

CHAPTER 11

DOES THE EUROPEAN UNION INVEST IN IMMIGRANTS?

Steinar Stjernø

The total foreign-born population in the European Union constitutes 21 million persons, and in the last years, more than one million persons are seeking for asylum every year. A large share of immigrants are young people of working age. Such flows of human beings raise both normative, political and economic challenges for the EU. This contribution discusses the idea of social investment in EU immigration policy. First, it describes the number and distribution of immigrants from non-EU countries. Second, the development of the role of the idea of social investment in EU's normative framework is analysed, with a particular focus on immigrants and the integration of immigrants into the labour market. Third, the relationship between declarations and actions is discussed.

The material is EU documents and texts. High-level texts are treaties and documents that have been approved by the European Council and Council of Ministers. Medium level texts are Commission directives, Commission documents following up treaties and Council agreements, whereas low level documents have been formulated below this level, for instances by working groups, EU administrative staff, etc. However, texts do not necessarily tell us anything about social investments in practice. The European Social Fund Project Database makes it possible to compare projects targeted at immigrants with projects targeted at other groups. Finally, data from European Social Surveys are used to comparing attitudes in member countries to economic aspects of immigration.

Historical, social, political and ideological differences between EU member states have made the development of a common immigration and integration policy a long and complicated process. Some countries have received immigrants from former colonies since the 1950s (UK, France); others from the late 1960s or early 1970s (Germany, Sweden); some only a few decades (Southern Europe). Finally, immigration is a rather recent phenomenon in Finland and in Central and Eastern Europe (Eurostat, 2011). Thus, immigration into the member states varies, both in terms of numbers, share of the population and in the composition of the immigrant population.

Today, all EU member states are receiving or transit countries of migration. Immigrants come as legally or illegally labour migrants, asylum-seekers or refugees, as students and for family reunion. Relative to the total population, Luxemburg, Ireland, Sweden, Belgium, Spain, Austria and Slovenia have a high share with more than 14 per cent

non-nationals. In absolute terms, the largest numbers of non-nationals from countries within and outside the EU are found in Germany (7.7 million persons), Spain (5.1 million), the UK (4.9 million), and Italy (4.1 million). Altogether, the numbers in these countries constituted 71 per cent of the total number of non-nationals in the EU. In most EU countries, the majority of non-nationals are citizens of non-member states.

TABLE 1 APPROXIMATELY HERE

In 2014, EU countries received almost 627 000 asylum seekers from non-EU countries and in 2015 the number increased to 1.3 million. The largest groups were Syrians escaping from the civil war, followed by citizens from Russia, Afghanistan, Serbia, Pakistan, Somalia, Iran, Iraq, and other states ridden by war and/or dictatorship. Handling of asylum applications differs across the EU Member States as laws and rules of asylum and migration policies varies. The highest numbers of positive asylum decisions were recorded in Germany, Sweden, France, Italy, and the UK (Eurostat, 2014). Generally, immigrants are younger and more educated than the resident population. Adding to these differences, member states have met immigration with different political ideologies, ambitions of integration, economic and social interests, laws and regulations. This constitutes the context of EU immigration and integration policy.

These flows of immigrants constitute humanitarian, social and economic challenges to both societies and governments of member states as well as to the political institutions of the EU. At the same time, it represents an influx of potential labour in nations with an aging and stagnating population. The issue here is not the social and cultural challenges, but to discuss to which extent investing in immigrants is part of EU policy.

Immigration policy consists of two main elements – control policy and integration policy. Control policy consists of rules and procedures governing the selection and admission of foreigners. Integration policy is about facilitating access to housing, the educational system and labour market – eventually making immigrants share cultural values with the inhabitants of the receiving country as well. The first three decades after the *Treaty of Rome* in 1957 was a period of non-existent EU policy in both control and integration policy. In accordance with the subsidiarity principle, immigration policy was for a long time the exclusive domain of national governments. Member states continued to have exclusive regulatory power in this area until the 1990s, and EU institutions were mainly concerned with removing obstacles for

the free movement of labourers within the EU-area. Only in the last couple of decades have immigration policy, border control, and integration of immigrants become a responsibility for EU institutions as well.

SOCIAL INVESTMENT AND THE NORMATIVE FRAMEWORK OF THE EU

The distinguishing feature of the social investment perspective (Hemerijck, 2014) is that social policy can have a productive function. The *Treaty of Rome* referred briefly to two ideas that some decades later became part of the concept of social investment - *productive re-employment* and the importance of *vocational training* (Article 125). Besides, it established a *European Social Fund* in order to improve employment. The Single European Act in 1986 established the principle of free movement of people, services, goods and capital with no internal borders. This made immigration to each member state of interest for other member states as well and resulted in a growing acceptance that EU should have some regulatory power. In the late 1980s, attention was directed towards South European states because these countries now experienced pressures at their external borders.

After the Schengen agreement about abolition of internal borders was made part of the EU, member states accepted that a more common policy towards extra EU immigrants should compensate for the removal of internal borders, with some soft harmonisation of visa policy and asylum laws. Member countries, which were not at the edge of the EU, made a more restrictive control policy an EU issue, and gradually this developed into a broader perspective on the relationship between immigration and integration, labour markets and welfare arrangements. From around 2000, the Commission took a more active role within decision-making on migration and asylum. The Commission's Directorate-General for Freedom, Security and Justice (DGFSJ) became an actor in migration and asylum policy.

The *Treaty of Maastricht* in 1992 was a significant step in the development of a normative framework for the EU. The same year, the umbrella organization of Christian democratic and conservative parties – *The European People's Party* – had adopted a platform with key Catholic and Christian democratic concepts such as freedom and responsibility, justice, subsidiarity and solidarity. It criticised neoliberalism, because neoliberalism ignored the social dimensions of the free market (Stjernø, 2004, 2011). The treaty reflected some of these values, as it declared the ambition to reconcile non-inflationary economic growth and convergence of economic performance on the one hand with high level of employment and social protection and social cohesion on the other hand (Title II, Article G2). The subsidiarity principle was redefined. Vocational training, education and employment should now be a

common responsibility for the EU and the member states and no longer be entrusted to national governments alone. EU institutions should play an active role in the forming of a skilled labour force and labour market policy in general. Vocational training was important because it could facilitate mobility and integration into the labour market (Article 127). With the treaty, the member states committed themselves to intergovernmental collaboration in these areas.

The governance of immigration policy was changed. National governments largely preserved their authority in the area of immigration and asylum (Geddes, 2008), but the role of the EU was strengthened, as the Council could now adopt joint decisions and actions in immigration policy with a qualified majority instead of requiring unanimity. The treaty devoted several articles to immigration control – rules of asylum and family reunion, border control and illegal immigration. However, it said nothing about integration of immigrants (Title VI, Article K.1).

In this high-level document, two dual tracks were developed in the years to come. First, a normative framework was established. Here, social cohesion is found together with other key concepts such as social inclusion, solidarity and justice. These concepts were combined with the economic instrumental idea of social investment – that investing in training and education would contribute to economic growth and employment. Second, in the years to come, the EU went on developing a dual structure of governance in the fields of labour market policy and in immigration with shared responsibility between the EU and national governments.

The idea of a social investment policy matured gradually in Europe from the 1990s (Morel, Palier & Palme, 2011). In the preceding years, a frequent diagnosis of Europe had been that Europe was suffering from ‘euro sclerosis,’ with low job growth and long term mass unemployment. Allegedly, this was due to rigidity in the labour market and general economic stagnation. In the *European Employment Strategy* (EES), which gradually developed from 1994, a key idea was that investing in people were crucial both to Europe’s place in the knowledge economy and to combat unemployment, poverty and social exclusion. Other key ideas were an active labour market policy with investments in workers’ skills and competencies, vocational training for the young and life-long learning, flexible working time, wage restraint, and reducing labour costs.

As discussed in chapter 1 the idea of social investment came to denote a policy that aimed at making people employable by increasing their skills and competencies, which could

assist EU-countries to meet challenges from increasing globalised competition. The common core of different concepts of social investment is that expenditure on kindergarten, education and vocational training are seen as investments in the present and future labour force. Thus, it is not a burden on the economy, but contributes to economic growth. The idea comes in at least two different versions. Gösta Esping-Andersen (2002) presented early papers on social investments - particularly investments in children - for the Commission and later in the book *Why We Need a New Welfare State*. He argued for what can be considered a social democratic version of the idea that social investments could be made without cuts in cash benefits. However, social investments can be included in a more neoliberal approach as well – social investments combined with cuts in cash transfers and emphasis on flexibility of work contracts. This represents a modification of neoliberalism (Hemerijck, 2011; Jenson, 2011). It shares with neoliberalism a focus on the supply of labour. However, it differs from neoliberalism because it does not consider social policy a burden on the economy and does not share neoliberals' negative attitudes to government responsibility and activity. This ambiguity of the concept makes it a flexible concept that makes it possible for governments and EU institutions to drift from one of these meanings above to the other.

The Amsterdam Treaty in 1997 made employment policy a more prominent issue for the EU. It authorised the Commission to take an active role in employment policy and declared that the activities of the Community should include a coordinated strategy for employment (Article 3i), and the promotion of a 'skilled, trained and adaptable workforce' (Article 109n). The treaty represented another step in the development of EU immigration policy by following up articles in the Maastricht Treaty. Control policy and rules for asylum and family reunion were still dominating issues, but now immigrants' rights and minimum standards for asylum seekers and for temporary protection (Article 73k) were emphasised as well. Labour migration and the integration of labour migrants were not yet themes.

In the years to come, recognition grew that neoliberal promises had not been met, and centre-left parties were gaining electoral success. Social democratic politicians believed that European the welfare state had to be transformed from transferring cash benefits to social investments in human capital – reconciling economic efficiency and solidarity (Hemerijck, 2013).

After the approval of the Amsterdam Treaty, EU institutions devoted more attention to economic and political integration of immigrants. The European Council followed up at a meeting in Tampere, Finland, two years later, and called for common European measures in

both control policy and in integration policy. These should include asylum, fair treatment of immigrants, more equal rights between immigrants and EU citizens, measures to fight racism and xenophobia (Geddes, 2008; Kicing, 2013).

The Lisbon European Council in 2000 declared the ambition to make Europe the most competitive and knowledge based economy in the world. In *The Lisbon Strategy*, social investment was a key idea together with *social cohesion* – a concept that has no important role in neoliberal ideology. More and better jobs should go together with social cohesion (de la Porte and Jacobsson, 2011). The EU introduced the Blue Card as a means to attract highly qualified migrants. Later, a Council directive (2009/50 EC) facilitated admissions for qualified persons by harmonising entry and residence conditions and improve the legal status of those already in the EU (European Council, 2009).

Gradually, the attention was widened from employment for young persons to the unemployed in general. Finally, immigrants came on the list of target groups for social investment (de la Porte and Jacobsson, 2011). In 2001, the *Treaty of Nice* stated that EU institutions might promote the integration of immigrants residing legally in a member state. The Union should “support and complement the Member States” in “conditions of employment for third-country nationals legally residing in the Union territory,” in combating social exclusion and in integrating persons excluded from the labour market (Article 137). All these treaties are high-level documents reflecting that integration of immigrants in the labour market was a growing concern for the EU. In the succeeding years, the EU budget allocated financial resources for promoting the integration of immigrants.

The *Justice and Home Affairs Council* – the ministers of the member states for these affairs - adopted the high-level text *Common Basic Principles for Immigrant Policy Integration*, which should form the further foundation of EU initiatives in the field of integration. Here, integration was defined as “a two-way process of mutual accommodation” by immigrants and resident members of member states.” Employment and education were seen as critical factors for integration (European Commission, 2004).

As part of implementing these policies, the Directorate-General for Freedom, Security and Justice published *The Handbook on Integration for Policy-Makers and Practitioners*. Here, we find a fully developed idea of social investments in immigrants. The handbook referred to human rights standards and to values that the EU had declared as basic – equality, anti-discrimination, solidarity and participation, and tolerance. First, introduction programmes should improve immigrants’ linguistic skills, labour market skills and knowledge about

culture and society (Chapter 1). Second, inter-religious dialogues, local electoral rights, and participation in consultative bodies should strengthen immigrant participation in civil society. Third, authorities should develop indicators of economic and political integrations (employment, voting, etc.) which could function as comparative benchmarks (DGJFS, 2005).

In the succeeding years, EU institutions adopted a range of documents and acts concerning integration of immigrants. *The Treaty of Lisbon* in 2007 elaborated on the normative framework of the EU, referring to universal values of rights of the human person, non-discrimination, tolerance, solidarity and equality between men and women. The internal market should be a social competitive market economy based on balanced economic growth, price stability, with full employment and high level of social protection (Article 1a and Article 2). Here, all the positive concepts in Christian democratic ideology were present. In sum, this vocabulary is clearly distinguishable from neoliberal language and has more in common with social democratic language. Besides, the treaty strengthened EU's role in immigration control with common rules and systems for the admission of immigrants. These documents and acts constitute a normative framework for integration with participation, management of diversity, social inclusion, and education as key concepts.

In 2008, the Council adopted the *European Pact on Immigration and Asylum*. Although illegal immigration and border control were predominant themes, the pact was innovative. It stated that immigrants might contribute decisively to economic growth in member states because of the state of their labour markets and the aging of the population. It stated bluntly that 'zero immigration is both unrealistic and dangerous', and that a common EU immigration policy was needed. Member states should 'establish ambitious policies to promote the harmonious integration in their host countries of immigrants who are likely to settle permanently' (for an analysis of EU's role in migration and asylum policy, see Boswell & Geddes, 2011).

The Commission started publishing annual reports on immigration and asylum in 2009. The first report was mainly about linking skills of legal and highly qualified immigrants and EU labour need; restricting illegal immigration and strengthen border control, and a growing concern about the effect of the economic crisis on immigrants (European Commission, 2009). Young people with a migrant background are at greater risk of dropping out from school than others, and their risk of poverty or exclusion remains higher than the overall EU population (European Commission, 2013). During the economic crisis from 2008 to 2012 immigrants' employment rate fell.

In the Commission's document *Europe 2020. A strategy for smart, sustainable and inclusive growth* (European Commission, 2010), the term social investment is not present, but the idea certainly is. The Commission called for an agenda for 'new skills and jobs to modernise the labour markets and empower people by developing their skills throughout the lifecycle'. Growth should be inclusive and be based on the values of solidarity and social cohesion. Among the new ambitious goals were that by 2020, 20 million less people should be at risk of poverty 75 per cent of the populations should be employed; and the share of early school leavers be less than 10 per cent.

At least from 2009 – 2010, we may say that social investment is a key idea in EU policy documents at all levels, and that this idea is entrenched in a normative framework with social inclusion, integration and solidarity as basic concepts. In the present *Consolidated Treaties*, several articles underline the importance of investing in the labour force. The significance of vocational training and retraining in order to "facilitate vocational integration and reintegration in the labour market" (p. 121) is emphasised, but investing in immigrants is not a theme (Article 166) (European Union, 2010).

This high-level document does not pay much attention to immigrants and the integration of immigrants in the labour market, except for a few statements. The Union shall develop a common immigration policy, fair treatment of immigrants residing legally in member states and combat illegal immigration (Article 71.1). It shall complement the Member States in creating 'conditions of employment for immigrants,' in combating social exclusion and in the integration of persons excluded from the labour market' (Article 153). In the area of immigration policy, as in labour market policy and social policy, the text balances carefully between the subsidiarity principle and creating space for EU-initiatives and excludes 'any harmonisation of the laws and regulations' (Article 79.4).

INTEGRATION, RIGHTS AND DUTIES

As the number of migrants and refugees has increased, integration policy has gradually become a more important concern for the EU. However, the long-term tendency is that immigration from countries outside Europe has become more disputed. Right wing anti-immigration parties have gained increased support and influence in many member states. Politicians declare that multiculturalism has been a failure, and governments have introduced measures to restrict family reunion by income test and language tests.

In this change of political climate, from the 1990s a growing number of countries have established courses in language training and about the history, culture and political system. In

some countries, such courses were the result of initiatives from far right populist parties and/or conservative parties (Perchinig, 2012). Today, many member states have introduced such programmes with varying content and organization, in some countries voluntary and in other mandatory.

EU policies reflected this development. *The Handbook of Integration* argued for introduction courses for improving immigrants' linguistics skills and knowledge about culture and society. EU's programme 'Solidarity and Management of Migration Flows' (2007 – 2013) established a *European Fund for the integration of third-country nationals*. Here, introduction programmes and actions for specific immigrant groups were prioritised. Another priority was to improve the integration of immigrants in 'societies, values and ways of life of member states' (European Commission, 2011b). The *European Pact on Immigration and Asylum* of 2008 stated that immigrants should respect EU values, such as human rights, tolerance, equality of men and women, and compulsory schooling for children. The Pact called for a balance between migrants' rights (to education, work, security, and public and social services) and duties (compliance with the host country's laws) (Council of the European Union, 2008).

For the period 2014 – 2020, the EU has established the *Asylum, Migration and Integration Fund (AMIF)* with an amount of EUR 3.137 billions. These resources shall be spent on developing a *Common European Asylum System*. Illegal immigration shall be combatted, and member states that receive more immigrants than other member states shall be assisted. Legal immigration to member states in line with labour market needs and promoting the effective integration of immigrants shall receive financial support.

It is difficult to assess to what extent these programmes may be regarded as social investments. Language training certainly is a way of investing in the integration of immigrants in the labour market. On the other hand, these programmes can be considered as 'aggressive integrationism'. Immigrants are accepted only if they accept the values of the host country and take part in courses to prove their motivation in this respect (Triadafilopoulos, 2011). These texts do not say much about reciprocal accommodation – cf. about *Common Basic Principles for Immigrant Policy Integration* above.

SOCIAL INVESTMENTS FROM DECLARATIONS TO IMPLEMENTATION?

To what extent has the increasing emphasis in EU documents on social investments resulted in prioritising economic resources for investing in immigrants?

Despite the ambitious rhetoric in key EU documents, analysts have not been able to track a significant change in EU-policies towards social investments in the years before the financial crisis. Analyses on social expenditure from 1980 to 2007 have concluded that the share of GDP for education and active labour market policy decreased, and that resources for activation schemes hardly are in line with the idea of social investment (Jenson, 2011; de la Porte and Jacobsson, 2011). On the other hand, the share of GDP for family policy increased (Jenson, 2011). Within the EU/EEA, Denmark, Sweden, Belgium, France, Norway, UK, Ireland, and Hungary could be regarded as most social investment oriented, whereas Switzerland, Germany, and countries in Eastern and Southern Europe are least investment oriented (Nikolai, 2011). According to Hemerijck (2013) - a key analyst and advocate for the social investment approach - the Nordic welfare states come closest to having developed a comprehensive social investment policy.

Whereas unemployment rates increased during the financial crisis, most EU countries did not spend a greater share of the GDP on active labour market programmes in 2011/2012 than in 2005 (OECD, 2015). The share of GDP spent on education fell every year from 2009 to 2012 in most countries (Eurostat, 2012). However, according the OECD Social Expenditure Database investing in families became somewhat more highly prioritized in some EU-countries during the year of crisis (OECD, 2015). Altogether, it is difficult to trace a significant change in the direction of social investment policy in member states.

The European Social Fund

The European Social Fund (ESF) ‘works by investing in Europe’s human capital – its workers, young people and all those seeking a job’ (European Commission, 2015a). It co-finances projects in member states to increase workers’ employability by giving them new skills or training, helping young people make the transition from school to work and assisting, disadvantaged groups to find a job and integrate them in society. It contributes to projects with 15 million participants in the member states. Although it is difficult to assess the reliability of data in the ESF project database (ESF, 2014b), table 2 indicates that immigrants have not been a major target group for the fund’s social investments.

TABLE 2 APPROXIMATELY HERE

From 2000 to 2008, the ESF co-financed 1408 projects with migrants as a target group. This is not a small number, but projects targeting migrants constituted only four per

cent of the total number of projects, which indicates that investing in migrants was not a *highly* prioritized goal. The share of such projects is particularly low in priority areas that typically indicate social investments - such as developing skills, education and lifelong learning. In the next four years, the projects targeting immigrants constituted approximately the same share of ESF-financed projects on employment, mobility, education and social integration as in the previous period. Besides, immigrants were one of several target groups in another six per cent of the projects. This does not mean that immigrants did not take part in other projects, but project descriptions did not mention immigrants (author's analysis based on presentation of projects on the ESF website).

EU ambitions on social investments and integration 2012-2020

EU's ambition for the period 2012 to 2020 is to reinforce the role of the ESF. The budget shall increase at least by 20 per cent, and resources shall be allocated to social inclusion so that 'people in difficulties and those from disadvantaged groups will get more support to have the same opportunities as others to integrate into society' (ESF, 2014). The Commission's 'Social Investment Package for Growth and Social Cohesion' states that social policy has a productive function. The social investment approach shall be reinforced, with more investments in children, women and gender equality. However, immigrants are not mentioned as a target group (European Commission, 2014b). Neither were immigrants devoted much interest in the working documents on social investments from the ESF and the Commission staff (see European Commission (2015b)). This may indicate that investing in and integrating immigrants has become of less interest for the EU in recent years.

A GAP BETWEEN RETHORIC AND REALITY?

This contribution has demonstrated that the EU has established a normative framework, which with its emphasis on human dignity, social cohesion and solidarity is distinguishable from neoliberalism. These normative values go together with an economic theory in which market competition, knowledge economy, human capital and social investments are key concepts. This idea of social investment has become firmly established as a core idea in EU documents at all levels – from high-level treaties, commission directives and other texts (medium level), and policy documents from commission staff and the Committee for Justice and Internal Affairs (low level). Thus, at the rhetoric level the EU has a consistent policy for social investments. This applies to immigrants as well, although to a weaker degree. Immigrants came later than other groups on the list of the groups targeted for social investments, and in

only the last decade immigrants have been on the list of groups worthwhile investing in. However, immigrants are not on the list of target groups in the most recent policy documents.

It is difficult to assess the degree to which the presence of social investment in policy documents has resulted in practical politics. A complete picture of social investments in immigrants should include activities in the member countries. Unfortunately, no comparative data exist that make this possible. The analysis of European Social Fund projects demonstrates that immigrants are a target group for investments, but only to a weak degree. Children, youth and gender issues have had a higher priority than immigrants have. In action plans for the years to come, investing in immigrants has even a less prominent place than before. The historians Schulz-Forberg and Stråth (2010) conclude that there is a gap between what the EU declares about European integration and its institutional capacity to follow up what is mapped out by language. As we have seen, this is the case for investing in immigrants as well (see also Stjernø, 2015).

Before discussing some probable reasons for this gap, it should be mentioned that some authors argue that that social investments may result in more inequality and poverty. If resources to programmes of social protection with a strong distributive effect – as unemployment benefits and health care – are transferred to programmes with a weaker distributive effect – as education, this could increase poverty. Investing in kindergarten could have the same effect if middle class women find work, but not women with lower education. Thus, we cannot take for granted that social investments result in stronger social inclusion and cohesion and that it contribute to solidarity and justice, as many EU-documents tend to suppose (Cantillon, 2011; Vandenbroucke and Vleminckx, 2011).

A reason first for the observed contrast between rhetoric and reality in the field of immigration could be the type of governance in this area. National governments and the EU share responsibility for immigration policy and labour market policy. Coordination of EU policy takes place partly at the ministerial level, and partly through soft governance – the *open method of coordination*. The Commission and EU countries in partnership set the priorities and decide how the ESF shall spend its resources, which probably is one of the reasons that activities increasing immigrants' skills vary strongly between countries.

Another and probably more important reason is that the financial aspects of investing in immigrants is controversial among economists. OECD concludes that immigration has boosted the working-age population and accounted for 70 per cent of the increase of the workforce in Europe in the last ten years. Migrants fill jobs that natives are not willing to

accept and increase the flexibility in the labour market. Migrants contribute to government income, but employment determines their fiscal contribution. Research concludes that the fiscal impact of migration in European OECD countries, Australia, Canada and the US in the past 50 years is close to zero. Hence, immigration is neither a burden nor a blessing for public finances (OECD, 2014).

The financial crisis limited the economic and political leeway for social investment policies and was a serious blow to the ambitions of the Lisbon strategy. German requirements for budgetary balance and reduced public debts resulted in austerity politics in crisis-ridden member states, as Ireland and in Southern Europe. These states could not as before the introduction of the Euro, resort to Keynesian deficit budgeting or to devaluing their currency, but had to cut their budgets and expenditure for both consumption and investments. In the last years, we have witnessed a tug of war between a German lead group of member states demanding that member states should stick to budgets within EU parameters, whereas other member states - particularly Southern member states - require financial slack and the possibility to stimulate economic growth by investing in people, research, education and infrastructure. Thus, it should not come as a surprise that investing in immigrants was not a prioritized issue.

A fourth reason for the low priority on investing in immigrants is that immigration is controversial among citizens of member state as well. In both 2008, 2012 and 2014 *European Social Survey* (ESS, 2016) includes data about citizens' opinion of whether immigration is good or bad for the country's economy. People were asked to express their opinion on a scale from 0 ('bad for the economy') to 10 ('good for the economy'). Unfortunately data from the 2014-survey were not yet available from many countries in Southern and Eastern Europe countries at the time of writing.

TABLE 3 APPROXIMATELY HERE

Surprisingly, the economic crisis from 2008 does not seem to have had a strong impact on the opinion about the economic effects of immigration. In most of the EU countries that participated in the ESS in both 2008 and 2012, the mean score remained stable. It became slightly more negative in six countries – particularly in France, Portugal and Slovakia. On the other hand, it became more positive in three – Germany, Hungary and Estonia. The more

positive attitudes in Germany should not be surprising, because unemployment decreased and it was a strong demand for labour in these years.

Generally, the attitudes in EU member states to the economic consequences of immigration are mixed or negative. In 2014, only in Germany, Sweden and Finland attitudes were generally positive to the economic effects of immigration (scored above 5.0 on the scale 0-10). Only in these countries, the share with a positive attitude to the economic effects of immigration was greater than the share of those with an opposite opinion (table not shown). In France, Belgium, the Czech Republic and Slovenia opinions were more negative. In the Netherlands, Poland and Denmark approximately the same share tend to be negative and positive. Thus, the economic effects of immigration are controversial not only among economists, but among people in member states as well.

Voter attitudes are not automatically transformed into political influence. In the election to the European Parliament in 2014, far right parties with hostile attitudes to immigration increased their support in some countries - Austria, UK, France, Greece, and in Scandinavian countries, but this did not happen in other countries (Halikiopolou and Vasilipoulou, 2014). It remains to be seen to which extent the increased support of these parties will influence EU immigration policy.

Finally, the refugee crisis from 2014-2015 has made it more challenging for governments spending resources on immigrants. The massive influx from far away countries has further increased the efforts to regain control over common borders and eclipsed integration policy. At the time of writing, national governments and the EU have not agreed upon how to re-establish border control, and disagreements about to what extent and how to receive immigrants are increasing – both within and between European countries. Both strengthening border control and accommodation of refugees will require large financial resources. In this situation, it is a danger that national governments and EU institutions will neglect or not sufficiently prioritise investing in the human capital of immigrants and thereby making immigrants a permanent underclass in or outside the labour market.

REFERENCES

- Boswell, C. and A. Geddes (2011). *Migration and mobility in the European Union*. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Cantillon, B. (2011). 'The paradox of the social investment state: growth, employment and poverty in the Lisbon era.' *Journal of European Public Policy* 21 (5), pp. 432-449.
- Council of the European Union (2008). European Pact on Immigration and Asylum. 13189/05 ASIM 68. Brussels, Council of the European Union.
- de la Porte, C. and K. Jacobsson (2011). 'Social investment or recommodification. Assessing the employment policies of the EU member states.' In N. Morel, B. Palier and J. Palme (Eds.), *Towards a social investment welfare state? Ideas, Policies and Challenges*. Bristol: The Policy Press, pp. 117-149.
- DGJFS (2005). Handbook on Integration. For policymakers and practitioners. Brussels, Directorate-General Justice, Freedom and Security/The European Commission. http://ec.europa.eu/ewsi/UDRW/images/items/docl_1212_616852085.pdf. Accessed 10.01 2015
- ESF (2014). European Social Fund 2014-2020, European Commission. <http://ec.europa.eu/esf/main.jsp?catId=62&langId=en>. Accessed 13.02 2015
- ESF (2015). European Social Fund database. <http://ec.europa.eu/esf/main.jsp?catId=46&langId=en>. Accessed 13.02 2015
- Esping-Andersen, G. (2002). 'Towards the Good Society, Once again.' In G. Esping-Andersen (ed.), *Why we need a New Welfare State*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 1-25.
- European Commission (2010) Europe 2020. A strategy for smart, sustainable and inclusive growth (2010). Communication from the Commission. Brussels, 3.3 2010. Com

(2010) 2020 final.

<http://ec.europa.eu/eu2020/pdf/COMPLET%20EN%20BARROSO%20%20%200007%20-%20Europe%202020%20-%20EN%20version.pdf>. 10.12 2015.

European Commission (2004). EU actions to make integration work. Common Basic Principles. Brussels: European Commission.

European Commission (2009). Report from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council. First Annual Report on Immigration and Asylum. Brussels: European Commission.

European Commission (2011b). Report from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions on the results achieved and on qualitative and quantitative aspects of implementation of the European Fund for the Integration of third-country nationals for the period 2007-2009. Brussels: European Commission.

European Commission (2013). Social Investment Package. Key facts and figures. Brussels: European Commission. Employment, Social Affairs and Inclusion.

European Commission (2014b). Policy Roadmap for the 2014 Implementation of the Social Investment Package. September 2014 version. Brussels, European Commission. Employment, Social Affairs and Inclusion. Brussels: The European Commission.

European Commission (2015a). What is the ESF? Brussels: The European Commission.

European Commission (2015b). Social investment: Commission urges member states to focus on growth and social cohesion. Brussels: The European Commission.

European Council (2009). Entry and residence of highly qualified workers (EU Blue Card), EUR-Lex - 114573 - EN - EUR-LEX.

European Union (2010). Consolidated Treaties. Charter of Fundamental Rights. Luxembourg: Publications of the European Union.

Eurostat (2011). Migrants in Europe. A statistical portrait of the first and second generation. Luxembourg, Eurostat. <http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/documents/3217494/5727749/KS-31-10-539-EN.PDF/bcf27a60-7016-4fec-98c5-e8488491ebbd>. Accessed 19.01 2015

Eurostat (2012). Government expenditure on education - 2012 results. Eurostat. http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php/Government_expenditure_on_education_-_2012_results. 17.02 2015

Eurostat (2014). Asylum statistics. From Statistics Explained. Data from July 2014.

- ESS (2016). European Social Survey 2008, 2012, 2014.
<http://www.europeansocialsurvey.org/>. 15.06 2016.
- Geddes, A. (2008). *Immigration and the European Integration. Beyond Fortress Europe?* Manchester: Manchester University Press.
- Halikiopolou, D. and S. Vasilipoulou (2014). 'Support for the Far Right in the 2014 European Parliament Elections: A Comparative Perspective.' *The Political Quarterly* 85 (3), pp. 285 - 288.
- Hemerijck, A. (2011). 'Two or three waves of welfare state transformation?' In N. Morel, B. Palier and J. Palme (Eds.), *Towards a social investment welfare state? Ideas, Policies and Challenges*. Bristol, The Policy Press, pp. 33-60.
- Hejmerick, A. (2013). *Changing Welfare States*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Jenson, J. (2011). 'Redesigning citizenship regimes after neoliberalism: moving towards social investment.' In N. Morel, B. Palier and J. Palme (Eds.), *Towards a social investment welfare state? Ideas, Policies and Challenges*. Bristol: The Policy Press: 61-87.
- Kicinger, A. (2013). Migration Policy from the European Perspective: A Primer for Forecasters. In M. Kupiszewski (Ed.), *International Migration and the Future of Populations and Labour Force Resources in Europe*. Dordrecht: Springer, pp. 7-34.
- Morel, N., B. Palier and J. Palme (2011). Beyond the welfare state as we knew it? In N. Morel, B. Palier and J. Palme. *Towards a social investment welfare state? Ideas, Policies and Challenges*. Bristol: The Policy Press, pp. 1-30.
- Nikolai, R. (2011). 'Towards social investment? Patterns of public policy in the OECD world.' In N. Morel, B. Palier and J. Palme. *Towards a social investment welfare state? Ideas, Policies and Challenges*. Bristol: The Policy Press: 91-116.
- OECD (2014). Is migration good for the economy? *Migration Policy Debates*, May, 2014.
 OECD
<http://www.oecd.org/migration/mig/OECD%20Migration%20Policy%20Debates%20Numero%202.pdf>. Accessed 20.01 2015
- OECD. (2015). "Social Expenditure database."
http://stats.oecd.org/Index.aspx?datasetcode=SOCX_AGG#. Accessed March 5, 2015,
- Perchinig, B. (2012). The National Policy Frames for the Integration of Newcomers. Comparative Report. WP 2. PROSINT Promoting Policies for Integration.
<http://research.icmpd.org/1429.html>. Accessed March 16 2015

- Sculz-Forberg, H. and B. Stråth (2010). *The Political History of European Integration*. London and New York: Routledge.
- Stjernø, S. (2004). *Solidarity in Europe. The History of an Idea*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Stjernø, S. (2011). 'The idea of solidarity in Europe.' *European Journal of Social Law* (3), pp. 156-176.
- Stjernø, S. (2015). 'Solidarity Beyond Europe?' In J. Salomon (Ed.). *Solidarity Beyond Borders*. Londo: Bloomsbury, pp. 1-26.
- Triadafilopoulos, T. (2011). 'Illiberal Means to Liberal Ends? Understanding Recent Immigrant Policies in Europe.' *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies* 37 (6), pp. 861-880.
- Vandenbroucke, F. and K. Vleminckx (2011). 'Disappointing poverty trends: is the social investment state to blame?' *Journal of European Social Policy* 21 (5), pp. 450-471.

Table 1 Immigrants and asylum seekers to EU and member states. 2012 – 2015.

	Born in a non-member country 2012 (1000)	Foreign-born population (% of total population) 2013	Asylum applicants. Total numbers.	
			2014	2015
Total EU		-	626 960	1321600
Belgium	737	15.5	22 710	44 630
Bulgaria	52	-	11 080	20 365
Czech Republic	154	7.1	1 145	1 515
Denmark	200	8.5	1 460	20 935
Germany	2318	12.8	202 645	476 510
Estonia	14	10.1	155	230
Ireland	183	16.4	1 450	-
Greece	415	6.6	9 430	-
Spain	1889	13.4	5 615	-
France	1566	11.9	64 310	-
Croatia	65	-	450	210
Italy	2269	9.4	64 085	84 085
Cyprus	66	-	1745	-
Latvia	27	-	375	330
Lithuania	26	-	440	315
Luxembourg	53	43.7	1 150	-
Hungary	153	4.3	42 775	177 135
Malta	31		1 350	-
Netherlands	503	11.6	24 495	44 970
Austria	340	16.2	28 035	-
Poland	574	1.8	8 020	12 190
Portugal	42	8.3	440	-
Romania	268	-	1 545	-
Slovenia	110	16.1	385	275
Slovakia	8	3.2	330	-
Finland	137	5.6	3 620	32 345
Sweden	622	16.0	81 180	162 450
UK	2767	12.3	32 785	38 800

Retrieved from

<http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/tgm/table.do?tab=table&init=1&language=en&pcode=tps00191&plugin=1>. OECD International migration policies and data <http://www.oecd.org/els/mig/keystat.htm>. [Share of total population for France and Italy from 2012 and Poland and Portugal 2011.](#)

Table 2. European Social Fund. Projects 2000 – 2008 total number and projects with migrants as a target group.

ESF priority area	Total number of projects	Number of projects with migrants as a target group	Per cent with migrants as a target group
All priority areas	34272	1408	4.1
Increasing migrants' participation in employment	554	500	90
Integration of disadvantaged people into employment	4924	378	7.6
Improving equal access to employment	1540	104	6,8
Active and preventive measures to support employment	4542	136	3,0
Develop lifelong learning	1012	26	2,6
Promoting education and training throughout working life	2374	54	2.3
Employment and training support for workers and companies	5651	50	0.9

Source: (ESF, 2015)

Table 3. Share – per cent – who agree that immigration is good for the country's economy. Mean score on a scale 0 = bad – 10=good.

	2008	2012	2014
Germany	5.3	5.8	5,9
Belgium	4.8	4.6	4,9
Netherlands	5.4	5.2	4,9
France	4.9	4.6	4,6
Denmark	5.3	5.1	4,9
Finland	5.5	5.5	5,3
Sweden	5.5	5.6	5,8
UK	4.7	4.5	4,8
Ireland	5.0	4.9	5,0
Poland	5.5	5.5	4,9
Lithuania	-	5.3	5,2
Latvia	4.1	-	-
Estonia	4.5	4.9	4,9
Czech Republic	4.2	4.0	3,7
Slovakia	4.3	3.9	-
Hungary	3.5	4.1	3,6
Slovenia	4.4	4.5	4,0
Romania	5.4	-	-
Croatia	4.3	-	-
Bulgaria	5.2	5.0	-
Italia	-	5.2	-
Spain	5.2	5.2	5,0
Portugal	5.0	4.3	5,0
Greece	3.5	-	-
Cyprus	-	3.0	-

Source: European Social Survey 2008, 2012, 2014.

FINAL - Revised by Espen Dahl June 13, 2016

References and citations checked ACW July 11, 2016