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Exploring the relationship between trust and participatory processes: Participation in urban development in Oslo, Madrid and Melbourne

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Abstract
Few government participation initiatives allow real influence on decision making in urban development. Participation mostly remains a method of collecting information with the aim of improving public services. Some research on participatory initiatives in urban development highlights stories of success, but most are accounts of failure. One significant finding in the literature is that unresolved conflicts in urban regeneration programmes compromise the cooperation between grassroots and governance networks, erode citizens' trust in city governments and contribute to disengagement, cynicism and protest. In this paper we measure citizens' trust in local government politicians and civil servants and link it to participation processes in urban development. We investigate how citizens in inner-city districts of Oslo, Melbourne and Madrid participated in urban development processes, how fair they think these processes were and whether development outcomes reflect and respect local community views. Findings from a questionnaire given to local resident organisations in the three cities show that residents trust politicians and civil servants more when they have a sense of efficacy in influencing policy. While digital platforms have widened participatory channels, the findings show that residents combine digital and traditional modes to maximise influence. Results show that engagement in itself raises trust in the government. A very clear finding in all cities is that trust increases when residents believe that public authorities handle urban development correctly and fairly.

Keywords
participatory democracy, local democracy, urban regeneration, gentrification, governance networks, activism, social movements, protest mobilisation

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Introduction

Urban development is often a challenging zone of conflict. To mitigate this, city governments and planning authorities have long been mandated to engage with residents on urban development proposals. In recent years, formal consultative requirements have been integrated with wider moves to implement participatory modes of governance (McCann, 2017). Changes in local neighbourhoods typically motivate residents and local businesses to mobilise politically, particularly when urban development negatively affects them in their everyday lives. Conflict is often sharpest in inner-city districts where development pressures are greatest and densification or gentrification alter urban character and social networks. Mobilisation against the consequences of urban development may take a range of forms: from engagement with city governments through formal participatory or consultation mechanisms to direct political action.

A neoliberal turn in urban governance has been observed globally in cities. Variations are influenced by the local settings of state, economy and society. Pierre (2011) theorises that cities can be located on a spectrum of political interests, spanning from a focus on attracting private business investment to giving primary concern to social justice and securing residents' interests. The three cities chosen for this research cover different points on this spectrum. Melbourne's developer-led pattern of infrastructure and housing development, combined with high levels of immigration, has fuelled rapid growth in recent decades and given rise to vigorous protests by residents over urban development issues (Buxton et al., 2016). Madrid's tourist economy has significantly impacted the inner-city housing market in recent years, with residents gaining direct participation in urban planning after a coalition of associations took power in 2015 (Ruano et al., 2019). Oslo's urban entrepreneurship is moderated by the relatively larger role of government in the Nordic states in terms of welfare support and citizen engagement (Reichborn-Kjennerud & Ophaug, 2018).

We chose the three cities, from a most different cases perspective, because they are located at different points on the spectrum that Pierre describes. Melbourne is the city most influenced by neoliberalism. From the 1990s onwards, decision makers rapidly privatised public services and sold public assets, resulting in a reduction of some welfare services and increasing developer influence in urban projects. Urban development in Oslo is also neoliberal, but welfare levels remain the same, whereas Madrid, with lower welfare levels than the two other cities, remains more collective and family orientated. The shift from managerial to entrepreneurial modes of urban governance in the 1970s has been an important part of this dynamic, sometimes sitting awkwardly with the participatory turn noted above.

Since the 1980s, each of these cities has taken an active role in attracting businesses through policy interventions. Lees et al. (2016) argue that the public sector, in the free-market city, is actively responsible for facilitating gentrification, triggered directly through construction and property development (most notably in Melbourne) or indirectly through business-friendly strategies and planning regimes. State and municipal governments often institutionalise collaborations with business, lifting them outside the realm of democracy. Some important policies and questions are then discussed and decided elsewhere (Mayer, 2006). Major development projects organised through public-private partnerships or other arrangements that sit outside of democratic control are not always open to resident influence through participatory democracy.

Simultaneously, in recent years, the city governments of Oslo, Madrid and Melbourne have experimented with new ways to engage citizens in participatory urban governance. In particular, the advent of digital information and communication technologies (ICTs), such as web-based portals, apps and social media, has widened the consultative repertoire of city

governments. Our research engages with political trust and its relationship to the increasing use of digital platforms in participatory democracy, especially pertaining to urban development. There has been little research on this topic.

Trust is conceptualised in two ways in the relevant literature: trust as a sociological construct, exemplified by Putnam's (1995) focus on social capital, networks, norms and reciprocity, and trust as a political construct, exemplified by Hetherington and Husser's (2012) focus on whether governments or organisations keep agreements and promises. There is some overlap between these categories, but for the purpose of this article, the latter definition is operative. Participation and trust are mutually interdependent (Sztompka, 1999). In this study, we therefore investigate how the dynamics of urban development impact residents' trust in institutions (Corbett & Le Dantec, 2018; Kwok et al, 2018).

The article proceeds as follows: The following section describes the three cities that are the focus of this study, discussing their governance and planning systems, and the processes through which they engage with city residents. Next, we outline the theoretical underpinnings of the article, particularly the rationale for a comparative study. This is followed by a discussion of the study's methodology: primarily the use of survey questionnaires. Data from these questionnaires were analysed using factor and correlation analyses. We found that residents trust politicians and civil servants more when they actively engage and when they think they have influenced policy and believe the process is fair and correct. We also found that residents combine digital and traditional modes to maximise their influence over the process and outcome. Finally, we discuss and conclude that trust in institutions is fundamental if residents are to accept urban development as a reality of dynamic urban systems. If not, they will try to use the democratic system, and perhaps extra-democratic processes, to change the institutional order.

Governance and participation in the three cities

While the three cities in our study are located in countries with representative democratic political systems, contrasting legal and administrative traditions and practices have created distinctive patterns of urban governance. This is seen in the scope and structure of the local jurisdictions as well as in processes for citizen participation in governance. Melbourne is highly segmented, with 31 local government authorities, contrasting with Madrid and Oslo's metropolitan-scale local government. The local jurisdictions in Melbourne are relatively constrained in fiscal power and service provision, in contrast with the two other cities. On the other hand, Melbourne's style of representative democracy, with large electorates and relatively few elected officials, contrasts with Madrid's direct and participatory aspects and with the neighbourhood-level representative structures of both Madrid and Oslo. Notably, the Victorian state government, where Melbourne is located as the capital, is responsible for large urban development projects. Urban development is increasingly developer-led or organised through public-private partnerships, consistent with Victoria's early and aggressive adoption of neoliberalism (Costar & Economou, 1999). These features introduce planning conflicts between jurisdictions and transfer the political risks of poor development outcomes to local governments. Many of Melbourne's local government authorities have developed web-based citizen-engagement portals, supplementing conventional face-to-face forms of consultation and engagement. Commercial practitioners increasingly conduct these engagement processes on behalf of public institutions (Christensen, 2019). While the directive for engagement comes from the Local Government Act (Christensen, 2018), the topics are typically determined by the local authority rather than through dialogue with

citizens. Some Melbourne local authorities have experimented with participatory budgeting (Christensen & Grant, 2016). More typically, though, they comply with a basic mandate to "exhibit" or publicise annual budgets, which have been formulated by administrators.

Madrid is divided into 21 districts, which are further subdivided into 128 neighbourhoods. Each district has elected representatives forming the District Municipal Board. This board makes and implements decisions on issues affecting the district and also makes proposals to the Madrid City Council. Additionally, some residents from districts are appointed by the municipal political groups as representatives, matching the political groups' representatives. Citizen participation takes place through the Sectorial Councils, the Director Council of the City and the Local Forums. The Sectorial Councils are consultative bodies in particular policy areas, and the Director Council is a forum for strategic urban development. In 2017, Madrid's new city government introduced the Local Forums, in addition to the traditional neighbourhood associations in each of the districts, to allow all citizens from age 16 (citizens gain voting rights at 18 years of age) to propose initiatives to the plenary of the District Municipal board.

Madrid was hit hard by the financial crisis between 2008 and 2013. Its urban centre has since been gentrifying, and the local economy depends on mass tourism. Commerce and tourism represent 32 percent of the city's GDP. These developments have transformed traditional life and the urban form and have negatively impacted housing affordability. The conservative government that had been in power for 25 years prior to 2015 was unresponsive to citizen participation. Neighbourhood associations involved in participation were often affiliated with political parties. The economic crisis, in conjunction with this political corruption, led to the emergence of new social movements and political parties. Ahora Madrid, an alliance of diverse associations and social movements, formed a coalition with the new political party Podemos and the Socialist Party to win government in Madrid's 2015 municipal elections. A similar case occurred in Barcelona with the Ganemos Barcelona (Let's Win Barcelona) platform, headed by the anti-eviction leader and current city mayor Ada Colau. Ahora Madrid, the new coalition governing Madrid from 2015 to 2019, introduced radical participatory systems that represented a fundamental break with previous participatory arrangements.

One of Ahora Madrid's initiatives was the web platform Decide Madrid. Citizens could debate various urban development issues and also make proposals on this platform. If the proposals were supported by 1% of the population over 16 years of age registered in the city (over 27,000 people), the proposals could be voted on. The Municipal Council itself could also submit proposals. The platform supported participatory budgeting. €100 million per year was spent over the last three years (€70 million in 2016), of which 70% went to the districts and 30% to city-wide projects. The distribution of funds between the 21 districts was directly proportional to the number of inhabitants and inversely proportional to per capita income. Decisions made through the digital platform were binding for the city government.

Oslo has 15 districts, each with an elected district council. These districts are subdivided into 98 neighbourhoods. There are approximately 5 to 9 neighbourhoods in each district. District meetings begin with an "open half hour", where residents may come and ask questions. In addition, municipalities are mandated by law to have advisory groups for seniors, youths and people with disabilities (Reichborn-Kjennerud & Ophaug, 2018). Oslo citizens can present petitions to the Municipal Council if they collect 300 signatures. A digital platform called *Min Sak* is used for this process. Oslo has digital solutions for direct feedback on municipal service delivery but no digital participatory platform. Citizens representing interest organisations are formally entitled to present their views in various ways, such as at an open meeting, to a city council committee or a written submission. Oslo's planning regime

is primarily neoliberal but has participatory provisions in planning and building legislation, and in legislative acts governing counties and municipalities. An area-based initiative in one of Oslo's deprived central areas, included in this study, makes formal provision for residents to participate in the area's development.

Theorising participatory democracy and trust

There are many hypotheses, but insufficient research, on the relationship between trust and participation, notwithstanding that participation and trust are mutually interdependent according to Sztompka (1999). This paper contributes to filling this gap, building on classic and contemporary literature on trust and governance in urban development. A long-standing theme in the literature is that trust in authorities is declining while political participation, through channels other than voting, seems to be increasing (Levi & Stoker, 2000). This could be cause for alarm, but at the same time, some rational distrust is necessary for political accountability in a participatory democracy (Levi & Stoker, 2000). Distrust is not the opposite of trust but rather an attitude in which the assumptions of trust are continuously tested and scrutinised (Corbett & Le Dantec, 2018).

Governance networks beyond the state could be seen either as an opportunity for democracy or a risk to it (Swyngedouw, 2005). While the former celebrates the potential of urban governance to include marginalised residents through new mechanisms of direct democracy, the latter warns of the lack of representativeness, transparency and accountability of these networks. Much hinges on the way participation is practiced: from methods of deep engagement in order to access community perspectives (Glackin & Dionisio, 2016) to deliberative practices that assume implicit trust in planning systems despite evidence of its erosion under New Public Management control systems (Puustinen et al., 2017).

Several studies of citizen participation in local governance point to the difficulty of getting people to participate. Often, the most powerful stakeholders or "the usual suspects" dominate, and input from participatory processes seldom seems to have a strong and direct impact on political decision-making (Michels & de Graaf, 2010). However, some research has demonstrated that certain groups of residents can have substantial influence by using specific types of co-creation methods in collaboration with the local government (Stapper & Duyvendak, 2020).

Following the 2008 financial crisis, innovative ways of participating have been increasing worldwide. New social movements, using new methods to influence policy, play a key role in pressuring for local government. A large literature exists on protest mobilisation, examining its successes and failures (Bosi et al., 2016). Unresolved conflicts, though, often lead to frustration and lack of trust if participation fails to fulfil its initial promises. In the neoliberal planning system, a post-ideological politics of consensus renders the political merely administrative. The system does not acknowledge conflict as such, which may lead to protest action (Kwok et al., 2018). One important way that has been shown to secure residents' interests, in a post-political regime, is through building social capital and boosting residents' efficacy in safeguarding their own interests (Shand, 2018).

Why is trust in government important? Trust is contagious. Sztompka (1999) argues that if there is systemic trust in the social order then there is most probably trust in specific economic, political, judicial and educational arrangements, and also in specific positions, such as judges, and in specific people. Trust in higher-level objects amplifies trust at lower levels. The opposite is true in the case of distrust: it expands upwards from more concrete levels towards more general ones. One person's good behaviour can also increase trust in insti-

tutions (Sztompka, 1999). When government is perceived as trustworthy, citizens are more likely to comply with its demands (Levi & Stoker, 2000), evident in the varying compliance of national populations with COVID-19 restrictions.

According to recent surveys, levels of political and social trust as well as social capital have been declining over time in a number of advanced industrial democracies. Political scandals, worsening social problems and unresponsiveness reduce trust in politicians, whereas successful public policy and institutional reforms have been found to increase it (Levi & Stoker, 2000). At the level of government institutions, fairness, transparency in policy making and openness to competing views build trust. These findings evidence system-specific dissatisfaction rather than concerns with the performance of individual politicians (Levi & Stoker, 2000). Activism, for example, is often a response to loss of trust in government caused by specific events (Tarrow, 1999).

Recent research also indicates that residents trust government actors when they perceive that they benefit from a specific policy (Nunkoo & Ramkissoon, 2012). Benefits from urban development come as a result of decisions made by politicians and urban elites. Offe (1999) distinguishes between two dichotomies of trust: mass/elite and horizontal/vertical, which establish four realms in which trust relations can unfold. In this analysis we will look primarily at the second realm: the trust the masses have in political or sectoral elites.

Jennings et al. (1998) find that residents have greater confidence in government at local level than at national level. The ordinary relationships that citizens have with political authorities are most likely to be local in focus, with local issues influencing judgements about their particular authorities. The tasks of local governments are also easier to perform and to evaluate (Levi & Stoker, 2000). This analysis underpins our study's focus on the role of local authorities in urban development and how it directly affects residents' lives. We distinguish between different targets of trust: local politicians and civil servants. At the same time, we also focus on a specific policy area (urban development) to analyse the dynamics of trust.

Putnam (1995) argues that there is a relationship between a trustworthy government and the interpersonal and social trust among strangers that is the focus of the social capital literature. It is, nevertheless, an empirical question as to whether social trust is a necessary condition for democracy or the other way around (Levi & Stoker, 2000). It has been shown that the more trusting individuals are, the more they are inclined to participate in planning processes because they believe in the system. Lower trust, on the other hand, can lead to greater public participation through mobilisation due to frustration, pessimism or outrage (Kwok et al., 2018).

A range of contingent historical and political factors, beyond the processes of local democracy, influence trust in local politicians and civil servants. Each of our cities and their respective countries have a distinctive history. Spain is a relatively new democracy and has experienced a range of corruption scandals that have reduced citizens' trust in politicians in general. Australia is positioned between Spain and Norway on a range of indices measuring trust in electoral systems and politicians, with Australia sitting slightly below the global average of 48 percent for trust across the three tiers of government (Dell et al., 2019; PEW Research, 2017). Australian commentators observe a "democratic recession" since the late 1990s, with a particular decline over the past decade, which has been marked by frequent change of leaders by major parties at a national government level (Cameron & McAllister, 2019; Stoker et al., 2018). Norway is ranked seventh on Transparency International's corruption index for 2020. It can thus be considered a high trust country if a measure of corruption is seen as a proxy measure of trust.

Institutions stand for and represent certain values. Failure to live up to these values can

destroy trust (Corbett & Le Dantec, 2018). In our research, we strive to gauge whether citizens deem politicians and civil servants trustworthy in overseeing urban development. We are therefore studying citizens' understanding of trust by linking it, through survey questions, to the macrodefinitions of what trustworthiness means. According to Corbett & Le Dantec (2018), trust-generating values represented by institutions include truth-telling, fairness, promise-keeping and solidarity. More simply, Hetherington and Husser (2012) speak of political trust as the ratio of people's evaluation of government performance relative to their normative expectations of how government ought to perform. This definition sees trust as a function of changes in perceived performance on important problems and is in line with what we try to uncover in this study.

Methods

Comparative data on participation in urban development is scarce. Most comparative studies are single-country surveys, which are not always or fully comparable (Levi & Stoker, 2000). This article addresses this research gap by using the same questionnaire to compare three cities that differ in their governance and participatory systems. The data allow for analysis of the ways in which participation and the different urban development processes in the three cities influence trust in local politicians and the public administration.

Savitch and Kantor (2004) observe that exploring "variation" across cases is an effective site of conceptualisation. At the same time, research on interconnections amongst cities, or with shared features across different urban contexts, is limited. According to Robinson (2016), finding shared processes (which in our case would be governance and participatory systems) or outcomes forms a good basis for comparison. Difference is good for creative thinking about the determination of the given phenomenon of study.

The data for this study were obtained through an online questionnaire replicated across the three cities. The questionnaire was co-developed by the present paper's authors as part of the "Democratic Urban Development in the Digital Age" (DEMUDIG) project, which is funded by the Norwegian Research Council. The questionnaire was distributed to residents, organised interests, civil servants and elected officials in the central districts of the three cities in the first half of 2020.

It is known that people tend to engage more in participatory processes when their local area is affected (Levi & Stoker, 2000). Therefore, we specifically asked about issues that residents had been engaged in within their local community. Our hypothesis was that their perceptions and experiences of participatory processes were indicators of trust in decision makers. The dependent variables in the analysis are, therefore, the extent to which residents trust local politicians and the extent to which they trust public administrators. We used questions on trust from the European Social Survey. The questionnaire also contained open-ended questions, enabling us to collect both qualitative and quantitative data. The project primarily targeted organised interests, understood broadly to include diverse civil-society groups, such as sporting organisations and management boards of social housing blocks.

In Oslo, the questionnaire was distributed online to 322 residents using Questback software. 188 respondents answered, giving a response rate of 61 percent. The respondents were recruited through contacting NGOs, neighbourhood organisations, parents' representatives in the schools and prior contacts from qualitative interviews conducted for the project. Oslo-based researchers participated in events relevant for local urban development, where we approached attendees. We also posted in local groups on Facebook for each district and on the districts' own Facebook pages.

In Madrid, researchers used the online program LimeSurvey. A link to the questionnaire was distributed to representatives of neighourhood associations. It was opened by a total of 388 residents, 276 of whom answered a significant amount of questions (more than five). We then delimited our sample to respondents claiming to have a connection with the central districts of Madrid (understood as districts inside the M-30 ring road), leaving a total of 219 respondents.

In Melbourne, researchers used Qualtrics online survey software and targeted residents and organised interests in seven inner-city Melbourne councils, resulting in 100 completed responses. Several recruitment methods were used. Recruitment to the questionnaire was done through email contact, with email addresses gathered by first searching for publicly available ones (n=210) and then by snowballing through known contacts. A DEMUDIG Facebook page was created, on which paid geographically targeted posts promoted the questionnaire over a three-month period. This method emulated similar recruitment campaigns through social media. Other recruitment methods included sending LinkedIn messages to a database of contacts (n=150), advertisement on university/research centre websites and media pages and an advertisement in a media article written for the online journal *The Conversation Australia*. Of all the recruitment methods used, snowballing was the most effective. Melbourne-based researchers also employed digital ethnography to follow and analyse the local councils' social media webpages (such as Facebook and Twitter). The Melbourne researchers' use of the snowballing method means the total number of people or organisations that were reached is not known; therefore, a response rate cannot be determined.

We used several data-analysis techniques. First, we ran quantitative bi-variate analyses, such as frequencies, cross-tables, and comparison of means. Then, we did a standard factor analysis, limited to the merged Oslo-Madrid data. Data collection in Oslo was completed before the onset of the COVID-19 pandemic. Anti-pandemic measures limited contact with residents to online methods only in Madrid and Melbourne. This may have affected the comparability across cities, particularly in the case of Melbourne. Therefore, we did not include the Melbourne data in the factor analysis.

We used oblimin and varimax rotations to reduce the number of independent variables. All independent variables were used as input except the background variables. Only four of these six factors, in their turn, correlated significantly with the variables "trust in local politicians" and "trust in the public administration". Those four factors are described in more detail below.

After the factor analysis, we ran a correlation analysis where we included all the independent variables to see how they affected the dependent variables "trust in politicians" and "trust in the public administration". We also ran a separate correlation analysis for each city to compare their results. In addition, we tried some linear regressions, but the model fit turned out to be poor as the linearity assumption did not seem to hold. To improve the quality of the data – because the sample size was small and to prevent outliers from distorting the results – the 1 to 5 scale variables (i.e., completely disagree, disagree, neither disagree nor agree, agree and completely agree) were recoded as 1 to 3 (disagree, neither disagree nor agree and agree). We also deleted marginal extreme answers in the variable measuring whether respondents identify to the left or to the right of the political spectrum.

In addition to analysing the quantifiable data, we systematised the open-answer categories to get a grip of what "trust" meant to the respondents in the three cities. These data have been used to deepen the understanding of the quantitative analysis.

Analysis

First, we performed a factor analysis. Four factors correlated significantly with the trust variables. These were factor 5: "Use of conventional channels"; factor 7: "Use of digital channels"; factor 9: "Social perception"; and factor 14: "Individual pressure". The factors and the variables they consist of are described below.

We then performed a correlation analysis. The analysis included the four factors identified above as well as the independent variables that correlated significantly with the trust variables. In addition to the four factors, we included indexes of the means of the variables included in the four factors. These are termed "means" in the correlation analysis.

Factor 1: "Use of conventional channels"

It is typical for people who can be described by this dimension to use a combination of the municipality's own participatory channels and direct contact with politicians. They also perceive themselves to be able to influence urban development processes by using these methods.

The variables included are: Q13.1, Q13.2, Q24.1 and Q24.2.

Table 1: Component matrix

Question	Component
Q13.1 In what way did you engage? I used the municipality's participatory channels	0,640
Q13.2 In what way did you engage? I contacted politicians	0,734
Q24.1 To what extent have you been able to influence the city development process through the municipality's participatory channels?	0,682
Q24.2 To what extent have you been able to influence the city development process through influencing the politicians and the administration in the municipality directly?	0,828

KMO 0,557
Sig 0,000
Explained variance 52,533%

Factor 2: "Use of digital channels"

People in this category typically use social media pages, such as Facebook, Twitter or other types of online platforms. It is also normal for them to think that they have influenced the urban/local community development by using their own platforms, such as webpages, blogs and social media, in addition to the "conventional channels" detailed above.

The variables included are: Q13.8, Q17.3, Q24.3 and Q24.4.

Table 2 Component matrix

Question	Component
Q13.8 In what way did you engage? I used social media pages such as Facebook, Twitter or other types of campaigns online	0,711
Q17.3 I think I have influenced the urban/local community development through my own platforms such as webpages, blogs and social media	0,824
Q24.3 To what extent have you been able to influence the city development process through your own channels such as blogs and social media?	0,903
Q24.4 To what extent have you been able to influence the city development process through a combination of the above alternatives?	0,806

KMO: 0,765
Sig: 0,0
Explained variance: 66,23%

Factor 3: "Success perception"

Respondents described by this dimension consider themselves to have influenced the urban/local community development in their area by using the municipality's own participatory channels, through their own platforms, such as webpages, blogs and social media, and by influencing politicians and civil servants directly.

The variables included are: Q17.1, Q17.2, Q17.3, Q17.4, Q24.2, Q24.3 and Q24.4.

Table 3 Component matrix

Question	Component
Q17.1 I think I have influenced the urban/local community development in my area	0,844
Q17.2 I think I have influenced the urban/local community development in my area through the municipality's own participatory channels	0,696
Q17.3 I think I have influenced the urban/local community development through my own platforms such as webpages, blogs and social media	0,789
Q17.4 I think I have influenced the urban/local community development through influencing politicians and civil servants directly	0,840
Q24.2 To what extent have you been able to influence the city development process through influencing the politicians and the administration in the municipality directly?	0,699
Q24.3 To what extent have you been able to influence the city development process through your own channels such as blogs and social media?	0,725
Q24.4 To what extent have you been able to influence the city development process through a combination of the above alternatives?	0,816

KMO: 0,820
Sig. 0,000
Explained variance: 60,016%

Factor 4: "Individual pressure"

Respondents described by this dimension contacted politicians, contacted traditional media outlets, such as TV, radio and newspapers, and also influenced the urban/local community development through their own platforms, such as webpages, blogs and social media, and through direct contact with politicians and civil servants. They used digital communication other than the municipality's platforms, finding this to be an effective way of bringing attention to the city's and districts' problems. They also found that they had been able to influence urban development by using a combination of methods from municipal channels, talking to politicians and civil servants directly and by using their own channels, such as blogs and social media.

The variables included are: Q13.2, Q13.4, Q17.3, Q17.4, Q20.1 and Q24.4.

Table 4 Component matrix

Question	Component
Q13.2 In what way did you engage? I contacted politicians	0,664
Q13.4 In what way did you engage? I contacted traditional media outlets such as TV, radio and newspapers	0,695
Q17.3 I think I have influenced the urban/local community development through my own platforms such as webpages, blogs and social media	0,776
Q17.4 I think I have influenced the urban/local community development through influencing politicians and civil servants directly	0,782
Q20.1 I use digital communication other than the municipality's platforms to influence the city/local community development because it's an effective way to get attention about city/district problems	0,635
Q24.4 To what extent have you been able to influence the city development process through a combination of the above alternatives?	0,711

KMO: 0,768
Sig: 0,000
Explained variance: 50,762%

In the correlation analysis below, we show how strongly the factors, indexes and independent variables correlate with the dependent variables "Trust in local politicians" and "Trust in the public adminstration".

Table 5 Strength of the correlation.

Range	Strength
0,2-0,3	Low correlation
0,3-0,4	Medium correlation
>0,4	High correlation

Table 6 Significant correlation with the trust variables (all cities).

Trust in politicians	Trust in the public administration
Success Perception Factor	
Success Perception Mean	
I organized or participated in protest action*	
I organized and sent petitions*	
I think I have influenced the urban/local community development through influencing politicians and civil servants directly	
I think the public authorities handle urban/local development correctly and fairly	I think the public authorities handle urban/local development correctly and fairly
Traditional news media are not interested in city/district problems*	
I feel that I will not be able to communicate my views*	
I feel that it is futile to participate as the council/municipal organisations will not listen to my views*	I feel that it is futile to participate as the council/municipal organisations will not listen to my views*
In my community people are not very friendly*	

**Inverse relation with the dependent variable*

Table 7 Significant correlation with the trust variables (individual cities)

Question/factor/index	Politicians	Oslo	Madrid	Melbourne
Conventional channels factor			Trust more	
Digital channels factor/mean		Trust more		
Success perception factor/mean		Trust more	Trust more	
Women			Trust more	
People voting to the right		Trust less	Trust more	
Organized/participated in protest action			Trust less	
Think they have influenced the urban development in their area			Trust more	
Think they have influenced the local community development through their own platforms (blogs and social media etc)		Trust more		
Think the public authorities handle urban development correctly and fairly			Trust more	
Use social media pages such as Facebook, Twitter or other types of campaigns online				Trust less
Use the municipal digital platform to engage				Trust less
Participate because they think locals know best what benefits their area				Trust less
Found the online participatory platform unnecessarily complex				Trust less
Use digital communication, as a powerful tool, rather than the municipality's platforms to participate				Trust less
	Public adm	**Oslo**	**Madrid**	**Melbourne**
Women			Trust more	
Success perception factor/mean			Trust more	
Individual pressure mean			Trust more	
People voting to the right			Trust more	
Organized/participated in protest action			Trust less	
Think they have influenced politicians and civil servants directly		Trust more		
Use digital communication other than the municipality's own platforms to influence because it is less time consuming		Trust more		
Think the public authorities handle urban development correctly and fairly		Trust more		Trust more
Did not participate because it is futile		Trust less		
Engaged through contacting traditional media outlets such as TV, radio and newspapers				Trust less
Participated because locals knows best what benefits their area				Trust less
Participated because changes will effect those that live in the area negatively				Trust less
Participated because they know the system and offered their assistance				Trust less
Have had enough of participatory activities				Trust less
Found the online participatory platform unnecessarily complex				Trust less
Use own digital communication, not the municiaplity's that they deem less effective				Trust less
Use social media to find people to solve problems in their community				Trust less

Based on these findings, we introduce a model that is dynamic, reflecting the influence of time, channels of engagement and network size, rather than the static modelling of citizen participation as in Arnstein's classic formulation (Arnstein, 1969).

Our model incorporates the number of channels residents use to exert influence, how broad their network is and how much time they use. These increase the influence on policy the residents will have.



Figure 1.
Factors strengthening the residents power to influence policy

The transparent arrows moving between the three blue arrows illustrate that the three factors (channels, network and time) strengthen each other mutually. If residents use more time, it is more likely that they use multiple channels and broaden their network. If they use multiple channels, it is also likely that they broaden their network, and if the network is large, it is more likely that they can use more channels effectively. The last two arrows demonstrate that residents who perceive that they have influence and consider the process to have been handled fairly and correctly trust more.

Our factor and correspondence analyses show that residents who considered themselves to have successfully influenced policy trusted politicians more. These residents typically used multiple channels. This is in line with the model in Figure 1, which theorises that the level of resident influence is increased when many different channels are used. The data also indicate that residents who are familiar with the political system have more influence. Having more knowledge can be an indicator that they have a powerful network, as our model suggests. Some of the answers to the open-ended questions also pointed to the value of persistent engagement over time.

Discussion

Trust in planning systems is key for residents to embrace and accept change, which is why we analyse trust in relation to urban development in this article (Puustinen et al., 2017). We targeted residents who were able to answer questions about participation. The sample contained respondents who participated but did not trust the system, respondents who did not participate and lacked trust, and respondents who trusted the system and participated.

Some engaged, then, because they trusted the systems, whereas others participated out of frustration and to defend their neighbourhood (Kwok et al., 2018).

In all three cities, residents who believed that the public authorities handled urban/local development correctly and fairly trusted politicians and civil servants. These findings echo previous research on trust, which has found that public officials need to be transparent in their policy making and open to competing views in order to earn the trust of the citizens (Levi & Stoker, 2000).

The data show that trust correlated with residents' sense of political efficacy in all cities. That is, residents who are confident in their capacity to influence policy and decision-making have higher trust levels. This cohort engages using digital and non-digital formats, including the local authority's web-based portals.

Trust levels in politicians and administrators are somewhat different and locally contingent. The former are trusted more than the latter in Oslo, but the the opposite is true in Madrid, where residents trust political parties and politicians less. Overall, the data point to the significance of competency and confidence in the political engagement of residents. The competent group of respondents can be characterised as political insiders, given their familiarity and engagement with policy and decision-making processes. A second group of residents who responded to the questionnaire can be described as political outsiders. With this group, low trust in politicians and administrators correlates with lack of engagement and participation. This group dislikes engagement through municipalities' digital platforms, with some "outsiders" preferring to organise and solve local problems through social media channels.

However, all residents who participate in some form or other trust politicians and civil servants more than those who do not participate. It seems that a strong engagement in itself correlates with trust, particularly when that engagement is citizen-initiated. Returning to our earlier discussion on forms of trust, what we see here is not simply a matter of high or low political trust but rather a mobilisation of different forms of trust. The insiders' efficacy and competency in political engagement correlates with political trust, but the outsiders' preference for local problem-solving and social networking is more consistent with Putnam's conception of trust as social capital. This seems to be more prominent in Melbourne than in the other cities. One interpretation could be that residents and organised interests who are familiar with the political process and are capable of engaging effectively with it have higher levels of trust. If that is so, it raises the issue of whether digital participation reinforces this sense of political competency. Note that Melbourne's participatory platforms, including web platforms, feature council- or government-initiated rather than citizen-initiated topics open for consultation. Melbourne residents who used the municipal digital platforms to engage trusted the politicians less.

Referring back to the discussion of comparative rationales earlier in the article, is there a headline finding that differences in political and administrative traditions appear to have little impact on trust? One difference between cities that merits analysis is the comparatively lower trust levels among Melbourne respondents compared to Madrid and Oslo. Qualitative data gathered by the questionnaire, along with contextual sources, suggest an explanation for this. Over the past two decades or so, Melbourne has been one of the fastest growing cities in the global north, driven largely by Australia's relatively high rates of migration and policy preference for migrants of family-formation age. Together with substantial inflow of international investment capital into high-rise residential towers, this has led to densification, vertical and horizontal sprawl, and spiralling housing costs, with a particular impact on the inner-urban region. Urban development projects – including residential and infrastructure

such as major roads – have attracted significant and sustained community protest, directed at both local and state governments (Legacy, 2015).

Residents in Melbourne seem to be comparatively less trusting of their politicians and civil servants. The correspondence analysis demonstrates that Melbourne residents who use both social media and municipal digital platforms trust less. They also think that locals know best, preferring to use their own digital communication tools and finding the public online solutions unnecessarily complex. This suggests that they may be disgruntled with the system and/or outcomes (Christensen, 2019). Madrid residents who participated in organised protest action also trust less, equally a sign of distrust in the institutionalised participatory system.

Institutions stand for and represent certain values and can destroy trust if they fail to live up to them (Corbett & Le Dantec, 2018). Based on our findings we suggest a new trust typology, from high to low trust, where Oslo is high on the scale of trusting institutions. In the middle, we find residents who trust less in the institutions, but still use their channels, as well as their own, such as protest action and their own social media, to influence policy. These residents have low trust in the system, but they nevertheless use it. Thus, they trust that the democratic system is accountable and that it "works". In Madrid, organised residents used the existing institutional system to assume power and introduce system innovation, creating a digital platform for direct democracy and new local forums as an alternative to the neighbourhood organisations, who were perceived to be partly corrupted by political parties (Sztompka, 1999). Similarly, Melbourne residents did not trust institutions, but as with Madrid, they still engaged with them in their daily lives. They were willing to engage to support their community, even with low trust levels. Distrust is not the opposite of trust in this case but rather an attitude in which the assumptions of trust are continuously tested and scrutinised, as Corbett & Le Dantec (2018) describe it. In the case of Madrid, distrust led to institutional innovation, which suggests that a certain lack of trust can be positive and actually demonstrates that the democratic system works. On the bottom of the scale we find those who do not trust and do not participate because they do not believe that the system works fairly. These are the outsiders who may represent a challenge for democracy if they channel their frustrations outside rather than inside the democratic system.

This distrust was manifested by residents in various ways in the open-ended questions posed in the questionnaire. Relevant responses were mainly associated with the question at the end of the survey: "Do you have anything to add?" A key issue for residents was the splitting of decisions between the two levels of government responsible for urban development (state and local), which was seen as a point of discord as neither are seen to take full responsibility nor are they given full powers to safeguard the community's interests or values. Power and money are two other factors that residents see as inherent influences over local government that add to their sense of distrust. When community engagement in Melbourne is perceived as an "exercise in spin" or "farce" or "opaque" by residents, it also adds to distrust. This does not, however, mean that residents preclude themselves from participating. As one resident remarked, "[The community engagement process] is very alienating and makes you want to disengage – except it's where you live and how it affects your family that is at stake." This may indicate that, despite its flaws, community engagement may be one way to facilitate dialogue between the local government and residents, and to ultimately build trust.

Similar concerns were expressed in Oslo despite residents having greater trust in politicians and civil servants than in the other two cities. Some distrust in the process is reflected in the residents' concerns about district authorities not having as much power or control over local development as the state agencies. They also raise the same concerns as the Mel-

bourne respondents did about politicians' interest in increasing profits and capital through densification and gentrification versus the needs of the local community.

Residents who were left-leaning trusted politicians more in Oslo, whereas the opposite was true in Madrid. According to Levi & Stoker (2000), similar surveys have shown that responses have strong partisan and incumbent-specific components. For example, Democrats trust Democrat presidents more, which in this case would indicate that we are partly measuring trust in the incumbents themselves and not simply trust in the system. Oslo had a left-wing local government at the time of study, and Madrid had a right-wing government. Distrust can nevertheless also reflect dissatisfaction with positions taken by political parties, i.e., whether or not they offer alternatives that the voters believe will solve the issues they are concerned with. For example, when asked why they didn't participate in community engagement processes, a respondent remarked "[i]t is absurd to imagine that with a peri-fascist municipal government, upward channels of influence are possible." Another respondent pointed out that with the new government, Decide Madrid was no longer working as a participatory tool.

In Madrid, while there were more partisan answers, the distrust also transcended political parties to extend to all politicians and district councillors, suggesting that systemic factors, such as political scandals and the presence of a critical media in Spain, are important (Levi & Stoker, 2000). Respondents echoed similar sentiments to those in Melbourne regarding politicians' self interests and the transient nature of their tenure, which they believe makes them disinterested in long-term positive changes. The wide electorate responsibilities, with district councillors representing multiple districts and lacking local affiliation, was also criticised. In Melbourne, though, being "local" was not enough: some respondents considered that civil servants were simply disinterested in knowing about and acting on the communities' views. Whether the Westminister model of an impartial civil service is a factor in this perceived disinterest, or, conversely, whether that model has receded in favour of new modes of urban governance that operate across and beyond city regions (MacLeod, 2011) is a point that merits further analysis.

Conclusion

Trust is key in securing good urban development outcomes. The participatory methods used and the different forms of deliberation with residents all contribute to building trust in institutions from the bottom up. Done in a competent way, this contributes to conflict avoidance (Hardin & Offe, 1999; Puustinen et al, 2017; Shand, 2018; Stapper & Duyvendak, 2020; Kwok et al., 2018). A clear finding in this study is that residents who trust the system also believe they have been able to influence policy. There is an equally strong correlation between trust and the perception that public authorities handle urban development correctly and fairly. Public institutions would, therefore, benefit from engaging more with residents who distrust the system but still participate and residents who lack trust and do not participate.

The present study contributes to the literature in three ways: The first is the indentification of differences between the cities, which are clearly linked to trust in politicians and civil servants. Residents who trusted least also distrusted municipal participatory channels more. They preferred citizen-initiated channels like their own social media or organised protest action. The second is the contribution to a better understanding of the link between participation and trust. The findings indicate that lower trust levels translate to lower trust in municipal participatory systems, indicating a two-way dynamic between trust and par-

ticipatory systems. The third contribution of this study is our model, based on the findings, which theorises that residents who have a large network and use more channels to influence policy over time tend to have more influence in the process.

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