³.

GDP at factor cost (1992 prices) was TAS 2094 billions Percapita income at current prices amounted to TAS 319,754⁵⁴.

According to the household survey of 2000 – 2001 the proportion of the population below the poverty line is 18 percent and that below the national basic needs poverty line is 35.7 percent⁵⁵.

In the 2002 national census the total population was 34.4 million. The 2004 estimates are 35.3 million out of which 51 percent are female and 49 percent male. About 80 percent of the population are based in the rural areas while about 20 percent are urban based⁵⁶.

Based on the 2002 census the illiteracy rate was 32 percent for mainland and 37 percent for the isles. Life expectancy was 51 years for mainland and 57 years for the isles.

3. PSRP Status

The Tanzania government started the formulation of its development vision in 1995. The vision lays out the long term development goals and perspectives against which the strategy for poverty alleviation (NPES) was formulated. In October 1997 the National

⁵³ Tanzania in Figures (2004) National Bureau of Statistics

⁵⁴ Ibid

⁵⁵ Exchange rate (2004) 1 USD = 1,089 Tshs

⁵⁶ Tanzania web site

Poverty Eradication Strategy became ready for approval. The NPES laid out objectives for poverty reduction efforts by the year 2010.

Meanwhile the medium-term national strategy of economic and social development was being developed. This constituted joint efforts of the government and the international community through the Tanzania Assistance Strategy (TAS).

In the context of the enhanced Highly Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) initiative, a medium-term strategy of poverty reduction was developed through broad consultation with national and international stakeholders. This is the Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP)

In brief the PRS focused on six priority sectors namely primary education, roads, water, legal and judicial system, health sector, and agriculture. It also targets HIV/AIDS, gender, governance, local government reform program, human capital development, and environment as the cross-cutting issues. The aim is to bring about improvements in these sectors. Three pillars underlie this strategy, namely (a) Economic growth and the reduction of income poverty, (b) Improved quality of life and social well being, and (c) Good governance and accountability.

The process of formulating the PRSP started in October 1999. A committee of 12 ministers and the governor of Bank of Tanzania was formed to steer a process of preparing the PRSP. The ministries involved were the Vice President's office, the Prime Minister's Office, Planning Commission, Ministry of Finance, Ministry of Education, Ministry of Health, Ministry of Works, Ministry of Community Development, Ministry of Local Government, Ministry of Agriculture, Ministry of Water, Energy and Minerals, Ministry of Labour and Youth Development and the Bank of Tanzania. The first PRSP was completed in October 2000.

The PRSP process was coordinated by the Vice President's Office through its Poverty Reduction Unit.

The technical Committee prepared the final PRSP and organized the zonal and national PRSP workshops. The zonal workshops were mainly aimed at soliciting views from the grassroots stakeholders. They were concurrently conducted during the 11th and 12th May 2000 in seven zones of mainland Tanzania. The zones include Lake zone, Western zone, Northern zone, Central zone, Southern Highland zone, Southern zone and Eastern zone.

Each district was represented by 4 villagers (sampled randomly from 2 villages), one district councilor, one town councilor and one District Executive Director (DED). For every zonal workshop civil society was represented by 5 NGO (One person each).

The workshops were conducted through working groups, followed by plenary presentations. To ensure active participation villagers were grouped according to regions and gender, councilors by region, DEDs by region and NGOs by zones.

The list of some of the civil society organizations that were represented in the zonal workshops is appended.

Before the review three annual reports were prepared. The first report was the 2000/01; the second 2001/02; and the third 2002/03. In the whole of 2004 a review of the PRSP was carried out. This review was consultative to the district level. The main findings of the review were as follows:⁵⁷.

⁵⁷ The URT (June 2005) national Strategy for Growth and Reduction of Poverty.

- a) Participatory structures were formed on an ad-hoc basis.
- b) Collaboration with stakeholders was less frequent and joint decision making on relevant aspects of pro-poor policy was limited.
- c) The PRS process was exceptionally compressed (six months duration); too tight timeframe for consultation limited the participation of stakeholders.
- d) CSO involvement and their impact on outcome of the processes have been very limited.
- e) Inadequate background and understanding of PRSP limited stakeholders' participation.
- f) Inadequate resources to implement PRS consultations.
- g) Problem of synchronization where TAS (Tanzania Assistance Strategy) was supposed to provide PRS framework but was not completed before the PRSP.
- h) The composition of participants in the workshop did not represent adequately all sections of society: women, youth, people with disabilities, the elderly, people living with HIV/AIDS, orphans were not adequately represented in the PRSP process.
- i) Inadequate analysis of the "voices of the poor" through the zonal workshops.
- j) Inadequate mechanism in dealing with crosscutting issues such as environment, HIV/AIDS, Gender, and Employment.
- k) Lack of PRS Communication strategies.
- l) Inadequate capacity in key government institutions (PRS technical committee, PRS steering committee, PRS inter-ministerial committee).
- m) CSOs lacked access to key documents and adequate mechanism to provide feedback.
- n) Inadequate capacity of several CSOs to engage in policy dialogue.

In Tanzania the 2004 PRS review culminated into the birth of the National Strategy for Growth and Reduction of Poverty (NSGRP). This was approved by Cabinet in February 2005⁵⁸. The key strategies across sectors include the achievement of broad based and equitable growth, improvement of quality of life and social well being, with particular focus on the poorest and most vulnerable groups, and improvement of governance and the rule of law and of accountability of leaders and public servants. In agriculture the goal is to increase growth rate from 5 percent to 10 percent by 2010.

4 Participation of RPOs in PRSP

Civil society organizations participated in the PRSP process through their networks. However, it appears that RPOs at the micro level were not involved in the PRSP process. The NGOs which participated in the zonal workshops could be those from the macro and macro levels.

Our investigation was aimed at revealing whether RPOs at the micro level participated in the PRSP process. We found out that:

⁵⁸ This list was obtained through interviewing Andrew Mushi of TANGO. Efforts to get the list from the Poverty Reduction Unit VP office were unsuccessful. The list could not be accessed.

(a) Depth of participation

		Strong	Average	Weak
1.	RPO participated very well	20%	40%	40%
2.	Ordinary members well incorporated	20%	20%	60%
3.	Ordinary members participated well through RPO measures	60%	-	40%
4.	Ordinary members participated well through CSO arrangements	20%	40%	40%

This table reveals that RPOs did not participate well in the PRSP process. Our interviews with the respondents revealed that their responses referred to their participation in the National Strategy for Economic Growth and Reduction of Poverty (NSGRP) or MKUKUTA.

(b) Scope of participation

		Strong	Average	Weak
5.	Influence in agricultural issues	20%	40%	40%
6.	Influence in cross-cutting issues	40%	40%	60%
7.	Influence in macro-economic policies	60%	-	40%

The data reveal that key representatives of RPOs might have influenced policy issues but not to a significant scope.

(c) Level of participation

		Strong	Average	Weak
8.	Participation in follow-up process	-	20%	80%

Participation in the follow-up process and implementation is very weak. The RPO which indicated some participation is a branch of macro-level NGO.

(d) Overall assessment of participation

		Strong	Average	Weak
9.	PRSP allowed for most participatory policy making process.	20%	60%	20%
10.	PRSP has made permanent changes afterwards.	20%	40%	40%
11.	PRSP have been followed by effective implementation and productive measures.	-	40%	60%

To the respondents PRSP has not yet been effective.

Our respondents consist of 5 RPOs 4 of which are in Same district and one in Moshi district. One RPO is a branch of macro-level NGO while 4 are micro-level RPOs.

Their response is largely based on their experience with the review process which led to NSGRP or MKUKUTA. They had no idea of PRSP.

5. Future Collaboration

In this study we encountered a gap in data base for RPOs. It is crucial to have information regarding, at least, how many RPOs exist in Kilimanjaro region or even the northern zone; their locations; their activities; how many are involved in production; and how

many just support production. It would also help to have information regarding a few successful RPOs and the unsuccessful one; and to make a comparative study to understand factors leading to their performance in poverty reduction initiatives.

We take this opportunity to suggest that such a data base of existing RPOs in the northern zone be created and analysed for future use.

6. Conclusions and Recommendations

Conclusions

This study has revealed that micro-level RPOs have no idea about PRSP. Their response to the questionnaire has been based on what they know of the review that resulted into NSGRP or MKUKUTA. It appears therefore that there is no need to keep looking into RPO participation in the PRSP processes in Tanzania. The results of the review attest to fact that given the time frame for PRSP consultation, participation by micro-level organizations would be weak.

Recommendation

In order for MKUKUTA or (NSGRP) to have an impact on growth and poverty micro-level RPOs must be involved in implementation and monitoring and evaluation. There is also a need for strengthening micro-level organizations for them to be able to live up to the above mentioned challenge.

The state must assume the responsibility of strengthening micro-level RPOs by ensuring that they get access to human and financial resources. The state should also ensure that micro-level RPOs have access to opportunities for participation. As things stand now it delegated this responsibility to civil society. At the micro-level the state did not have anything to do with ensuring that RPOs participated in the process.

References

1. **Tanzania in Figures** (2004), National Bureau of Statistics.
2. Tanzania Web site
3. Ibid
4. Tanzania in Figures (op.cit)
5. The URT (June 2005) National Strategy for Growth and Reduction of Poverty.

Publications:

Bee, F. K. (2004) Rural Producer Organizations and Policy Formulation in Tanzania, NIBR Working Paper 2004:114.

Attachment

List of Civil Society represented in PRSP process:

Macro – level

NGO policy forum

Tanzania Gender Networking Programme (RPO)

Traditional Energy Development Organization

Tanzania Women Leaders in Agriculture

INADES

PELUM

MVIWATA (Mtandao wa Vikundi vya Wakulima Tanzania) (RPO)

Meso – level

Haki Kazi

ANGONET (Arusha NGO Network) (Umbrella RPO)

Same NGO (RPO)

Micro – level

Vibindo Society

This list was obtained through interviewing Andrew Mushi of TANGO. Efforts to get the list from the Poverty Reduction Unit VP office were unsuccessful. The list could not be accessed.