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Countering violent extremism in Somalia and Kenya: Actors and approaches

Stig Jarle Hansen, Stian Lid and Clifford Collins Omondi Okwany

OSLO METROPOLITAN UNIVERSITY
STORBYUNIVERSITETET



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Author: Stig Jarle Hansen, Stian Lid and Clifford Collins Omondi Okwany

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OsloMet – Oslo Metropolitan University
Postboks 4 St. Olavs plass
0130 OSLO
Telephone: (+47) 67 23 50 00
E-mail: post-nibr@oslomet.no
<http://www.oslomet.no/nibr>

Preface

This study, carried out for the Norwegian Embassy in Nairobi and the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs in 2016, focuses on the Norwegian government's support to peace and reconciliation projects in Somalia and Kenya, on those on countering violent extremism in particular. It has been conducted in collaboration between the Norwegian Institute for Urban and Regional Research (NIBR) and the Norwegian University of Life Science (NMBU), with Stig Jarle Hansen at NMBU as project leader.

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Oslo, April 2019

Geir Heierstad
Research Director

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List of Acronyms

| | |
|-----------------|---|
| AIWA | African Initiative for Women in Africa |
| AMISOM | African Union Mission in Somalia |
| ATPU | Anti-Terrorism Police Unit |
| AU | African Union |
| CBO | Community-Based Organization |
| CCA | Centre for Community Awareness |
| CHRIPS | Centre for Human Rights and Policy Studies |
| CIC | Coast Interfaith Council |
| CIPK | Council of Imams and Preachers in Kenya |
| Cogwo | Coalition for Grassroots Women's Organization |
| CSO | Civil Society Organisation |
| CVE | Combating violent extremism |
| DDG | Danish Demining Group |
| HAVAYOCO | Horn of Africa Voluntary Youth Committee |
| Hirda | Himilo Relief and Development Association |
| HURIA | Human Rights Agenda |
| IFRA | French Institute for Research in Africa |
| IMLU | Independent Medico-Legal Unit |
| INTOSAI | International Organization for Supreme Audit Institutions |
| IOM | International Organization of Migrations |
| IPOA | Independent Police Complaints Oversight Authority |
| ISS | Institute for Security Studies |
| IYAAT | International Youth Action Against Terrorism |
| KDF | Kenya Defence Force |
| KECOSCE | Kenya Community Support Centre |
| KHRC | Kenya Human Rights Commission |

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|-----------------|--|
| KNCHR | Kenya National Commission on Human Rights |
| KPR | Kenya Police Reserve |
| KTI | Kenya Transition Initiative |
| MRC | Mombasa Republican Council |
| MP | Member of Parliament |
| MUHURI | Muslims for Human Rights |
| NCIC | National Commission for Integration and Cohesion |
| NCTC | Kenyan National Counter Terrorism Centre |
| NGO | Non-Government Organization |
| NIS | Nordic International Support |
| NISA | National Intelligence and Security Agency |
| PRWG | Police Reform Working Groups |
| SNA | Somali National Army |
| SUPKEM | Supreme Council of Kenya Muslims |
| SYPD | Somali Youth for Peace and Development |
| UN | United Nation |
| UNDP | United Nations Development Programme |
| UNODC | United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime |
| UNOPS | United Nations Office for Project Services |
| WIIS HOA | Women In International Security Horn of Africa |

Summary

The presences of violent extremism on the Horn of Africa is severe and the situation influence both domestic and international. This project was to identify efforts and actors in Somalia and Kenya, which can operationalize the Norwegian policies regarding prevention of violent extremism presented in the White paper (2014-2015). The mandate of the project was to a) conduct a short analysis of security challenges in East Africa b) assess the Embassy's partners and other actors in Kenya and Somali c) propose efforts/measures the Embassy could support d) propose organizations and environments the Embassy might work together with for preventing recruitment to radical violent groups and for combating organized crime. The study utilizes both primary and secondary data, but we have focused on collecting primary data and have conducted a significant number of interviews. Interviews were conducted in person in Nairobi and Mogadishu, as well as by telephone from Norway to Mombasa, Kwale, Hargeisa, Kismayo and Baidoa, and the United Kingdom.

Combating violent extremism (CVE) is a concept widely discussed. CVE can be defined as 'a basket of measures that encompass community engagement, development, education, strategic communications, and public-private partnerships intended to reduce the appeal of and support for extremist groups, and enhance resilience against them' (Fink 2015). The research literature has introduced several broad theories to explain radicalization processes (i.e. rational choice approach, relative deprivation theory, social movement theory) and presented different causes to why individuals are recruited to extremism. Diversified prevention strategies and interventions is required. In addition, the realities on the ground and its implication for the CVE strategy should be acknowledged, it should be acknowledged that state control varies in the two countries and that CVE should be targeted accordingly. Types of extremist presence can be categorized as territorial control, where the extremists have full control of a territory, semi-territorial control where the extremists faces a superior army, but also an army that is mostly situates within its bases, and clandestine networks, where the extremists have to exist in hidden facing law-enforcement agencies. It also have to be accepted that a part of the CVE portfolio should be targeted on vulnerable micro groups rather than whole communities.

The current international engagement in Somalia suffers from two major weaknesses. First, CVE interventions have not been adequately targeted in design in relation to which part of Somalia they are to be implemented. In Somalia, there are zones where al-Shabaab have permanent control and semi-permanent control. It must be recognized that CVE mechanisms must be different in permanently controlled areas and semi-permanently controlled areas from other areas where the government and/or regional entities can provide adequately security. Second, CVE policies have not been based on lessons from previous projects in other countries: there has been little information sharing between various CVE measures within Somalia.

The present project report finds that state capacity building is especially important in areas where al-Shabaab has semi-peripheral control, as is the case

in much of the southern Somali countryside. Here a people-focused approach to combating violent extremism (CVE) is vital. The local populations need security in order to be convinced to stand up to al-Shabaab, so a stable police force is essential. Thus, regular salaries to the police officers and local ownership of police forces is crucial. It is also important to recognize that police corruption is an issue for CVE work: corruption erodes trust between the police and the local communities, and hampers efficiency for the police. Non-payment of wages acts to promote corruption. In areas where al-Shabaab has semi-peripheral control, normal de-radicalization programmes of the type implemented by the West have limited chances of success. As there are many also clan-based reasons for joining radical organizations, broader approaches are needed.

Parts of Somalia have a permanent security presence that hinders more than very brief takeovers by al-Shabaab forces. Also in such areas, the police need an effective presence, but other structures become more important. Several Somali NGOs have now developed experience and a good reputation in areas like clan reconciliation, teacher education, and youth work. As yet, these organizations have only indirectly entered into CVE work. They do have a role to play, but they will have to learn and adapt from outside and be engaged by other actors. Norway should encourage and participate in building up a coordination network between actors doing CVE work in Somalia. A sharing and lessons learned/training the trainers component should be a vital part of such an effort. Clan reconciliation is important in order to avoid 'issue alignment', so this activity should be part of a successful CVE portfolio. Clan elders are today also the frontline in CVE work: it is to them many parents choose to go to when they believe that their sons and daughters have become radicalized. The Norwegian portfolio in Somalia has been too concentrated and a more decentralized approach, including partners outside Mogadishu, is necessary.

The security situation in Kenya differ from Somalia and the degree of problems varies geographically. Al-Shabaab has no area/zones where they have full territorial control. However, clandestine active and passive networks and recruitments are widespread in Kenya. The writers clearly think that respondents and events confirm that the North East as well as Lamu probably are the most pressured regions in Kenya, and should be given priority. Distrust between the police and the government, and the audience is a general problem in all regions hampering coordination, information flows and general CVE work. In Kenya, many organisations are involved on different levels and with different approaches to CVE, but only a minority of the organisations are directly involved on individual level of prevention and reintegration. The UN-organisations, UNODC and UNDP, are directly involved in the police reform work. NGOs are also actors in enhancing the states capacity through policy work and facilitating training, stakeholders' meetings and workshops targeting civil servants, in particular the police. Particularly, the human rights organisations also monitor and correct police practice and thus to aid the improvement of the police services in Kenya. The political and administrative devolution in 2010 changed the infrastructure of the security sector paving the ground for enhanced security, but also new conflicts. It seems it has been insufficient focused on the challenges or opportunities regarding the new infrastructure. Different NGO's are facilitating

dialogue seminars on prevention of radicalization on different venues, in local communities, at universities or with national and international representatives. Dialogue between youth and the government officials, particularly police officers, are also effort that are conducted. This strategy is especially fit to counter Shabaabs strategy of issue alignment alongside the coast.

In Kenya, there are examples where NGO and CBO play a crucial role in targeting vulnerable groups and returnees. However, relatively few organisations in Kenya seems to operate on this level, which we see as a weakness, and Norway fund only some of these. The Norwegian support in Kenya have a high human rights profile due to the number of human rights organisations are funded. Protection of human rights becomes just even more significant when it comes to combating extremism so a continued strong support appear necessary (again a strategy that is especially fit to counter Shabaabs strategy of issue alignment), however, reallocating funding to other efforts should be considered. The portfolio ought to be extended to several projects targeting groups that are more vulnerable and families, groups and individuals who already are in radical networks. Religious groups have been important actor targeting vulnerable individuals, but we consider supporting religious councils or committees should be treated with extreme care, it is important that Norway are aware of the reach and the ideological discussions within their partners. Support to other groups that also can be a significant actor also towards the individuals in the risk groups are preferable.

Norway should consider increasing the support to efforts that can strengthen the state's capacity and particularly underpin the potential of the devolution. It should be noticed that police corruption is a very important problem for the legitimacy of state institutions, for the efficiency of investigations, and thus for CVE work.

1 Introduction

The security situation in many areas in the world has changed significantly in recent years. Increasingly, our own security is affected by situations and changes elsewhere around the globe. Fragility, conflict and violence outside Norway can pose threats to Norwegian interests, both domestically and internationally; this is for example exemplified by the Norwegian citizen Hassan Duhulow, who became Norway's second worst terrorist after participating in the Westgate attack in 2013, recruited by the radical Islamist group Al Shabaab.

The Norwegian government's White Paper *Global Security Challenges in Norway's Foreign Policy* (Meld.St.37 2014–2015) focuses on four areas of global security challenges: terrorism, organized crime, piracy, and cyber-threats. These challenges are interlinked, with similarities indicating that they can be addressed through a common set of efforts. This central White Paper describes the priorities, goals and principles for Norwegian efforts.

The Horn of Africa is a region with significant global security challenges. Despite a significant international military operation, the al-Qaeda affiliated group, known as al-Shabaab still controls areas in Somalia. The organization has also been responsible for several terrorist attacks in Kenya in recent years, and its recruitment of Kenyans makes the security situation in Somalia and in Kenya closely connected.

Norway has long been involved in stabilization efforts in the region, in Somalia in particular, through support to international and national organizations and through foreign policy instruments. This makes it especially pertinent to scrutinize and evaluate Norwegian support to peace and reconciliation projects in the region.

1.1 Project objectives

The Norwegian Embassy in Nairobi requested an assessment of the Norwegian government's support to peace and reconciliation projects in Somalia and Kenya, aimed at identifying efforts and actors in Somalia and Kenya for operationalizing the policies presented in the Norwegian White Paper (2014–2015). The Embassy requested an assessment of efforts and actors, to focus on two of the four challenges described in the White Paper: preventing recruitment to extremist groups, and combating organized crime.

The mandate of the project was as follows:

- to conduct a short analysis of security challenges in East Africa.
- to assess the Embassy's partners and other actors in Kenya and Somali working for dialogue between marginalized groups and the majority society, and the prevention and rehabilitation of youth recruited to violent groups. The assessment here should focus on relevance and achievements related to the aims of Norwegian support.
- to propose efforts/measures the Embassy could support for preventing recruitment to radical violent groups and for combating organized crime.

- to propose organizations and environments the Embassy might work together with.

This is not an in-depth evaluation of each one of the Embassy's partners and other organizations, or their activities and impacts. For several of these organizations, external evaluations have already been conducted (see Jones 2014). The specific focus of this assessment of the Embassy's partners and other actors is on their relevance to Norwegian foreign policy goals.

We begin with a brief description of the major points of Norwegian foreign policy as presented in the White Paper.

Norway's efforts at addressing global security challenges build on an integrated approach in line with the overarching principles of its foreign and development policy. This policy consists of four pillars: knowledge and analyses, national coordination, international cooperation, and capacity building (St.meld. 37: 2014–2015: 13).

The table below presents what we see as the main goals and principles of Norwegian efforts as set out in the White Paper. These should also underlie any CVE strategies and projects.

Goals and principles of Norway's efforts

| | |
|---|--|
| Rule of law and human rights | Crucial to Norwegian support: the work should be carried out in accordance with the principles of the rule of law and Norway's obligations under international law, including human rights and humanitarian law. |
| Capacity building | Capacity building is highlighted as a key instrument. The objective is to make institutions, international and national, better equipped for preventing and combating threats. |
| International cooperation | Norwegian foreign policy builds on support to and cooperation with international organizations. Norway intends to continue its support to and cooperation with such key international organization as the UN, UNODC, NATO and the AU in fighting terrorism, organized crime, piracy and cyber-threats. Capacity building and personnel assistance are key elements in Norway's support to these international organizations. |
| Enhance states' capacity | Here the aim is to make states better equipped to prevent and combat terrorism, organized crime, piracy and cyber-threats. This should also strengthen states' ability to safeguard the human rights of their citizens. |
| Targeting causes for recruitment to extremist groups | Countering radicalization and violence extremist should focus on the causes of recruitment. Highlighted key factors that may be preventive are: democratically principles, freedom of speech and media freedom, rule of law – in addition to |

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|---|---|
| | education, employment and a society built on social cohesion and inclusion. |
| Safeguarding women's rights | Women are considered an especially vulnerable group, and women's rights must be safeguarded. It is also important to ensure women's participation in CVE. |
| Strengthen civil society and local communities | In CVE, civil society and local communities are considered to have a crucial role. The Norwegian government wants to strengthen local communities' resilience to radicalization and violent extremism, by contributing to religious dialogue, improved trust between the justice sector and local communities, and support to moderate voices. In the development of strategies and action plans, civil society and local communities should be involved and play a key role. |

Source: based on *St.meld. 37: 2014–2015*

1.2 Methodology

The study utilizes both primary and secondary data, but we have focused on collecting primary data and have conducted a significant number of interviews.

Interviews

The Norwegian Embassy in Nairobi forwarded a list over partners with which the Embassy has recent or ongoing cooperation. We have interviewed most of these partners, in addition to representatives of other organizations, civil society representatives, and ordinary Somalis and Kenyans living in exposed areas. Interviews were conducted in person in Nairobi and Mogadishu, as well as by telephone from Norway to Mombasa, Kwale, Hargeisa, Kismayo and Baidoa, and the United Kingdom.

We conducted individual and group interviews. Interviews were semi-structured: they proceeded according to a common Interview Guide, but with the possibility of bringing in additional aspects or issues when this was considered relevant.

Interviews with organizations focused on their work, activities and the impact of their work, their perceptions of the security situation in Kenya and Somalia, and the capacity and performance of government institutions (particularly the police) and of Norway as a donor.

Triangulation has been important in data collection: we have interviewed representatives of the organizations, but have also collected information outside the organizations, in order to get internal and external perspectives on their activities. We have interviewed religious leaders, Member of Parliaments (MP), representatives of ministries, international delegates, diasporas, businesspersons, journalists and representatives of local communities. In total, thirty-five interviews were conducted with informants who were not from partners of the Norwegian Embassy. Several of these informants have significant

knowledge about the security challenges in Kenya and/or Somalia, and about state and non-state actors active in preventing radicalization and combating organized crime.

Documents and media studies

The Embassy supplied us with relevant documents for some of the organizations and institutions – project proposals, annual reports, minutes from meetings/conferences, etc. These documents have given vital information about the specific projects the Embassy is funding, and the partners' objectives, activities etc. However, we have not received relevant documents for partners funded by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. For all partners we have consulted their websites, and have also searched for information from web-based newspapers.

1.3 A word of caution: the climate for NGOs and the press in Somalia and Kenya

The implementation capacities of NGOs are necessarily influenced by the conditions under which they must operate. Conditions in Somalia are challenging in terms of security, due to the threat of al-Shabaab. NGOs in Kenya, particularly along the coast, have also received death threats from the organization. In addition, NGOs and journalists in Kenya have been challenged significantly by the government in recent years. The Kenyan government sought to reduce foreign funding to NGOs in Kenya to 15 per cent, by a proposed amendment to the Public Benefits Organisations Act of 2013. Foreign donor funding was seen as interference with the sovereign authority of Kenya, and NGOs that received more external funding were declared 'foreign entities' (*The Star* 2014). Although the Kenyan Parliament rejected cutting foreign funding to NGOs (Standard media 2014), the proposal from the President made clear the government's view on NGOs and funding from foreign donors.

In 2015, the government blacklisted, de-registered and blocked bank accounts for more than 80 civil society entities, including two Mombasa-based human rights entities supported by the Norwegian Embassy – Muslims for Human Rights (MUHURI) and Haki Africa. The Kenya government claimed that these entities were supporting al-Shabaab activities, directly or indirectly.

Funding for these two organizations has also challenged bilateral relations between Kenya's government and its development partners. The government asked several countries, including Norway, to stop funding the activities of MUHURI and Haki Africa (*The Star* 2015). The Norwegian Ambassador officially refused to comply, and stated that the funding would continue (Nation 2015).

In evaluating the achievements and performance of organizations, it is important to take into consideration the challenges confronting foreign donors and civil society in Kenya in recent years. There have been problems with implementation: in fact, one of our respondents was arrested only hours after the interview.

2 Security challenges in East Africa: brief analysis

The Horn of Africa region has experienced protracted interstate and intrastate wars and conflicts, brought about by historical injustices, socio-economic, environmental and governance causes. Furthermore, competition for national interests and a multitude of factors that include economic, political, security and strategic issues regarding the war on terror and international piracy have exacerbated the security issues experienced in the Horn of Africa. In addition, the region has a high number of refugees. Analysing the region as a unit reveals a range of existential threats to security. Socio-economically and politically, the nature of state power in the region is a key source of conflict, since political victory often assumes a winner-takes-all form with respect to wealth and resources, as well as the prestige and prerogatives of office. The security apparatuses are plagued by corruption.

The African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) has since 2007 continued to enhance the capacities of Somali soldiers and police in order to strengthen security institutions in Somali, for eventual handover. With Burundi facing a crisis as a state and the political debate in Kenya as whether to withdraw Kenya Defence Force (KDF) or not, AMISOM seems disunited. Ethiopian forces are playing a larger role than before, while Kenya also has a domestic debate over its allocation of forces in Somalia. A clear exit strategy for AMISOM does not exist, and the Somali government is dependent on AMISOM for security.

The Somalia government is still vulnerable to sporadic militia attacks. The security situation remains volatile and defined by the sporadic attacks on the part of al-Shabaab. The El-Adde attacks on the 15th of January, left several Kenyan soldiers dead; the attacks at Beach View Hotel on Lido beach on the 22 January 2016 in Mogadishu killed up to 20 people: both these indicate the continued presence of the insurgents in Somalia despite claims as to the weakness of al-Shabaab. Although peace has spread in Somalia over the past five years, the federal system makes possible local frictions between states, and clan clashes still occur – potential sources of support for al-Shabaab.

The upcoming selection process of a new president, cabinet and parliament might also create friction, but mechanisms for dealing with such frictions have gradually developed. Conflicts between the government and regional entities, and within the government, as well as (with some exceptions), also between the regional states, have been handled peacefully – a notable achievement. Somalia is progressing, but slowly, and might encounter setbacks in the future.

Since Kenya went into Somalia to fight the militia in 2011, there have been several attacks by the militia inside Kenyan territory. *Operation Linda Nchi* has not fruitfully stabilized Kenyan security. The al-Shabaab sympathizers recently charged in Mombasa, the suspect arrested in Isiolo, the strike in Pandanguo village in Lamu, five police feared dead in Lamu, including the El-Adde attacks – these are just but a few of the moves made by the militia in January and February 2016. Al-Shabaab is estimated to have a semi-permanent presence in

Boni forest, *de facto* wielding local control. Kenya's internal security is challenged by the gaps in different security policies. The new national constitution brought a new face to community policing at the county level, but the County Policing Authority has been undermined by the lack of budgeting power. There has been an antagonistic relationship between the governors and the county commissioners as to who is in charge of county-level security. In 2013 came the *Nyumba Kumi* policy, whereby each tenth individual is to report on the neighbours: indeed, a parallel policy to the County Policing Authority.

The Kenyan government has had security challenges in the northwest and northeast in Turkana, Marsabit, Mandera, Wajir and Garissa region, and Lamu. In Tana, there are also problems. Often these problems are connected with land-issues, or clashes between nomads and farmers/ various ethnic groups.

The presence of the government has been limited in these areas; however, with the new constitution, a roadmap of resource allocation to the counties was introduced. These regions are vulnerable to livestock rustling, fighting for resources like water points, and green pastures for their animals. In addition to the problematic County Policing Authority and *Nyumba Kumi* policies, the government opted for Kenya Police Reserve (KPR) to help stop insecurity in this region, a force largely distrusted locally.

Terrorist activities have become heightened in the region especially since the collapse of Somalia as a state. Currently, the region is considered as a breeding ground and a safe haven for terrorist organizations, with al-Shabaab carrying out indiscriminate attacks in Kenya; it has been claimed that the militia group al-Shabaab might have split in two, a possibility of having ISIL cells in the region. Cross-border problems are also evidence of insecurity in the region, with cattle rustling in northwestern Turkana, Pokot and the Karamoja in Uganda and the northeastern part of Kenya.

3 Tailoring CVE theory according to local conditions

Combating violent extremism (CVE) is a concept widely discussed, often used parallel to the concept of terrorism (as an equivalent of violent extremism), and drawing on other, equally debated, concepts like de-radicalization and radicalization (See Edine et al. 2011). Fink (2015) defines CVE as 'a basket of measures that encompass community engagement, development, education, strategic communications, and public-private partnerships intended to reduce the appeal of and support for extremist groups, and enhance resilience against them'; and this conceptualization can be taken as a point of departure here. Norwegian legal definitions of 'terrorism', focusing on intentional disturbance of societal functions in order to create fear and to force a government or recognized international organization to change its policies, should also be kept in mind as a guideline for Norwegian civil servants (see Norwegian Penal Code §147).

Yet the terms and definitions have political and normative connotations and can be used to brand political enemies, as well as to quell political dialogue with non-violent political actors who hold deviating opinions. On the other hand, careful consideration might allow CVE strategies to include, for example, a human rights component. Indeed, the British prevention programme for countering radicalization has moved from a definitional focus on the radicalization process as a process ending in coalescence, to a focus on a wider end-result where a person holds beliefs that counter human rights, and contest democracy itself. The idea was 'Draining the Swamp': removing the ideological foundations (Gearson & Rosemont 2015). This in turn has had consequences for ideas about partners, where the programme shifted from supporting religious groups with ideological similarities to organizations like Islamic State, but where the main message was non-violent. This in turn has consequences for Norwegian engagement, in which human rights are supposed to play a key role. The above development should not necessarily be seen as research-driven, but equally driven by a political process where CVE is viewed holistically in combination with other interests and issues. Indeed, religious scholars of the Wahhabi persuasion have been successfully involved in several de-radicalization processes, like Saudi Arabia's 'Prevent, Rehabilitation and aftercare approach' (Rabasa et al. 2010). Critics maintain that the religious focus was to legitimize the state rather than prevent violence. Thus, not preventing violence outside the country, moreover, the mono-religious context of the Saudi state apparatus meant that it became legitimate to use only Wahhabi sheiks, while similar interventions in other countries focusing on one strand of Islam might offset the balance of power between other groups. The use of religious scholars in general is now seen as a tool best employed in combination with other tools, and with due consideration for the balance between religious communities.

3.1 Approaches for understanding why individuals become radicalized, and the relevance for CVE engagement

The research literature has introduced several broad theories to explain radicalization processes. A first common approach was ***the rational choice approach***, where actors with clearly defined goals is assumed to act in the best way possible to achieve these goals. However, the more general rational choice approach fails to explain why individuals should join a terrorist organization that produces collective goods, which can be produced by others without that individual's participation (thus allowing the individual to avoid risk). The latter is seen as a situation that inhibits recruitment – a claim not supported by empirical findings (Edine et al. 2011).

Such an approach should be further nuanced. Selective incentives might be present in poorer countries, as individuals can achieve financial gains from joining organizations. For example, several research projects in Pakistan have found greater support for militancy in poorer areas, as well as within families who expected to would gain financially from joining radical networks (see Mesøy 2013). Hansen (2016) also notes that while most studies have focused on radical organizations operating as clandestine networks in a hostile environment, this might far from being the case in Syria, Iraq, Nigeria (Borno), parts of Mali, Yemen – as well as in Somalia and parts of Kenya. In those areas, extremists either fully control territories, or have a kind of semi-territorial control where they are left in control of territory in general, expect for the occasional campaigns of the government forces, leaving the locals at the mercy of the extremists. In such situations, selective incentives become more important. Thus, in the cases of Kenyan CVE outside zones of semi-permanent control, selective incentives should be of less importance – a hypothesis confirmed by the research of Annelie Botha and Mahdi Abdille (2014a; 2014b). This has also been highlighted by Petter Nesser, who underlines that tactical situations may differ and influence recruitment patterns: and this should be acknowledged by Norwegian decision-makers. (Petter Nesser commenting on Master-thesis defence in NMBU)

The second common explanatory model is the relative deprivation theory, often applied to explain violence and wars in general (Rabasa et al. 2010). In relative deprivation theory, violence is created when groups, usually not amongst the poorest in society, feel that they are entitled to benefits because of their position, benefits that they fail to get. Mark Sageman (2005), for example, has suggested that high education and low ability to secure jobs afterwards was a precondition for early radical recruitment in the USA and the UK. However, Hassan Riza (2009) indicates that this is not the case for Australia. Overall, the evidence backing the relative deprivation model is rather inconclusive.

A third common explanatory model is the social movement theory approach. It emphasizes how ideas must be embedded in movements, with a highly professionalized core, dependent on political opportunities and the ability of the movement/ organization in question to organize. The ability of the movement to

justify and appeal to organized action, to *frame* a situation, is central here, and framing theory has become an integral part of social movement theory (Beck 2008). Identity formation within the group and appeals to wider identities are a crucial aspect of social movement theories. Moreover, social movements need not be organizations: they can be networks drawn together by several key operatives, in which friends and these operatives play a role in the recruitment effort (Della-Porta 1995). Repression might also have an activating role, as it holds down the more open parts of the movement, and often less radical parts (Beck 2008). In addition, a final factor to be mentioned in relation to social movement theory is the role of diffusion, where ideas about strategies and goals can spread across borders by exposure to methods from outside – one example being how al-Shabaab and Boko Haram adopted suicide bombing from ideologically similar organizations, and brought the technique to Somalia and Nigeria.

These approaches highlight the nuances that are important for Norway's CVE work.

Shabaab have actively used grievances in their propaganda, on a strategic level focusing on Kenyan treatment of Muslims in the coast, use of death squads, land issues in Lamu (Hansen 2015). In Somalia, Shabaab have actively plaid on issues regarding discrimination against minority clans, and clan biased army units transgressions against local clans (ibid), to create a form of 'issue alignment' where local conflicts are re-interpreted in the light of Shabaabs ideas of a global clash between Islam and its enemies. Using this strategy, Shabaab is attempting to attract not only direct victims of these conflicts, but also individuals that feel more subjectively that they are victims, despite being more remote from the conflicts.

NGO activists, also in the Horn of Africa, have tended to focus more on broader structural variables that promote violent extremism, such as reducing as poverty and alienation. While such programmes can make many positive contributions to society, they might not in fact target the most vulnerable groups. Anja Dalsgaard Nilsen (2010) has criticized such structural approaches for their serious shortcoming in explanatory power. Many people in East Africa are poor, and indeed many teenagers feel alienated – yet terrorist recruitment is not widespread. So much CVE work focus on these variables, and yet such factors are not good predictors.

To identify potential recruits for extreme groups, nuances are needed, as noted by Peter Nesser (2016) in his exploration of European jihadist organizations, dividing members of radical groups into four ideal types: entrepreneurs, protégés, misfits and drifters. Entrepreneurs may be well adjusted in society and resourceful, driven by ideas rather than personal grievances. They 'make things happen' and are vital for creating the group. In addition, the protégés are resourceful, from good backgrounds, highly intelligent, socially skilled, well mannered, and excelling in what they do. Current CVE programmes often neglect the entrepreneurs and the protégées, crucial in any extremist cell. A father of three boys that left Norway for Syria, for example claimed 'The municipality, and

the NGOs and the police did not care for my boys, they only focused on the boys that were hanging around in the street, not university graduates.’ Similar feelings were expressed by respondents in Mogadishu ‘The Shabaabs... well they are superior to us, their leaders have higher education and more skills than us, how can we match them? (interview with civil servant, Mogadishu, 17 January 2016).

Nesser’s other two categories are important. He elaborates on the misfits, who are weaker in society, very often with a criminal background, where personal problems or older friends draw these individuals into the organization. Misfit are searching for a sense of belonging, although they may be good in sports, for example. And finally, drifter go with the social flow, they follow friends and family, joining ‘cool groups’ – but feel little ideological commitment.

CVE projects that cater for all four ideal types have to be designed, going beyond a focus on alienation and poverty, more in line with the research findings of Botha (2014b) on Kenyan radicalization processes (but also social movement theories). Such projects should focus on other indicators of vulnerabilities – like having friends or family members already in the radical networks, coming from broken families, or coming from specific regions. As indicated by Botha’s two research papers, one should also be willing to acknowledge the realities on the ground and the implications for the CVE strategy in question. For instance, a territory where al-Shabaab has full territorial control must be differentiated from an area where it exists only in the form of passive followers. Here it is fruitful to follow Hansen’s (2016) categorizations of types of extremist presence. Much of CVE research has neglected the situations in which an extremist organization like al-Shabaab has in Middle Juba, with full and relatively stable **territorial control**, close to securing for itself a monopoly on violence, able to punish opponents as well as reward followers openly with financial gains, often collected from local taxes. In such situation, it must be recognized that al-Shabaab provides opportunistic possibilities, joining the movement can be financially advantageous. al-Shabaab can also undertake peace negotiations between warring clans; its soldiers will intermarry with the local community, providing forms of local social embeddedness – in short, al-Shabaab becomes a part of society, and can punish all forms of externally sponsored CVE attempts. These areas, which still exist inside Somalia, cannot be targeted by ordinary CVE programmes. They require programmes that target high-level leaders, and programmes like the Saudi Arabian Sakhina project, targeting jihadist discussion forums (Boucek 2008). On the other hand, security should not be forgotten. While AMISOM has good chances of vanquishing al-Shabaab from its zones of permanent control in Somalia, the most common situation regarding control in the Somali countryside, and indeed in Kenya in the Boni forest, also seriously hampers regular CVE work.

Semi-territoriality is a situation where the radical organization faces superior forces that it cannot hope to defeat in open combat, but where the superior forces fail to permanently secure the local population. Often this is because a lack of will or capacity to garrison villages permanently, or large areas or challenging geography. Western doctrinal thinking has highlighted self-protection of military forces, often leading to neglect of the local population, leaving them at the mercy

of the insurgents except for the occasional campaigns of national/international coalition forces. In the Horn of Africa, this state of affairs is present in much of Bay-Bakol, Middle and Lower Shabelle, Hiraan, and parts of Galmudug, Gedo and lower Juba, but also in the Boni area of Kenya. In such a situation, al-Shabaab is free to punish its civilian enemies, thereby ensuring a form of loyalty, as the locals fear reprisals. It also leads to a situation in which the al-Shabaab presence and ability to tax is permanent enough to secure stable incomes for recruits – making opportunism and the desire for income more important for recruits, as well as the need for safety, at times achieved through al-Shabaab membership.

Semi-territoriality and territoriality are very unlike the situations faced in the West, in South Asia, South America and Oceania, and many current CVE strategies and research are not adjusted to situations like this. Kilcullen (2009) rightly notes that strategies to counter extremism in such areas should be people-centric, focusing on the locals and their security situation. The first priority must be local security, but this is too often neglected. Demobilization strategies are increasingly important, as are alternative livelihood strategies, but only insofar as basic security has been provided. Kilcullen also highlights how recruitment to radical organizations can be because of 'issue alignment', with the radicals hijacking issues related to group grievances of local groups. These may be grievances that have little to do with any global jihadi agenda, the West or its allies; people find themselves forced to fight wars that they did not need to, they are lured into local conflicts as a party, and the radicals get allies who in reality care little about their ideology.

More traditional CVE strategies are usually designed for areas where extremist networks operate as **clandestine networks** facing a functioning police force, requiring them to hide in order to maintain operational secrecy. In this situation, an organization may introduce institutional barriers to prevent the whole organization from unravelling because of investigations, and where opportunism as a reason for joining the organization simply became less viable, as the threat of punishment is greater. This is perhaps where traditional CVE strategies have the largest potential to function. In some areas, such clandestine networks will be active, there will be attacks, and high possibilities for sanctions and punishment for defectors, as in the Garissa and Mandera areas. Some areas – like Bosasso, Mogadishu, Baidoa and Kismayo – have stable networks that implement attacks; in others, like Las Anod, Burao, Brome, Hargeisa, Galcayo, Garowe, and Kwale, Mombasa, Lamu and Nairobi, the networks are more passive.

4 Combating violent extremism in Somalia

4.1 Introduction

The current international engagement in Somalia suffers from two major weaknesses related to the above theory discussions. First, CVE interventions have not been adequately targeted in design in relation to which part of Somalia they are to be implemented. Conditions vary considerably from one location to the other, presenting different needs in different regions. In fact, projects do not seem to be based on specific needs but are instead concentrated in some locations – often not where the need is greatest, but because of the nature of network-based interaction within the circles that work on related subjects in Nairobi and the international zone in Mogadishu. Second, CVE policies have not been based on lessons from previous projects in other countries: there has been little information-sharing between various CVE measures within Somalia, and this might also lead to neglect of the fact that al-Shabaab does not recruit only from marginalized groups. As one official in the Ministry of Justice put it: ‘al-Shabaab’s leaders are better educated than the police leaders’. A recurrent issue is the question of control mechanisms, and the authors of this report are seriously concerned about the Embassy’s capacity to follow up on projects once their staff have left.

As noted, it is essential to tailor projects according to where they are to be implemented. In Somalia, there are zones where al-Shabaab have permanent control – as is the case in Juba, where they have semi-permanent control; as in lower Shabelle, parts of Gedo, Bay-Bakool, middle Shabelle, Hiiraan, and parts of Galmudug. It must be recognized that CVE mechanisms must be different in permanently controlled areas and semi-permanently controlled areas from other areas where the government and/or regional entities can provide adequately security. Al-Shabaab often has semi-permanent control of large parts of the southern Somali countryside, and its capacity to exert sanctions and pressure on the locals is great. Several recent incidents indicate al-Shabaab’s ability to induce fear amongst the local population. For example, group members retook Merka rather quickly after a government strike (wages had not been paid to the police and the army; the Somali army also withdrew because of clan considerations). This point is also illustrated by the withdrawal from Kamoor and Geed Weyne during the second week of February. The likelihood of sanctions against government supporters (or supporters of other political groupings hostile to al-Shabaab) in these areas is strong. Any measures should focus on removing security threats to the local population, as well as against potential defectors. Here it should be remembered that the threat of sanctions can actually induce violence. Membership in al-Shabaab is able to give individuals protection (ironically, against al-Shabaab regulations) as well as potential financial gains through regular pay and access to local taxing. This means that the organization becomes a reference point for clans that are in conflict, whether inviting al-Shabaab to address clan conflicts, or by attempting to manipulate the organization, while it attempts to manipulate these in return. There have been rumours of clan mobilization – for example in support of al-Shabaab in the EI

Adde attack (Ombati 2016), where many observers implicated clan mobilization in relations to the Marehan clan, a clan that has suffered a loss in prestige over the fall of Kismayo, and has used al-Shabaab as a tool before (Hansen 2013). The power of al-Shabaab can thus be harnessed to address clan deviances, and to boost a clan's status – a form of 'issue alignment', very tempting to use if a clan is out of options. In the past al-Shabaab actively used/was used by clans that were strong in the periphery but lacked national influence, to influence politics.

'Issue alignment' in the semi-peripheral zone is enhanced by the fact that al-Shabaab remains a powerful actor, as it remains uncontested in the countryside. It has also become a tempting ally in clan conflicts. In order to avoid this, the provision of sustainable security is essential. In Somalia, the central army has been irregularly paid, and at times they lack local legitimacy. The same applies to the police, and both forces evacuated Merka partly because of this lack of payment (as well as a local clan conflict). The story of Merka illustrates how the lack of payment and lack of local legitimacy influences troubles in semi-peripheral areas. Both are pressing issues that will have to be addressed.

4.2 State capacity building in semi-peripheral areas

Non-payment of wages to the security sector, and the issue of local legitimacy of security forces, have been plaguing Somalia for years. Such non-payment has been a reality since 2007, a deep embarrassment for the international community and the various Somali governments since that time. Although things have improved, the problem has remained, and is connected to widespread corruption within the government. Interesting moves have come from DIFID /Terra Incognita, including plans for randomized surveys to monitor which units get payment each month. Current efforts in getting money transferred directly to soldiers/policemen through mobile phones is also interesting. United Nations Office for Project Services (UNOPS) have been relatively successful in developing biometric registration for individual low-level police commissioners as well as to parts of the Somali National Army (SNA), enabling secure monitoring of transfers. The checks-and-balances mechanism for stipend transfers includes a joint committee of the Somali government, UNOPS, and Sahan (other partners than Sahan are also possible in the future). However, these transfers cover only foreign stipends to the police, not direct cash payments from the government, and thus does not help to create long-term sustainability. There have been no attempts to establish a similar system for the cash transfers, and in Somalia this has led to rumours that the donors only look after 'their own money.' This is definitely an area that needs extra support, not necessarily in direct financial support to soldiers or police, but in securing adequate channels for this support and preventing corruption. It must be accepted that this should be a part of the CVE portfolio, indeed highly relevant, as shown by the incidents in Merka. A major problem in today's situation is that foreign-funded stipends are targeted at the lower ranks, adding legitimacy to a solution where mid-level leaders use the cash payments from the Somali state to offset their perceived difficulties in

getting access to these funds. It is also important to recognize that police corruption is an issue for CVE work: corruption erodes trust between the police and the local communities, and hampers efficiency for the police. Non-payment of wages acts to promote corruption. An important first step in this process is the work of 'Terra Incognita', but another interesting partner could be the IDIINTOSAI Development Initiative (IDI), (INTOSAI stands for International Organization for Supreme Audit Institutions) of Norway. It has considerable experience in capacity building on general auditing mechanisms in weak states, who now also has indicated an interest in working in Somalia. However, once provided, such basic knowledge needs to be rapidly integrated into the relevant establishment, and the Embassy should actively facilitate this.

The payment backlogs to the police and army in Somalia have been extremely detrimental to the morals of the Somali state police, as private persons suspect officers of embezzling the funds. CVE efforts cannot function without proper security forces, and such forces do not really exist yet, although there have been some positive developments. Observers like the UN police commissioner and the AMISOM police commissioner highlight that the new state police functions better than the central police – but there has been little will (except for DIFID) to fund these entities, leaving the most important partner in rural and district CVE work without funding.¹

Mid-level corruption in the army and the police (including the new police forces of the regional states) is a major CVE issue in Somalia. Neither Norway nor other countries has developed a good project portfolio here, this despite Norway's experience in handling similar problems elsewhere, as in Afghanistan and Iraq; the United Nation (UN) police commissioner for example wants Norwegian police, trained in CVE work. Here it should be noted that it is unrealistic for Norway to enter more hard-security work in Somalia. Norway lacks comparative advantages for doing this, as well as, perhaps, the political will. However, Norway does have advantages in doing police reform work, as well as anti-corruption work. As one senior Somali elder expressed it:

(police) salaries are not paid for five or four months. They are not real police. Amar, to be real police you need discipline and salaries.²

The current situation creates distrust between the wider community and the police, as some police officers find that they have to be corrupt in order to ensure survival when their wages are not paid..

¹ Interview with AMISOM police commander Anand Pillay, 17 March 2016, Interview with UN Police commander, Christoph Buick, 20 March 2016

² Interview with Saror elder, 17 January 2016.

Local ownership of police forces is also essential. Attention should be paid to community policing projects, as should possibilities for local participation, also through the regional states, as conducted today by DFID in Juba and the South West state. One-step could be to create community councils, including clan leaders, for local police forces, that also have contact with a central body with standardized central training packages, and at times with the diplomatic community. Another step could be local community-based police forces under some form of central control and registration, perhaps as a part of the regional state structure. Local respondents indicated that this might well have led to the police remaining in Merka on 7 February despite the wage issues. Interestingly, clan leaders in Mogadishu interviewed by journalists expressed great admiration for the old neighbourhood watches, the *Madanis*. As in Kenya, they also expressed a wish to see deeper Norwegian engagement in bottom-up projects, i.e. locally based projects.³ There are pitfalls with projects of this type, as local leaders might take control and use them for their own purposes. There should thus be checks and balances developed, and proper vetting procedures must be in place, as well as centralized control mechanisms – for example, a biometric registration system. Here there is a synergy between concerns in Kenya and concerns in Somalia, as well as countermeasures. Local anchoring with local elders from several clans can also enhance the ability of the police to deal with clan grievances. In turn, handling clan grievances can lead to less potential for ‘issue alignment’, as clans will have other options than approaching al-Shabaab for support. However, this also requires countrywide police presence, which is not yet the case.

Finally, an essential step is to work actively to integrate Somali actors into the Interpol system. This is important for Norway, as there are still Norwegian al-Shabaab fighters, and it will aid the work of tracking such persons. Interpol is notably absent in Somalia, and an office should be established, Norway can easily put diplomatic pressure on this issue.

In areas where al-Shabaab has semi-peripheral control, normal de-radicalization programmes of the type implemented by the West have limited chances of success. As there are many also clan-based reasons for joining radical organizations, broader approaches are needed. It should be recognized that regional clan grievances as well as poverty and the need for security might propel violent extremism, but in many cases, an important tool for such steps will be civil society. One organization that has handled such projects in the past is the Swedish Life and Peace institute.

4.3 Supporting civil society in areas with stronger security

Parts of Somalia have a permanent security presence that hinders takeovers by al-Shabaab forces, in some zones the security situation is on a par with neighbours outside Somalia. In these zones, violent extremism takes the form of

³ Interview with Ugas from Ayr clan, Interview with Senior elder from Abgal clan 20 January 2016.

clandestine networks, more similar to the form that violent extremism takes in most of Kenya, Tanzania and Ethiopia. CVE work in these zones should not be neglected. Some efforts described above, like working against police corruption, and supporting the payment of police wages, will be helpful in these zones as well. The zones can be used to re-integrate al-Shabaab fighters, or to work against extremism amongst youth. It is not without significance that the organization used Hargeisa as staging ground for attempts to launch attacks in Addis Ababa and Djibouti, and that a large component of the former Shabaab fighters at the Serendi camp in Mogadishu are Isaqs.

Radicalization is an ongoing process in Somaliland, in Puntland, as well as the larger cities in the south, like Kismayo, Baidoa, Beled Weyne and Mogadishu. The first line that families face when they suspecting that they have a radicalized son or daughter are the local elders, or local sheiks. This is important to bear in mind regarding potential partners in Somalia. Awareness of this first line is important, as is clear coordination with the NGO sector and the government, so that responses to youth at risk can be effective. At present, no project is doing this, but organizations working overtime with clan-structures, such as Oxfam Novib or life and peace institute, could easily handle such projects. The fact that parents often bring children that they feel are in danger will have the potential to make such efforts targeted.

The authors of this report were asked to assess two programmes directly engaged in the rehabilitation of former fighters in these zones, programmes that in the past have had some support from Norway. In itself, this is an interesting fact, and respondents in Somalia expressed sorrow that there were so few projects of this type. The geographical distribution of CVE programmes seems to be limited, and the Ministry of Justice, as well as local residents, asked for a broader spread, emphasizing that the need was great in Kismayo and Beled Weyne. Norway seems to have restricted itself in the core areas of Somaliland. However, it should be noted that CVE programmes are needed here, and are of particular interest to Norway because of the sizable Somaliland population in Norway, and can be conducted in dialogue with the government in Mogadishu following the Nordic International Support (NIS) model in Kismayo, seeking approval by the central government before they are set up.

The results and the methods of operation of the two programmes in Mogadishu and Baidoa are mixed, however. The Serendi project in Mogadishu, a local, previously Norwegian-supported programme to de-radicalize and re-integrate al-Shabaab fighters, leaves much to be desired, as expressed by all the elders, journalists and state officials interviewed in Mogadishu. It should also be noted that there has been massive criticism of the way this has been handled. Respondents criticized Serendi for being isolated from the wider context; and elders, religious leaders, state officials all criticized the lack of access to the project. The elders who criticized the lack of access were amongst the most important in Mogadishu, even though Serendi itself says that it employs elders. Those elders that the project employs must be assumed to be of less importance in the Mogadishu hierarchy – a serious problem, since prominent elders are a crucial first line to which parents bring their sons returning from al-Shabaab. The

use of local elders also seems strange, as many of the peoples in the camp come from Somaliland and Kenya. The Serendi also had little noticeable integration of lessons learned from the wider field of de-radicalization, including from the other de-radicalization projects in the region – even though it drew on Danish expertise in the field during its inception. Perhaps because of the lack of ability to interact with the wider society, there were many rumours, which our research team were unable to assess properly. As expressed by MP Abdi Hosh:

I don't know if they have the capacity to differentiate the legitimacy of the defectors. There is a real danger, some could be sleeping cells. How good training do they have? I have heard of incidents... officers that were abusing the kids, forcing them to report things that were not true'.⁴

Other issues have also been brought up, like the treatment of minors, and the use of former prisoners to head sections of the camp. Several minors have been taken out of the camp and transferred to, *inter alia*, the El Maan Peace and Human Rights Center, now operating in both Baidoa and Mogadishu. The minors were then reintegrated into society.

The current donor of the Serendi Programme, the British government, points to the fact that they have a human rights representative who has been going through the procedures for Serendi, and that the situation has improved dramatically. While some government representatives claim that the problem now could be controlled by outsiders (donors), others hold that the problem originated during the Norwegian-supported establishment phase, which allowed an isolationistic approach to CVE work. While our task was to assess, not to evaluate, projects Norway supports, the Serendi case offers several lessons for Norway. Human rights issues must be addressed very early in the start-up for partnerships, and routines must be monitored. Perhaps more importantly, it is essential to avoid turf wars between different institutions, and institutions and the government; liaison mechanisms should be required by Norwegian partners. Third, much of the work is NGO-based; and with little efforts expended on considering the research on which strategies that actually work and which do not, there is a lack of lessons-learned mechanisms that can be used to address lessons external to the institution. This is not uniquely a Serendi problem: the same problems are found in many CVE programmes, also in Norway. Serendi was also offering its services to returning al-Shabaab soldiers in a context where few other programmes existed. A need for coordination and mechanism for integration of lessons from the wider field of de-radicalization is needed – not only for Serendi, but for most de-radicalization and anti-radicalization projects. In this sense Norwegian support for Serendi might actually ensure that Norway gains influence in order to address the drawbacks that have become evident.

⁴ Interview with Abdi Hosh, 3 January 2016

Other alternatives in Mogadishu are limited. While Elman is engaged in reintegrating children, this is not their focus. Several other NGOs have been engaged in CVE work, such as the Centre for Community Awareness (CCA) dedicated to transforming the lives of youth at risk. CCA has hosted seminars to raise awareness of radicalization, and has an address in the Jaale Siyaad Road Wadajir District near Aden Adde Airport, by the International Zone in Mogadishu. The organization uses cultural programmes, sports tournaments, national culture evenings, public debates and forums and research, discussion forums and workshops, as well as national awareness campaigns. Another organization is the outreach organization New Horizons in Mogadishu, led by a religious-trained leader. Their efforts primarily involve confidence building, but they have also arranged talks on preventing youth from joining al-Shabaab. The group is located in Hoodan, and can thus reach some of the more vulnerable areas of Mogadishu, such as Daynile. However, there seem to be few mechanisms for these organizations to absorb learning from outside.

Other interesting NGOs working with the civil societies does not work directly with CVE, but with relevant issues. *Amiin*, led by Yassin Mohamed, claims that it is engaged in life-saving and developing community services, and desires to restore social trust and brotherhood with collaboration of key stakeholders. Amongst the stated targets are also to improve the livelihood style of Somali community, through the establishment of free ambulance programmes, providing safe and clean water, awareness raising, income-generation activities and education as well as building community ownership. This organization enjoys local respect. It is present in Mogadishu-Somalia, with field offices in Mataban, Guri-el and Merka, and, through its youth employment programmes, is able to reach youth. Such organizations can be used for CVE-related work, and such a model has been tried out with USAID. There are other similar organizations. For instance, the KAASHIF Development Initiatives, with offices in Middle Shabelle, Lower Shabelle, Bay & Bakol, and Central regions of Somalia, was founded as early as in 1996. Its activities in teacher training are potentially important for CVE, and its work in local conflict resolution between sub-clans, can prevent 'issue alignment'. Further, Somali Youth for Peace and Development (SYPD) has its focus on other sectors, but its activities resemble a CVE agenda. For example, SYPD has hosted seminars to counter youth problems, a platform relevant to CVE work, and has been in operation since 2004. The Coalition for Grassroots Women's Organization (Cogwo) was established back in February 1996. It has a good reputation in other areas, working with women's empowerment, which can be used as a basis for more general information work, as well as targeting families at risk. Cogwo has had Norwegian partners before, and has an extensive reach through Mogadishu.

Hirda (Himilo Relief and Development Association), is another long-established organization involved in education, and has a wider society outreach, but until now has been interested only in general education. Hirda is a part of the IMPACT Alliance, led by Oxfam Novib, an alliance of NGOs that can provide greater impact and quality control on CVE issues. However, an NGO that specializes in education will need to adapt and learn from the outside in order to become an

efficient CVE partner, and must have the will to engage vulnerable groups, not only the general population.

It has been difficult to get proper information on governmental programmes, but the Ministry of Justice does have services for organizations involved in CVE work, including a list of ‘approved’ sheiks for CVE work. The list includes the spiritual leader of the Daam Jadiid, a breakaway group from the Muslim Brotherhood, Sheik Barud nur Gurhan – the list seems to include several strands of Islam.

Outside Mogadishu, reintegration programmes as well as radicalization programmes were harder to examine. The International Organization of Migrations (IOM) programme in Baidoa was a part of a larger national programme for the treatment and handling of disengaged *fighters*. The plan involved the Somali Ministry of the Interior, the Ministry of Security, and the Ministry of Justice, and The United Nations Office for Project Services (UNOPS) and IOM. The group was led by Mr Malik from the Ministry of the Interior. Originally founded by Great Britain, the plan was to create four centres, one in Baidoa, one in Mogadishu, one in Beled Weyne and one in Kismayo. At the time of writing, one centre, managed by Adam Smith International, was operating in Beled Weyen, but with limited activities; and a centre in Kismayo was on the verge of being started. According to Heidrun Salzer:

They should stay in there for three months. Religious leaders speak to them. We work through the DDR committee, there are elders and community representatives. NISA determined when they can be released.⁵

Elders are involved systematically and are drawn upon. A weakness remains the NISA screening procedures. The project is only for the less severe cases, IOM does not know how the severity is determined, nor what happens to candidates not deemed suitable for the programme. For a lengthy period, participants were kept longer than three months, because the final re-integration component was missing, but this has now been funded. The centre in Baidoa also included a female element, with women who had worked for al-Shabaab on the logistics side. It should be mentioned that participants always are free to leave the programme, and that the participants who stayed longer did this voluntarily. IOM efforts also seemed unable to draw on lessons learned in the wider field of de-radicalization. However, this project was less controversial than Serendi, and seems be better integrated with other institutions in Somali society. This might actually have been a consequence of Serendi, according to Heidrun Slazer: ‘Because of Serendi we needed a better structure, we understood that we

⁵ Interview with Heidrun Salzer, IOM representative 19 March 2016

needed more structure...’ The overarching organization was thus constructed with a view to avoiding isolation.

Several broader organizations that have gradually been gaining project experience are handling human rights training and education, and are active in Baidoa, Beled Weyne, Hargeisa and Wajir. Horn of Africa Voluntary Youth Committee (HAVAYOCO) operates in Hargeisa and Mogadishu, as well as in Ethiopia (in Addis Ababa and JigJiga). It was founded in 1992 and has cooperated with USAID on at least one CVE-related project. It also has a community-awareness programme and activities aimed at changing anti-social behaviour, although this is only a minor component of the project portfolio. However, also here there seems to be little attention to identifying vulnerable groups for radicalization. IOM is in the start-up phase with an African Development Bank funded programme ‘Targeting youth at risk’, and IOM has become aware of the greater need to target other groups than solely the poor and disenfranchised, as middle-class youth and upper class youth are also vulnerably. In Kismayo, a very important area for CVE activity, there is also AfrisoHELP, a Norwegian-Somali organization, involved in the Kismayo areas as well as on the Kenyan side. The organization was started in Sandefjord in 2009. It can serve as a tool to empower the diaspora and help in vulnerable situations, and have shown willingness to develop further in this direction.

A promising NGO is the African Initiative for Women in Africa (AIWA), led by Hanan Ibrahim, who participated in the design of the British Prevent Counter-radicalization Project. AIWA activities in Somalia are in the early phase, but publications from the organization indicate willingness to learn from state-of-the-art research on radicalization processes, although it is important to include research on non-Western radicalization programmes and factors in such publications. AIWA has had activities in Kenya and in Somalia, including Somaliland, and plans to have a widespread reach. Its focus on mothers as a force to counter radicalization is refreshing and somewhat different from the focus of other de-radicalization projects. The authors of this report have noted the lack of tools that can be used in addition to religious leaders and elders in the Somali CVE portfolio. The addition of family groups could be valuable.

4.4 State capacity building in more central areas

Also the central level must be addressed in relation to Somali CVE work. More bottom-up efforts should be supported, as long as there are learning mechanisms included in such projects. The Parliament sees important work on anti-terror legislation, and this small niche is well taken care of by the Norwegian portfolio through the Oslo Centre, an organization that enjoys a good reputation, and has had a solid presence on the ground, a fact that is recognized positively by Somali actors.

There are also other promising initiatives at the more central level, like the mid- to high-level defector programme is being initiated from the Office of the Prime Minister. Previous mid-level efforts, as well as high-level ones, have had little effect. The large defections simply came about because of other reasons, as the

case of Zakariya Ahmed Ismail Hersi, a Surah member and possibly an Amnyat (al-Shabaab's intelligence unit) leader (this he denies himself), who defected because of internal conflicts, as did the more peripheral Hassan Dahir Aweys. Attempts to sway mid-level commanders and top commanders have otherwise been conducted in an *ad hoc* fashion. The government's new initiatives, actually now incorporating Hersi, might promote more defections, and could be an interesting partner in CVE work. Expectations should not be too high, but this could be a low-cost part of the portfolio. In addition, here, it is important to learn from the failures of other programmes, and ensure that proper screening mechanisms are in place.

Overall, the Norwegian CVE efforts in Somalia has had a good start. Partners have often been the only choice available, or they have been of relatively good quality. However, there have been major weaknesses – like the failure to incorporate lessons learned, the tendency to stay very central in focus and for example avoid important areas in Somaliland, although the need here is pressing. Moreover, the majority of Norwegian Somalis going to Syria seem to come from these areas. The centralization model should be abandoned, but efforts in politically sensitive areas can be made more politically acceptable through dialogue – as in the case of the engagement of Nordic Crisis Management in Berbera port in the past (Hansen 2008).

4.5 Conclusions: Somalia

The Norwegian CVE effort in Somalia is indeed of importance to Norway. Al-Shabaab has been the second most important radical recruiter in Norway, dispatching perhaps as much as 20 foreign fighters to Somalia, and the Somali diaspora in Norway is sizable. However, Norwegian CVE efforts have been limited. Only to a small extent, has there been systematic consideration of differences in the type of al-Shabaab presence in Somalia, and efforts have been relatively centralized. There have been shortcomings, such as the lack of adequate targeting of risk groups, the poor capacity to incorporate lessons learned from the wider field of de-radicalization, as a centralized scope.

In Somalia, an efficient police force is lacking, the most important partner in CVE work is missing. There have been positive developments, but observers hold that investigative capacities are non-existent. In the semi-peripheral zones, these entities need to be present to make a difference, so as to offer an alternative to al-Shabaab pressure and provide security. Together with these entities, there must be clan reconciliation mechanisms, to hinder 'accidental guerrillas' and lower the potential for issue alignment when clan grievances serve to create alliances with al-Shabaab. In order for the police to be an effective partner, wages must be paid, and there must be trust between the various levels. Of vital importance: the police forces need to be supported with a local presence, also in the countryside and in the various states. This is perhaps one of the most important elements in the struggle against al-Shabaab.

In other areas, al-Shabaab exists as clandestine network. Also in such areas, the police need an effective presence, but other structures become more important.

Several Somali NGOs have now developed experience and a good reputation in areas like clan reconciliation, teacher education, and youth work. Yet, these organizations have only indirectly entered into CVE work. They do have a role to play, but they will have to be engaged by other actors. Larger NGO consortia can be one way to organize the activities of these entities. The ability and will to identify groups highly vulnerable to radicalization is lacking among the entities that focus directly on CVE-related work, and they are weak in integrating knowledge on de-radicalization processes. This also goes for the two projects working with the de-radicalization of foreign fighters, the IOM project and the Serendi. There are few more directly CVE-related projects, and they are relatively concentrated.

Some form of cooperation between organizations doing CVE-related work might offset some of the above problems. NGOs could learn from each other, developing common training-of-trainers procedures, and drawing on international experts on de-radicalization, as well as upon vulnerable groups

4.6 Somalia: specific recommendations

-The Norwegian CVE portfolio in Somalia it is too limited and too concentrated: it needs expansion, in quality and in quantity. In quantity Hargeisa, Burao, Garowe, Bosasso, Beled Weyne, Kismayo all play a role in the al-Shabaab recruiting network, yet they have little to offer returning fighters, and there are few organizations dealing with general CVE projects that target vulnerable groups. Norway should encourage NGOs in these areas to enter into CVE-related tasks. Here HAVAYOCO, KAASHIF Development Initiatives, and Amiin are tempting partners with a broader reach. Dialogue should be established, although these organizations today are involved in CVE work only indirectly-

Other potentially relevant organizations with a Mogadishu focus are the Centre for Community Awareness (CCA), and New Horizons, both with a clearer CVE profile.

As in Kenya, AIWA has focused specifically on the protection of women's rights and on engaging women in the prevention of radicalization, which is a goal in the Norwegian strategy (St.meld.37 2014–2015). In Somalia, this is a fresh strategy and should be encouraged. AIWA has also been able to incorporate the findings of de-radicalization studies into its programme.

Personal engagement is essential in these programmes: it cannot just be a 'tick off the correct box' exercise, with a list of activities to be fulfilled. People must be involved – people who care about the issues. Despite the drawbacks of IOM and especially Serendi in Mogadishu (and the drawbacks are many), they should be supported, but also controlled, and forced to integrate lessons-learned mechanisms. Their work must be based on the latest knowledge regarding anti-radicalization. As this can be hard for smaller NGOs, we recommend that the various partners in a Norwegian portfolio should be linked together to achieve this: new partners should be linked with older partners in coordination and lessons-learned forums. Norway should encourage and participate in building up a coordination network between actors doing CVE work in Somalia. A sharing

and lessons learned/training the trainers component should be a vital part of such an effort. Such a coordination network could also develop the competence for a counter-jihadi capacity on the internet – a capacity non-existent in Somalia today. Such coordination need not be costly.

However, not everything should be accepted as a CVE project. CVE projects must focus on vulnerable groups. Broader projects, some with importance for CVE work, should be referred to by their correct designation: broader prevention of criminality. Norway's project portfolio should contain both.

The Norwegian White Paper (2014–2015) emphasizes the enhancement of state capacity for making states better equipped to prevent and combat extremism. The traditional anchor in CVE work, the police, is not yet functional in Somalia. However, a functioning police service is essential to successful CVE effort. Norway should engage in police reform work, sending Norwegian police with a CVE background to serve with the UN police mission.

Norway should follow DIFID's lead, supporting the work on ensuring the payment of police wages, and strengthening the police also at regional state level, bringing police services to the Somali, also in areas with semi-territorial Shabaab control, ending this state of affairs. A good partner in this process is Terra Incognita, especially for more centralized parts of it. In the countryside, Norway should establish a dialogue with DFID, to harness the lessons learned from more state based security solutions.

It must be recognized that corruption and lack of community contact hamper CVE efforts in Somalia, and that police corruption is a CVE problem. Establishment of the IDIINTOSAI Development Initiative in Mogadishu should be encouraged.

Further, Norway should pressure for the establishment of Interpol in Mogadishu.

Clan reconciliation is important in order to avoid 'issue alignment', so this activity should be part of a successful CVE portfolio. Clan elders are today also the frontline in CVE work: it is to them many parents choose to go to when they believe that their sons and daughters have become radicalized. The activities of the clan elders need to be coordinated with the police, and clan elders need to know what they are doing. Training of clan elders in CVE, and in clan conflict resolution should be encouraged. Here advantage should be taken of the capacity of the Swedish Life and Peace Institute in this area. A specially pressing area is lower Shabelle, where the Somali army, because of clan composition, now is seen as an outsider for many of the locals.

Religious leaders are a necessary element in CVE efforts, but efforts should be taken to maintain representation for the various religious communities, also including Sufis in such work. And finally,

human rights aspects must be included.

5 Combating violent extremism in Kenya

5.1 Introduction

As will be indicated in this chapter, many areas in Kenya are affected by conflict and security challenges. Several of our informants stressed that conflict dynamics vary depending on the geographical area. The presence of al-Shabaab also differs, involving territorial control, semi-territorial control and a clandestine presence. In Kenya, al-Shabaab has no area/zones of full territorial control. Their presence is strong in Boni, where control can be characterized as semi-territorial. Given the nature of the Kenyan security apparatus, other areas, such as the northeast, may have the potential to host al-Shabaab on a semi-territorial basis. These areas should be watched carefully, also because semi-territoriality will give al-Shabaab opportunities for income generation (see chap. 3 above).

Clandestine active networks and recruitments are widespread in Kenya more passive networks that also recruit can be found in Mombasa, Kwale, Kilifi, and in Majengo and Eastleigh in Nairobi. This section will also explore the situation in Tana, as the region is close to Shabaab activities and have a potential for issue alignment, the authors thus clearly see a potential for Shabaab expansion in especially the lower part of the Tana river. As will be shown, Shabaab have highly active branches in Lamu and Garrisa and Mandera.

As in Somalia, 'issue alignment' is an important factor in exploring al-Shabaab's potential for expansion. In Somalia, the organization has actively played on clan conflicts in order to mobilize potential support. In Kenya, al-Shabaab has tried to do this in Mombasa and Lamu through propaganda, by re-interpreting a conflict created by the dominance of the central Kenyan elites, as well as the results of

Kikuyu favouritism of President Jomo Kenyatta, when Kikuyus were allocated land along the coast, into a conflict that pits 'Muslims' against 'Christians'. For al-Shabaab, 'Muslims' then usually refer to the coastal tribes, while 'Christian' refers to the highland elites (Shabaab 2015). Al-Shabaab has also used episodes of police brutality in its propaganda efforts, and maintains an image of being anti-corruption, as well as depicting the police in Kenya as spreading misinformation. This has been a strong current in Mombasa, where Kenyan police brutality, combined with a previous centralisation of power, have given ample possibilities to take advantage of grievances against the central state, which they have done in their propaganda.⁶ In addition, these issues will also motivate recruits for the organisation.⁷

⁶ See for example Nation Team (2014): "Al Jazeera 'exposes' Kenya's police death squads", Daily Nation, 9 December; For Shabaab propaganda on the subject see for example Abu Hassan Al Nairobi (20) Sheik Abud Rogo, Chanzo Cha Mabadiliko" *Gaidi Mtaani* 1434-3

⁷ See for example Calvin Onsarigo and Charles Mghenyi (2015) ,Al Shabaab still a major security threat to Kenya – returnees", *The Star* 18 November

The situation along the coast often opens up for possibilities for such 'issue alignment', but also for recruitment to other violent organisations as youth gangs, and the Mombasa Republican Council. An important issue is the problematic land relations along the coast, with a past running back to pre-colonial times. The coastal areas had a dominating Arabic population that ensured that land holdings were registered with the British, however in much of these lands local tribes, like the Mijikenda ("the Nine Tribes"), a tribal federation. In Kilifi, the local Mijikenda's were evicted from land that they in some cases had been staying at for generations in the late colonial period and early independent period, as the land registry were effectuated. The British colonial authorities and later Kenya did however create settlement schemes to address the problem, where locals were supposed to buy public land, or land bought from the outsiders. These schemes functioned poorly, loans were not adequately provided and designed for the new landowners, and government officials sold land to the central Kenyan elite, often members of central ethnic groups as Kikuyu (Kanyinga 2000).

It is hard for radical groups as the Shabaab to frame this situation in religious terms, as the subtribes of the Mijikenda in the area are multi religious in composition, and since some of the original benefactors of the state of land distribution rules, where the Muslim coastal Arabs. This does not mean that organisations as the Shabaab don't recruit in Kilifi, but that it is most likely to happen because of more individual causes, general grievances against police behaviour, or trans-coastal networks,.

Kwale, to a certain extent follows the same pattern, although Mijikenda tribes in the area, Digo and Duruma, the largest groups, more clearly are leaning towards Islam. Other tribes are present in Kwale including Kambas, Arabs and Indians though to a very small proportion compared to the Digos and Durumas. Kwales past is also one of Arab exploitation in the late pre-colonial period, and in the early colonial period.⁸ The Kenyan government initiated several land reforms, but most of them were filled with irregularities, local elites, but also central Kenyan elites. Kwale has struggled with corruption, being amongst the most corrupt counties in Kenya, influencing land processes as well (Leftie 2016). The role of local elites in these processes makes it harder to frame the conflict in terms that Shabaab can use. Although there are clear indications of the Shabaabs links with Kwale, issue alignment becomes harder to employ. Old networks along the coast and Kwales proximity to the weakly guarded border towards Tanzania is however, facts that make coastal respondents wary of Shabaab activities in Kwale: According to Richard Itambo of Nataraji Youth Organisation in Kwale:

⁸ See for example Kimani Njogu(2013):*Citizen participation in decision making*, Twaweza Communications, Kenya, 47-48

“Kwale is on the border, very easy to cross into Tanzania. There are Tanzanian recruiters in Kwale....they can also use the ocean.... Tanzania have a problem with these networks. However, land conflict is in general not used by Shabaab”⁹

This is in contrast to the situation in Lamu County, predominantly Muslim with strong connections to Somalia, and through former Shabaab strongholds, through for example the travel patterns of the local Bajuni fishermen. Local ethnic groups, as the Bajuni, Sanye, Aweer (Boni), and Orma, was heavily discriminated against over land issues, and politically dominated by settlers from the central highlands, making a situation that Shabaab has been taking advantage of, and indeed have been reflected in Shabaab rhetoric, and in publications from activists within local ethnic groups (Kojamani 2015).

The combination of estrangement from land ownership on behalf of local Muslims, closeness to the Shabaab inside Somalia, and what locals see as estrangement from political power and state income redistribution, for example in the case of the Port South Sudan Ethiopia Transport (LAPSSET) Corridor Project, that intends to build a large port in the Lamu area, means that this area have an explosive potential (Anyadike 2014).

Tana faces some of the same problems, but are further away from Shabaab territories or semi territorial holdings. It does however hold a territorial conflict that are easier for the Shabaab to take advantage of. The Orma- Pokomo conflict, at least close to the lower end of the river, can be framed in a more religious language, due to the belligerents religious divide where a Muslim ethnic group (Orma) faces a Christian ethnic group (the lower Pokomo, a mainly Christian sub group of the Pokomo). Rumours of government involvement at the side of the lower Pokomos can enhance such propaganda, and are already there (Sentinel Project 2015).

The reality is that the conflict is about land, a conflict where the mainly framing Pokomos have controlled the riverbanks, but Orma and other nomadic tribes have needed access to the river for the livestock. In this situation Land-Grabbing and population increase and failed government land distribution schemes. However, Shabaab has shown that it can be quite good at re-interpreting local conflict dynamics, and in this case it has a clear presence close to Tana, in Lamu County. Shabaab have also managed to launch heavy attacks in Tana (Gettleman 2014).

The differences between the coast and the north-east is striking, as the border between Somalia here is porous, and local Shabaab commanders operating on the Somali side, also operates on the Kenyan side including the Shabaab commander Maxamed Kuno “Gacma-dheere”, that was behind the Garissa attack. The border is in many ways porous, and for some of the Shabaab sub

⁹ Interview Richard Itambo of Nataraji Youth Organisation in Kwale, telephone 4 May 2016.

units, meaningless as the groups travel relatively freely across the borders, and have links to both Somalia and Kenya. It is in this area that most Shabaab attacks takes place, and respondents underline that Garissa and Mandera still hosts many radical islam, and strong Shabaab networks (Hansen 2015b). The Islamic state also have sympathies in the area but lack local structures. The problems in the area is increased by distrust directed against the police, and corruption, corruption that in some cases creates suspicion amongst the locals that the police is infiltrated by the Shabaab.¹⁰ Some respondents saw Wajir as less vulnerable because of the strength of the local Sufi orders in the area, orders that Shabaab rivals with.¹¹

In the central cities of Kenya, we have also seen recruitment, and the potential for recruitment continues to exist. In some of the outskirts of Nairobi, as Majengo, there have been networks for recruitment, and some of these networks still exist, mother organisations involved in counter-radicalisation highlights that there are still groups of Shabaab/ Islamic state sympathisers in Majengo, but that recruitment channels have been reduced by police activities. However, a deep distrust between police and the local community hampers communication, a distrust often caused by the mass arrests conducted by the police in relations to for example operation Usalama watch. Human rights organizations in Kenya have condemned the discrimination and persecution of the Muslims during the so-called Usalama Watch anti –terror operation in 2014.¹²

As explained in chapter three, there are many reasons why individuals become recruited to extremism. This requires diversified prevention strategies and interventions, as violent extremism is interlinked with other social problems. The degree of problems varies geographically and the writers clearly think that respondents and events confirm that the North East as well as Lamu probably are the most pressured regions and should be given priority, this despite the fact that Norway now have a weak presence in the area. CVE work is in general weakly developed in these regions, and a vital gap needs to be filled.

However , there are also general problems that spans the different region. Distrust between the police and the government, and the audience is a general problem in all regions hampering coordination, information flows and general CVE work. In its efforts to tackle insecurity particularly related to violent extremism, the Kenyan government been accused of serious violations of human rights, including extrajudicial killings, arbitrary detentions, and torture by security forces. The government has failed to ensure accountability for security force abuses and other serious violations, which undermines the rule of law and public confidence (Human Rights Watch 2015, ISS 2014).

¹⁰ Interview with Muhamed Ali, 13 January 2016, Nairobi. Interview with Yasin Juma, x January, Nairobi.

¹¹ Interview with Yasin Juma, x January, Nairobi.

¹² See for example Amnesty (2014); *Somalis are scapegoats*, Amnesty International Special Report.

Our informants unanimously accused the ‘Usalama Watch’ – a massive security operation in specific areas in Nairobi and Mombasa – of discriminating against and persecuting Somali citizens. ISS (2014) claims the Usalama Watch has served only to increase the ‘sense of resentment, isolation, and discrimination, which are sure recipes for radicalization, extremism and ultimately further terrorist activities’. Several of our informants also highlighted the consequences of the police/military ethnic and religious discrimination of Somali communities in Kenya. Such security strategies have created alienation, hampering vital dialogue between these communities and the security services that can lead to arrests.

5.2 State capacity building

States have an important role in CVE, especially as regards the rule of law and ensuring that key institutions are functional in preventing and combating violent extremism. A structural problem is the existence of weak institutes and governance due to limited capacities and possibilities for combating violent extremism. Improving state capacity is crucial for improving Kenyan CVE capacities. EU’s strive (Strengthening Resilience to Violent Extremism) program has for example engaged the Kenyan National Counter Terrorism Centre (NCTC), in order to “Build the regional capacity of security sector and law enforcement authorities to engage with civil society in fighting violent extremism” (National Counter Terrorism Centre 2016). Although, STRIVE also included a research component as well as a civil society component Zeuthen (2015). Denmark also chose this option through their PREVENT program, teaming up their Police intelligence Services, the Politiets Efterretningstjeneste (PET), again with the participation of the NCTC. PREVENT involving civil society actors and enhancing the awareness and skills of staff in the prisons and probation services to hinder radicalisation, but also to transfer Danish practices as the monitor system (Brett, Eriksen, Rønn Sørensen and Copenhagen Aps 2015). The Danes fed into a wider interest in a more elaborated approach to CVE work initiated after a wider regional CVE conference in June 2015 (Muraya 2016), and through the work on a new national CVE plan.

Indeed, a better-functioning state will have better capacities to prosecute ringleaders in recruitment efforts. First, it will be more able to avoid corruption in its investigative work, corruption that can enable infiltration by radicals, and thus create distrusts, or that can hamper investigation. Second, Human rights improvement at the state level will indirectly counter al-Shabaab’s ‘issue alignment’ strategies, addressing general community grievances created by the police, as well as creating trust and allowing the police easier access to information on CVE recruiting networks from the wider audience. A such trust is often lacking today. It is illustrating that respondents in Nairobi, along the coast and with experience from the North East expressed that the lack of such trust, and police corruption was a major issue hampering Kenyan CVE work, although many highlighted some progress in regards to this.

One approach to enhance positive change is capacity building. As Prevent and Strive was working to train Kenyan authorities on softer approaches to CVE work. United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) and United Nations

Development Programme (UNDP) are directly involved in police reform work in terms of building legal infrastructure and institutions, capacity training, ICT infrastructure, piloting community policing and other regional projects, such as the borderland project between Kenya and Ethiopia.¹³ However, our Kenyan informants say that UN organizations have a poor reputation, and are perceived as unable to bring about changes on the ground. By contrast, the UN informants spoke of challenges encountered in working together with Kenyan governments – for example, obstacles in developing community policing after the launch of the neighbourhood programme *Nyumba Kumi*. Human rights organizations criticized the UN for being ‘policy blind’, not seeing that political change was needed to change the police. A similar critique might actually be risen against PREVENT and STRIVE. However, there is space for direct engagement, and the work of the new police commissioner, Joseph Boinett, was considered positive by many.¹⁴ A more elaborated approach to CVE work initiated after a wider regional CVE conference in June 2015 (Muraya 2016), and the work on a new national CVE plan, also are signs that there are thinking inside the Kenyan government on the relevance of rights issues for CVE work. The success of these efforts is monitored by human rights organisations who need to be consulted on their progress.

Among Kenyan NGOs, Independent Medico-Legal Unit (IMLU) has had a leading position in the police reform process. IMLU established a coalition of ten organizations, Police Reform Working Groups (PRWG), which initiated the police vetting process. Given the lack of progress in the police reform in general and in the vetting process, the coalition is considered as an ‘important entity in providing leverage for police reform’ (Jones 2014). The review of the IMLU concluded that it ‘has clearly impacted the police reform agenda’, and other organizations referred to it as ‘a ‘pillar’ and ‘breath of fresh air’ in police reform work (ibid.).

Despite the attempts mentioned by our informants, police reform in general has brought limited changes on the ground. Particularly informants from human rights organizations noted that the police are sometimes more the problem than the solution, due to their bad behaviour, brutality and corruption. However, a representative from Kenya National Commission on Human Rights (KNCHR)¹⁵ pointed to some structural changes such as the Independent Policing Oversight Authority and implementation of the Police Act.¹⁶ The leader of a women’s group¹⁷ in Nairobi reported change on the ground. Now community representatives and

¹³ Interview representatives for UNDP (22.01.2016, Nairobi) and UNODC (13.01.2016, Nairobi)

¹⁴ Interview Muhuri, Interview Imlu (12.01.2016, Nairobi)

¹⁵ Interview KNCHR (18.01.2016, Nairobi)

¹⁶ The Independent Policing Oversight Authority (IPOA) was established through an Act of Parliament published in November 2011 to provide for civilian oversight over the work of the police in Kenya, it can examine complaints on the police, and is independent of the police force. The Police act of 2011 enhanced vetting mechanisms for police, amongst other changes.

¹⁷ Interview, women’s group leader the ‘Majengo Women Community Conservation’ (12.01.2016, Nairobi)

police officers may participate in the same workshops (for instance, about child protection) and they have been given the police officers' phone numbers. In the workshops police and community, representatives share perspectives, knowledge and strategies.

Joint workshops and seminars for government institutions and civil society organizations are more common on certain topics. For CVE some mutual knowledge exchange forums have been conducted in Mombasa and Nairobi. These were typical stakeholders' meetings where various governmental and non-governmental institutions meet with the aim of resolving bottlenecks, discussing how different actors can work together and seeking to improve the delivery of justice. HAKI Africa and MUHURI are among the organizations that have taken the initiative to such meetings. In addition, training in law, human rights and torture issues is offered by civil society organizations (CSOs) to government officers, especially the police and representatives of the legal system.

The political and administrative devolution provided for in Kenya's new (2010) Constitution is perceived as one of the most significant changes in the country's political system since independence (DDG 2015). Such devolution is expected to reduce tensions related to control over central government, as well as improving government accountability, democracy and local ownership. In for example the coast areas , this was highlighted as positive, it was seen as countering radical recruitment and helping to create counter narratives against Shabaab recruitment by creating local empowerment.¹⁸

However, it also carries significant risks as a potential conflict driver on many levels. For example, divided executive authorities in Kenyan counties can weaken the government's capacity to respond to emerging conflicts, hampering coordination. Respondents sketched out elite capture as another potential problem with ties to Garissa and Mandera County.

Devolution has changed the infrastructure of the security sector, paving the way for enhanced security, but also for new conflicts. As noted by Centre for Human Rights and Policy Studies (2016), effective prevention of extremism is local, so it is essential to take into account the important role the county government can play in CVE – for instance, providing partnerships with county governments and local community actors. Neither Norway nor other countries seem to have focused sufficiently on these challenges or opportunities in terms of funding the partners.

The Norwegian Embassy supports the best-known and nationwide human rights organizations in Kenya and these organizations have been involved in the discussion and criticism of government practices. Such examples of the violation of democratic principles and of the Constitution make clear the importance of the presence of the human rights organizations and their pressuring the government

¹⁸ Interview with Peter Mwangangi, KTN Coast correspondent, 29 April 2016; Interview Richard Itambo of Nataraji Youth Organisation in Kwale, telephone 4 May 2016.; Interview with Hussein Khalid Hussein, Telephone 7 May 2016

to promote human rights. History has shown that the protection of human rights becomes even more significant in connection with the fight against terrorism.

The Embassy supports, or has recently supported, the Kenyan Human Rights Commission (KHRC), the Kenyan National Commission for Human Rights (KNCHR), the Independent Medico-legal Unit (IMLU) and Inform Action. In addition to these Nairobi-based organizations, the Embassy support HAKI Africa and MUHURI in Mombasa. Human Rights Agenda (HURIA) in Mombasa is another human rights organizations that has a good reputation.

The human rights organisations that receive Norwegian support have considerable similarities, but there are also differences in their approach and activities as we have seen. Some organisations are mainly working on advocating human rights through legal and policy reforms, but other organisations provide legal and health services for victims of torture and other inhuman treatment. Human rights organisations also provide a tool to monitor and correct police services and thus to aid the improvement of the police services in Kenya. In fact they have the potential to facilitate community contact for the Kenyan police and improve their soft powers strategies by providing correctives to malign human rights practices in the police. Capacity building of stakeholders and facilitating dialogue are other methods of the organisations for advocating human rights. Film and community discussions is as an approach Inform Action has used to reach and empower the citizens. However, the organisations are mainly focusing on human right issue more broadly and not CVE in particular. Anyway, the more broadly human right focus may also have, as we have described above, a significant indirectly influence on counter violence extremism.

Booliska Kenya oo argagixinaya shacabkooda (DAAWO SAWIRADA)

Wariye Mujaahid ah May 17, 2016

Uncategorized, Warar, Warbixino



Booliska wadanka Kenya ayaa xasuuq iyo argagax xoog badan ku sameeyay shacabkood, iyagoo sidoo kalena laayey qaar ka mid ah bulshada wadankooda kuwaas oo banaanbaxyo ka dhigayay magaamada Nairobi.

Dadkaan oo banaanbax sameynayay ayaa ahaa kuwo taageersan kooxda mucaaradka ee uu hogaamiyo Raila Odinga, Waxayna iskugu

soo baxeen qaybo kamid ah wadanka Kenya gaar ahaan magaalada Nairobi iyagoo codsanayay in lakala diro gudiga doorashooyinka wadanka Kenya.

Example of Shabaab use of Kenyan police violence in their propaganda, taken from the Radio Andalus webpage of the Harakat Al Shabaab.

<http://radioandalus24.com/?p=7105>

5.3 Dialogue

Lack of trust between the citizens and the police is emphasized as a major issue hampering Kenya CVE work as we have described above. Dialogue and trust building between the police and citizens are seen as a tool for improving the communication and contact between the police and the communities. Dialoguing between youth and government officials and other stakeholders takes place in schools and within the communities. Peace Clubs are a school project where young people work together with key stakeholders and the police and other security actors in their local communities, in order to address issues of concern. The aim is a 'strengthening of local mechanisms for dialogue, interaction and consultation among the key actors and stakeholders' and to 'encourage youth to engage in peaceful non-violent activities' (Oslo Centre Proposal 2015). It thus has the potential of limiting the possibilities for 'issue alignment' as well as targeting vulnerable youth directly.

The project 'Community Youth Security Forum' involves dialogue meetings between youth, security authorities (the Anti-Terrorism Police Unit, ATPU, in particular) and county governments. The project was initiated by MUHURI in order to 'deliberate with the people about how best to combat terrorism and flush

out suspects from within the communities’, and to ‘listen to the security concerns of the youth and together devise ways of dealing with them peacefully’. Projects vary in content. The Peace Club focuses on building good relations and trust in general between youth and public authorities, particularly the police, but maintains that there is a CVE aspect as well. Moreover, as the Oslo Centre, which supports the revitalizing of the clubs, is aware, the poor and marginalized are not necessarily the only target group for recruitment, and the Peace Clubs work this into their practices. However, it seems that they still have some way to go as regards integrating wider CVE perspectives and findings from research into their activities. The Peace-clubs are active in Kwale and Lamu, the latter a very important location. It does not exist in the north east, nor in areas like Majengo in Nairobi. However, there are alternatives in these areas.

MUHURI’s coastal project appears to focus more on immediate security concerns in the community. It is the members of the local communities that have the local information and relations needed to identify suspicious individuals. Local meetings for building trust between the citizenry and the authorities might improve relations so that more information is delivered to the police and the ATPU.

Norway has not supported the MUHURI ‘Community Youth Security Forum’ – and this could be an alternative for Norwegian support.

It should be noted that the British high commission has extensively supported dialogue programs in Mombasa, involving Haki, but also Kenya Muslim women alliance and Kenya Muslim youth alliance. The project conducted by Haki the respondents indicated have been a part of a relative successful development in Mombasa.¹⁹ In this sense dialogue efforts in Mombasa have been heavily supported.

Danish Demining Group (DDG) is one of the organizations focusing on the challenges and possibilities regarding devolution, and mainly in Northern Kenya, which is high-risk zone. DDG has also cross-border projects in these areas, working on inclusive community consultations, capacity building among local stakeholders and multi-level dialogue meetings among stakeholders in-country and cross-border. DDG has been a long-standing actor in strengthening community safety in conflict areas in Kenya, in particular at the northern border areas. The organization appears to have extensive local knowledge from an area where interaction and preventive efforts are essential but few other organizations operate. In the north east, the USAID supported Kenya Transition Initiative Program (KTI) has also operated dialogue programs in the north east through their ‘Yes we can’ initiative, but had problems because of their American affiliation (Khalil and Zeuten 2015). We recommend that consideration be given to providing further support, to partners in this exposed region.

¹⁹ Interview with Peter Mwangi, KTN Coast correspondent, 29 April 2016; Interview Richard Itambo of Nataraji Youth Organisation in Kwale, telephone 4 May 2016.; Interview with Hussein Khalid Hussein, Telephone 7 May 2016

In contrast to many other countries, dialogue seminars on prevention of radicalization and de-radicalization seem lacking in Kenya. The African Initiative for Women in Africa (AIWA) has facilitated consultation forums in Mombasa and Nairobi where national and international representatives shared their experiences and perspectives on combating radicalization. The AIWA report stated that these consultation forums have been well received by participants (AIWA 2015). Together with International Youth Action Against Terrorism (IYAAT), AIWA has recently facilitated recently a youth conference aimed at university/college students, supported and attended by several national student organizations. Universities and colleges can be breeding grounds for extremist recruitment, and one of the terrorists involved in the 2015 Garissa attack had a degree from a Kenyan university. A more academic and civic forum has been facilitated in cooperation by the Heinrich Böll Foundation, the French Institute for Research in Africa (IFRA) and the Centre for Human Rights and Policy Studies (CHRIPS). These forums complement the stakeholder meetings facilitated by HAKI Africa and MUHURI in Mombasa, which are locally based with mainly local representatives.

Given the lack of common meeting places, these initiatives stand out as crucial efforts aimed at creating dialogue among stakeholders, and sharing experiences and knowledge.

5.4 Prevention targeting individuals

Prevention efforts aimed at individuals may be on the general or selective level. Above, we have described several projects and strategies that can be categorized as universal prevention work. For instance, the Peace Clubs target young people in general with the message of peace and social cohesion, and engage them in positive social activities (Oslo Centre 2014). Another prevention project aimed at young people is the football tournament in Mombasa by HAKI Africa that will engage youth in general in sports activities, and dialoguing about peace and security before, during and after the matches (HAKI Africa 2014). Such projects can have a wider impact than only on young persons likely to join radical groups

Another universal preventive effort is to involve women, and mothers in particular, in CVE. This has been a main objective for AIWA and Women in International Security Horn of Africa (WIIS HOA). Women have an important role to play in CVE, not least since they are the backbone of the family. Moreover, they are also well aware of the situation in the local community, whereas their men are often absent (AIWA 2015). In addition to awareness among mothers about the risks of their children being recruited, AIWA and WIIS, through the women's organizations in their networks, are also targeting women and families at risk. These efforts can be described as more selective preventive effort. WIIS supports mothers and families that are concerned about family members planning to join al-Shabaab or other violent groups, as well as families where members (often sons or husband) have already been recruited. A woman may not report to the government if, for instance, her husband has left for Somalia and has been killed, due to shame and threat of reprisals from the intelligence

services and the police. In consequence, the widow may lose her rights regarding distribution of the estate.²⁰ The support provided (by WIIS in particular) works at both the universal and the selective levels.

Another selective effort is HAKI Africa's project 'Youth Income Generating Activities', which targets a small number of young people, assisting them to develop a business. Our informants highlighted unemployment and idleness as crucial push factors for radicalization. The Kenya Transition Initiative (KTI), funded by USAID, CVE programme has also focused on preventive efforts targeting risk-groups through funding mechanisms that support individuals with small grants. A criticism to this programme has been that the targeted group are too wide, and it is a need to narrow CVE targeting to precise at-risk population subset, as among other members of specific clans, religious converts, ex-convicts, gang-members etc. (Khalil and Zeuthen 2014). This criticism may also apply to several of the individual preventive efforts and should be taken into consideration when organizations and programmes is supported. Kenya Community Support Centre (KECOSCE), based in Mombasa, are directly engaged in mentoring programs of students, and combines this with a strong online portfolio, and community dialogue efforts, but again fails to target vulnerable groups.

The state has officially granted amnesty to returning foreign fighters who voluntarily agree to leave extremist groups and be reintegrated (IOM 2015). Along the coast, where many have returned from al-Shabaab, Supreme Council of Kenya Muslims (SUPKEM), National Commission for Integration and Cohesion (NCIC) and International Organization of Migrations (IOM) have facilitated meetings between returnees, local and religious leaders and government representatives (SUPKEM 2015). In addition, SUPKEM says that it runs a rehabilitation programme for al-Shabaab returnees.²¹ The initiatives of SUPKEM and IOM show how NGOs can play a role in the reintegration and rehabilitation of returnees. Along the coast, in addition to SUPKEM, the Council of Imams and Preachers of Kenya (CIPK) and the Coast Interfaith Council (CIC) are religious organizations that are involved in CVE. The Kenyan government, through NCIC, is working together with these religious organizations in prevention and reintegration.²² Religious organizations and leaders are respected and considered as valuable in CVE by the national and local government. In Kenya, religious organizations/councils/leaders have a significant role in preventive efforts. Religious leaders can challenge ideas, understandings and beliefs that are embedded in movements or in individuals; and from a social movement theory perspective, religious leaders appear as important actors. For instance, religious scholars have successfully been used in several de-radicalization processes in Saudi Arabia. However, in Kenya, it has mainly been Muslim councils that have

²⁰ Interview WIIS Kenya. 14.03.2016. Oslo

²¹ Interview with Hassan Ole Naado, Nairobi 03.01.2016. However, it has not been possible to obtain verified information about the scope, strategy and concept of the programme.

²² Interview NCIC (21.01.2016, Nairobi)

been involved, and several of them are controversial, some arguing that they don't represent the wider Muslim population, some arguing that they are state controlled, some saying that they have radicals in their midst²³. Local religious leaders we interviewed were dissatisfied with and critical to SUPKEM.²⁴ We were told that Kenyan citizens feel that these Muslim councils do not represent their opinions and beliefs.²⁵ Although it is beyond the scope and resources to conduct a survey of opinions amongst Kenyan Muslims on these institutions, it seems like the legitimacy of the councils might be questioned among several leaders in the communities.

5.5 Concluding remarks: Kenya

In Kenya, many organizations work on the policy level, seeking to influence the government's development of strategies, plans, legislation and practices. In particular, human rights organizations operate on this level, and the partners supported by the Embassy are mainly these human rights organizations. This is in line with the Norwegian strategy of strengthening the role of civil society in CVE (St.meld. 37 2014–2015).

In general, our research team has found few programmes, projects or actors that focus specifically on high-risk groups; we see this as a major weakness. Indeed, it seems that the more selective the efforts are when it comes to targeting specific high-risk individuals and groups, the less involved is Norway. As described in chapter three strengthening the structures and universal efforts targeting the whole population, or indeed wider communities, may prevent various types of problem in the lives of young people, but these efforts are not sufficient for persons already at risk (Dahlgard Nilsen 2010). More specific efforts targeting those at risk of radicalization are required – in addition, as highlighted by social movement theories, to efforts targeting families, groups and networks already involved in radical networks (Botha and Abdille 2014; Beck 2008). The importance of early intervention is also highlighted in the Norwegian strategy for prevention of radicalization and violent extremism (Action Plan 2014).

The Norwegian White Paper emphasizes the enhancement of state capacity for making states better equipped to prevent and combat terrorism, organized crime, piracy and cyber-threats. Capacity building in general is also highlighted as a key instrument. Norway does not give funding to the Kenyan state. The funding provided by the Embassy goes mainly to NGOs: only in exceptional cases has funding gone to state institutions, such as the Kenya National Commission for Human Rights (KNCHR). The funding to NGOs may indirectly go to capacity building through NGO activities such as training, workshops, etc., for civil servants. Nor does Norway contribute to the basket fund for the police reform programme led by UNODC. Sweden, for instance, have been a main partner for

²³ For a short summary of this critique see Arye Oded (2000): "Islam and Politics in Kenya" Lynne Rienner: Boulder, 24, the same lines are voiced today.

²⁴ Interview religious leaders (06.01.2016, Nairobi)

²⁵ Interview journalist (13.01.2016, Nairobi)

the police reform programme, but has reduced the support recently among others due to corruption. The Kenyan state, in particular the police, is in dire need of enhanced capacity. Key obstacles here are low wage-levels and corruption; these challenges have also an effect on the police performance regarding CVE, as in Somalia. Corruption as a problem for CVE has also been highlighted by other authors (see Hellsten 2016). It hampers community trust in the police, thus obstructing the flow of information. It also allows radical groups to buy themselves out of prison after arrest – as two notable individuals, al-Qaeda leader Fazul Muhamed, and well-known al-Shabaab member Samantha Letwaith (‘the widow’) seem to have done. Police reform in Kenya requires that police corruption be dealt with, and strategies for handling this issue should be a part of the Norwegian portfolio.

Kenya poses considerable challenges as poverty, unemployment and low education levels. Several of our informants mentioned these in explaining why Kenyans are recruited to extremist groups,²⁶ and most of the informants said they would targeted these structural challenges if they could influence on CVE efforts. They also emphasized targeting the root causes, meaning structural challenges involved in funding CVE efforts. According to Khalil and Zeuthen (2014), from a programmatic and donor perspective, targeting these structural challenges is beyond the realistic scope of CVE in the short term, as it will require large-scale investments and expensive programmes that need to be sustained over long periods. We wish to point out that, although these structural problems cannot fully explain why people join extremist groups, structural challenges should not be ignored in longer-term preventive strategies, but that these challenges are more similar to more general development challenges.

5.6 Kenya: specific recommendations

Preventing radicalization that can lead to violent extremism can be conducted by using many of the same toolkits as for various other social problems. Continued support to universal preventive efforts that can be CVE-relevant is important, but these efforts should be recognized and referred as to what they are, *broader crime prevention efforts*. Funding for strengthening CVE should be allocated to CVE-specific projects, like projects directly targeting individuals, groups or communities at risk of being recruited to extremist groups, or for reintegration efforts.

Lesson-learned mechanisms and state of the art

It is crucial for lessons-learned mechanisms and the activities of organizations to be based on state-of-the-art knowledge regarding CVE. As also in Somalia, Norway should link together the various partners in a Norwegian portfolio for Kenya to achieve this. Also in Kenya, Norway should encourage and participate

²⁶Material incentives are offered to young people to motivate recruitment to al-Shabaab, with a monthly salary if they join the group (Interview religious leaders and leader of women’s group (06.01.2016, Nairobi). Muhsin Hassan also describes the practice of offering material incentives (Khalil and Zeuthen 2014).

in building up a coordination network between actors doing CVE work. A sharing and lessons learned/training of trainers component should be a central element here.

Areas of support

The Norwegian Embassy has supported mainly community projects along the Kenyan coast, working closely with MUHURI and HAKI Africa. The coast is still an area of recruitment to al-Shabaab, and an area important to focus on.

North Kenya, particularly Garissa and Mandera, has counties where there have been several attacks, as well as a high level of terrorist recruitment. They are also regionally close to places where Shabaab holds semi-territorial and even territorial control in Somalia. Norway should consider strengthening its focus on this region. DDG appears as an organization with extensive experience and local knowledge of this area where few other organizations are operating. DDG also has experience from community Safety projects. We strongly recommend that Norway should consider extending its involvement to North Kenya, perhaps with DDG as a partner. It should be borne in mind that government control of the countryside is weaker in these areas and that al-Shabaab might achieve semi-territoriality. If that should happen, CVE work would become far more complex, so it is especially important to focus on efforts at the present stage.

Informal settlements ('squatter settlements') in Nairobi, particularly Eastleigh and Majengo, are another area with high levels of recruitment to extremist movements. Greater preventive efforts are required here. Lamu is also in a special situation, also close to areas where Shabaab enjoys semi-territoriality.

Human rights organizations

Norwegian support in Kenya has a high human rights profile. All the well-known nationwide human rights organizations are supported. In Kenya, violations of democratic principles and the Constitution, in addition to torture and other inhumane mistreatment of citizens, have made clear the importance of the presence of human rights organizations. Protection of human rights becomes even more significant when it comes to combating extremism – in part to counter 'issue alignment', in part to enhance trust between the police and local communities by building up practices more focused on human rights. Protection of Human Rights also becomes important as a criteria for evaluating progress in the Kenyan police works on improving their CVE approaches. Human rights organisations have also an important role as monitors to understand if this work is successful. Continued Norwegian support to human rights organizations is essential. In particular, we wish to highlight Independent Medico-Legal Unit (IMLU), due to its very diversified activities and its position in the police reform. There are some differences among the human rights organizations that receive Norwegian supported, but the similarities are more important. One institution that Norway does not support at present, but that we found relevant and that the Embassy may consider supporting, is the Centre for Human Rights and Policy Studies (CHRIPS). This is an independent think-tank, research and policy development centre. It focuses more directly on violence, security and violent

extremism; it facilitates highly very relevant seminars and publishes related policy brief and articles.

Targeting high-risk individuals and groups

Few of Norway's partners are directly involved in prevention on the individual level, targeting specific at-risk individuals and groups. The portfolio ought to be extended to several projects aimed at groups that are more vulnerable and families, groups and individuals who are already involved in radical networks. Examples from the Kenyan coast have shown that NGOs and CBOs can play important roles in targeting vulnerable groups and returnees. However, relatively few organizations in Kenya seem to operate on this level: there should be more NGOs that can intervene with a preventive approach towards high-risk groups. Norway should consider contributing to such funding. These organizations should be local-based and enjoy legitimacy and trust in the communities. The security of the members of the organizations must be ensured. Norway should also continue to defend civil society organizations that are unfairly accused by the government of supporting extremism.

Schools as an intervention arena

The schools are a favourable arena for universal prevention approaches. The Peace Clubs appear to be a promising universal effort, not least given their potential for expansion and sustainability. Such Peace Club already exist within the schools; they are not a new, separate project that would depend on the activity, funding and engagement of an NGO.

The NCIC and the Ministry of Education support a revitalizing and extension of Peace clubs to other counties. The ongoing revitalizing of the Peace Clubs supported by the Oslo Centre is also underway in areas like Kwale and also to Lamu, the latter is highly important for al-Shabaab. However, steps must be taken in order to ensure updated efforts on how to assess which groups are vulnerable, and that the efforts have a mechanism for learning from recent research and lessons learned regarding CVE efforts. We feel that stronger institutional management would be advantageous for ensuring follow-up capacity in such projects. We would also like to highlight Kenya Community Support Centre (KECOSCE), based in Mombasa, as an alternative partner, a partner that also have a focus on online radicalisation processes.

Another noteworthy initiative is AIWA's development of a CVE toolkit for use in educational institutions (AIWA 2015b). In our view, however, the toolkit focuses more on what needs to be done, than how to do it. For instance, there is no comprehensive advice on how to implement activities such as spearheading dialogue about CVE. Consideration should be given to programmes or projects that can help teachers to become better equipped to lead discussions, or that support NGOs and CBOs that can assist the schools to conduct this dialogue with the pupils. Recently, a teacher in Nairobi was nominated for the unofficial 'Nobel Prize for teaching', because of his lessons about extremism in Nairobi schools (*Daily Mail* 2016). That shows the importance of strengthening efforts of this type.

Universities and colleges can serve as breeding grounds for recruitment, as seen in Kenya and elsewhere. Empowering university/college students to counter violent extremism is important. AIWA is already involved in facilitating seminars and workshops at universities and colleges, but the Embassy may consider extending support to other student organizations, in view of the importance of targeting this arena. IYAAT is specifically engaged in CVE and should be considered.

Support to religious groups

In Kenya, religious groups are involved in efforts to prevent individuals from joining extremist groups, and in reintegration. From a donor perspective, we feel that supporting religious councils or committees should be treated with extreme care. The legitimacy of the council/committee may be questionable and it might be difficult to ensure a balance between religious committees/groups, also within the same religion. Human rights organizations and women's organizations can also be important in targeting individuals at risk, and support to religious groups have to be a part of a package.

Safeguarding women's rights and involvement in CVE

AIWA has focused specifically on the protection of women's rights and has engaged them in the prevention of radicalization – which is a goal in the Norwegian strategy (St.meld.37 2014–2015). In addition, AIWA is also one of the few organizations the Embassy support that focus specifically on countering violent extremism. Thus, AIWA stands out as a partner that contributes differently from many of the other organizations supported by the Embassy, and is an important partner in CVE. Women in International Security Horn of Africa (WIIS HOA) might also be an alternative.

Enhancement of state capacity

The Norwegian White Paper emphasizes the enhancement of state capacity for making states better equipped to prevent and combat extremism. The Kenyan devolution reform is perceived as one of the most significant changes in Kenya recently. It has the potential to reduce tensions and strengthen state control – or to become a

conflict driver. To some extent, Norway supports projects that can contribute to capacity building in the state by providing support for current partners. We recommend that Norway should increase its support to efforts that can strengthen capacity of the Kenyan state, and underpin the potential of the devolution reform in particular. Projects that can play a role in addressing land conflicts are also highly relevant. It should be noted that police corruption remains a major problem for the legitimacy of state institutions, for the efficiency of investigations, and thus for CVE work. Human rights watchdogs can address such issues, and this capacity should be enhanced. Wider dialogue between the Embassy and the Kenyan authorities can also create momentum on this issue.

6 Conclusions: Directions for CVE in the Horn of Africa

This study is based on field research conducted mainly in the course of one month, January 2016, and thus has its limitations in scope and depth. We have found several problems that the two countries have in common, to varying degrees, such as poor state capacities, and irregularly paid and corrupt police forces (weakening a major partner in CVE work). However, we have also found a blossoming civil society of NGOs, often doing sterling work; a relatively open culture; and considerable will to deal with the problems of CVE.

Both countries are plagued by the Harakat al-Shabaab with its Kenyan offshoots, an organization that exploits geographical and ethnic grievances (in Kenya), and clan grievances (in Somalia), attempting to twist these into a discourse where also small local conflicts are seen as a conflict between Good and Evil. Both countries have also seen the growth, but also the decline, of large criminal networks.

In Kenya, the police have been accused of gross abuses of human rights, and have been criticized by human rights organizations – it is to be hoped that such instances can contribute to improvements in the longer run. In Somalia, the police have been too fragmented to function meaningfully as an entity. The police forces of both countries have difficulties in dealing with local communities, a problem that hampers information transfers from potential sympathizers, but there are moves underway to remedy these problems.

There are many initiatives in CVE work. Many of these are not aimed at the most vulnerable groups, but have a more general target. There should be space for both, but more specific targeting is needed at least among some groups. The NGOs involved in such work often have little expertise, and could benefit from cooperative efforts.

Norway has a booming civil society, and a police force with long experience in handling dialogue and crime prevention. Therefore, Norway has indeed a role to play in aiding CVE efforts in the Horn of Africa. Moreover, with al-Shabaab recruitment from providing Norway with the second most lethal terrorist threat in its history, Norway should recognize its national interest in such work. Here it will need to find the right partners, and proper standards for the transfer of knowledge to these partners.

We hope that this report, with its clear policy recommendations, will contribute to this. It is crucial to find local and global partners and make sure that they have the appropriate expertise, to enhance state capacity, and to address grievances that al-Shabaab might exploit.

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