13 Citizenship in democratic welfare states

A typology of social exclusion

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Introduction

The core purpose of citizenship is to determine an individual's formal membership in a political community (Isin & Nyers, 2014). This implies two types of relationships: one is between the state and the citizens in the form of rights and duties, and the other is between the citizens themselves. We may argue, as Preuss (2016) does, that these types of relationships are closely connected. Possessing individual rights and duties and being a member of a political community are two sides of the same coin. Consequently, being a citizen involves access to rights and duties as a member of a political community regulated by the state.

In this book, we have examined three phenomena in combination. Firstly, we are concerned with citizens who are at risk of being socially excluded. We have studied the requirements set by the state for citizens to be eligible for social benefits, and we have studied citizens who struggle to exercise their rights in practice as members of society. These citizens are all at the margins of the welfare state. The threat of poverty and social exclusion is increasing in Europe. As Falch-Eriksen discussed in Chapter 2, in 2021, Eurostat released the statistical claim that one-fifth of the EU population was at risk of poverty and social exclusion. In 2020, almost one quarter of the child population was at risk of poverty and social exclusion (Eurostat, 2022).

Secondly, we concentrate on welfare states. The core notion of the welfare state is that the state has collective responsibility for the well-being of its citizens. As Haug thoroughly discussed in Chapter 1, there are many different forms of welfare states, and post-war welfare states have changed over time (Kourachanis, 2020). Our main concern is that the status quo that has brought peace and prosperity to the post-war welfare states is currently threatened by a series of challenges. As discussed in the Introduction to this volume, many challenges expressed and resolved at the national level stem from changes crossing national borders. In this book, we have discussed how environmental damage has put pressure on states to find new sustainable solutions for future welfare. We have shown how the COVID-19 pandemic, which rapidly spread to all corners of the world, was putting even more pressure on citizens' social lives. States are deregulating markets within the framework of global liberal capitalism. Accordingly, we have seen increasing economic insecurity for many citizens, with growing difficulties in accessing the labour market

for marginalised groups. Furthermore, we have shown how borders that were once open to people who are living increasingly transnational lives were closed during the COVID-19 pandemic. This raised questions about solidarity across national borders and also how each state could provide for the welfare of its own citizens.

Thirdly, we concentrate on constitutional democracies. In a constitutional democracy, the citizens are the authors of the law, and this gives legitimacy to the rule of law. As Falch-Eriksen thoroughly discussed in Chapter 2, for a democratic welfare state, modern citizenship includes constitutional rights, democratic rights and social welfare rights within one membership scheme that each member carries equally as part of the social and political order. It is important that the citizens decide the democratic rights to political participation for themselves. In this way, citizenship establishes a concept of egalitarian justice and lays out a formal expression of solidarity. In a democratic welfare state, studies of citizenship can therefore tell us the extent to which common norms are shared between its members, as well as whether these norms are built to ensure continuous and simultaneous social reproduction and integration. Studying citizenship and how these political and social mechanisms function can provide us with key insights into the threat of social exclusion.

The ongoing war in Ukraine is intensifying many of these challenges. It is changing our understanding of the possibilities of war in Europe and increasing our compassion for those who stand in the middle of it. The war has also intensified the energy crisis in Europe, which will have significant consequences for citizens living on the economic margins.

By focusing on the risk of social exclusion for citizens in the democratic welfare state, our aim has *not* been to assess the merits or shortcomings of the welfare state per se. Instead, we have used the empirical cases to throw light on challenges that are relevant across nation-states attempting to maintain and improve their welfare systems (Taylor-Goodby, 2019). Parallel to the changes in democratic welfare states, citizenship is constantly being reconstructed (Clarke, 2022; Kourachanis, 2020). There is therefore a constant need for empirically based analyses of which mechanisms lead to the social exclusion of citizens, as well as how different concepts of citizenship can help us understand this exclusion.

The purpose of this chapter is to show how a concept of citizenship can create new insights into how we collectively coordinate and resolve social challenges through the democratic welfare state. To narrow down this broad topic, we concentrate on two specific questions: What kind of political and social mechanisms are at play when citizens are exposed to exclusion, and how would different concepts of citizenship respond to social exclusion?

The chapter is divided into three sections. In the first part, we discuss the role of citizenship in democratic welfare states and various mechanisms of social exclusion. In the second part, we analyse how various categories of people live at the margins of the welfare state. This is based on the findings derived from the empirical studies in the chapters of this book. In the third part, we suggest a typology for social exclusion based on how four ideal types of citizenship respond to social exclusion within democratic welfare states. Finally, we conclude by discussing how any form of social

exclusion is a cause for concern and, in most cases, the very purpose of the welfare state is to solve these problems.

Part I: citizens and the mechanisms of social exclusion

The scholarship on citizenship often refers to citizenship as the sum of civic, political and social (welfare) rights. This definition originates from the well-known categorisation performed by Marshall (1950). The sum of these rights constitutes the fundamental formal building blocks of *the legal status* of citizenship, that is, the status of a legal personhood that carries a set of legally specified rights (Cohen, 1999). As discussed in Chapter 1 of this book, Marshall kicked off modern citizenship studies. While civil rights emerged in the eighteenth century, the political right to vote originated in the nineteenth century. In the twentieth century, citizenship expanded along with social rights as a virtue of membership within a community aimed at securing the well-being of its members (Marshall, 1950). The substantial content of citizenship thereby becomes a fundamental formal, political and normative reality for the nation-state and what it means to be a member of it. In parallel to citizenship there is a corresponding and fundamental duty on the part of the nation-state to enforce rights. Consequently, rights can have massive implications *if* the nation-state performs its formal duties of enforcing rights, and as it does, the nation-state can address social exclusion very differently depending on how citizenship is conceived.

In this regard, social exclusion can be used as an analytical tool with which to unravel what different types of citizenship do when confronted by exclusion, as well as how they react within a welfare state that is created to ensure the welfare of each member in one way or another. The social dimension of citizenship connects the individual explicitly to the welfare state via the way it refers to individuals' social rights and duties in relation to their individual welfare. The root of this dimension can again be found in Marshall's (1950) studies. He was concerned with how social inequality led to obstacles to citizens' participation in social, cultural and political life. In contrast to how capitalism led to increased inequality, citizenship represents the principle of equality and social integration (Marshall, 1950). For Marshall and scholars who have followed his ideas, it is a shared understanding that individuals who do not have social rights or who have social rights that are not enforced are excluded from exercising their full membership in the political community to which their citizenship belongs (Kourachanis, 2020). By extension, we can argue that social rights become crucial in the effort to safeguard each individual's dignity and ensure that a sense of justice pervades society through social redistribution (Habermas, 2010).

While citizenship has traditionally been a tool with which to ensure the inclusion of individuals into a polity, it has always implied the exclusion of non-members, that is, those who do not carry membership and cannot take part in the political community or receive welfare benefits and services (Bauböck et al., 2006). There are zones of differentiated access to rights, in which some individuals only have access to certain rights and duties without having access to all of them. Many social

rights and obligations are detached from formal national citizenship in most European welfare states (Dominelli & Moosa-Mitha, 2016). For instance, the right to cash benefits, including sick pay and disability benefits, unemployment benefits, old age pensions and paid parental leave, is generally linked to formal employment and paying statutory social insurance contributions. This shows what Bauböck et al. (2006) calls a mismatch between citizenship and the territorial scope of legitimate authority. This mismatch between state, territory and people also leads to the questioning of citizenship as a meaningful practice.

Nevertheless, classical sociology reminds us that social and political orders, such as the nation-state, depend on social integration to reaffirm, sustain and reinvent themselves across time (Habermas, 1996; Held, 1996; Parsons, 1951; Weber, 2001 [1930]). In this regard, citizenship, if properly construed, can act as a significant integration mechanism. The idea is that citizenship, as a set of civil, political and social rights and as a political practice, can help create feelings of belonging to a political community. Social inclusion is the active public effort to sustain social and political order by including and integrating each member of the social order as a citizen. The ways different approaches to social inclusion include citizens also vary regarding how they deal with social exclusion.

Social exclusion can imply anything from a barely significant inequality to an indicator of the disintegration of the social and political order. Citizenship is connected to the threat that social exclusion poses to a nation-state's social and political order because of the fact that it is based on the idea that each person is bestowed with a membership that entails a specific configuration of individual rights and duties for all (Cohen, 1999; Marshall, 1950). By distributing citizenship equally within a nation-state and configuring it through democratic means according to what the population would want from such membership, citizenship becomes integrative to the social community itself. It carries with it many of the societal expectations that serve to bind society together.

The proportion of national citizens with civil and political rights but not social rights seems to be growing across European welfare states. As we also discussed in the Introduction, Bloemraad et al. (2019) call this "membership without social citizenship." They describe how a broadening of legal, social and cultural membership in Western societies appears to be accompanied by a reduction in the social rights of citizenship. The authors' point of departure is Marshall's argument that modern societies are characterised by a progressive extension of civil, political and social rights to a more significant number of individuals, recognising, in principle, the right of the citizens to a minimum standard of living. In terms of the extension of rights, Bloemraad et al. (2019) show how new and diverse groups, such as racial, sexual and religious minorities and immigrants, gain access to formal national citizenship in Western societies more easily than they did 50 years ago. However, in contrast to Marshall's expectations, Bloemraad et al. (2019) do not see an extension of the distribution of welfare resources given the simultaneous granting of social rights to these citizens. The authors document more demanding judgements about who should receive access to public assistance in the form of either increasingly harsh judgements about who "deserves" public support or "welfare

chauvinism." While Bloemraad et al. (2019) show that the segment of the national citizens seen as deserving of redistributive support has shrunk, they conclude that this trend is not universal, linear or equal for all vulnerable groups and that there are differences between countries.

By extracting some standard features, Kourachanis (2020) elaborates on the transformation of the concepts of social citizenship and the welfare state in their parallel evolutionary paths from the post-war period to the present. He describes the changes over time in that social citizenship is transformed into responsible citizenship. Based on these changes, we will highlight two general tendencies. According to Kourachanis, the most critical transformation is the shift from an emphasis on social rights to an emphasis on citizens' obligations and responsibilities, that is, a shift in emphasis from rights to civic duties. Another significant change is the shift from focusing on social class (cf. Marshall) to emphasising the cultural aspects of social inequality. While the first tendency concerns the social rights dimension of citizenship, the second relates to the membership aspect.

Kourachanis's (2020) main point is that these changes in citizenship exist in parallel with the restructuring of the welfare state. In both areas, he sees conceptual and ideological shifts leading to the introduction of new conditions for citizens to be eligible for social benefits. He calls this an *exclusion filter*. Like the findings of Bloemraad et al. (2019), Kourachanis's (2020) central point is that citizens must demonstrate that a rights claim is legitimate and that it triggers support, rather than receiving public assistance, as a type of right extended to everyone in the polity. Accordingly, we elaborate on the political and social mechanisms that may worsen social inclusion.

Part II: empirical findings – at the margins of the welfare state

In line with Kourachanis, we define an exclusion filter in terms of what citizens must demonstrate to be eligible for a social benefit from the state. Furthermore, we distinguish between two types of exclusion filters. The first consists of the eligibility criteria the citizen must meet to obtain goods and services based on their social rights. The second is the citizen's struggle to exercise his or her rights in practice. Both types of exclusion filters can be at work simultaneously, as well as in various combinations. By more closely examining each chapter's contributions, we elaborate on whether and how we can observe an exclusion filter in terms of the conditions for a citizen to be included socially.

As discussed in the introduction, the volume is organised around a distinction between legal-political and sociological perspectives on citizenship. In line with the legal-political perspective, some chapters study laws, public policies, and bureaucratic logics governing citizens' access to social protection. Other chapters apply the sociological perspective and examine subjective feelings of membership, belonging or identity, as well as opportunities to participate actively and be included in different areas of society. This involves how individuals and groups experience the consequences of how laws and public policies are implemented in practice.

In this concluding chapter, we go beyond the legal-political versus sociological distinction to show that these types of relationships are connected. As discussed earlier, having special rights and duties and being a member of a political community are two sides of the same coin (Preuss, 2016). The following analyses are organised around how the chapters examine different categories of people with common challenges, specifically those who live at the margins of the welfare state: people with disabilities, people who are unemployed, families with children in vulnerable life situations, people crossing national borders, people who express discontent over social welfare schemes and, finally, future generations.

People with disabilities are often excluded from the labour market (Vornholt et al., 2018). In many countries, the employment rate of people with disabilities is significantly lower than that for those without disabilities. For disabled people, this form of marginalisation has been a critical marker of social exclusion (Barnes & Mercer, 2005). This is the theme of both Chapter 4 and Chapter 5 of this volume. In *Chapter 4*, Kaja Larsen Østerud, Janikke Solstad Vedeler and Nora Framstad show how employers' perspectives on hiring disabled workers resonate with the Norwegian work inclusion policy, the Inclusion Dugnad enacted in 2018–2022. This policy was introduced with a welfare state sustainability narrative, highlighting how employers should contribute to the societal economy by hiring disabled people. State employers struggled to meet the quota. The political and social mechanisms of this exclusion process are such that employing disabled people is portrayed as a charitable act, and the hiring employers have trouble addressing disability as an asset. This is an exclusion filter concerning how the policy was communicated and practised, as it reproduces the idea that disabled people do not live up to the image of the ideal worker. From this chapter, we learn that attempting to incentivise employers to hire disabled people for the sake of the welfare state, in effect, concedes that disabled people fail to live up to employers' notion of an ideal worker, rendering them second-class workers.

Employers' role as crucial actors in disability employment policy work is also the central theme of *Chapter 5*. With data from the United States, Jaskirat Kohli and Janikke Solstad Vedeler describe laws attempting to extend economic and social security to individuals with disabilities. Still, these are not enough to improve the social exclusion these citizens experience. The political and social mechanisms of this social exclusion are related not to a lack of laws but, rather, to whether or not employers extend group membership to individuals with disabilities. Three types of exclusion filters are revealed based on the dynamics of ingroup/outgroup membership. Firstly, efforts to improve job prospects for women and ethnic minorities cloak the exclusion of individuals with disabilities. Secondly, the employers' perceived threat of lawsuits fosters a compulsion to engage in compliance and cost/risk analyses. Thirdly, employers judge individuals with disabilities as inferior to those without disabilities. We learn from this chapter that labour market participation is a civic right and duty, one that cannot be ensured without employer involvement.

Unemployed people can generally be seen as being at risk of social exclusion. This does not only apply to people with disabilities, as discussed earlier. Because the

right to meaningful employment is essential to discussions of citizenship, such exclusion implies that these citizens' opportunities to participate in all areas of society are weakened. What does the state do if a citizen is unemployed in the short or long term? This question is explored in Chapters 3 and 9 using the Norwegian welfare state as a case. The welfare state does not guarantee its citizens the right to work, but if a citizen cannot provide for their subsistence, they have the right to income support from the state.

In *Chapter 3*, Kristian Heggebø and Axel West Pedersen show an example of a welfare state that introduced more inclusive unemployment benefit regulations in response to the increasing unemployment rate due to the COVID-19 pandemic. People with weak labour market attachment and/or non-standard employment contracts are not covered by the generous out-of-work benefit available in the Norwegian welfare system – a clear example of an exclusion filter. In March 2020, the Norwegian welfare state altered the eligibility criteria, replacement rates and the maximum period of income support so that the level of generosity increased noticeably. The policy changes revealed existing gaps in the unemployment benefit regulations – for example, the precarious position experienced by freelancers, the self-employed and newly graduated students. While all policy amendments were explicitly announced as temporary, the chapter concludes by questioning whether these changes could have any long-term implications by leading the policy domain in a more inclusive direction. An important lesson from this chapter is that the Norwegian welfare state responded to deteriorating economic conditions during the COVID-19 pandemic with more social inclusion for a disadvantaged group, namely unemployed people without access to the unemployment benefit. This generous out-of-work benefit will no longer exclude citizens with weak labour market attachment and/or non-standard employment contracts if the temporary changes become permanent.

In contrast to the above focus on citizens who are active in the labour market but temporarily out of work, in *Chapter 9*, Helle C. Hansen and Erika Gubrium reveal how service users who do not obtain paid employment often circulate in the welfare system over time. The chapter shows how the service users experience Norwegian activation policies to prevent social exclusion through labour market participation. The social mechanisms are both inclusive and exclusive. In terms of civic participation, the programme is affirmative – in the short term for those who are in the programme and in the long term for those who find work after participating. A vital exclusion filter is that the qualification programme is based on an adult worker norm, with the expectation of full-time programme participation. This universal norm prevents the possibility of transformative change. From this chapter, we learn that activation may result in the further subordinated status and social exclusion of citizens who already experience difficulties complying with the societal norm of participation and becoming a full member of society.

Families with children in vulnerable life situations may be excluded from critical aspects of citizenship in at least two ways. One form of exclusion would be the result of state bodies intervening in family life so that children and parents lose the right to family life. The other form of exclusion is that the state does not support or

intervene in families that need help to enable individual family members to become full members of society. These forms of state interference in families, or the lack thereof, are crucial for social inclusion and exclusion from family life and participation in the broader community.

While respect for family life allows parents and children to enjoy one another's company without state interference, there is also a need to protect the child's right to be sheltered from abuse and neglect within the family. Consequently, Child Protection Services (CPS) is legally mandated to protect family life and remove children from their parents in some situations. As Simen Mørstad Johansen shows in *Chapter* 6, this state–parent–child triangle can be balanced in different ways in national laws and policies concerning the legal rights to child protection. Such differences must, however, be seen within the framework of how international human rights conventions set standards for how democratic welfare states should protect family life and, thereby, the cosmopolitan citizenship of the child, which is based on these standards. Accordingly, the chapter reveals various political mechanisms in Romania and Norway regarding how preventive child protection and family welfare policies emphasise parents' education. In Romanian legislation, there is a solid, explicit emphasis on the responsibility of the parents, and there is a low threshold for providing measures to improve parental competence. In contrast, Norwegian legislation focuses on the rights of the child, and the legislation lacks a focus on parental competence. The result may be exclusion from family life. From this chapter, we learn that Norwegian legislation and policies regarding parents' education are not in line with international human rights conventions.

As mentioned earlier, families with children can also be excluded from society due to a lack of support from the state. In *Chapter* 8, Sigurd Eid Jacobsen and Kjetil Klette-Bøhler take inspiration from recent theories on affective citizenship to offer an analysis of the affective ramifications of being entitled to or excluded from social services, education and health. Empirically, the authors focus on qualitative interviews that explore how Norwegian families with disabled children experienced societal participation and access to welfare services during the pandemic. The study shows how the pandemic hampered these families' well-being, as well as their participation in society more broadly, because several welfare services were shut down due to infection-control measures. More importantly, social exclusion had deep affective consequences for those involved, as it generated tears, anger, frustration and feelings of being abandoned by the welfare apparatus according to the informants. More importantly, such feelings were socially mediated in complex ways during the pandemic, as it placed increased pressure on the family at large. According to the author, the focus on affective citizenship and the emotional costs of social exclusion fills a lacuna that is often neglected by citizenship scholars who focus exclusively on the allocations of rights and duties while neglecting citizenship's affective ramifications. We learn from this chapter that infection-control measures hampered families' sense of recognition within Norwegian society.

People crossing national borders are often excluded from parts of society that are more easily accessible to citizens who live their whole lives within the territory of one nation-state. By crossing national borders, they do not fit within the

traditional understanding of (ideal-typical) distinctions between nation-states on which citizenship is based, in which there is a correspondence between territory, state administration and population (Preuss, 2016). This applies to people who live transnational lives, that is, those on the border between multiple legal statuses and those who move permanently from one country to another.

These challenges became even more pressing during the COVID-19 pandemic. As Justyna Bell, Anne Balke Staver and Ida Tolgensbakk show in *Chapter 11*, the travel restrictions introduced because of the pandemic affected non-citizens with ties to Norway and Norwegian citizens with family ties crossing national borders. The chapter finds that some individuals have experienced that their relationship to Norway has become weaker than they had previously anticipated, while others have been confronted with a situation in which their citizenship status was inadequate to secure their family life. This chapter shows how COVID-19 has exposed the disjuncture between the legal rules and the lived experiences of citizenship. Thus, in this case, the exclusion filter surfaces in the citizens' struggle to exercise their rights as members of society.

For immigrants who have permanently moved from one country to another, the challenges are not travelling restrictions and border control but, rather, whether and how they can become full members of a community. They become well integrated into society's major arenas legally, politically and socially in the Marshallian sense of citizenship. Immigrants are usually disadvantaged economically for some years after arrival. Still, one may assume that their economic and financial situation will gradually approach that of comparable natives. However, in *Chapter 10*, Jon Ivar Elstad and Kristian Heggebø analyse the economic incorporation of African and Asian refugees in Norway, showing that this is not always the case. The chapter reveals that the income gap "up" to the natives narrowed rapidly during the first years after arrival, but the positive trend was soon reversed because the income gap increased again after some ten years of residence. Moreover, a more recent refugee cohort that arrived around 2010 had actually a worse income trajectory than an earlier refugee cohort that arrived around 2000. Persistent precarious labour market attachment seems to be a major reason for such unfortunate tendencies, but the analyses also indicated that lower educational levels among recent refugee cohorts could be involved. An important lesson we draw from this chapter is that, in the long run, a lack of economic incorporation may lead to lasting marginalised citizenship status for African and Asian refugees in Norway.

People who express discontent over social welfare schemes may have civil and political rights, which makes it possible to express their dissatisfaction. This means they use their political rights to protest against social exclusion. This is the theme Barbara A. Zarate-Tenorio discusses in *Chapter 12*. She shows how people exercise citizenship in the quest for social inclusion in truncated welfare states in Latin America. Using data from the Latin American Public Opinion Project for a sample of 18 countries, the chapter reveals that the democratic deficit is widening. The chapter shows how discontent over public social services and support for redistribution are positively associated with several forms of political participation among citizens, such as voting in general elections, signing petitions, community projects

and protests. One essential political mechanism affecting this political participation seems to be that citizens in this region expect democracies to reduce inequality and deliver a good quality of welfare services. This chapter explains how political citizenship rights are exercised within the struggle for social citizenship rights in democracies with truncated welfare states.

Future generations can be defined as young individuals who do not have the right to vote and individuals who have not yet been born. They are excluded from the welfare states because they have little or no influence on current political decisions regarding their welfare. This implies they are highly dependent on the political choices made by the present generations, who can also affect the future ecosystem more than ever. Due to these political and social mechanisms, in *Chapter 7*, Marianne Takle develops analytical tools that can be used to understand what it would mean to include future generations in the contemporary concept of citizenship. The aim is to bring future challenges closer to the current generations' lives, allowing us to better understand what is required of us today if we include future generations in our welfare state considerations. By applying these tools to Norway, as an example of how around 30 countries have included ecological protection clauses for future generations in their constitution, the chapter shows conflicting ideas about whether to impose long-term political and legal restrictions on the current generations. What we can learn from this chapter is how global environmental challenges to the welfare state have led to contestations over national boundaries and cosmopolitan ideas intended to ensure the welfare of future generations.

Altogether, the various chapters show how different forms of exclusion filters are at work when marginalised groups or, more precisely, categories of people are excluded from different arenas in society. Some citizens have challenges meeting the requirements to obtain social rights, while others struggle to exercise their rights and duties in practice as full members of society. In some cases, we also find citizens who both face challenges to meet the requirements to obtain social rights and struggle to exercise their rights and duties. Moreover, the chapters show how some citizens are excluded from different arenas within society. While some are excluded from working life, others are excluded from having a family life, and still others are excluded from participating in political and social life at large. Our main point is that all these forms of exclusion affect these individuals as citizens, particularly their need for economic security and the opportunity to live a decent life.

Part III: a typology for social exclusion

The main lesson we draw from these empirical studies is that the different forms and arenas of exclusion affect individuals as citizens. We have shown how social exclusion encompasses a series of different situations in which individuals become detached from the social and political order. Whatever type of social exclusion exists, there is the potential for a greater understanding of how it works, including the political and social mechanisms at play.

What are the common denominators of social exclusion? How can we better understand the interconnection between social exclusion and citizenship in democratic

welfare states? One approach to understanding social exclusion is to refer to social exclusion instead of poverty (see Byrne, 2005), but this type of definition seems more like rebranding poverty as a euphemism than bringing in something new. A more tangible approach, which brings in something new, is to connect exclusion to that which it is excluding individuals from, namely the interconnected roles of the social and political order at large, as well as the congruent sense of non-belonging that follows from exclusion. This can entail poverty, but the point of departure is the mechanism causing the disintegration of the social and political order and exclusion from it, as currently configured. With a focus on the dynamics of disintegration, social exclusion can be a common denominator for a wide range of observable phenomena (see Byrne, 2005).

In this book, we have applied a concept that is better equipped at understanding not only social exclusion but also the extent to which it is a threat to a particular social and political order. Such a concept may also be able to explain what is implied by social exclusion when the role of citizenship enters the equation, including when the citizen, by virtue of citizenship, is being pushed towards the fringes of society. Citizens can be pushed or even relegated to the periphery of society, where the benefits of being a member of society incrementally decrease, opportunities are gradually revoked and simply living life becomes difficult. For a nation-state set to ensure the welfare of its citizens, such a scenario is contrary to its very purpose.

In this concluding chapter, we aim to further develop the relationships between citizenship and social exclusion. We draw on four ideal types of approaches to citizenship to make sense of the different forms of social exclusion: instrumentalism, communitarianism, civic-republicanism and cosmopolitan citizenship. These ideal types are thoroughly discussed in Chapter 2, and here, we recapture their major aspects, with the aim of developing a typology of social exclusion. These types can be applied to empirical studies and developed further in future research.

Now, with regard to these ideal types, empirically, they are very often all at play within nation-state contexts. However, using the types as a conceptual grid for analytical purposes, based on different modes of rationality of democratic self-government, will enable us to elaborate on the different types of social exclusion that are operative, to what degree they are operative and what effects they may have. We seek to enable scholars to provide new insights into the conceptual interconnections between citizenship, social exclusion and the democratic welfare state.

In this respect, landing on four traditional ideal types may seem reductive, but the purpose of this approach is to show there is a need to better understand the concepts we already have, rather than seeking out new ones. Although there could be an even broader differentiation than our four ideal types of citizenship, we can assume they capture key principled differences in how a political order is established and functions. All of the ideal types have different underlying principles of membership roles of the citizenship and relate to national identity in different ways. Most importantly, they draw on widely different concepts of legitimate political action and social exclusion, which opens many paths to reducing the threat of social exclusion. In this way, we must also extrapolate these ideal types from different types of normative orders.

All these types of citizenship must be guaranteed materially, on a constitutional level, because the sovereign nation-state stands as the only entity that can enforce the rights and duties prescribed by citizenship. Thus, citizenship can imply different things depending on what type of nation-state one lives in and is contingent on the historical-political development of the normative composition of belonging to the membership. When we empirically investigate how a nation-state's citizenship deals with social exclusion, it is pointless to think that one will find only one of the ideal types. One will always find a combination of the four.

Instrumental citizenship is stripped down in the sense that it is developed for the sole purpose of effective problem-solving and coordination. The legitimacy of the instrumental type of citizenship, in terms of welfare, is based on how effectively it enforces services. Because social exclusion can be deemed a threat to any social order, instrumental citizenship deals with exclusion in the most cost-efficient manner conceivable.

The Aristotelian version of communitarianism is an approach that establishes the nation as a pre-political entity (not necessarily in any factual sense) and that lays out the premise of belonging and identity. The idea of contextual belonging as a prerequisite for citizenship also denotes who the welfare state is supposed to serve, as well as the type of ethic the community at large possesses. According to this communitarian version, the threat of social exclusion is addressed by ensuring that individual citizens threatened with social exclusion are provided with education and opportunities according to the same moral compulsion as others within the community.

Within a communitarian understanding, only individuals who share pre-political bonds, based on blood or ancestry affiliated with a cultural community, can become or remain as citizens, where the state is not neutral with regard to social integration. Communitarianism thereby has an in-built foundationalist ethos, referring to what can be deemed metaphysical principles or complying with majority paternalism. The criteria one chooses for who can become members define the community and with whom one will act in solidarity. Social exclusion can be both about purifying the community from what is conceived of as disintegrating factors such as pluralism and also developing how the community works.

The civic republican approach is a product of the French Revolution. It altered the sense of belonging expected within the political order forever, as it made the nation into a political identity with a corresponding sense of belonging that could be designed and wielded as part of strategic political development for citizens of a democratic polity. The main difference with Aristotelian communitarianism is that the modern version is an ascribed national identity that can be defined in universal terms, as opposed to a contextual polity developed through belonging to contextual norms.

By being able to politically ascribe citizenship to a citizen's sense of belonging within the parameters of the nation-state, national membership in the democratic polity is also acquired. By defining citizenship through politics within the nation-state, the contextual norms are replaced by a purely politically ascribed membership right. Citizens within a democratic polity receive their membership as part of a formally established community, not through descent. Thus, communities will comprise variations of many different sub-identities that are ascribed to the

political community in question. However, within the civic republican approach, the building blocks of citizenship can vary greatly across time because this approach is supposed to be more attuned to the variations caused by the democratic rule of law. Consequently, what is defined as social exclusion and how to deal with it will vary across time and according to majority rule.

In the cosmopolitan type, the normative foundation is universal and typically associated with the demand to enforce a human rights standard through human rights norms. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights is often cited as the origin document of human rights, but we also can add the series of international human rights conventions that have come about in its aftermath. A conventional approach to cosmopolitan citizenship is that it is a constitutionally settled guarantee for safeguarding each citizen's dignity as a matter of right (Habermas, 2010). Consequently, human rights conventions are, in various ways, approached as a way to secure each individual citizen's dignity. In this sense, human rights consist of rights norms that advocate the protection, emancipation or empowerment of each citizen equally.

Thus, cosmopolitan citizenship must be embedded in the rule of law as constitutional restraints with respect to other types of regulation. Rights would become meaningless if they could easily be set aside by interim majority rule, by single politicians or in any other arbitrary manner. Individual human rights must be accompanied by a duty to uphold rights claims whenever they are raised. This duty is universally distributed without discrimination so that each individual's dignity is equally protected. Social exclusion thereby becomes an infringement on the protection of individual dignity. If any individual fails to achieve what they could reasonably lay claim to as compared to others with the same access, the infringement is a type of social exclusion relative to that person. In this manner, social exclusion becomes a violation of each individual's dignity.

How citizenship is shaped through democratic law-making while simultaneously abiding by the constitutionality of basic rights, democracy and popular sovereignty guides the affirmation and reaffirmation of the citizenship design. Citizenship thereby combines the two main building blocks of law-making not as a "closed chapter in the history of ideas" but, rather, as a vital tool with which to secure and sustain order (Habermas, 1996). As long as constitutional rights norms are operative and guide popular sovereignty, law-making can be argued to be ultimately self-imposed and carry a claim of being legitimate. Popular sovereignty becomes embedded in the formal regulation of the citizenship construct and a part of democratic self-government. In this way, basic constitutional rights norms lay the ground for what can and cannot be done to any individual, as well as securing each person's dignity. The constitutional protections that rights provide can thus be said to provide democratic law-making with a claim to legitimacy.

Conclusion – democratic design with constitutional restraints

The modern concept of citizenship was developed in the context of the modern nation-state, with industrialisation, the political regulation of capitalism, the expansion of democratic rights and developed welfare systems. In short, the nation-state itself has not existed in its current form for that long, and it has become the

strongest tool with which to ensure collective problem-solving and coordination, as well as keeping the social order integrated. The vast scholarly literature on citizenship that has developed has partly incorporated the enormous complexity of modern constitutional democratic welfare states, and there is a current debate about the reconstruction of the concept (Clarke, 2022). A crucial question is whether contemporary models of citizenship capture the new, complex and dynamic challenges to the democratic welfare state or if they, rather, blur this discussion and make the phenomena of citizenship meaningless.

In this concluding chapter, we have shown how a concept of citizenship can create new insights into how we collectively coordinate and address social challenges through the democratic welfare state. By focusing on social exclusion, we argue that the concept of citizenship is particularly relevant within a democratic welfare state context. The threat of social exclusion constitutes a source of tension against which democratic welfare states must always be vigilant if they are to abide by the basic doctrine of redressing unjust social exclusion and securing the welfare of all equally.

Furthermore, we have shown how the various chapters in this volume reveal the kinds of political and social mechanisms that are at play when citizens are exposed to exclusion. We discussed this in terms of the exclusion filters that are at work when marginalised categories of citizens are excluded from various arenas in society. We have shown how some citizens have challenges in meeting the requirements to obtain social rights, while others struggle to exercise their rights and duties in practice as full members of society. We have also shown how some citizens are excluded from working life, while others are excluded from family life and from participating in political and social life at large. The main lesson we draw from these empirical studies is that the different forms and arenas of exclusion affect individuals as citizens, particularly their need for economic security and the opportunity to live a decent life. Social exclusion encompasses a series of different situations in which individuals become detached from the social and political order.

Whatever type of social exclusion there is, there is the potential for a greater understanding of how it works and what political and social mechanisms are at play. To elaborate further on this, in this chapter we have suggested how different concepts of citizenship would respond to social exclusion. Based on our discussion in Chapter 2, we have drawn on four ideal types of approaches to citizenship: instrumentalism, communitarianism, civic-republicanism and cosmopolitan citizenship (Held, 1996). In this concluding chapter, we have developed a typology of social exclusion, as shown in Table 13.1.

Table 13.1 Citizenship and social exclusion

Citizenship	Central legitimising norm	Socially excluded
Instrumental	Efficient problem-solving	Non-identified problem
Communitarian	Ethical compliance	Non-belonging
Civic Republican	Democratic participation	Inconsequential participation
Cosmopolitan	Safeguard individual dignity	Individual dignity threatened

The purpose of establishing such a typology is to better capture how different membership types establish different corresponding types of social exclusion, with different solutions following. We can also assume that, provided certain key challenges facing modern welfare states, certain solutions to social exclusion are unrealistic or even illegitimate.

While all these forms of exclusion are often at play within democratic welfare states, we find various combinations from one country to the next. By using this typology for analytical purposes, we can elaborate on the various types of social exclusion that are operative, to what degree they are operative and what effects they may have. In this respect, we seek to enable scholars to provide new insights into the conceptual connections between citizenship, social exclusion and the democratic welfare state.

Furthermore, the typology shows that how a democratic rule of law works has vast implications for whether social exclusion is dealt with. For instance, in parliamentary systems, democracy is accomplished via electing an assembly that, on a basic level, is intended to represent the entire population governed. However, those who govern are representing the winners of the election or the majority within the assembly. Based on the ruling majority's priorities and choices of action, social exclusion of different kinds can receive different degrees of priority. In most cases, the whims and desires of majorities are what separate democracies. If the constitutional rights carried by citizens are respected and enforced, we can still see variation in both priorities and choices from one nation-state to the next. Some nation-states will choose to lean into citizenship that is more communitarian, thus treating social exclusion differently from, for instance, those that lean into cosmopolitanism.

Within a democratic welfare state, any type of social exclusion is a cause for concern, and in most cases, it is the very purpose of the welfare state to resolve. We can assume that the welfare of those excluded is, arguably, in peril due to exclusion. In many ways, the development of the democratic welfare state is motivated by a desire to prevent intolerable social exclusion among citizens and ensure political and social dynamics are in place that assist each citizen who is at the brink of exclusion so that they do not fall out of society (Goodin, 1986). With membership in welfare democracies, where a driving ethos is to ensure the welfare of each citizen, social exclusion becomes a matter for political craftsmanship; citizenship becomes a device that modern law-making can develop so as to regulate the interactions between strangers and redistribution, as well as ensuring a threshold of well-being.

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